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Abstract 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is playing an increasingly important role in 
the economies of many less industrialised countries. The Caribbean, specifically 
Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago are excellent examples of this phenomenon. 
The increased dependence of these countries on FDI calls to question the 
attractiveness of their business environment to the foreign investor. This study aims to 
provide answers to this research question. To this end, it examines the factors that 
influence the motivations, locational choices and market entry mode of multinational 
enterprises making investment in these three countries. This study also seeks to 
ascertain the extent to which these factors are influenced by the timing of the 
investment decision, the type of FDI (market-seeking, resource-seeking and export- 
seeking) and the country of origin of the investor. It is also concerned with the factors 
that influence the initial investment decision as well as the decision to continue 
operations in the countries. 
Fourteen hypotheses were advanced from the International Business literature. 
A triangulation approach to research methodology was employed in the study. The 
hypotheses were initially tested by means of a mailed questionnaire survey which was 
administered to 299 executives of multinational enterprises that operate in the three 
Caribbean countries. The hypotheses were further tested using the qualitative method 
of a case study approach. Twelve core cases of multinational enterprises operating in 
the export sectors of the three Caribbean countries were analysed. 
This study demonstrated the non-applicability of several of the FDI theories to 
the realities of small, developing economies. These theories were developed largely to 
explain the behaviour of firms originating in industrialised countries and making 
investments in these countries. Hence, several did not seem to fully explain the FDI 
process undertaken in the Caribbean. One notable exception was that of the "Double 
Diamond" model. The study showed that the "Double Diamond" model is a powerful 
framework for analysing the business environments of the three Caribbean countries 
studied. 
This study also illustrated the importance of government implementing 
strategies to ensure that the business environment is supportive of the foreign investor. 
Further, the study suggests that investments need to be made in human resource 
development, and institutional and infrastructural improvements. It also revealed that 
the investment incentive package needs to be revised and a nexus created between the 
government and the foreign investor. Finally, the study suggests that support needs to 
be given for the development of the locally owned firm. 
X 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Since the mid 1980s, there has been a resurgence of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), directed by the multinational enterprise (NINE), into the economies of the 
developing world. Indeed, the annual growth rates of FDI inflows into this region 
averaged 22 per cent during the 1985-1989 period compared to a mere 3 per cent in 
the 1980 to 1984 period and 13 per cent during the 1975-1979 period [UNCTAD 
1991: 9]. This growth in FDI inflows continued unabatedly into the 1990s with total 
FDI flows into the developing world soaring to a record level of US$ 100 billion in 
1995 [UNCTAD 1996: 3]. 
The majority of these flows has been concentrated in two regions: (1) South, 
East and South-East Asia, and (2) Latin America and the Caribbean. These regions are 
the largest developing-country recipients of FDI. During the years 1986-1990, they 
accounted for approximately 86 per cent of the total developing-country FDI inflows 
[UNCTAD 1994a: Table 11.10,59]. It is noteworthy that most of the FDI going into 
these regions is received by several core countries. China has been the principal driver 
in the foreign investment boom in the South, East and South-East Asia region, 
accounting for 58 per cent of the flows in 1995. Similarly, it is three countries - 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico - which are members of the Associacion Latinomerican 
1 
de Integracion (ALADI 1) that receive the majority of FDI inflows in the Latin 
America and Caribbean region. These three countries accounted for 68 per cent and 70 
per cent of the region's FDI inflows during the years, 1990-1991 and 1995, 
respectively [UNCTAD 1994b: Table VII, 27; UNCTAD 1996: Annex Table 1,228- 
229]. 
Interestingly enough, it is the smaller and less industrialised countries, which 
receive less flows of FDI, that appear to be more dependent on these inflows. The 
Latin America and Caribbean region is an excellent example of this phenomenon. 
During the years 1990 to 1991, FDI inflows contributed to approximately 7 per cent 
of the gross domestic capital formation for the countries of the ALADI, 5 per cent for 
the Central American region and an astonishing 11 per cent for the Caribbean region 
[ibid., 32]. Indeed, the Caribbean region has become increasingly dependent on FDI 
for the financing of its domestic investment. This dependence is clearly seen among 
several of the larger economies of the region. During the five-year period, 1984 to 
1989, FDI contributed a mere 3 per cent of Barbados' gross fixed capital formation. 
However, by 1994, this figure rose to 5 per cent. In Jamaica, the figure was 2 per cent 
for the 1984 to 1989 period, but increased dramatically to 11 per cent by 1994. In 
Trinidad-Tobago, this increase was even more striking, with the ratio of FDI to gross 
fixed capital formation climbing from 6 per cent in the 1984 to 1989 period, to an 
astonishing 79 per cent by 1994. It is significant to note that the values recorded for 
these Caribbean countries exceed the aggregate value for developing countries. 
' The members of ALADI are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
2 The countries of the Caribbean region are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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During the years 1984 to 1989, the ratio of FDI inflows to gross fixed capital 
formation for developing countries was an average of 3 per cent. The comparable 
figure for 1994 was 8 per cent [UNCTAD 1996: Annex Table 5,249-255]. 
Evidently, FDI, as directed by the Multinational Enterprise (MNE), is playing 
an increasingly important role in the economic development of the Caribbean region. 
This region is small. The entire English-speaking Caribbean comprises a mere 5.9 
million people [United Nations 1997]. Its economies are monocultural specialising in 
activities that are subjected to the vagaries of the international economy (tourism) or 
ones that have lost their growth dynamics (sugar, bauxite). The region is in economic 
crisis as evidenced by its disappointing economic performance over the last decade 
[Caribbean Commonwealth Secretariat 1988]. Clearly, the renewed inflows of FDI are 
vitally needed in this region. With the recent implementation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the issue of renewed FDI flows into these countries 
has become even more critical. It has been suggested that NAFTA will result in a 
diversion of foreign investment away from low-cost economies, notably the 
Caribbean, into Mexico [UNCTAD 1992: 28; Gill 1993; Rugman and Gestrin 1993: 
186]. 
These issues thus beg the question as to the attractiveness of the business 
environment of the Caribbean to the multinational enterprise. It is this research 
question that this thesis seeks to address. To this end, its objectives are four-fold, viz.: 
1. To examine the motivations for foreign direct investment undertaken in the 
region; 
2. To explore the factors which influence the locational choices of the MNE; 
3. To determine the modality of this investment; and 
3 
4. To distil the policy implications that arise from this analysis to decision makers in 
the Caribbean. 
For almost forty years, researchers have been grappling with issues 
surrounding the phenomenon of the MNE and the factors that influence its behaviour 
in different countries. The early studies conducted on FDI sought to explain the 
factors that influence the initial decision of the firm which was engaged primarily in 
market-seeking FDI in industrialised countries [Hymer 1960,1976; Vernon 1966; 
Kindleberger 1969; Caves 1971,1974; Horst 1972]. Conversely, emphasis was placed 
on the factors which gave rise to the MNE, per se [Buckley and Casson 1976; 
Dunning 1979,1980,1981; Rugman 1980,1981]. Studies also focused on what were 
the locational attractions of both developed and developing countries which induced 
foreign direct investment [Reuber et al. 1973; Agodo 1978; Root and Ahmed 1979; 
Schemider and Frey 1985; Dunning 1988; and Lecraw 1991]. In addition, emphasis 
was placed on the efficacy of a single factor, for example, investment incentives, in 
attracting FDI [Guisinger et al. 1983; Lim 1983; Moody and Wheeler 1991]. 
Alternatively, researchers focused on the factors influencing the MNE's selection of a 
market entry mode [Johanson and Weidersheim 1975; Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 
1990; Oman 1984; Beamish and Banks 1987; Kogut and Singh 1988; Gomes- 
Casseres 1990]. Within the past decade, the rapid growth in export-seeking FDI has 
given rise to studies that have sought to determine the locational factors that influence 
this type of investment [Frobel et al. 1980; Rolfe and White 1992; Rolfe et al. 1993; 
Woodward and Rolfe 1993; Kumar 1994]. 
It is noteworthy that few of these studies examined the foreign direct 
investment undertaken in micro-economies, specifically, the Caribbean. Indeed, most 
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of the studies conducted on FDI in the Caribbean have emerged from the discipline of 
Development Economics. Thus, several inevitably focused on the inequitable 
relationship shared by the MNE and its host country [Mc Intyre and Watson 1970; 
Girvan 1970,1971,1987; Farrell 1979]. Alternatively, a few analysed the efficacy of 
the strategies implemented by these countries to attract FDI [Weiss 1989; Kramer 
1991; Gore 1993]. 
The approach adopted in this study contrasts sharply to those undertaken on 
FDI in the Caribbean. This is a strategy-related study that draws heavily on 
International Business theories. It seeks to integrate three main areas of concern in the 
foreign investment literature. To this end, it attempts to determine the factors that 
influence the motivations, locational choices and market entry mode of MNEs 
operating in the Caribbean. Moreover, this study seeks to ascertain the extent to which 
these factors are influenced by the timing of the investment decision, the type of FDI 
(resource-seeking, market-seeking and export-seeking), the quantum of initial 
investment and the country of origin of the investor. Further, it is concerned with the 
factors that influence the initial investment decision as well as the decision to continue 
operations in the region. 
This study draws heavily on the FDI literature in its attempts at finding 
answers to the research question. Fourteen hypotheses were advanced from the 
literature. A triangulation method was employed in this study. Thus, the fourteen 
hypotheses were initially tested by means of a nine-page mailed questionnaire which 
was administered to 299 executives of MNEs that operate in three Caribbean 
countries: Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago. The results of the mailed 
questionnaire were analysed using chi-square tests. The hypotheses were further tested 
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using a qualitative method. The objectives of using a qualitative methodology were to 
capture the nuances of the MNE's behaviour in the Caribbean and to gain a deeper 
understanding of the process of FDI as it is undertaken in the focus countries. The 
qualitative method used was that of the case study approach. Twelve core cases of 
MNEs operating in the export sectors of the three Caribbean countries were analysed. 
Following this introduction, Chapter two introduces the three focus countries: 
Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago. It profiles the socio-economic and political 
conditions prevailing in these countries. This chapter also attempts to highlight the 
differences in the business environment of these three Caribbean countries to the 
foreign investor. 
Chapters three to five review the literature which is relevant to the 
development of the fourteen hypotheses. Chapter three examines those theories which 
seek to explain the factors motivating a firm to engage in production abroad. Chapter 
four analyses the strands of the FDI literature that attempt to elucidate where a firm is 
likely to locate its production and the factors which influence this decision. Chapter 
five is the last of the literature review chapters. In this chapter, an analysis is 
undertaken of the theories that purport to explain the factors determining an MNE's 
selection of a market entry mode. In all three chapters, special emphasis is placed on 
those theories which focus on the behaviour of the MNE operating in developing 
countries. 
Chapter six discusses the hypotheses that were developed in Chapters two to 
four. In addition, it provides the rationale for the use of a triangulation method in this 
study. This chapter also explains the process by which the MNEs and their 
6 
respondents were selected for both the mailed questionnaire survey and the case 
studies. 
Chapters seven to ten present the findings of the analysis of the research data. 
In chapter seven, the research findings of the quantitative study are analysed and 
interpreted. In addition, it compares the findings of the quantitative study with those 
reported by other researchers. In chapters eight to ten, the hypotheses, which were 
analysed in chapter seven, are further tested using the case study approach. To this 
end, case studies are conducted of a grouping of four firms that operate in the export 
sectors of the three Caribbean countries. Chapter eight is a case study of four MNEs 
that have made investment in Jamaica's apparel sector. In chapter nine, a case study is 
made of four MNEs that operate in the information service industry of Barbados. 
Similarly, chapter ten conducts a case study of seven MNEs engaged in FDI in the 
natural gas sector of Trinidad-Tobago. In this case study, two of the firms examined 
are joint ventures: one of which involves three MNE partners, the other two. In all 
three case studies, the industry selection is explained, case histories for the MNEs are 
presented and the foreign investment decision is analysed. 
Chapter eleven cross-analyses the case study data. In this chapter, the foreign 
investment decisions made by the fifteen MNEs that operate in the focus countries is 
analysed with the aim of identifying patterns of similarities and differences. To this 
end, the factors that influence these firms' motivations for FDI, choice of location and 
selection of market entry mode are analysed across industry and country. 
Chapter twelve is the concluding chapter. In this chapter, a comparison is done 
of both the quantitative and qualitative studies. The objectives of this comparative 
analysis are to increase the generalisability, deepen the understanding, and provide 
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fuller explanations of the factors influencing the foreign investment decisions of the 
MNEs that operate in the three Caribbean countries. In addition, in this chapter, 
policies for the improvements of the business environment of the focus countries are 
articulated. Further, the chapter examines the limitations of the study and identifies 
areas for future research. 
One insight gained from this study is the non-applicability of several of the 
FDI theories to the realities of small, developing economies. These theories have been 
developed largely to explain the behaviour of firms originating from advanced, 
industrialised countries and making investments in these countries. Thus, not 
surprisingly, they do not seem to fully explain the FDI process conducted in small, 
developing countries. For example, the study failed to find support for the 
monopolistic advantage theory postulated by Hymer [1960]. Nonetheless, a few of 
these theories appeared to adequately explain the investment behaviour and corporate 
strategy of the MNE engaging in FDI in the Caribbean. The most notable was the 
"Double Diamond" hypothesis advanced by Rugman and D'Cruz [1993] and Rugman 
and Verbeke [1993]. This study shows that the "Double Diamond" model is a 
powerful framework for analysing the business environment of the three Caribbean 
countries studied. The "Double Diamond" model demonstrated the extent to which the 
focus countries were integrated into the global corporate strategy of the MNEs 
studied. In so doing, it highlighted the deficiencies of the business environment of the 
three countries. 
The study also illustrated the importance of the governments of the focus 
countries aggressively pursuing strategies to ensure that their countries develop a 
business environment that is more supportive of the foreign investor. It seems that the 
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focus countries still offer the MNE what has been termed "basic factors" Porter 
[1990]. These are low-cost, semi-skilled labour and a strategic location. The study 
suggests that investments need to be made in human resource development, 
infrastructural improvements, and the strengthening of the institutional framework for 
industrialisation. Also, it has appears that a nexus needs to be created between the 
foreign investor and the government. Moreover, it seems that the investment incentive 
package needs to be revised. Finally, the study also suggests that support should be 
given for the development of the local firm. 
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Chapter Two 
The Caribbean Host Countries: An Introduction 
2.1 Introduction 
The Caribbean region consists of an archipelago of islands stretching from the 
Southeast tip of Florida along the Caribbean Sea to the mainland of South America, 
where the continental enclaves of Belize, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana form 
the southern part of the region (See Diagram 2.1). The Caribbean consists of sixteen 
independent countries: three French departments, five British colonies in varying 
degrees of autonomy, a US Commonwealth and a US territory, and six semi- 
autonomous members of the Netherlands [Knight and Palmer 1989: 3-4; Kurlansky 
1992: xi-xii]. The focus of this study will be on the English-speaking countries that 
are members of the only operating trade agreement in the region, the Caribbean 
Common Market (CARICOM). The CARICOM countries are the only group that 
approximates a form of unity and co-operation in the region. The members of 
CARICOM are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and 
Trinidad-Tobago. This grouping of English-speaking Caribbean countries is small: 
these territories boast a population of a mere 5.9 million [United Nations 1997]. The 
countries have similar characteristics. They all possess a shared history. 
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England acquired these territories by settlement and conquest between the 
early seventeen and eighteen century. The raison d'etre of these colonies was 
mercantilism - producing raw materials, including sugar for the British and European 
markets. It was argued that sugar production required a large labour force which the 
Amerindian and European immigrant population could not provide. Hence, African 
slaves were brought to work in the plantations of the British West Indies. With the 
emancipation of slavery in 1838, territories such as British Guyana and Trinidad still 
argued the need for an additional labour force. This ushered the advent of East Indian 
and Chinese immigrants to work on the sugar plantations [Knight and Palmer 1989: 6- 
9; Mandle 1989: 234]. Colonisation remained a critical element of the history of these 
territories until 1962 when Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago were granted their 
independence. Today, all of these countries, except for Montserrat (a British colony) 
are independent states. 
It could be argued that these Caribbean countries replaced one colonial master 
for another. These countries are presently within the US sphere of influence. The US 
is their principal export market as well as their main source of imports and foreign 
investment [Worrell 1987: 2]. Moreover, because of their strategic geographical 
location, these countries are also occasionally subjected to US political intervention 
[Knight and Palmer 1989: 2-3]. 
Yet, the legacy of British colonisation still prevails in these territories. This 
can be clearly seen in their social, political and economic institutions. Their political 
systems are modelled on the Westminster system. In addition, their legal systems are 
derived from the English Common law. Moreover, the economic institution of the 
plantation still exists [Mandle 1989]. These countries remain highly dependent on 
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international markets. As noted earlier, they historically produced agricultural 
products for export to developed markets. These markets supplied the goods needed 
for local production and consumption. Unfortunately, the CARICOM countries have 
not yet managed to move fully beyond the confines of history. At present, they 
produce a limited range of goods and services (sugar, bananas, bauxite, oil and 
tourism) for export, generating the foreign exchange needed to supply a wide diversity 
of imports [Worrell 1987: 1-2]. Hence, their economic growth depends crucially on 
exports. Not surprisingly, these countries have highly open and extremely vulnerable 
economies. 
Most of them are classified as middle-income less developed economies by the 
World Bank. They are overshadowed by their Latin American neighbours with whom 
they have been coupled under the World Bank classification. Indeed, economic 
growth rates for the Latin America and Caribbean region during 1993,1994 and 1995 
were a recorded 3.6 per cent, 5.2 per cent and 0.4 per cent, respectively [Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 1996: 68]. The comparable rates 
for the CARICOM Caribbean were -0.6 per cent, 2.1 per cent and 1.3 per cent. 
3 
Moreover, FDI inflows to the Caribbean were considerably less than those to the Latin 
American and Caribbean region as a whole. The Caribbean accounted for a mere 4 per 
cent and 3 per cent of total FDI flows to the region in 1993 and 1994, respectively 
[UNCTAD 1995: 69]. 
It is noteworthy that policy makers in the Caribbean region clearly recognised 
the difficulties that the relative size of these territories posed to their future economic 
3 These statistics were provided by Mr. Osmond Gordon, Programme Manager, Statistics, Caribbean 
Community Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana, interview by author, facsimile, 24 October 1997. 
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development. Thus, attempts were made at economic integration. In July 1973, the 
CARICOM was established. The main objectives of this trade agreement were 
economic integration (involving market integration, co-ordinated production and joint 
actions in extra-regional trade); functional co-operation in areas such as education, 
health, meteorology, transport and labour relations; and the co-ordination of foreign 
policies of member states [Pollard 1996: 86]. 
Despite the attempts at regional integration, CARICOM is presently 
dominated by three core countries. These are Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad- 
Tobago. These three countries accounted for approximately 81 per cent, 78 per cent 
and 85 per cent of intra-regional trade during the years 1991,1992, and 1993, 
respectively. 4 Like their CARICOM partners, these countries are remarkably similar 
in many ways. Their economies are basically monocultural. In Jamaica and Barbados, 
the main export earner is tourism. In Trinidad-Tobago, it is oil. However, these three 
countries differ in terms of the ethnic homogeneity of their population. Jamaica and 
Barbados are relatively ethnically homogeneous societies with the majority of their 
population being of African descent. Trinidad-Tobago is more ethnically diverse. 
Most of its population is of either African or East Indian descent. 
One defining characteristic of these three countries is their heightened concern 
about their ability to attract foreign investment. Indeed, since the late 1980s, these 
three countries have been aggressively attempting to lure the foreign investor. To this 
end, they have instituted various measures to ensure that their business environments 
are internationally competitive. These three countries are the focus of this study. In 
the following sections, a profile of them will be undertaken. 
4 
Ibid. 
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2.2 The Host Countries 
2.2.1 Jamaica 
Geography 
Jamaica is the most northerly island of the Caribbean. It lies in close proximity 
to the US. The country is situated 588 miles south-west of Miami. With an area of 
4,441 square miles, Jamaica is the largest of the three countries studied. 
Economic Performance 
Jamaica is a market-oriented economy that is based on a system of private 
ownership and international trade. Its principal economic activities are tourism, the 
main source of foreign exchange; bauxite/alumina, the second source of foreign 
exchange; manufacturing; and agriculture. In 1994, these sectors accounted for over a 
half of Jamaica's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment, and over seventy- 
five per cent of its foreign exchange earnings [World Bank 1995b: 254]. 
The Jamaican economy has witnessed declining fortunes over the last twenty 
years. Its strong economic performance in the decade immediately preceding its 
independence (1962 to 1972) was reversed in subsequent years. During the years 1973 
to 1987, the economy experienced severe contractions. Indeed, GDP declined by 28 
per cent from 1973 to 1987. Moreover, external debt increased almost four-fold from 
US$ 1,206 million to US$ 4,568 million. It was during this period that the 
government was compelled to approach the international lending agencies for 
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financing. As part of its loan conditions, Jamaica embarked on a series of economic 
reforms. These included devaluation, privatisation, fiscal restraint, and trade and 
exchange rate liberalisation. Economic conditions have improved since the late 1980s. 
Real growth averaged about 6 per cent over 1988-1990, but has since been below 2 
percent (See Diagram 2.2(1)). In addition, since 1993, capital inflows have more than 
tripled (See Diagram 2.2(4)). 
Social Conditions 
Jamaica is the largest country in CARICOM. In 1995, its population was 
approximately 2.5 million. Thirty-two per cent of this population lives below the 
poverty line [ibid., 252]. Indeed, during the years, 1980 to 1985, the top twenty per 
cent of households in Jamaica possessed 47 per cent of the total income. Conversely, 
the bottom twenty per cent of households secured a mere 6 per cent [World Bank 
1996a: 171]. Jamaica also suffers from regional disparities that have resulted in a high 
migration from the rural areas into the capital. These migrants form concentrations of 
the urban unemployed [Worrell 1987: 3]. Over the last seven years, the country's 
unemployment rate has been declining (See Diagram 2.2(3)). It moved from 18.9 per 
cent in 1988 to 15.4 per cent in 1994 [The Planning Institute of Jamaica 1995: iv]. 
Nonetheless, urban poverty and unemployment contribute to the country's serious 
crime problem. There was a total of 780 murders in 1995 alone [ibid., 23.2]. The high 
levels of violence limit the urban poor's accessibility to the public sector services, 
significantly, public transport, thereby restricting their opportunities for economic and 
social mobility. In addition, the incidences of industrial strikes, though high, have 
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been declining over the last few years. Work stoppages fell by 27.4 per cent between 
1994 to 1995 [ibid., 19.1-19.2]. Further, Jamaica's literacy rates are among the lowest 
of the focus countries. Despite universal primary and lower secondary enrolment, 
almost 24 per cent of the population over 15 years old is illiterate [World Bank 1996b: 
249]. 
Receptivity to Foreign Direct Investment 
Over the past thirty years, the Jamaican government has dramatically changed 
its policies towards FDI. Interestingly, these changes mirror the economic conditions 
prevailing in the country. In the pre-1970s period, the government adopted conscious 
policies of attracting foreign investment. Foreign capital, whether attracted by the 
generous investment incentives offered or by the country's resources of bauxite, 
entered Jamaica in the pre-1970 era [Ramsaran 1985: 160]. The years, 1972 to 1980 
saw a dramatic reversal of this policy. The democratic socialism philosophy of the 
then ruling government had as one of its basic tenets, state control over critical sectors 
of the economy. Hence, in certain sectors of the economy, notably utilities, 
communications and mining, the foreign investor was to play a limited role. 
Moreover, its mode of market entry was specified to that of a joint venture [ibid., 
161 ]. Not surprisingly, during this period, there was a decrease in FDI inflows into the 
country. Researchers attribute this decline to the deterioration of the political and 
social climate of the country as well as the seemingly anti-foreign investment posture 
of the ruling government [Ramsaran 1985: 162; Worrell 1987: 42]. Within the last 
seventeen years, there has been a return to the foreign investment policies of the pre- 
1970s period. The foreign investor is now viewed as one of the key elements in the 
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regeneration of the Jamaican economy. Several measures have been adopted to lure 
the foreign investor into Jamaica. These include the removal of all restrictions on 
foreign investment; the elimination of exchange controls; the lowering of tariffs, the 
divestment of state assets to the foreign investor; the creation of export processing 
zones; and the granting of special incentives to operators in these zones. In addition, 
operations of the institutions mandated to stimulate industrial activity in the country 
have been rationalised to increase their efficiency. [Fortune, May 1 1995; Corporate 
Location, July/August 1995]. 
2.2.2 Barbados 
Geography 
Barbados is the most easterly of the Caribbean islands. It lies 270 miles north- 
east of Venezuela, South America and 1200 miles south-east of Miami. The country is 
the smallest of the three studied. It is a mere 166 square miles. 
Economic Performance 
Like Jamaica, Barbados is a market-oriented economy based on private 
ownership and international trade. Its economy is based on four key export sectors: 
tourism which provides the main source of foreign exchange, economic activity and 
employment; offshore financial services, the second principal source of foreign 
exchange and economic activity; agriculture; and manufacturing. In 1994, these 
sectors accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the country's GDP [Central Bank 
of Barbados 1995: Table I 2]. 
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The Barbadian economy is one of the most stable in the Caribbean region. Its 
GNP per capita of US$ 6,560 in 1994 is the one of the highest in the comparative 
grouping of upper-middle-income economies [World Bank 1996b: Tables 1 and 1 a]. 
However, like the other open economies in the region, Barbados is extremely 
vulnerable to vagaries in the international economy. Thus, during the periods, 1973 to 
1974,1981 to 1982, and again in 1990 to 1992, the country experienced economic 
decline (see Diagram 2.3(l)). These were primarily a result of the changes in demand 
for its main exports: tourism, sugar and manufacturing (electronics). The corrective 
actions implemented by the Barbadian government, some of which were put in place 
through a consultative programme with the International Monetary Fund in 1991, 
included the introduction of new export activity, specifically, telecommunications 
services and offshore financial services; a two-year wage freeze in the public and 
private sector; price controls; trade and exchange rate liberalisation; and privatisation. 
In addition, like Jamaica, it rationalised the operations of the institutions responsible 
for promoting investment in the country. Since 1992, the Barbadian economy has 
experienced positive growth rates arising from the successful performance of its new 
export sectors (telecommunications services and offshore financial services) and the 
recovery of the tourist industry (See Diagram 2.3(l)). 
Social Conditions 
Barbados, with a population of 260,000 (1995), is the smallest of the three 
countries studied. However, in 1994, the country ranked first among developing 
countries in the United Nations' Human Development Index which measures 
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education levels, life expectancy and per capita income. Indeed, Barbados' literacy 
rate of 97 per cent is the highest in the region. Moreover, its life expectancy of 75 
years surpasses the regional average of 68 years [World Bank 1996a: 28-29]. Yet, 
Barbados' unemployment levels are among the highest in the region. In 1994, the 
numbers unemployed represented 28.5 per cent of the labour force (See Diagram 
2.3(3)). However, the country does not suffer from the political and social instability 
that has plagued the other two focus countries. 
Receptivity to FDI 
Unlike the other two Caribbean countries studied, Barbados has always 
actively attempted to attract FDI. To this end, since its independence in 1966, it has 
sought to create a business environment that is conducive to foreign investment. In so 
doing, it developed an extensive network of roads and established a well-developed 
telecommunications system, reliable utility services, and excellent airport and seaport 
services. The country has also established a fairly generous package of investment 
incentives. Since 1974, Barbados has offered the foreign investor incentives available 
under the Fiscal Incentives Act. This Act, to which the CARICOM countries 
subscribe, attempts to harmonise the fiscal incentives offered throughout the region. 
Barbados also grants special incentives to specified activities such as export-oriented 
manufacturing and offshore service operations [Barbados Investment and 
Development Corporation n. d. ]. 
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2.2.3 Trinidad-Tobago 
Geography 
Trinidad, an island of 1,864 square miles, lies just 10 miles off the east coast 
of Venezuela. Tobago, which is much smaller: 116 square miles, lies 21 miles to the 
north-east of Trinidad. Trinidad-Tobago form one political and administrative entity. 
Economic Conditions 
Trinidad-Tobago is an oil economy whose economic conditions mirror the 
world price of its major export commodity, oil. The country enjoyed unprecedented 
economic prosperity during the years 1974 to 1982. Indeed, its per capita income 
soared to US$ 6,600 in 1982 [World Bank 1995b: 500]. During this period, the 
government invested heavily in state-owned, gas-intensive activities. Thus, at present 
the economy is based on oil, gas and downstream petrochemical industries. However, 
the decline in the international oil market that began in 1982, triggered a recession in 
Trinidad-Tobago which lasted until 1991 (See Diagram 2.4(1)). Thus, in 1989, the 
country, like the other two in this study, was compelled to approach the international 
lending agencies for financial support. As part of its loan conditions, Trinidad-Tobago 
implemented stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes. The main objective 
of these programmes was to transform the country into a more diversified, market- 
oriented economy led by the private sector [World Bank 1996b: 508]. To this end, the 
adjustment measures implemented included devaluation, fiscal restraint, improved tax 
administration, divestment of state enterprises, and trade and exchange rate 
liberalisation. The country also sought to rationalise the operations of its institutions 
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mandated to stimulate industrial activity. Further, the government has identified 
policies to develop labour-intensive export activities. It is attempting to generate 
employment and growth, and minimise its external vulnerability [ibid., 510]. These 
policies have gained modest success. The economy of Trinidad-Tobago achieved 
modest growth of 5 per cent and 2 per cent in 1994 and 1995, respectively (See 
Diagram 2.4(1)). 
Social Conditions 
Trinidad-Tobago, with a population of 1.3 million (1995), can be described as 
a medium-sized Caribbean country. Its literacy level of 98 per cent is one of the 
highest in the region. Despite its relatively high rates of literacy, the country suffers 
from high levels of unemployment (See Diagram 2.4(3)). The numbers unemployed 
doubled from 10 per cent in 1982 to 20 per cent in 1992 [World Bank 1996b: 501]. 
Moreover, with the declines in oil revenues, the government is no longer able to 
engage in the high levels of social expenditure which were necessary to mitigate the 
link between poverty and unemployment. Thus, within recent years, a group of `new 
poor' has emerged. This represents those members of the unemployed who have 
slipped below the poverty line [ibid., 501]. Poverty, coupled with high youth 
unemployment, has resulted in increasing incidences of crime and drug abuse. 
Nonetheless, Trinidad-Tobago enjoys the status of an upper-middle-income country. 
Its infant mortality rates are relatively low, primary school enrolment is almost 
universal and child malnutrition rates are extremely low [ibid., 501; World Bank 
1996a: 344]. However, one area of the economy which has been adversely affected by 
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the decline in oil revenues is infrastructural services. Private participation is being 
introduced to improve the quality of these services [World Bank 1996b: 502]. 
Receptivity to Foreign Investment 
Like Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago's policies towards the foreign investor have 
vacillated with its economic fortunes. In the pre-1970s period, the government 
adopted an `open door policy' towards foreign investment. The country attempted to 
lure this investment with a system of generous investment incentives and low wages. 
However, by the late 1960s, the government began to espouse a philosophy of 
nationalisation. Further, in the early 1970s, armed with its oil windfall, the 
government relegated the foreign investor to the "role of contractor or consultant or 
occasionally joint venture partner" [Farrell 1987: 241]. Nonetheless, the Trinidadian 
government was not anti-foreign investment. It merely specified the sectors in which 
the foreign investor could operate. Also, it limited the forms of foreign involvement 
that the foreign investors could use in its key sectors (oil and natural gas) [Ramsaran 
1985: 147-152]. The post 1983 period, characterised by declining oil revenues, 
witnessed a regression in the government's approach to FDI to that used in the pre- 
1970 era. The foreign investor was now actively courted. Moreover, no attempts were 
made to limit its areas of involvement or its mode of market entry. In addition, the 
government eliminated exchange controls, dismantled tariffs and other trade barriers, 
and divested state assets to foreign companies. Like its two Caribbean neighbours, it 
also sought to increase the efficiency of the institutions mandated to stimulate 
industrial activity by rationalising their operations. As diagram 2.4(4) shows, these 
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policies have achieved modest success. Trinidad-Tobago has the highest levels of FDI 
inflows of the three countries studied. 
2.3 Conclusions 
The countries that are the focus of this study are small, highly vulnerable 
developing economies. To a large extent, they have not fully managed to dismantle 
the economic institutions of colonialism. Thus, they are entering the twenty-first 
century with economies organised in a manner established in the seventeen century. 
These three economies are still largely monocultural, specialising in the production of 
exports - tourism, international financial services, bauxite, oil and petrochemicals - for 
international markets. Yet, policy makers in these countries are presently striving to 
escape the quagmire of history. Under the tutelage of the international financial 
institutions, they are all attempting to transform their economies. One of the main 
objectives of these efforts is to make their business environments more attractive to 
the foreign investor. Using hypotheses drawn from the international business 
literature, the subsequent chapters will analyse the relative success of these initiatives. 
27 
Chapter Three 
The Motivations for Foreign Direct Investment 
The foreign investment decision process is a complex succession of acts, 
rather than a single, identifiable act [Aharoni 1966: 4]. This study examines three 
elements of this multidimensional, evolutionary process. They include the following: 
1. The factors that motivate the firm to engage in production abroad; 
2. The factors that influence its choice of location; and 
3. The factors that determine its international entry mode. 
While the above issues are by no means exhaustive, this study asserts that these 
are the main ones which confront strategic planners of business enterprises. Further, this 
analysis is not concerned with the sequencing of the decision making process. Some 
researchers argue that the decision to engage in production abroad precedes the locational 
decision [ibid., 42-43]. Conversely, it could be argued that all three decisions are 
determined interdependently. Nevertheless, this study seeks to examine all three elements 
of the foreign investment decision process. As noted earlier, it does not attempt to 
determine the sequencing of the decision making process. However, it argues that these 
three elements are critical variables of decision to engage in international production. 
3.1. Introduction 
Since the 1960s, theorists have been grappling with the question of why the 
individual business enterprise will seek to engage in production abroad. In the foreign 
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direct investment (FDI) literature, four theories that purport to explain the firm's 
motivations for FDI can be identified. These are viz.: 
1. The Monopolistic Advantage Theory; 
2. The Oligopolistic Reaction Theory; 
3. The Internalisation Theory; and 
4. The Eclectic Paradigm. 
This chapter examines the main tenets of these four theories. In addition, where 
possible, the applicability of these theories to the FDI undertaken in developing 
economies will be discussed. 
3.2. Theories On The Motivations For Foreign Direct Investment 
3.2.1. The Monopolistic Advantage Theory 
The progenitor of this explanation for international production and indeed, of the 
theory of FDI, was Stephen Hymer [1976, written in 1960]. In making the vital 
distinction between portfolio investment and FDI, he deviated from the international 
capital movement approach that was adopted by previous theorists. 
Thus, Hymer argued that the difference between portfolio investment and direct 
investment lies in the issue of control. Control was defined as the investor owning more 
than 25 per cent of the equity of the foreign enterprise [Hymer 1976: 1-2]. Hymer posited 
that if the investor directly controls the enterprise, the investment made is considered to 
be direct investment, if he does not, it is portfolio. In this way, Hymer rejected the 
portfolio investment theory with its simplifying assumptions of a lack of risks, 
uncertainties, and barriers to the movements of capital, as an explanation for foreign 
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direct investment. Instead, he argued that FDI occurs in imperfectly competitive markets 
and adopted an industrial organisation approach to explain the process of international 
production. 
The basic tenet of Hymer's hypothesis was that firms will engage in FDI once 
they have advantages, for example, production technology, finance, cost, product 
differentiation or superior distribution networks that are not possessed by their domestic 
competitors. Hence, he asserted that if FDI is to occur there must be some imperfections 
in the goods or factor markets. Basing his argument on Bain's 1956 thesis, Hymer 
postulated that the possession of these advantages is a necessary condition for FDI since 
the foreign firm is at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the indigenous ones. The indigenous firm 
has knowledge of local market conditions, the legal and institutional framework for 
business, and local business customs that the foreign firm can only obtain at a cost. 
Moreover, the foreign firm incurs costs from operating at a distance that are mainly the 
result of the difficulties of operating in an unfamiliar environment. Thus, Hymer argued 
that if production abroad must be profitable, the foreign owned firm must possess certain 
advantages over the domestic ones. Indeed, he emphasised that the unequal ability of 
firms is a sufficient condition for international operations [ibid., 46]. 
This theme of the investing firm possessing superior advantages over its domestic 
competitors was echoed in the work of several other theorists. They refined and extended 
this hypothesis to include other sources of monopolistic advantages. Thus, Kindleberger 
[1969], using Hymer's work as a basis for his analysis, also rejected the hypothesis that 
FDI occurs in perfectly competitive markets. He posits: 
"In a world of perfect competition for goods and factors, direct investment cannot 
exist. In these conditions, domestic firms would have an advantage over foreign 
firms in the proximity of their operations to their decision-making centres, so that no 
firm could survive in foreign operations. For direct investment to thrive there must 
be some imperfection in markets for goods or factors. "[ibid., 33] 
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Kindleberger details the nature of the monopolistic advantages that the foreign 
investor may possess over its domestic competitors. Thus, he indicates that these 
advantages may arise in the goods market (product differentiation, superior marketing 
and distribution skills); in the factors market (preferential access to capital, restricted 
technology and superior managerial skills); and in the ability to achieve vertical or 
horizontal integration. Kindleberger also states that monopolistic advantages may arise 
through the actions of government in the host country. In restricting imports, the 
government may inadvertently stimulate FDI. 
Caves [ 1971,1974] also embraced the notion of the firm possessing what he terms 
"unique assets". However, in his explanation of the determinants of FDI, he emphasises 
that this investment occurs mainly in industries characterised by oligopolistic market 
structures. Moreover, he clearly distinguished among the various categories of FDI: 
horizontal extension (a firm that is producing the same product elsewhere); vertical 
extension (a firm adding a stage to the production process that either comes earlier or 
later than its principal processing activity); and conglomerate diversification. He focuses 
on the first two types of investment since he argues that the latter type rarely occurs. 
Caves indicates that it is the horizontally integrated firm which possessed the 
unique assets over its local competitors. He identifies these assets to be product 
differentiation. According to Caves, the advantage which product differentiation conveys 
to the foreign producer is the difficulty that the local competitor will meet in reproducing 
the product since it is protected by trade marks and brand names. In addition, he extends 
the term `differentiation' to include the possession of managerial, financial, and 
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innovative skills as well as privileged access to the factors of production. In a later work, 
he describes this advantage as an "intangible resource" [Caves 1982]. 
Empirical evidence was found to support this hypothesis. Caves notes the high 
degree of correlation that exists between the extent of product differentiation in an 
industry and the level of international production made by US firms. He states that firms 
in industries such as automobiles, other consumer durables and scientific instruments had 
more subsidiaries than those in primary metals, leather and lumber [Caves 1971: 8]. 
Nonetheless, Caves argues that the vertically extended foreign investor does not 
rely on the possession of these unique assets. Its motivations for international production 
are to avoid oligopolistic uncertainty concerning the long-term supply and pricing of its 
inputs as well as to erect barriers to entry against new rivals. 
Several theorists have expanded on the notion that privileged access to raw 
materials or minerals conveys a monopolistic advantage to the investing firm. It appears 
that the favoured access to raw materials or minerals may be a result of the firm's control 
over final markets or transportation; processing (vertical integration in mining and food 
processing) or production of the material (mining and plantation) [Lall and Streeten 1977: 
26]. The authors state that once the MNE acquires such access to raw materials, it is in a 
powerful oligopolistic position. Under these circumstances, the industry will shift from 
numerous firms that are small and competitive to one characterised by a few large, 
vertically integrated enterprises [Kindleberger 1969: 19-231. 
Vernon [1966] also concurs with the notion that it is a firm's possession of 
monopolistic advantages over its foreign competitors that determines FDI. However, he 
argues that this advantage, which he identifies as the ability to innovate and produce new 
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products, is determined by the structure of the market and the factor endowments of the 
home country. 
Thus, Vernon identifies the main types of monopolistic advantages of a firm, 
albeit US firms, and the factors that will result in their developing these advantages. No 
less important, he also identifies how the location of production will move from country 
to country over time. This issue will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
The monopolistic advantage theory was advanced by theorists from the developed 
world to explain the phenomenon of FDI occurring among industrialised economies. 
Thus, it is not surprising that several theorists argue that this theory is not an adequate 
explanation for the FDI undertaken in developing countries. 
Hood and Young [1979] postulate that the monopolistic advantage theory fully 
explains the FDI made by US multinational enterprises during the post World War II 
period. However, they question whether the MNE needs to possess any advantage when 
investing in developing countries since it is confronted with little domestic competition. 
They cite the example of Japanese ventures in developing countries that are faced with 
few, if any, effective local competitors. Moreover, they argue that the host governments 
may discourage local competition to ensure that maximum economies of scale are 
achieved [Hood and Young 1979: 67]. 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that the MNEs are not motivated to enter Less 
Developed Countries' (LDC) markets because of the limited impact that their 
monopolistic advantages has on domestic competition. Vachani's analysis of the product 
market choices of MNE in India, reveals that MNEs were discouraged from entering the 
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LDC segments of the dentifrice and tractor industries. 
5 These were the lower income 
segments that were more price sensitive and less susceptible to product differentiation 
than the developed country segments. Vachani asserts that in the lower income segment, 
the MNE's possession of a monopolistic advantage, which he describes as product 
differentiation, had little impact on competition. The products of the MNEs were highly 
differentiated which made them much more expensive than the locally produced 
substitutes. Indeed, Vachani argues that the LDC segment was not "hospitable" to the 
products of the MNEs hence the MNEs were deterred from entering this segment of the 
market [Vachani 1985: 84-85]. 
Lall and Mohammed [1983] support Vachani's argument on the insignificant role 
that product differentiation plays in determining MNE's involvement in India. They, 
however, state that the advantages of sophisticated technology and scale are important 
influencing factors in motivating the MNE's entry into India. It is of interest to note that 
these authors also posit that the restrictive policy environment of a country may impede 
the MNE's use of its monopolistic advantage in international production. Thus, they 
revealed that because of the strict controls India imposed on foreign entry during the 
1970s, little foreign involvement was found in the capital-intensive activities where the 
MNE was believed to possess "special" advantages [ibid., 154]. 
The impact that a restrictive policy environment has on the MNE's use of its 
monopolistic advantages was also explored by Aswicahyono and Hill [1995]. The authors 
5 Vachani divides the Indian market into two distinct parts: the developed country segment and the less 
developed one. In the former, consumers demand product characteristics similar to those desired by 
their developed country counterparts. Conversely, in the LDC segment, consumers want product 
attributes that differ from those demanded by consumers in the developed world. Sushil Vachani, 
"Strategic Product Market Choices by Multinationals and Local Firms in a Newly Industrialised 
Country. " (DBA diss., Harvard University, 1985), 3. 
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also concur with the postulate that the monopolistic advantage theory does not fully 
explain FDI in developing countries. In examining foreign involvement in Indonesia, the 
authors argue that the MNE's use of product differentiation is limited since advertising is 
heavily restricted and the consumers are more price sensitive than their counterparts in 
the industrialised world. In addition, they argue that the MNE's use of technology was 
not very important since the manufacturing sector in Indonesia is dominated by labour- 
intensive, low value-added activities [ibid., 153]. 
It is thus open to question whether the monopolistic advantage theory provides an 
appropriate explanation of the motivations for the MNE's involvement in the Caribbean. 
Firstly, the Caribbean market is woefully small: the population of the English-speaking 
Caribbean is approximately 6 million. Thus, the notion of the MNE engaging in FDI to 
exercise its unique advantages of product differentiation over local competition seems 
unlikely. Moreover, the MNE is confronted with limited local competition. As several 
theorists posit, the region suffers from the lack of a dynamic entrepreneurial class 
[Worrell 1987: 23-24]. In addition, observers allude to the inefficiency of the domestic 
business sector that has long been cocooned from international competition by high tariff 
and other import restrictions [Watson 1983: 73-75]. Hence, it seems unlikely that the 
monopolistic advantage theory will satisfactorily explain MNE activity in the Caribbean 
context. 
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3.2.2 The Oligopolistic Reaction Theory 
Another strand of the literature on FDI holds the view that international 
production is the result of a firm's strategic reaction to the anticipated behaviour of its 
oligopolistic competitors. Several theorists did make passing mention of this 
phenomenon [Aharoni 1966; Vernon 1966; Caves 1971]. Yet it was Knickerbocker 
[ 1973 ] who examined this investment behaviour at length. 
Basing his analysis on the behaviour of US manufacturing firms during the 1948 
to 1967 period, Knickerbocker concludes that the risk-avoiding members of an 
oligopolistically structured industry will follow one another into any substantial foreign 
market in which one of them has set up production. In so doing, he argues the oligopolists 
are protecting the exploitability abroad of the special firm-specific capabilities 
(technological and organisational skills) they acquire at home. Moreover, Knickerbocker 
argues that a rival firm's moves into a foreign market not only could threaten the 
corporate earnings of the other oligopolists, but also could result in it acquiring 
competitive assets far in excess of those it already possesses. Thus, he posits, the 
defensive investment undertaken by the other oligopolists serves to maintain the balance 
of competition within the industry. 
Knickerbocker postulates that it is the firms that are "product pioneers", that is, 
those which develop, mass produce, and mass market a product uniquely suited to the US 
market, that are most likely to engage in this practice. Thus, he found that firms in highly 
concentrated industries producing heterogeneous products such as electrical and transport 
equipment, and food were the ones most likely to be engaged in this parallel investment. 
He also noted that this investment prevails in vertically integrated industries such as 
36 
primary metals, paper and petroleum. In the latter industries, the oligopolists checked 
their rivals' attempts to secure access to low-cost, reliable raw material supplies. 
Knickerbocker's oligopolistic reaction theory holds considerable intuitive appeal 
as an explanation of the motivations for FDI in the primary sector as well as some 
segments of the manufacturing sector of developing countries. It is noteworthy that this 
investment behaviour which has been described as `follow-the-leader' was observed in 
the semi-conductor industries of Southeast Asia and the raw material industries of several 
developing countries [Vernon 1983: 190]. Thus, it would be illuminating to determine the 
extent to which this theory explains the motivations for the MNE's involvement in the 
primary sector (bauxite, oil and natural gas) of the Caribbean as well as those 
manufacturing activities that are intensive in the use of low-cost labour. 
3.2.3. The Internalisation Theory 
Another group of theorists sought to provide an alternative interpretation to the 
Hymer-Kindleberger-Caves industrial organisation approach. Indeed, they attempted to 
explain why the firm becomes involves in international production instead of selling its 
advantages to foreign competitors. Thus, there was now a switch of emphasis away from 
the act of FDI, to the institution that is making the investment, the multinational 
enterprise. This is the theory of internalisation as posited by [Buckley and Casson 1976; 
Casson 1979; Rugman 1980,1981,1985; Buckley 1987]. 
The roots of the theory of internalisation lie in Coase [1937] who postulated that 
there are certain conditions when it will be more efficient for the firm to create an internal 
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market than the use the existing one. Coase's work was extended by Williamson [ 1975, 
1985] who adopted the nomenclature of markets and hierarchies. The internalisation 
theory was further developed and applied to the behaviour of MNEs by McManus [ 1972], 
and later by researchers associated with the "Reading School" such as Buckley and 
Casson [ 1976], Rugman [ 1980,1981 ] and Hennart [ 1986]. 
The proponents of the internalisation theory posit that a firm will internalise the 
production of intermediate goods and services whenever their markets fail. Market 
failures may arise because of the absence of a futures market; the firm's inability to 
exercise discriminatory pricing; and information impactedness. Internalisation may also 
occur because of locational factors. It is likely to predominate when governments 
intervene in international markets through the imposition of value-added taxes or restrict 
capital movements. Differences in the income and profit taxes between countries would 
also facilitate the internalisation of markets [Buckley and Casson 1976: 36-39]. Thus, the 
firm will bring under its common governance and control those activities that were 
formerly linked by the market. The MNE is created when markets are internalised 
internationally. 
The two authors also posit that the firm will engage in international production if 
it perceives that the net benefits of its joint ownership of domestic and foreign activities 
exceed those offered by the market. Moreover, it is argued that the firm will internalise 
markets until the costs of further internalisation outweigh the benefits [Casson 1979: 46; 
Buckley 1983: 42-43]. Further, it is noted that the process of internalisation is a dynamic 
one. Once the NINE is established abroad, it will use its internal organisation to prevent 
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the loss of its firm-specific advantage by maintaining control over the production and sale 
of final products which incorporate this firm-specific advantage [Rugman 1980b: 369]. 
Buckley and Casson [ 1976] argue that industry-specific factors will result in the 
internalisation of markets for intermediate products that are used in certain multistage 
production processes. In addition, they postulate that industry-related factors will cause 
the internalisation of the market for knowledge. The two authors postulate that the first 
type of internalisation results in the vertically integrated firm while the second type 
generates the horizontally integrated firm. They also state that it was the internalisation of 
the market for primary products (minerals, agricultural commodities and oil) that was 
largely responsible for the growth of the pre-World War II MNEs. They explain that the 
growth of the present day MNE is fuelled by its desire to internalise the market for 
knowledge [ibid., 45-62]. 
It is noteworthy that a distinction is made between the sources of the firm's 
advantages that results in it becoming engaged in production abroad [Dunning and 
Rugman 1985]. Under Hymer's analysis, the firm develops advantages which are based 
on structural market imperfections. These advantages, such as superior marketing ability, 
scale economies and knowledge advantage assist the MNE to construct entry barriers and 
thus increase its market power. Conversely, the proponents of the internalisation theory 
posit that the firm develops advantages which are of the "Williamson-type transaction 
costs". These transaction costs arise naturally or are assumed to be external to the firm. 
The MNE responds to them by creating an internal market. Once this internalisation is 
realised, the MNE possesses ownership advantages that are similar to those advanced by 
Hymer [ibid., 229]. Indeed, this is the main difference between the theory advanced by 
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Hymer and his followers, and those of the internalisation school. 
6 Hymer perceived that 
the MNE could profitably create entry barriers by exercising its Bain-type advantages. By 
contrast, the internalisation theory postulates that these advantages are effectively 
deployed by the firm in response to transactional market failure. It is only when such 
internalisation is conducted internationally that the MNE is created. 
While it is evident that the MNE bypasses the markets for intermediate products 
and knowledge through the process of FDI, empirical verification of this theory has 
proven to be very difficult, if not impossible [Hood and Young 1979: 57; Agarwal, 1980: 
754]. Indeed, there are very few original field studies which aim at testing the 
internalisation theory [Dunning 1993: 145]. One such study was beset by a paucity of 
data. The researcher noted that because of these data limitations, caution was necessary in 
the use of the study results [Rugman 1980c: 218]. Nonetheless, this study proposes to test 
one hypothesis that largely arises from the internalisation theory. The internalisation 
theory suggests that the MNE, which internalises its intermediate markets, will be 
involved in intra-firm trade. This study contends that the global firm, which is involved in 
intra-firm trade, will select a wholly owned subsidiary as its preferred market entry mode. 
This issue will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
6 It must be noted that several scholars have argued that Hymer was aware of transaction market failure 
as precipitating the formation of a MNE. They point out that Dunning and Rugman [19851 only 
examined Hymer's dissertation, not his other works. They argue that Hymer's later papers 
demonstrated his knowledge of Coase, and his application of Coase's theory to the market 
imperfections theory of MNEs. See Harauo Hogaguchi, and Brian Toyne, "Setting The Record 
Straight: Hymer, Internalisation Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. " Journal of International 
Business Studies 21, no. 3 (1990): 487-494. 
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3.2.4. The Eclectic Paradigm 
Dunning [1979,1980,1981], in his eclectic paradigm, sought to offer a general 
framework for determining the extent and pattern of both foreign-owned production 
undertaken by a country's enterprises and that of domestic production owned by foreign 
companies. In so doing, he synthesises three strands of the theory of FDI by arguing that 
it was the monopolistic (which he terms ownership-specific) advantage, together with the 
internalisation and locational advantages that influences a firm's decision to engage in 
foreign production. 
Dunning states that ownership-specific advantages include assets such as natural 
endowments and capital. However, like several of the theorists previously discussed, he 
also considers ownership-specific advantages to be those intangible resources that are 
peculiar to a firm, for example, technology, marketing or managerial skills [Dunning 
1993a: 77]. By contrast, he posits that a firm's internalisation advantages arise from 
transactional market failure. These advantages are derived from the benefits which the 
firm gains from the common governance of its value-added activity. According to 
Dunning, internalisation advantages include the desire to avoid search and negotiation 
costs, to protect the reputation of the firm, and to engage in practices such as transfer 
pricing and cross-subsidisation [ibid., Table 4.1,81]. 
Interestingly enough, several theorists note that these two advantages (ownership- 
specific and internalisation) are really internalisation advantages since any ownership- 
specific advantage has to be internalised in order to be effective [Rugman 1985: 571; 
Casson 1987: 34; Itaki 1991: 446-450]. To some extent, Dunning recognises this. He 
widens the definition of ownership-specific advantages to include those assets which 
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originate from a firm's ability to co-ordinate and capture the gains from organising a 
diverse set of multiple, value-added, geographically dispersed cross-border activities. He 
also includes those which are derived from the firm's ability to capture the benefits of 
risk diversification. These assets are called "transaction cost advantages" [Dunning 
1993a: 80]. They include the benefits that the branch plants of established firms enjoy 
over their domestic competitors, for example, favoured access to inputs or economies of 
scope and specialisation. In addition, transaction cost advantages include the advantages 
to be derived from a firm's multinationality, for example, enhanced knowledge about 
international markets or an ability to reduce risks [ibid., Table 4.1,81 ]. 
Dunning argues that a firm, which possesses superior ownership-specific 
advantages over its foreign competitors and decides to internalise them, is confronted 
with the decision of whether to create or use these ownership-specific advantages in a 
foreign location. The firm's choice of locating its foreign operations is influenced by the 
locational advantages of a country. Dunning notes that locational advantages are not 
limited to the natural resource endowments of a region. They include the cultural, legal, 
political and institutional environment in which a firm operates. In addition, he identifies 
the market structure, and government's legislation and policies as being locational 
advantages [ibid., 77]. 
Dunning predicts that the more ownership-specific advantages a firm possesses 
over its foreign competitors, the greater is its incentive to internalise them rather than 
externalise their use. Furthermore, he argues that the more it is in the firm's interest to use 
these advantages in a foreign location, the greater is the possibility of its becoming 
engaged in FDI [ibid., 80]. 
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In addition, Dunning asserts that the eclectic paradigm explains all forms of 
international production made by MNEs in different geographical regions [ibid., 82-83]. 
Thus, it will be useful to determine the extent to which the eclectic paradigm explains the 
motivations for FDI undertaken in the Caribbean. 
3.3 Summary and Conclusions 
Several main themes can be drawn from this analysis of the literature on the 
motivations for FDI. Firstly, as Hymer and his followers posit, a firm must possess 
superior advantages over its foreign competitors if it is to be successfully engaged in 
production abroad. They argue that the possession of these advantages is necessary since 
the firm incurs unavoidable costs from operating in a foreign location. Other theorists, for 
example, Vachani, and Lall and Mohammed, postulate that the monopolistic advantage 
theory is not applicable to the realities of the developing world. They state that the lack of 
effective competition, the lower income levels of the population as well as the rigid 
regulatory regime towards FDI preclude the MNE's use of its unique assets. 
Other theorists, notably Knickerbocker, state that oligopolistic firms will follow a 
rival's entry into a substantial foreign market in which it has established production. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that this defensive investment is characteristic of highly 
concentrated industries producing differentiated goods as well as vertically integrated 
industries involved in the processing of raw materials and minerals. 
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Thirdly, a group of theorists posits that the MNE would choose to engage in 
international production rather than sell its unique advantages to foreign firms because of 
transactional market failures. 
Finally, Dunning emphasises that it is the firm's decision to use its ownership- 
specific advantages in combination with a country's locational endowments that 
determines FDI. 
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3.4 Hypotheses on the motivations for Foreign Direct Investment in the 
Caribbean 
Three hypotheses on the motivations for the MNE's engaging in FDI in the 
Caribbean may be advance from the literature. These are the following: 
1. No relationship exists between the MNE's use of its unique advantages and the 
presence of domestic competitors. 
2. There is a positive relationship between `follow-the-leader' investment behaviour 
of MNEs and the use of low-cost factors. 
3. There is a positive relationship between the firm's use of its ownership-specific 
advantages and the locational advantages of the Caribbean. 
The first hypothesis is drawn from the argument posited by Hood and Young, 
Vachani, Lall and Mohammed that the monopolistic advantage theory fails to adequately 
explain the motivations for MNE's investment in developing countries. One of the 
reasons cited is the lack of effective domestic competition that the MNE experiences in 
developing countries. It appears that this lack of effective domestic competition may also 
characterise the Caribbean region. As was noted earlier, the region suffers from a lack of 
a dynamic business class. Moreover, it appears that its market size may hinder the MNE's 
effective use of some of its unique advantages, for example, product differentiation. 
Hence, it is postulated that the MNE's motivation for engaging in production in the 
Caribbean is not likely to be the result of its possession of superior ownership-specific 
advantages over the local competitors. 
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The second hypothesis is drawn from Knickerbocker's theory of defensive 
investment. It is postulated that MNEs in oligopolist industries such as oil, bauxite as 
well as some labour-intensive manufacturing activities would counter their rival's entry 
into the Caribbean region. They will engage in FDI in this region to maintain the balance 
of competition in the international industry. 
It is Dunning's eclectic paradigm from which the third hypothesis is drawn. It is 
argued that a firm would undertake investment in the Caribbean in order to combine its 
superior ownership-specific assets with the locational advantages of the region. 
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Chapter Four 
The Location of Foreign Direct Investment 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, no attempt will be made to undertake an exhaustive analysis of 
the voluminous literature on location theory. Instead, an examination will be carried out 
only of those theories which seek to explain why the NINE will choose to locate 
production in developing countries. In addition, this analysis will also include those 
theories which can potentially explain the locational decision of MNEs operating in 
these countries. 
Two distinct emphases can be identified in the location literature. The first is the 
theories that seek to elucidate where a firm is likely to locate its international 
production, and the factors that influence this decision. The second, is the empirical 
analyses that attempt to evaluate the relative importance of those factors that have been 
identified as determining a firm's locational decision. The following section examines 
the location theories. 
4.2. Theories On The Location Of Foreign Direct Investment 
The developing countries traditionally have been viewed as sites for locating 
low-cost, labour-intensive activities or securing access to natural resources. Hence, 
several of the location theories which focus on developing countries address these 
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issues. The two theories discussed below explore the reasons for MNEs locating their 
factor-intensive activities in developing regions. 
4.2.1 The International Product Cycle Theory 
Vernon [1966] sought to understand the continuous shifts in international trade 
and investment that had characterised the post World War II international economy. 
However, in viewing international production as a sequential process, he deviated from 
the approach used by previous theorists. Vernon combined the microeconomic concept 
of the product cycle with trade theory. In so doing, he advanced a theory which 
purported to explain the market-seeking production of US firms in the 1960s. 
Vernon argues that in the early stages of the life of a product, production is 
undertaken in the home country because of the need of producers to have easy access to 
inputs and to maintain swift communication with suppliers and competitors. At this 
stage, the product is highly differentiated and its demand fairly inelastic. Producers later 
begin to export the product to advanced countries, notably Western Europe, which have 
demand and supply characteristics similar to those of the US. 
Gradually, the product becomes more standardised, its demand more elastic, and 
the knowledge of its production more diffused. The expansion of foreign markets 
increases the attractiveness of establishing production there rather than in the home 
country. This investment is precipitated by the threat of the imposition of trade barriers 
or the anticipation of foreign competitors setting up production in these markets. 
Vernon argues that eventually the subsidiary would replace exports from the home 
country or even export back to it. Further, he postulates that at the advanced stages of 
standardisation, labour costs will become a critical consideration in production. Thus, 
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the less developed countries with low-cost labour will now offer a competitive 
advantage as a production location. 
Thus, Vernon hypothesises that production is initially located in the US, it is 
subsequently relocated to an advanced country, for example, Western Europe, and 
finally to the less developed countries. In all these three stages of the product cycle, 
changes in demand and in the supply of technology, together with cost considerations 
dictate the MNE's choice of locating foreign production. 
Vernon later sought to refine this theory by emphasising the oligopolistic 
behaviour of MNEs. To this end, he related the three stages of the product cycle to those 
of the innovation based oligopoly, the mature oligopoly and senescent oligopoly. In 
addition, he widened the scope of the theory to taken into account other factor costs 
(land and material). Further, the theory was not only limited to the FDI undertaken by 
US firms, but also those of other industrialised countries ['Vernon 1971,1974]. 
In this version of the product cycle theory, Vernon maintains the assumption 
that innovation is driven by market forces. However, he places less emphasis on the US 
market as a source of new products. Instead, he argues that while in the USA, 
innovation is labour-saving, in Europe, it is material- and land-saving, and in Japan, it is 
both material- and space-saving. In the first phase of the product cycle, the innovation 
oligopolistic firm locates production in the home market in order to co-ordinate the 
production process with the marketing and R&D functions. 
Vernon posits that when scale economies in production or marketing become 
critical, they would replace the innovation factor as a barrier to entry. At this stage, the 
industry will evolve to that of the mature oligopoly. Thus, in phase two, the NINE, 
protected by barriers to entry generated by economies of scale in production, 
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transportation or marketing will seek to engage in defensive investment. Its choice of 
locating foreign production is influenced by the actions of rival oligopolists. Vernon, 
adopting Knickerbocker's "follow-the-leader" hypothesis, postulates that the MNE will 
match the moves of a rival into a foreign location to maintain industry stability [Vernon 
1974: 102-104]. 
In the final stage of the product cycle, the barriers to entry generated by scale 
economies will weaken: cost considerations will now become critical. Hence, the 
senescent oligopolist will seek to locate production in regions where factor costs are 
relatively low. Thus, production will be relocated to low-cost, developing countries. 
Within recent times, the relevance and applicability of the product cycle theory 
to international trade and production have diminished [Rapp 1973; Giddy 1978]. 
Vernon, himself, recognised this [Vernon 1979]. He states that the growing similarities 
in income levels among industrialised countries, together with the geographic spread of 
the MNE, have negated some of the assumptions of this theory [ibid., 259-261]. 
Nonetheless, he posits that the product cycle theory is still applicable to the new MINEs 
that have not yet acquired a network of foreign subsidiaries or experience operating 
abroad. Most importantly, however, he advances the view that, unequivocally, it is still 
a useful theory for explaining the location of FDI in developing countries. 
4.1.2 The New International Division of Labour 
Another group of theorists, in agreement with Vernon, argues that the MNE 
undertakes foreign production in developing countries because of factor cost 
considerations. Indeed, Frobel et al. [ 1980] state that the movement of certain industrial 
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activities, significantly textiles and electronics, to the Third World is the result of what 
they term the "new international division of labour". 
Frobel enunciates that foreign production is no longer simply an exchange of 
commodities between two national economies: it is governed by the new international 
division of labour. Enterprises in the industrial world, stimulated by cheap labour, 
changes in the production process that allow aspects of production to be undertaken 
with minimum skills, and improvements in transport and communications, are 
relocating certain types of manufacturing operations into the developing countries. 
This fragmented production is assigned to whichever part of the world that 
provides the most profitable factor combinations. Moreover, this relocation of 
production has not only affected labour-intensive processes, but also those which are 
dependent on the use of raw material and energy. Activities which are a source of 
environmental pollution are also relocated. Interestingly, Frobel argues that even 
capital-intensive processes are affected [Frobel et al. 1980: 4]. Indeed, it is asserted that 
this rationalisation of production has helped individual firms to earn substantial profits 
despite the world recession of the late 1970s. 
Production is only partially transferred to the developing world, however. 
Hence, the production units in the home and host country are vertically integrated. This 
results in the trade of intermediate goods between these units. This growth in intra-firm 
trade has captured the attention of several scholars [Sharpston 1975; Buckley and Pearse 
1979; Kotabe 1989]. Early research attributed the growth of intra-firm trade to cost 
considerations. It was postulated that in the 1970s and the early 1980s, US MNEs, 
threatened with global competition, relocated labour-intensive production abroad in an 
attempt at maintaining cost competitiveness [Moxon 1975; Kotabe 1989]. This 
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investment was defensive since firms followed competitors in investing in offshore 
facilities [Moxon 1975: 56]. 
The production processes that were initially relocated were mainly assembly 
type activity that involved the use of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Limited training 
was required to perform the operations. Indeed, in some instances, the requisite skills 
could be acquired in a mere six weeks ([Sharpston 1975: 105]. The processes that were 
transferred were not only labour-intensive, but also they resisted automation or were 
those for which automation was uneconomic [Sharpston 1975: 105; Moxon 1975: 62]. 
A classic example is industrial sewing. Hence, garment making is an ideal operation for 
offsourcing since 80 per cent of the labour cost of clothing manufacture is at the sewing 
stage [Sharpston 1975: 103]. Other relocated activities include electronics, data 
processing and ship repair. 
The cost of transportation also influences the type of product relocated. Thus, 
products that have a high volume to weight ratio are selected. Moreover, "distance" and 
administrative costs play a considerable role in the choice of locating offshore activity 
[ibid., 111-114] .A country's proximity to a 
developed country market is a considerable 
advantage as evidenced by the success of the Mexican maquiladoras. 
To a large extent, offshore sourcing has been facilitated by government 
legislation [ibid., 115-119]. A classic example is the US Customs legislation. Under the 
tariff provisions 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80 of the US Harmonised Tariff Schedule 
(known as 806.30 and 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States until 1989), 
an importer is charged duty only on value-added abroad. It is noteworthy that these 
tariff provisions comprise part of the entitlements awarded to the Caribbean region 
under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. However, the 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80 products 
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that are eligible under CBERA are subject to duty free entry into the USA. In addition, 
in 1986, a Super 807 programme was enacted which sought to remove all quotas on 
Caribbean produced clothing. 
Cost considerations are no longer the sole reason for offshore sourcing. It 
appears that at present, offshore sourcing is a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage. The MNE, through intra-firm trading, is able to secure access to innovative 
technologies developed abroad, gain first-mover advantages from penetrating 
unrecognised high growth markets as well as provide the foundations for a speed 
advantage [Fagan 1991: 22]. 
It is interesting to note that Frobel attributes the acceleration in the spread of 
industrial production to the Third World to the establishment of free production zones 
in this region. Free production zones or export processing zones are either 
geographically defined, economic extra-territorial areas or functional states in which the 
enterprises produce exclusively for exports. The producers in these zones are generally 
offered special fiscal incentives, subsidised infrastructure provisions, duty-free imports 
of inputs, and unlimited repatriation of profits. Labour is also promised to be cheap, 
easily trained and docile [Roberts 1992: 2]. 
It is noteworthy that the growth of these zones in developing countries has been 
encouraged by the policy advice given by the international financial institutions: the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank [Kaplinsky 1993: 1851]. Indeed, the 
Caribbean region boasts 22 export processing zones, the majority (5) of which are 
concentrated in the Dominican Republic [Pantin 1993: 142]. It is must be noted that 
many of the products manufactured in the Caribbean zones are beneficiaries of the 
special tariff provisions of the US Customs legislation that were discussed earlier. The 
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activities performed in these zones generally exploit the comparative advantage of 
developing countries: Thus, simple, labour-intensive processes are performed. The 
goods produced have limited local value-added. They include textiles and clothing, 
electrical and electronic products, textiles and footwear [UNCTAD 1985: 4]. 
4.1.3. The "Double Diamond" Model of Competitive Advantage 
The "Double Diamond" model is not a location theory, per se. Indeed, it does 
not explicitly purport to explain the factors that influence the MNE's locational 
decision. Rather, its focus is on the dynamic interplay between the global corporate 
strategy of the firm and environments in which it operates. Nonetheless, it is believed 
that this model could adequately explain the locational decisions of MNEs operating in 
the Caribbean region. Clearly, any analysis of the global corporate strategies of firm and 
its enabling environments will highlight the locational endowments of these 
environments. Hence, it will be possible to ascertain the elements of these environments 
which initially attract, and may continue to attract, the MNE's investment. 
The "Double Diamond" model has been developed in recognition of the 
limitations inherent in the single diamond of competitive advantage as proposed by 
Porter [1990]. Essentially, Porter postulates that a global firm develops its sources of 
competitive advantage in its home country. By competitive advantage, Porter means the 
ability of indigenous firms to achieve international competitiveness. He details the 
characteristics of a favourable "proximate" environment in his model of the 
determinants of national competitive advantage [Porter 1990: 69-130]. 
In this model, Porter identifies four features of a national environment that 
enable firms to develop a sustainable competitive advantage. These four interacting 
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determinants form what Porter terms a "diamond" (See Figure 4.1). He argues that the 
diamond is "a mutually reinforcing system, with each of its determinants contingent on 
the state of the others" [ibid., 72]. The four determinants are viz.: 
1. Factor Conditions: The country's factors of production including basic factors such 
as natural resources, unskilled and semi-skilled labour and created, advanced factors 
such as modern communication infrastructure and specialised research institutes. 
2. Demand Conditions: The nature of demand for goods and services by domestic 
buyers as well as the degree of sophistication of these buyers. 
3. Related and supporting industries: The extent to which the domestic firms gain from 
the agglomeration economy effects of the presence of internationally competitive, 
domestic supplier and related industries. 
4. Firm strategy, structure and rivalry: The context in which firms are created, 
organised and managed as well as the nature of inter-firm competition. 
Figure 4.1 The Single Diamond of Competitive Advantage 
Firm Strategy, 
Chance -------------- Structure, And 
Rivalry 
Factor 
Conditions Demand 
Conditions 
Related And 
Supporting 
Industries 
Government 
Source: Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990), Figure 5.5. 
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In addition, Porter identifies two external variables that affect competitiveness, 
but not the four direct determinants. These are chance and government. Chance events 
occur outside of the firms' control, for example, wars or major technological 
discoveries. They can result in changing competitive advantage in many industries. 
Similarly, government, through its policies can improve or detract from national 
advantage. Porter identifies policies such as anti-trust and investment in education, as 
influencing the development of national advantage. 
Towards the "Double Diamond" of Competitive Advantage 
The academic merit of the Porter's model is without question. However, it 
appears that it has limited applicability for countries that are outside of the Triad. 
Porter's model was constructed on an empirical analysis drawn from seven advanced 
industrialised economies and one advanced developing country. However, more than 90 
per cent of the world's nations do not possess the economic structures, economic 
strength or affluence of these eight countries. Hence, the relevance and applicability of 
the Porter's model to most of the countries in the world are highly questionable. 
Not surprisingly, Porter's diamond of competitive advantage has provoked 
severe criticisms. One researcher notes that Porter failed to adequately address the 
manner in which the multinational activity of the global firm influences its international 
competitiveness [Dunning 1993b]. As Dunning succinctly states: 
"... there is ample evidence that the technical and organisational assets of the MNEs 
are influenced by the configuration of the diamonds of foreign countries in which 
they produce, which, in turn, may impinge upon the competitiveness of their home 
countries. " [Dunning 1993b: 107-108] 
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Indeed, Porter emphasises that the home country is the sole source of a firm's 
core competitiveness [Porter 1990: 599]. He defines only outward investment, 
specifically, "follow-the-leader" investment and the FDI that results from the imposition 
of trade restrictions, as being critical to the creation of a competitive advantage. He 
perceives inward FDI as not being "healthy" for the development of a nation's 
competitive advantage [ibid., 671]. 
Dunning [1993b], in an attempt to correct for Porter's omission of 
multinationality, suggests that MNE activity should be treated as a separate variable, 
assuming the same role in the model as those of chance and government. However, the 
most robust suggestion has been advanced by Rugman and D'Cruz [1993]. Their 
approach to the treatment of the effect of multinational activity on the development of a 
firm's competitive advantage is compelling. This is the "Double Diamond" model. 
Rugman and D'Cruz argue that Porter's model is flawed when applied to 
economies that are small, open and involved in trade. These economies are highly 
integrated with the advanced industrialised nations. Hence, to survive in rivalry with 
firms of the leading nations, the businesses of these smaller economies are forced to 
become globally competitive. This requires them to link the diamond of their home 
country with that of their leading trading partner. Indeed, they state that since more than 
70 per cent of the sales of Canada's industrial MNEs takes place in the USA, it is the 
US diamond that is likely to be of more relevance to these firms than their own home 
diamond [Rugman and D' Cruz 1993: 26]. 
It appears that Porter's view of FDI is rather dated. As noted earlier, he only 
envisages the global firm engaging in "follow-the-leader" investment or tariff-jumping. 
Thus, he fails to take cognisance of the increasingly important role that other nations' 
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diamonds are playing in the development of a MNE's global advantages. Figure 4.2 
demonstrates some of these relationships. 
Figure 4.2 The Impact of National Diamonds on Global Competitiveness 
Impact of Other Nations' 
Diamond on Global 
Competitiveness 
Impact of (Initial) Home Country Diamond on Global 
Competitiveness 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
1 3 
2 4 
Source: Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Multinational Strategic Management: An 
Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework. " Management International Review, 33 Special 
Issue (1993), Figure 1. 
As Rugman and Verbeke note, Porter's perception of the global strategies of the 
firm could be illustrated by quadrant 1 and 4 of Figure 4.2 [Rugman and Verbeke 
1993a: 74-76]. In quadrant 4, the home base is the MNE's source of its core 
competencies. This indeed is the focus of Porter's thesis. In addition, he posits that the 
ultimate global strategy is when a firm shifts its home base [Porter 1990: 615]. This can 
be illustrated in quadrant 1. However, Rugman and Verbeke argue that large MNEs are 
becoming increasingly independent of their home base. They are selectively utilising 
other nations' diamonds to develop international competitiveness [Rugman and Verbeke 
1993a: 74]. Quadrant 1 demonstrates the firm whose core competency is derived from 
its ability to co-ordinate and control geographically dispersed, value-added activities. 
This ability is increasingly becoming critical to the global firm's development of a 
sustainable competitive advantage [Dunning 1993a: 80]. 
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It is quadrant 3 of Figure 4.2 from which the "Double Diamond" model is 
derived. As discussed earlier, Rugman and D' Cruz note that to be competitive, firms in 
small, open, trading economies need to link their national diamond with that of their 
leading trading partner (See Figure 4.3). In this way, they would drawn upon both 
diamonds for factors (labour, capital and infrastructure), demand (knowledge of the 
trends in demand), supplier and related industries (accessing internationally competitive 
supplier firms in both locales), and inter-firm rivalry (benchmarking themselves against 
their most formidable competitors). In so doing, managers of firms in small, open 
economies would be able to access the determinants of competitiveness in the market of 
their leading trading partner as well as thoseof their home country. 
Figure 4.3 The Double Diamond of Competitive Advantage 
Supporting Infrastructure of Home Country 
of Home Country Customers in Home 
Government in Home Country 
Home Country's 
MNEs 
Resource of Host Country IS, L =ý Government in Host Country 
Supporting Infrastructure of Host Country 
Source: Adapted from Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Strategic Management: An 
Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework, " Management International Review 33 Special 
Issue (1993), Figure 3. 
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Indeed, it seems that it is the "synergistic combination" of determinants at the 
national as well as those at the international level that create global competitiveness 
[Rugman and Verbeke 1993b: 287]. It is noteworthy that Porter does not believe that the 
foreign activity of the multinational enterprise should be incorporated into the single 
diamond model. He notes that Rugman has failed to distinguish between the 
"geographic scope" of competition {regional or local) and the "geographic locus" of 
competitive advantage as seen in the single diamond [Porter and Armstrong 1992: 8]. 
Yet, as Ragman notes, the appropriate size of the diamond is not determined by the 
firm's home base, but by its strategy [Rugman 1992: 8]. Clearly, a multinational firm 
will selectively use elements of the diamonds of countries in which it operates to gain 
global advantages. Moreover, it can be suggested that the proclivity of MNEs to tap into 
other national diamonds will certainly increase with the present emergence of regional 
trading blocs such as the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the European 
Union (EU), and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). 
Hence, the "Double Diamond" model suggests that firms operating in the small, 
open economies of the Caribbean will link the diamond of these countries with that of 
their major trading partner. Conversely, this study argues that the MNE which makes 
investment in the Caribbean will attempt to link the diamond of its home country with 
that of the Caribbean. Further, it is posited that any analysis of the "Double Diamond" 
model for the Caribbean will reveal the locational endowments, i. e., the determinants of 
the Caribbean diamond, which the DINE uses together with those of its home country to 
achieve international competitiveness. 
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Summary 
Despite the diversity in the arguments presented by the researchers discussed 
above, several common themes emerge from the analysis. Firstly, all the location 
theorists emphasise that factor cost considerations are a critical variable in the location 
of production in developing countries. Indeed, Vernon and Frobel identify low-cost 
factors as locational assets of these countries. Frobel elaborates that it is unskilled and 
semi-skilled labour, which is docile and easily trained, that is a locational attraction. In 
addition, Frobel and Vernon have alluded to the role that raw materials play in attracting 
FDI into developing regions. 
In addition, researchers such as Frobel and Sharpston note the important role 
that governments play in influencing the inflows of FDI. Indeed, Frobel posits that it is 
the government's creation of free production zones that precipitated the flow of FDI 
into the developing world. 
Finally, several researchers emphasised the role that corporate strategy plays in 
the locational decision. Rugman and D' Cruz note that the MNE, to be internationally 
competitive, will integrate its home country diamond with that of its major trading 
partner. 
Several of the issues discussed above have formed the basis of much of the 
empirical analyses undertaken in the location theory literature. Some of these studies 
and their findings will be discussed in the following section. 
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4.3. The Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of the MNE's Locational 
Choices 
The empirical research conducted on the determinants of the MNE's locational 
decision has generally tended to adopt two approaches: a quantitative and a qualitative 
approach. In the following section, some of the major studies undertaken will be 
discussed. However, attempts will be made to limit the analysis to the literature that 
seeks to explore the factors that determine the MNE's decision to locate its foreign 
production in developing countries. 
4.3.1. Qualitative Studies 
Two studies discussed in this section examine the "proximate" environment in 
which the firm operates. The other, analyses one of the policy instruments that 
governments in developing countries implement to attract foreign investment. This is 
the investment incentive system. 
One of the earlier studies undertaken was that of Reuber [1973]. On the basis of 
interviews conducted with executives in North America, Europe and Japan, he sought to 
analyse the factors influencing firms' decision to locate their production in developing 
economies. The study examined two types of FDI: domestic market development and 
export-seeking. Reuber notes that there was no overriding factor that influenced a firm's 
locational decision. However, he posits that the factors which appeared to affect market 
development FDI were the size of the host country's market and the policies that are 
enacted to protect this market from competing imports. By contrast, export-oriented 
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investments were lured by the availability of low-cost factor inputs, significantly skilled 
and unskilled labour, and basic infrastructure. Financial incentives such as tax holidays, 
duty remissions and accelerated depreciation on machinery and equipment were also of 
critical importance [Reuber et al. 1973: 118-119]. 
It is noteworthy that Reuber concludes that the incentive system does have some 
influence over the locational decisions of firms. The incentives which are of the most 
significance are tariffs, quotas on competing imports, concessions on imports of inputs 
and tax concessions [ibid., 128]. However, he reveals that the incentive system itself 
was inefficient since under alternate arrangements the same level of investment could 
have been attracted at much lower costs. One of the reasons he adduces for this 
inefficiency was the highly complex nature of the system which results in high 
transaction and administration costs. He also states that the system itself was 
contradictory in nature since it was possible to simultaneously find policies to enhance 
FDI along with those to discourage it. Moreover, he argues that because of fierce 
competition among developing countries to provide such incentives, many of the 
incentives granted cancel out each other. Hence, the incentive system simply functions 
to raise the rents accruing to the existing investors. It is inefficient in luring new 
investment [ibid., 129]. 
There were several factors that Reuber identified as having little impact on the 
investment decisions of the firms surveyed. These include the fears of political 
instability, devaluation, expropriation and restrictions on foreign ownership. He states 
that while these considerations are not unimportant, the differences among developing 
economies are so minimal that they have little effect on the firms' locational choices. 
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Another landmark study was that of the Guisinger et al. survey of 74 foreign 
direct investment projects [Guisinger et al. 1985]. These projects were based in four 
industries which were located in ten countries. Both developed and developing 
countries were surveyed. Unlike Reuber, Guisinger focused solely on the investment 
incentives offered by governments to attract FDI. Nonetheless, he emphasises that a 
variety of factors influences the locational decision of a firm. Indeed, he postulates that 
the net incentive, the variety of the incentives, the stability of policies, the timing of 
incentives, investment promotion and government services in infrastructural projects all 
impact on a firm's locational decision [Guisinger 1986b: 85]. However, he states that 
the net incentive, which he describes as the net rate on return of all investment 
incentives granted, is the most important influencing factor. Moreover, like Reuber, he 
concludes that investment incentives are an effective mechanism for attracting foreign 
direct investment. 
The main contribution of Guisinger's study to the location theory literature is its 
clarification of the investment incentives which attract the various types of FDI [Wells 
1986]. Indeed, Guisinger attempted to distinguish between the types of incentives 
offered. Two types were identified: Factor based and commodity based incentives. 
Factor based incentives are those which affect the cost of production. They include tax 
holidays, interest subsidies, cash grants and accelerated depreciation allowances. 
Conversely, commodity based incentives affect revenues and the intermediate input 
costs of the factors of production. These are incentives aimed at protecting the investor 
from import competition. They include tariffs and quotas. In addition, Guisinger 
distinguishes between the markets in which FDI is oriented. He identifies three such 
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markets: the domestic market of the host country, the regional market (e. g., the 
European Union) and the world export market. 
Guisinger arrived at the same conclusions on investment incentives that Reuber 
had almost a decade earlier. Thus, Guisinger concludes that factor incentives had 
virtually no impact on the locational decision of firms that were engaged in market- 
oriented investment. By contrast, commodity based incentives influenced this type of 
investment. Factor based incentives were influential in the locational decisions of 
MNEs that were primarily engaged in export-oriented activities. Commodity based 
incentives, however, had little impact on the investment decisions of firms involved in 
this activity. He further notes that factor based incentives and, on occasion, commodity 
based incentives, such as government procurement practices, affected the locational 
decision of firms investing in the common market [Guisinger et al. 1985: 318-319]. 
Unlike Reuber, Guisinger, in his analysis of fiscal incentives, also included the 
performance requirements that are mandated by some countries on the investments 
made by MNEs. He reveals that performance requirements do influence the investment 
decisions of foreign firms. However, their influence varies across industries and 
countries. Guisinger also notes that developed countries were more likely to use factor 
based incentives since their ability to offer commodity based incentives was limited by 
the rules of the European Union. In contrast, performance requirements were widely 
used in developing countries. It appears that the requirements for their successful 
application -a large domestic market - exist in some of these countries. 
A more recent study on the locational choices of 140 US multinationals 
operating in developing countries was conducted by Wallace [1990]. This study sought 
to ascertain the critical impediments that MNEs face when investing in the developing 
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world. The study findings reveal that the tax policy of the host country plays a critical 
role in the locational decision. Moreover, in contrast to Reuber, Wallace posits that 
country risk figures prominently in the MNE's locational choices. She states that 
political instability, threats of expropriation and stringent policies towards profit 
repatriation are serious deterrents to FDI. However, Wallace's findings on factor cost 
considerations were similar to those of some of the theorists discussed (Frobel, Vernon). 
Approximately 45 per cent of the firms surveyed, identified the availability and cost of 
raw materials, and significantly, trained labour, as critical factors in their locational 
choices. Indeed, it has been suggested that MNEs are increasingly attracted to regions in 
which there are pools of low-cost, skilled labour [Campbell 1994: 201]. 
Thus, the qualitative analyses on the locational decisions of MNEs in developing 
countries have supported many of the hypotheses proposed by the location theorists 
examined earlier. As Reuber and Wallace conclude, FDI inflows are attracted to 
countries that offer low-cost factor inputs. This supports the theories advanced by 
Vernon and Frobel. In addition, Reuber and Guisinger's finding on investment 
incentives was critical. Indeed, it appears that market-oriented FDI is induced by 
commodity based incentives. Conversely, export-oriented investment is lured by factor 
based incentives. However, the evidence on country risk is inconclusive. Reuber and 
Wallace obtained conflicting results on its impact on FDI. 
Many of these propositions were econometrically tested. Some of these studies 
will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
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4.3.2. Quantitative Analyses 
The empirical studies discussed in the following sections explore the influence 
that selected locational endowments have on the firm's locational decision. The three 
elements analysed are investment incentives, trade restrictions and preferential trading 
agreements. The first two locational elements have been discussed by several of the 
theorists examined earlier. The second, preferential trading agreements, has been 
included in this analysis because of their proliferation in the Caribbean region [World 
Bank 1988]. Alternatively, other studies have attempted to ascertain the locational 
factors which induce specific types of FDI. Indeed, several theorists argue that the 
various types of FDI respond differently to the locational advantages of a host country 
[Woodward and Rolfe 1993; Coyne 1995]. At present, many developing countries, 
including those of the Caribbean region, are attempting to attract export-oriented FDI 
[World Bank 1987a]. Thus, this analysis will attempt to examine some of the seminal 
studies conducted on the factors influencing the locational decisions of export-seeking 
MNEs that operate in developing countries. 
4.3.2.1 Investment Incentives 
Several of the quantitative studies have attempted to test the influence that 
investment incentives have on the firm's decision to engage in FDI in developing 
countries. One such study is that of Lim [1983]. It is noteworthy that Lim found no 
support for the hypothesis that fiscal incentives (tax holidays and cost lowering 
incentives) are necessary to attract FDI. He argues that influence of non-tax factors (a 
The preferential trading agreements which are enjoyed by the countries of the Caribbean are those 
offered under the Generalised System of Preferences, the Multifibre Agreement, the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, the Canadian Preferential Trade Scheme for the Commonwealth Caribbean (CARIBCAN), 
and the Lome Convention. 
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proven record of economic performance and the presence of natural resources) play a 
more decisive role in the locational decision. Indeed, Lim discovered an inverse 
relationship between the generosity of fiscal incentives and FDI inflows. A possible 
explanation for this relationship was advanced by Shah and Toyne [1978]. These 
researchers argue that countries lacking in natural resources endowments, technology 
and labour skills, compete fiercely for foot-loose manufacture investment. In their 
excessively generous provision of fiscal incentives, these economies compete away 
potential revenues from corporate taxes. They found this phenomenon to characterise 
small island and "quasi-island" economies [ibid., 285]. 
Similar conclusions were arrived at by Wheeler and Mody [ 1991 ]. They describe 
the manner in which foreign governments compete for FDI with tax and other 
incentives as "location tournaments". Their analysis suggests that US firms are 
influenced by the agglomeration benefits, such as the infrastructure quality, the degree 
of industrialisation and the level of investment in their choice of locating international 
production. Most importantly, it is argued that for developing countries, the critical 
variable that influences a firm's locational decision is not tax incentives, but the 
presence of good quality infrastructure [ibid., 71 ]. It appears that transfer pricing and the 
US tax legislation negate the benefits of tax incentives. 
Loree and Guisinger [1995] also lend support to the argument that the provision 
of generous investment incentives does not necessarily result in increased flows of 
inward FDI. Indeed, it could be inferred from their analysis that it may be more 
beneficial for a developing country to invest in upgrading its infrastructure than to grant 
redundant incentives [Loree and Guisinger 1995: 296]. 
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It is noteworthy that conflicting results were obtained in the studies that 
examined the efficacy of investment incentives on firms' decision to engage in FDI in 
the Caribbean. Rolfe and White [ 1992], using a decision modelling approach, attempted 
to ascertain the importance that forty managers ascribed to selected tax incentives 
relative to non-tax incentives. This study analysed the initial investment decision of the 
managers who were involved in offshore, export-oriented investment in the Caribbean. 
Their findings revealed that tax incentives (tax holidays and import duty exemptions) 
are insufficient to attract FDI. These tax incentives are not able to overcome 
unfavourable non-tax factors (uncompetitive wages, dividend remittance policy and 
infrastructure). Moreover, the efficacy of tax incentives is diminished by the practice of 
transfer pricing implemented by the parent and subsidiary companies. Nonetheless, the 
researchers argue that in instances where the non-tax factors were generally favourable, 
the two tax factors influenced the locational decision. Rolfe et al. [1993] obtained 
somewhat different results. However, this study was based on the responses of 891 
managers of firms that were involved in both market-seeking and export-seeking FDI in 
the Caribbean. It seems that the investment incentives most preferred by the respondents 
were related to tax factors (tax holidays and import duty concessions) or foreign 
exchange controls (free repatriation of profit and dividends). It is noteworthy that 
exporters considered import duty concessions to be more desirable than did investors 
geared to the domestic market. Similarly, Coyne [1995] discovered that repatriation 
schemes were critical to the initial investment decision of firms involved in market- 
seeking, export-seeking and resource-seeking investment in Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad-Tobago. Tax holidays and duty exemption schemes were also of importance. 
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4.3.2.2 Trade Restrictions 
As noted earlier, government's intervention in the economy could have a 
decisive influence on FDI inflows. One policy instrument implemented by governments 
of both developed and developing countries is trade restrictions. 
A wealth of research has been conducted on the influence that trade restrictions 
has on the MNEs' locational decision. Kindleberger [1969] postulated that 
government's imposition of trade restrictions could inadvertently stimulate a firm to 
engage in FDI in the host country. Several qualitative studies support Kindleberger's 
hypothesis. Franko [ 1976] describes trade barriers as the "main triggers" of Continental 
European foreign manufacturing in developing countries in the post World War II 
period [Franko 1976: 115]. Similarly, Vernon [1971] revealed that trade barriers 
stimulated US MNE to set up manufacturing facilities to produce luxury goods for the 
affluent minority in developing countries during the same period [Vernon 1971: 53]. 
One of the earlier studies which attempted to test the influence that trade 
restrictions have on the locational decisions of NINE was Horst [1972]. Horst argues 
that foreign direct investment is the successor to foreign trade. His empirical analysis of 
US firms operating in Canada concluded that tariffs imposed in the host country 
positively influenced the propensity of US firms to establish manufacturing plants in 
Canada rather than export the product to the country. It is noteworthy that On [1975], 
using more disaggregated data, found no support for Horst's hypothesis. Similar 
conclusions were obtained in a later study conducted by Buckley and Dunning [1976]. 
Their study found that tariffs had no influence on US firms' decision to engage in FDI 
in the UK. 
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Conversely, Lall and Siddharthan [1982] posit that trade barriers were important 
in stimulating non-US MNEs to set up manufacturing operations in the USA. Hollander 
[1984] supports this hypothesis. He states that the propensity of US firms to replace 
exports by FDI was higher when the host country imposes trade restrictions against the 
competing imports. Moreover, he notes that the increased manufacturing production by 
US firms in the European Economic Community (EEC) in the late i 960s was a result of 
the discriminatory nature of EEC tariffs [Hollander 1984: 14-15]. A similar conclusion 
was arrived at by Scaperlanda and Balough [1983]. 
Conflicting results also have been found for the influence that trade restrictions 
have on the locational decisions of MNEs operating in developing countries. As 
discussed earlier, Reuber [1973] and Guisinger et al. [1985] found that trade restrictions 
against competing imports were powerful investment incentives for the market-seeking 
MNE. Further, Lecraw [1991] discovered that changes in the tariff rate had a positive 
influence on market-seeking FDI. Rolfe et al. [1993] support this argument. Their study 
revealed that the market-seeking investor moderately ranked tariff protection as his 
most desirable investment incentive. However, Agodo's findings on the determinants of 
US manufacturing investment in Africa contradicts those of the previous researchers. 
He states that despite the high tariff rates existing in Africa, a minority of the firms 
indicated that trade protection played a significant role in their locational decision 
[Agodo 1978: 102]. Similarly, Coyne's analysis of MNEs operating in three Caribbean 
countries found that market protection was of minimal importance to the market- 
seeking MNE [Coyne 1995: 127]. 
It is argued that tariffs are no longer such a powerful locational inducement 
[Dunning 1993a: 155]. Nonetheless, despite the present trade liberalisation schemes 
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currently being implemented in the Caribbean, the region still retains a relatively 
restrictive trade regime [World Bank 1993a: 20-25]. Thus, concerns on the influential 
impact that trade restrictions have on FDI inflows are still relevant to this region. 
4.3.2.3. Preferential Trading Agreements 
The imposition of trade restrictions is not the only means by which governments 
could distort trading patterns. Governments of advanced industrial economies can also 
conclude trading agreements which grant preferential access to their markets to selected 
developing countries' exports. Indeed, the granting of preferential trade agreements was 
initially proposed more than three decades ago [Yannopoulos 1986: 15]. The objective 
of these agreements was to aid the economic development process of countries of the 
Third World. Today, several of these agreements flourish, some of which include the 
General System of Preferences, the Lome Convention and the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative. 
Interestingly enough, it has been argued that the preference scheme is likely to 
promote foreign direct investment in the beneficiary country. Johnson posits that 
preferential trading schemes result in the establishment of a type of "tariff factory" in 
the recipient country. Multinationals locate production in the beneficiary country to 
exploit the advantage of preferential access to industrial markets. In so doing, they gain 
a competitive edge over the sales of rivals in the domestic market of the preference- 
giving country [Johnson 1968: 19]. It is noteworthy that this process is also referred to 
as foreign investment diversion [Kreinin 1975: 337]. 
Surprisingly, little research has been conducted on the influence that preferential 
trading agreements has on the creation of `tariff factories' in the beneficiary country. 
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Yannopoulos suggests that this paucity of research is likely to be a result of the failure 
to integrate preferential trading and geographic trade discrimination with the theory of 
international production. In addition, research has been hampered by the absence of 
adequate data [Yannopoulos 1986: 27]. Nevertheless, some surveys confirm the 
influence of preferential trading agreements on MNEs' locational decisions. 
One of the earlier analyses that explored the relationship between preferential 
trading agreements and foreign investment diversion was by Kreinin [1975]. He noted 
the impressive export performance of Greece following its association with the 
European Union in 1962. He attributes this growth in exports to foreign investment 
diversion resulting from the country's associate status [Kreinin 1975: 356]. 
Similarly, Joekes [1982]'s study of the clothing industry in Tunisia and Morocco 
demonstrates the influential impact that preferential trading agreements had on foreign 
investment in this sector. In 1970, selected industrial exports from these countries, 
including clothing, were granted preferential access to the EEC market. Joekes notes 
that the post 1970s growth of clothing exports was impressive. During the period 1970 
to 1978, Tunisia's clothing exports increased from $1 million to almost $ 200 million. 
Morocco's grew from less than $1 million to $ 65 million. It is significant to note that 
Tunisia's clothing exports outperformed those of Morocco. Joekes attributes Tunisia's 
superior performance to the larger number of foreign investors operating in this sector 
[Joekes 1982: 108]. 
Foreign investment diversion also occurred in the Caribbean region following 
the enactment of the US's Caribbean Basin Initiative. However, several researchers 
revealed that the volume of FDI inflows was not as much as initially anticipated 
[Griffith 1990; Azel 1991; Coppin 1992]. It appears that FDI flows were skewed 
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towards the garment sector. Moreover, it seems that these flows were concentrated in a 
few countries, notably the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Haiti and Jamaica [Griffith 
1990: 47-49]. 8 
It is noteworthy that the present preferential trading agreements enjoyed by the 
Caribbean countries are being superseded by the regional free trade agreements 
concluded by the benefactor countries. 9 This is clearly demonstrated by the nullifying 
effects that the NAFTA is having on the CBI agreements [Gill 1993]. Yet, the Caribbean 
region still benefits from a plethora of preferential trading agreements [World Bank 
1988]. It will thus be instructive to ascertain the extent to which these preferential 
agreements are a locational attraction to the MNEs. In addition, it will be useful to 
determine the role that these agreements play in the MNE's continued presence in the 
region. 
4.3.2.4 Export-oriented FDI: 
Other studies have solely concentrated on the determinants of a particular type 
of foreign direct investment in developing countries. In one such study, Kumar [1994] 
attempted to analyse the factors that influenced US MNEs to engage in export-oriented 
FDI in 40 developed and developing countries. 
8 The Caribbean Basin Initiative beneficiaries were the Central American countries of Guatemala, 
Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Panama, Costa Rica, and the countries of the Caribbean namely, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Jamaica, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis, 
Montserrat, Dominican Republic, Antigua, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Haiti, Barbados, the 
Netherlands Antilles, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
9 It is significant to note that one theorist describes the free trade areas which are presently emerging 
globally as nothing more than preferential trading agreements. He argues that these are not genuine 
free trade areas since they grant free trade to members, but (implicitly) protection against non- 
members. See Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements (Washington, 
D. C.: The AEI Press, 1996). 
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Kumar suggests that export-seeking investments are "special" types of FDI 
which are attracted to different locational advantages than market-seeking FDI [Kumar 
1994: 153]. He concludes that countries with low-cost labour were more successful than 
others in attracting this type of investment. In addition, he reveals that countries which 
possessed a pool of skilled labour, quality infrastructure and industrial services attracted 
export-seeking FDI. Interestingly enough, Kumar posits that economies, which were 
relatively closed, were able to successfully lure export-seeking FDI through the 
establishment of export processing zones. Further, he notes that fiscal incentives and 
government policies were insufficient in attracting offshore investment. Moreover, it 
seems that countries endowed with natural resources, for example, petroleum, were 
successful in inducing this investment. 
Thus, Kumar's findings, specifically, that the determinants of export-seeking 
FDI include low-cost labour, a fairly advanced infrastructure and the presence of natural 
resources, were not significantly different from those of the theorists discussed earlier. 
His conclusions, however, on the advantageous presence of export processing zones in 
otherwise closed economies were noteworthy. 
Another study that also examined export-seeking FDI is significant because of 
its regional selection. Woodward and Rolfe [1993], using a sample of 187 firms, sought 
to determine the locational factors that influenced MNEs to engage in export-seeking 
FDI in the Caribbean. 
Several of the authors' conclusions were consistent with those of the previous 
study. Thus, like Kumar, they conclude that foreign investors are deterred from 
countries with high labour costs. High transport costs as well as political instability 
were also disincentives to export-oriented investment. 
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In addition, the two authors posit that high levels of per capita income were an 
inducement for investment. Interestingly, they hypothesise that the level of per capita 
income was a measure of the quality of the country's infrastructure. High levels of per 
capita income indicated a sound infrastructure. Monetary variables also were identified 
as being important to attracting export-oriented investment. A devaluation of the 
exchange rate was perceived as having a positive influence on FDI while an increase in 
the inflation rate a negative one. 
The prevalence of manufacturing concentration also induced export-oriented 
FDI. The authors suggest that countries with strong manufacturing concentration are 
able to offer foreign investors the benefits of agglomeration economies. In addition, it is 
significant to note that the length of the tax holiday had a positive influence on export- 
oriented investment. It appears that the prevailing perception among the MNEs 
surveyed was that the longer the tax holiday, the more favourable was the host 
government's attitude towards FDI. The length of the tax holiday was also said to 
reflect the economic conditions of the host country. Similarly, the prevalence of profit 
repatriation restrictions was perceived to be a signal of the host country's negative 
attitude towards FDI. Like Kumar, Woodward and Rolfe also conclude that export 
processing zones play a role in luring foreign direct investment into developing 
countries. 
4.4 Conclusions 
It is now possible to draw some general conclusions about the factors that 
influence the locational choices of MNEs in developing countries. 
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There appears to be a consensus among theorists on the role that factor costs 
play in attracting FDI. As theorists such as Vernon, Frobel, Wallace and Kumar note 
factor cost considerations play a vital role in a MNE's choice of locating international 
production in developing regions. Generally, the factor identified is labour. Indeed, it 
seems that the presence of a low-cost, skilled and docile labour force is an important 
locational asset of developing countries. 
The studies were inconclusive on the effectiveness that the investment incentive 
system has in attracting FDI inflows into developing regions. One group of theorists, 
notably, Reuber and Guisinger, agree that the efficacy of this policy instrument is 
dependent upon the type of FDI. Thus, they argue that market-oriented investment is 
induced by investment incentive policies which seek to protect the domestic market 
from competing imports. This hypothesis has been supported by the empirical analyses 
conducted by Lecraw and Rolfe et al.. On the other hand, Reuber and Guisinger posit 
that export-oriented investment is attracted by those incentives which lower the cost of 
production. This hypothesis has been contradicted by the work of researchers such as 
Lim and Kumar. What is noteworthy, however, is the argument posed by Shah and 
Toyne that the investment incentive system of small, developing countries is an 
ineffective mechanism for attracting FDI. Moreover, theorists such as Wheeler and 
Mody, and Loree and Guisinger emphasise the locational attractions of quality 
infrastructure and agglomeration economies rather than the generous provision of 
investment incentives. Further, Frobel, Kumar, and Woodward and Rolfe argue that the 
government created, export processing zone is an efficient mechanism for luring FDI 
into otherwise unattractive regions. 
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In addition, it is noteworthy that several researchers such as Johnson, 
Yannopoulos and Joekes postulate that preferential trading agreements are likely to 
promote foreign direct investment in the beneficiary developing country. Finally, 
Rugman and D' Cruz posit that the MNE, to become globally competitive, will link its 
national diamond with that of its relevant Triad trading partner. This study contends that 
the "Double Diamond" model could effectively identify those critical locational 
advantages of the Caribbean that are used by the global firm in its attempts at achieving 
international competitiveness. 
4.5 Hypotheses on the location of foreign direct investment in the Caribbean 
Six hypotheses can be drawn from this analysis of the literature on location 
theory. These are: 
1. There is a positive relationship between the MNE and the decision to establish 
and continue operations in the Caribbean because of low-cost factors. 
2. There is a positive relationship between the presence of export processing zones 
and the export-seeking MNE. 
3. No relationship exists between investment incentives offered by the Caribbean 
governments and the MNE's decision to establish and continue operations in the 
Caribbean. 
4. There is a positive relationship between the market-seeking MNE and trade 
restrictions. 
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5. There is a positive relationship between the export-seeking and resource-seeking 
MNEs and the use of preferential trading agreements. 
6. There is a positive relationship between the national `diamond' of the MNE and 
the `diamond' of the Caribbean. 
The first hypothesis is drawn from the arguments advanced by Vernon and 
Frobel which were supported by the empirical analyses conducted by Reuber, Wallace, 
Kumar, and Woodward and Rolfe. This study argues that factor cost considerations are 
a significant locational advantage in the Caribbean. 
The arguments posited by Frobel, Kumar, Woodward and Rolfe form the basis 
for the second hypothesis. They all note the positive influence that the presence of 
export processing zones has in luring FDI into otherwise unattractive regions. As Pantin 
reveals, the Caribbean region boasts 22 export processing zones. Thus, it could be 
hypothesised that MNEs locate production in this region to take advantage of the 
locational benefits offered in these zones. 
The third hypothesis is drawn from the theories advanced by Lim, Toyne and 
Shah, and Loree and Guisinger. These theorists all note the limited influence that the 
investment incentive system has in attracting FDI in the developing world. Moreover, 
since 1973, the countries which are members of the Caribbean Common Market 
(CARICOM) have all sought to harmonise the fiscal incentives that are offered to the 
foreign investor. Hence, most of the countries in the Caribbean region offer the foreign 
investor almost similar investment incentives. It could thus be argued that the 
investment incentive system implemented by the Caribbean countries is not an 
important locational attraction to the foreign investor. 
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The fourth hypothesis is advanced from the arguments posed by Reuber and 
Guisinger which were supported by empirical analyses conducted by Lecraw and Rolfe 
et al.. This study argues that relatively restrictive trade regime of Caribbean is an 
incentive for the MINE to establish operations in the region. 
The fifth hypothesis was drawn from the postulate advanced by Johnson that 
was supported by the empirical analyses conducted by Kreinin and Joekes. It seems that 
preferential trading agreements are a locational asset of the beneficiary country. As 
earlier discussed, selected products from the Caribbean enjoy preferential access into 
the markets of several advanced industrial countries. Hence, this study posits that these 
preferential trading agreements will positively influence the locational decisions of the 
resource-seeking and export-seeking investors. 
The sixth hypothesis is derived from the arguments advanced by Rugman and 
D'Cruz, Rugman and Verbeke, and Moon, Rugman and Verbeke. These researchers 
postulate that the global firm will selectively use elements of the diamonds of the 
countries in which it operates. Moreover, as Rugman and Verbeke note, business firms 
in small, open economies will link their national diamond with the diamond of their 
major trading partner. Thus, this study argues that the MNE operating in the Caribbean 
will seek to integrate the diamond of their home country with that of the Caribbean. It is 
important to note that this hypothesis is the flip side of the original "Double Diamond" 
hypothesis. Indeed, unlike the theory postulated by Rugman et al., which focuses on 
outward FDI, the hypothesis advanced in this study, examines inward FDI. 
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Chapter Five 
The Modes of Foreign Direct Investment 
5.1. Introduction 
The forms of institutional involvement employed by MNE in international 
markets range from spot market transactions at one extreme to hierarchical 
transactions at another. This diversity in the forms of foreign investment begs the 
question as to the factors that determine the MNE's choice of international market 
entry modes. This chapter seeks to examine how the literature has addressed this 
question. In addition, emphasis will be placed on the theories which attempt to explain 
the determinants of the MNE's mode of international production in developing 
countries. 
5.2 Theories On The Modes Of Foreign Direct Investment 
5.2.1 Transactions Costs and the Choice of Market Entry Mode 
The transaction cost theory, as initially postulated by Williamson [1975, 
1981 ], is one of the theories that sought to explain the factors influencing the MNE's 
choice of institutional involvement. Williamson views the modem corporation, 
notably the MNE, as "the product of a series of organisational innovations that have 
the purpose and effect of economising on transaction costs" [Williamson 1981: 1537]. 
Hence, he postulates that a firm will engage in international production when the costs 
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of using arm's-length agreements exceed those it would incur from internalising the 
exchange. The transaction costs identified by Williamson were those associated with 
the repeated transfer of complex technology. They include all payments connected 
with the search by the seller for a suitable buyer, or vice versa; those of negotiating a 
contract as well as those incurred in monitoring the effects of the transaction so that 
the interests of the transactor are protected. He argues that the mode of foreign 
involvement utilised by the MNE will be that of a wholly owned subsidiary. This 
organisational form facilitates better disclosure, more efficient governance and easier 
agreement than arm's-length trading [Williamson 1981: 1563]. 
Teece [1981,1983,1986] elaborated on this theory. The concept of transaction 
costs arising from the transfer of idiosyncratic technology was now extended to 
include other types of proprietary knowledge. Thus, Teece identifies transaction costs 
to include those involved in the transfer of managerial and marketing know-how. He 
also considers those incurred in protecting the quality of products or services 
associated with low-technology, high-service industries. 
In addition, a distinction was made between the horizontally and vertically 
integrated MNE. The former produces the same goods in plants located in different 
parts of the world. The vertically integrated MNE, on the other hand, is involved in 
the transfer of intermediate products between its geographically dispersed facilities. 
Teece argues that the horizontally integrated MNE emerges because of the transaction 
costs associated with the transfer of proprietary assets. In addition, this type of MNE 
results from the firm's desire to protect product or service quality. Conversely, the 
vertically integrated MNE is a result of the firm's attempts to avoid the transaction 
costs stemming from high switching costs [Teece 1983: 53-57]. 
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Another school of thought, which has adopted a perspective similar to that of 
the transaction cost theory, is the internalisation theory. Both of these theories view 
the emergence of the MNE as a response to market failure. However, their emphasis 
differs. The transaction cost theory focuses on the transaction as its unit of analysis 
while the internalisation theory emphasises the internalisation of markets [Teece 
1986: 23-24]. 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the internalisation theory argues that a firm 
will internalise production when markets for intermediate products fail. The 
protagonists of this theory concentrate on the internalisation of markets for certain 
types of raw material and proprietary knowledge. According to the internalisation 
theory, the MNE will choose the wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of entry into 
international markets. 
Within recent times, however, there have been modifications to these theories 
to allow for the pervasive spread of other institutional forms of foreign involvement. 
Thus, the original protagonists of the internalisation theory, Buckley and Casson, have 
modified the theory to include 50-50 equity joint ventures. They state that "joint 
ventures are compromise contractual arrangements that minimise transaction costs 
under certain environmental constraints" [Buckley and Casson 1988: 52]. They posit 
that joint venture agreements will be concluded once there are benefits from 
internalising the market for intermediate goods and services traded between two firms. 
Buckley and Casson identify a particular type of joint venture, the "symmetrically 
motivated" joint venture. In this arrangement, each partner has the same motivations 
for internalisation. According to Buckley and Casson, the motivations for entering a 
joint venture include the benefits arising from economies of scale and scope. They 
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postulate that joint ventures also exist because of the technical complementarity 
between the inputs of both firms. They also argue that there are obstacles that prevent 
the merger of the individual firms. Buckley and Casson cite the managerial difficulties 
that arise in operating the resultant enterprise, the legal impediments, for example, 
anti-trust legislation, or the restrictions on foreign acquisitions. They emphasise that 
joint venture arrangements need to be explained in terms of internalisation economies, 
the benefits arising from the merger as well as the obstacles to the merger. The 
authors state that the strength of the MNE's desire to enter into a joint venture is 
determined by the extent to which the internalisation economies are constrained by the 
other two factors, that is, the benefits arising from the merger and the obstacles to the 
merger. Further, they assert that the MNE will choose to serve a market by means of a 
joint venture, the larger are the obstacles to the merger, the smaller are the benefits to 
the merger, and the smaller are the internalisation economies (relative to the two other 
factors) [Buckley and Casson 1988: 42]. 
Beamish and Banks [1987] also qualified the internalisation theory to allow 
for conditions under which firms will engage in joint ventures. Using the transaction 
cost paradigm, they argue that a successful manufacturing joint venture is established 
in a developing country where there is a "spirit of mutual trust and a commitment to 
the long-term commercial success" of the venture [Beamish and Banks 1987: 4]. 
Success is reinforced when these attitudes are supported by organisational systems 
such as profit sharing and joint decision making. Beamish and Banks posit that it is 
under these conditions, the MNE overcomes the transactional disabilities which cause 
it to bypass the market and form a wholly owned subsidiary. The foreign firm is thus 
able to gain the efficiency and revenue gains available from a joint venture agreement. 
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It is noteworthy that there are similarities between the transaction cost theory 
and the internalisation theory. Buckley postulates that both of these theories assume 
that organisations economise on transaction costs. Further, he notes that both theories 
need supporting assumptions for their empirical verification [Buckley 1988: 131]. 
Much of the empirical analysis conducted on these theories is derived from the 
assumption that the MNE economises on transaction costs. It is noteworthy that the 
firm which economises on transaction costs by internalising its intermediate markets, 
will be engaged in intra-firm trade [Buckley and Pearse 1979]. Moreover, it can be 
argued that the firm which is involved in intra-firm trade generally will choose a 
wholly owned subsidiary as its international entry mode [Caves 1982: 87; Farge and 
Wells 1982: 13-15; Dunning 1988: 194]. 
It appears that the technological intensity of a product has a positive effect on 
the propensity of the firm to engage in intra-firm trade [Cho 1990]. Moreover, 
Anderson and Gatignon [1986] propose that for highly proprietary products or 
processes, the firm will select modes of entry that offer greater control, such as a 
wholly owned subsidiary. Further, Gomes-Casseres [1989] suggests that firms with a 
network of subsidiaries, that is integrated into their global system, will prefer whole 
ownership as their mode of international involvement. He postulates that these firms 
will be better able to exploit the global economies of scale and scope with this foreign 
entry mode [ibid., 14]. 
Interestingly enough, Gomes-Casseres [1990] posits that if these MNEs are 
unable to obtain whole ownership of their subsidiaries, they may avoid investing in 
the restrictive countries. He further states that if the firms did proceed with the 
investment in such countries, they would modify the subsidiary's strategy to reduce 
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the extent of intra-firm trade [ibid., 17]. Thus, it seems that the MNE, which is 
involved in intra-firm trade, will select a market entry mode which allows it to 
exercise control over the operations of its subsidiaries. Anderson and Gatignon [1986] 
note that control is vital to the future of such enterprises. It influences their ability to 
implement strategies, co-ordinate activities and to resolve disputes. In addition, the 
firm is able to secure a larger share of the foreign profits if it has control [ibid., 3]. 
Strategies that require high control normally result in the formation of a wholly owned 
subsidiary [Stopford and Wells 1972; Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Hill et al. 1990]. 
The literature thus suggests that the firm, which is involved in intra-firm trade, will 
favour a high-control market entry mode, i. e., the wholly owned subsidiary. 
5.2.2 Culture and Market Entry Choices 
Several researchers, for example, Davidson [1980], have demonstrated the 
propensity of MNEs to establish production in countries that are culturally similar to 
their home country. Yet, it was Kogut and Singh [1988] who first attempted to relate 
this phenomenon to the firm's selection of market entry modes. 
Kogut and Singh postulate that the transaction cost theory does not sufficiently 
explain the MNE's selection of international entry mode. They argue that the 
transaction cost theory needs to be qualified by factors which stem from the 
institutional and cultural context [Kogut and Singh 1988: 412]. Indeed, they state that 
cultural differences influence managers' attitudes towards the costs and uncertainty of 
alternative market entry modes [ibid., 414]. Further, these authors posit that it is the 
differences in the culture between the host and target country which influence the 
investing firm's selection of market entry mode. They sought to test this hypothesis 
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by examining the influence that the cultural characteristics of a country had upon its 
firm's choice of entry mode into the US. The authors limited their analysis to three 
forms of institutional involvement: wholly owned greenfield investment, joint venture 
and acquisition. 
Kogut and Singh argue that differences in national cultures result in different 
organisational and management practices as well as employee expectations. Hence, 
the greater the cultural distance between two countries, the greater will be the 
likelihood that their organisational characteristics will be different. Further, they note 
that firms emerging from culturally distant countries will experience greater 
difficulties in effectively managing a foreign acquisition than those from culturally 
similar countries. These difficulties arise from the differences in administrative and 
cultural practices, and personal characteristics between the target and investing firm 
[ibid., 414]. Kogut and Singh thus posit that the firm's selection of an international 
entry mode is influenced by two cultural factors. The first is the relative cultural 
distance between the home country of the investing firm and the host nation. The 
second is the investing firm's underlying cultural attitudes towards uncertainty 
avoidance. 
The measures of culture, deployed by Kogut and Singh, were derived from the 
indices designed by Hofstede. Hofstede [1983] perceived that differences in national 
culture varied along four dimensions. These he identified as uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism, tolerance of power distance and masculinity versus femininity. Scales 
were devised for countries along each of these four dimensions. It was these scales 
which were used by Kogut and Singh to test the influence of the two cultural variables 
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(uncertainty avoidance and cultural distance) on the selection of market entry modes 
by foreign firms making investment in the US during the period 1981 to 1988. 
Statistical testing lent strong support to the postulate that cultural differences 
affect the selection of market entry mode. Kogut and Singh's analysis revealed that 
the more culturally distant from the US is the investing firm, the greater is the 
likelihood of it selecting a joint venture over an acquisition. Weaker support was 
found for the probability of the firm choosing a greenfield investment over an 
acquisition. In addition, the effect of uncertainty avoidance increases the probability 
of a firm's choosing a joint venture and a greenfield investment over an acquisition. 
It appears that cultural factors (cultural distance and uncertainty avoidance) do 
play an influencing role in the MNE's selection of foreign entry modes. The firm that 
perceives the host country to be cultural distant will likely choose a wholly owned 
greenfield or a joint venture over an acquisition. The investing firm seems to place 
greater costs and risks to managing an acquisition relative to a wholly owned 
greenfield investment or a joint venture. Further, the firm characterised by relatively 
high uncertainty avoidance in its management practices, will likely select a wholly 
owned greenfield or a joint venture over an acquisition. In so doing, it is attempting to 
avoid the potential administrative conflicts that may arise from its management of a 
foreign acquisition. 
It is noteworthy that Padmanabhan and Cho [1996] arrived at fairly similar 
conclusions to Kogut and Singh [1988]. The former study examined the factors 
affecting the selection of market entry mode of Japanese MNEs in 36 countries during 
the years, 1969 to 1991. Unlike Kogut and Singh, Padmanabhan and Cho analysed 
only two international entry modes: wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
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They concluded that Japanese firms were more likely to select wholly owned 
subsidiaries in culturally distant host countries than culturally similar ones. 
Padmanabhan and Cho deduce that the costs and uncertainties of managing joint 
ventures were much greater in culturally dissimilar countries than culturally similar 
ones. Most importantly, they revealed that cultural dissimilarity still played a 
significant role in increasing the likelihood of the Japanese firms selecting a wholly 
owned subsidiary in non-restrictive countries. It seems that the Japanese preference 
for wholly owned subsidiaries in culturally dissimilar countries becomes more 
pronounced when they have greater latitude to choose between alternative market 
entry modes [Padmanabhan and Cho 1996: 59] 
Interestingly enough, Kogut and Singh postulate that these cultural factors 
may be later superseded by the firm's multinational experience [Kogut and Singh 
1988: 429]. Indeed, it has been argued that the international experience of a firm 
influences its choice of market entry mode. This issue will be discussed in the 
following section. 
5.2.3 International Experience and Market Entry Choices 
One school of thought postulates that there is a direct relationship between a 
firm's selection of market entry mode and the level of its international experience 
[Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; Johanson and Vahlne 1977,1990; Welch and 
Luostarinen 1988; Forsgen 1989]. This is the internationalisation theory. This theory 
sought to explain the internationalisation process of firms emerging from the small, 
domestic markets of the Scandinavian countries. 
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In this theory, the internationalisation process is viewed as a sequential affair. 
The firm's involvement in a foreign market develops according to an establishment 
chain [Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975: 307]. The firm, with little international 
experience, enters a foreign market by indirect exporting. It progresses to the 
establishment of a sales subsidiary and eventually to the investment in production 
facilities. The driving force of this internationalisation process is "experimental 
market knowledge" [Johanson and Vahlne 1990: 12]. At each successive stage of the 
internationalisation process, the firm gains valuable knowledge of opportunities and 
problems in the market. This knowledge reduces market uncertainty. Hence, the firm 
makes greater resource commitments to the country as it gains experience from its 
operations in the market. 
In addition, the theorists postulate that the MNE will initially invest in markets 
that are of a limited psychic distance from its home country. Psychic distance is 
defined as the factors which prevent the flow of information between firm and 
markets. They include differences in language, culture, political systems and levels of 
education and industrial development [Johanson and Weidersheim-Paul 1975: 307]. 
The internationalisation theory argues that MNE's initial investment will be in 
markets which are similar to its home country in culture, political systems and level of 
industrial development. As the MNE gains international experience, it will 
progressively enter countries that are of a greater psychic distance from its home 
country. 
Several researchers have supported the postulate that the MNE's level of 
foreign experience directly influences its selection of a market entry mode. Indeed, 
research conducted on US MNEs supports this theory [Davidson 1980; Loree and 
90 
Guisinger 1995]. Similarly, work done on the service MNEs in the Asia-Pacific region 
has confirmed this theory [Li 1994]. In addition, the behaviour of Japanese MNEs in 
the US and Canada was found to be consistent with the internationalisation theory 
[Tan and Vertinsky 1996]. Further, researchers examining the internationalisation 
process of selected companies also found support for the theory of internationalisation 
[Fina and Rugman 1996]. Nonetheless, the internationalisation theory has provoked 
several criticisms. One researcher, using the arguments of the transaction cost theory, 
notes that the internationalisation theory makes the implicit assumption that the firm 
is producing and marketing abroad a standardised product [Rugman 1980a]. Rugman 
argues that for licensing to be a viable option at the early stages of 
internationalisation, the product must be standardised. He notes that if the firm 
possesses unique firm-specific assets, it will be unwilling to lose these assets through 
premature licensing. Indeed, the licensing option will only be used when the product 
is mature. Alternatively, the firm will only use licensing agreements if it can 
successfully segment its markets [ibid., 24]. Other theorists argue that the 
internationalisation theory is based on the investment behaviour of firms emerging 
from the homogenous Scandinavian bloc. This thus raises questions as to the 
representativeness of the research [Sullivan and Bauerschmidt 1990]. Sullivan and 
Bauerschmidt posit that there is a possibility that nation-specific factors may moderate 
the internationalisation process [ibid., 28]. 
The internationalisation theorists admit that the simple theory of 
internationalisation was a satisfactory explanation for the foreign investment 
behaviour of firms until the mid 1970s. After this period, markets became more 
globalised and integrated thus rendering the explanation of a sequential, stepwise 
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internationalisation process inappropriate [Welch and Luostarinen 1988: 50; Fina and 
Rugman 1996: 201]. Yet, several aspects of the theory appear to be still relevant. The 
literature seems to suggest that the international experience of a firm plays a decisive 
role in its choice of operating in foreign, culturally different markets. It appears that as 
multinational managers become more acculturated, they are more willing to enter into 
psychically distant markets [Li and Guisinger 1992: 685; Loree and Guisinger 1995: 
294]. It could further be argued that such MNEs when not constrained by country- 
specific factors such as host government regulations, will seek to use the mode of a 
wholly owned subsidiary in these markets. 
5.2.4 Developing Countries and the New Forms of Foreign Direct Investment 
Over the last two decades, there has been a discernible shift away from the 
MNE's use of the wholly owned subsidiary to institutional modes that involve less 
equity participation. Several of the theorists previously discussed have alluded to this 
[Stopford and Wells 1972; Beamish and Banks 1987; Buckley and Casson 1988; 
Gomes-Casseres 1990]. This study makes special mention of these new institutional 
forms of foreign involvement because they are especially prevalent in developing 
countries [Beamish 1994: 493]. The emergence of the new international entry modes 
was a result of host government's policies during the pre-1980 period, the MNE's 
perception of the advantages of alternative forms of involvement and the advent of the 
smaller MNEs [Helleiner 1987: 70]. It is noteworthy that the 1980s was characterised 
by a period of global liberalisation with many governments removing restrictions on 
foreign equity. Nevertheless, these forms of foreign ownership still prevail, albeit in 
reduced numbers, in both developed and developing regions [Contractor 1990]. 
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The new modes of market entry are diverse in nature. They occupy that grey 
area between spot market transactions and the total merger of the firm. They include 
such forms of foreign involvement as joint ventures where the equity does not exceed 
50 per cent, licensing agreements, turnkey contracts and management contracts. It is 
thus questionable whether all of these new forms of foreign involvement are indeed 
investments. However, this study seeks only to analyse 50-50 and minority joint 
venture agreements. It is believed that in these forms of institutional involvement, all 
parties have an interest in the viability of the project as an investment. 
Some of the theories which were discussed previously have attempted to 
explain why the firm will select these international entry modes rather than the wholly 
owned subsidiary. As noted in Section 5.2.1, Beamish and Banks [1^987] modified the 
internalisation theory to allow for joint venture agreements. They posit that joint 
venture agreements prevail under conditions of mutual trust and commitment, and 
hedging against uncertainty. Buckley and Casson [1988] added two factors: the 
benefits arising from the merger and the obstacles to merger. Another theorist states 
that the basis for these inter-firm arrangements is collaboration. Richardson [1972] 
posits the prime reason for the existence of such agreements is the need for firms to 
co-ordinate closely complementary yet dissimilar activities. Further, other theorists 
perceive the choice of market entry influenced by the interaction of the transaction 
cost theory (what the firm wants) and the bargaining power approach (what the firm 
gets) [Gomes-Casseres 1990; Pan 1996]. 
Interestingly enough, in developing countries, the new forms of foreign 
involvement appear to be concentrated in specific industries. Oman [1988] reveals 
that in developing countries there is a proliferation of these investments in the 
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extractive industry, specifically the petroleum industry. In the manufacturing sector, 
the new forms of investment are likely to be found in investment projects where the 
output is marketed in the domestic or regional market. There is a noticeable absence 
of these modes of investment in production for export [ibid., 388-391]. Further, 
several theorists note that that these investments are likely to be found in investment 
projects that use relatively stable or low technologies. They are less likely to be found 
in technology-intensive activities [Stopford and Wells 1971: 119-123; Oman 1988: 
390; Franko 1989: 281. Alternatively, it is suggested that the new forms of investment 
are concentrated in the high-growth industries or in the high value-added segments of 
the industries of the host country. In these industries, governments clearly wield 
considerable bargaining power over the MNE [Oman 1988: 391]. 
In addition, it appears that the new international entry modes tend to be used 
by the "newcomer" and follower MNEs in their attempts to compete with the more 
established MNEs in global markets [Stopford and Wells 1971: 138-141; Oman 1988: 
386; Franko 1989: 27-29; Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992: 20]. In some cases, these 
institutional forms of foreign involvement are used as aggressive investments to 
penetrate or increase market share in industries that are dominated by the leading 
firms. Here, the firm generally offers the host country shared ownership or greater 
access to technology in return for exclusive access to the domestic market. In other 
cases, these institutional forms are used for investment that is defensive in nature. The 
newcomer and follower MNEs lack the financial and managerial resources needed for 
participation in the globalised oligopolistic rivalry that characterises many industries. 
Hence, in order to assume a competitive presence in critical markets, these firms share 
ownership with local firms in exchange for access to finance, local market knowledge 
94 
and shared risks [Oman 1988: 386; Franko 1989: 27]. It is noteworthy that the 
industry leaders only use these new forms of investment in highly protected, isolated 
markets. The output of these markets does not compete with their core activities 
[Oman 1988: 389]. 
In addition, the new international entry modes tend to be country-specific. It 
appears that MNEs from Japan and Europe are more likely to conclude such 
agreements than US MNEs [Oman 1984: 81-84; Dunning 1988: 173-174; Pan 1996: 
18]. These reasons for these firms entering such agreements are related to the factors 
discussed above. Many of them are the "newcomers" to the industry and thus are more 
willing to share equity than the industry leaders. In addition, it has been posited that 
the manufacturing technology that the Japanese firms transfer abroad is mature. 
Hence, they are willing to enter into these new forms of foreign involvement in 
developing countries [Dunning 1988: 173]. 
It is important to note that the explanations for the emergence of the new 
forms of foreign investment accord with the existing literature. Indeed, these modes of 
market entry tend to be found in the lower technology sectors. As the internalisation 
theory posits the forces which propel the firm to internalise production are the highest 
when the technology is proprietary. The firm will only conclude such investments for 
mature technology. Further, as Gomes-Casseres [1990] explains, the larger MNE will 
only concede to these modes of reduced equity when the government has strong 
bargaining power. 
The new modes of investment, especially those in developing countries, are 
considered to be risky ventures [Beamish 1988: 10; Caves 1982: 81]. Thus, they are 
generally concluded for activities over which the MNEs do not wish to exercise total 
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control. It is only the smaller or new MNEs that appear to be willing to concede to 
forms of foreign involvement that result in reduced control. This appears to be a 
strategy they use to compete in the global oligopolistic markets. In addition, it appears 
that the conditions under which the larger MNEs are willing to concede to reduced 
control are when the local partner is able to contribute skills to the venture. These 
skills are normally its knowledge of local markets, culture and politics [Beamish 
1988,1994]. The larger MNEs or the industry leaders are also involved in these 
reduced equity arrangements when they provide them with critically needed raw 
material inputs or when the host government wields considerable power [Stopford and 
Wells 1972; Beamish 1988; Gomes-Casseres 1990]. 
5.3 Summary and Conclusions 
The theories analysed above reveal that the MNE's mode of market entry is 
dependent on several variables. The transaction cost theory and the internalisation 
theory posit that it is the firm's possession of proprietary assets that influences its 
selection of market entry mode. These theories postulate that the MNE will select the 
wholly owned subsidiary as its form of foreign involvement. Moreover, the theories 
posits that the firm which internalises its intermediate markets will be involved in 
intra-firm trade. It is further suggested that the firm which is involved in intra-firm 
trade will use a wholly owned subsidiary in foreign locations. 
Alternatively, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul posit that the firm with 
experience in international markets will seek to choose a wholly owned subsidiary as 
its mode of market entry. By contrast, Kogut and Singh posit that culture plays an 
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important role in the MNE's selection of an institutional form for foreign 
involvement. Thus, it is postulated that the MICE will use of a wholly owned 
greenfield or a joint venture agreement instead of an acquisition in culturally distant 
markets. 
Moreover, as Oman and Franko reveal, it is the smaller and new MNEs that 
tend to participate in those forms of market entry that require less equity. These 
MNEs used the new modes of market entry as a strategy for competing in the global 
oligopolistic rivalry which characterises many industries. In addition, in sectors where 
the governments wield considerable bargaining power, the NINE may concede to 
these modes of reduced equity. 
5.4 Hypotheses on the modes of foreign investment in the Caribbean 
Five hypotheses can be drawn from this analysis of the literature on the modes 
of foreign investment. These are: 
1. There is a positive relationship between intra-firm trade and the use of a 
wholly owned subsidiary. 
2. There is a positive relationship between the MNE with international 
experience and its use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
3. There is positive relationship between cultural distance and the use of wholly 
owned greenfield investments and joint venture agreements. 
4. There is a positive relationship between the resource-seeking MNE and 
minority and 50-50 joint venture agreements. 
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5. There is a positive relationship between the government policy towards the 
mode of market entry used by foreign firms in the primary sector and the 
resource-seeking MNE. 
The first hypothesis is drawn from the arguments posited by researchers such 
as Anderson and Gatignon [1986] and Gomes-Casseres [1989]. They argue that the 
firm which possesses proprietary technology or a global network of subsidiaries will 
engage in intra-firm trade. Also, it will seek to use a wholly owned subsidiary as its 
international entry mode. This study contends that the MNE which operates in the 
Caribbean will be involved in intra-firm trade for several reasons. Firstly, the 
resource-seeking MNE will attempt to internalise the market for raw materials 
(bauxite, oil and natural gas). It does this to avoid the transaction costs stemming from 
high switching costs. In addition, those that possess a global network of subsidiaries 
will also be involved in intra-firm trade. The various inputs needed for production 
undertaken in Caribbean will be sourced from the parent firm or its affiliates. It is 
noteworthy that latter type of MNE possibly will be located in the export processing 
zones. Thus, these two types of MNEs will seek to establish wholly owned 
subsidiaries in the Caribbean markets. In so doing, they will be able to enjoy the 
global synergies arising from their geographically dispersed activities as well as 
maintain control over their Caribbean operations. 
The second hypothesis is derived from the theory advanced by Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, and Johanson and Vahlne. These theorists view the 
internationalisation process as a sequential affair. It is the firm, which has 
accumulated international experience, that will establish a wholly owned subsidiary in 
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foreign locations. Hence, it is hypothesised that the firm with considerable experience 
operating in foreign markets will use the wholly owned subsidiary as its market entry 
mode in the Caribbean. 
It is Kogut and Singh's postulate from which the third hypothesis is drawn. 
They posit that the MNE will choose to enter culturally distant markets through the 
mode of wholly owned greenfield investment or joint venture agreement rather than 
an acquisition. Thus, this study hypothesises that the MINE from countries with 
cultures which are dissimilar to those of the Caribbean will select a wholly owned 
greenfield investment or joint venture. 
The fourth hypothesis is based on the theories postulated by Oman and 
Franko. They argue that it is the reduced equity modes are prevalent in the extractive 
industries of developing countries. Thus, this study contends that these market entry 
modes will be used by the resource seeking MNEs. Finally, the last hypothesis is 
drawn from the work done by researchers such as Oman and Gomes-Casseres. It is 
argued that the selection of market entry mode is a result of a dynamic interplay 
between the firm and the government. Hence, this study argues that Caribbean 
governments will influence the firm's choice of market entry mode used in the 
primary sector. It is assumed that the governments are able to wield considerable 
bargaining power over the firm's selection of market entry mode in this sector. 
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Chapter Six 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, a review was conducted of the various theories which 
sought to explain the factors that influence the motivations of firms engaging in 
production abroad, their choice of location, and their selection of a market entry mode. 
It is noteworthy that many of these theories were developed to explain the behaviour of 
firms that originate from advanced, industrialised countries and were investing in 
operations in such countries. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that there is a paucity of 
international business research conducted on less industrialised, less developed 
countries or what has been quixotically described as the "forgotten locations" by 
Thomas [1996]. This study thus seeks to provide furthur clarity to the discussion of 
factors that influence the investment decisions and corporate strategy of MNEs in 
developing countries, specifically three island states in the Caribbean: Jamaica, 
Barbados Trinidad-Tobago. What this study proposes to do is to test the relevance of 
the theories discussed in previous chapters to the foreign direct investment that is 
undertaken in these three countries. In so doing, it hopes possibly to refine the extant 
theories on foreign direct investment. To this end, a hypothetico-deductive method was 
employed. Thus, as noted in the preceding chapters, fourteen hypotheses were advanced 
from the analysis of the literature. These are as follows: 
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Hypotheses on the Motivation for Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean 
H1. No relationship exists between the MNE's use of its unique advantages and the 
presence of domestic competitors. 
H2. There is a positive relationship between `follow-the-leader' investment 
behaviour of MNEs and the use of low-cost factors. 
H3. There is a positive relationship between the firm's use of its unique 
advantages and the locational advantages of the Caribbean. 
Hypotheses on the Location of Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean 
H4. There is a positive relationship between the MNE and the decision to establish 
and continue operations in the Caribbean because of low-cost factors. 
H5. There is a positive relationship between the export-seeking and resource- 
seeking MNEs and the use of preferential trading agreements. 
116. There is a positive relationship between the presence of export processing 
zones and the export-seeking MNE. 
H7. No relationship exists between investment incentives offered by Caribbean 
governments and the MNE's decision to establish and continue operations in the 
Caribbean. 
H8. There is a positive relationship between the market-seeking MNE and trade 
restrictions. 
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9. There is a positive relationship between the national `diamond' of the MNE and 
the `diamond' of the Caribbean. 
Hypotheses on the Mode of Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean 
H10. There is a positive relationship between intra-firm trade and the use of a 
wholly owned subsidiary. 
H11. There is a positive relationship between the MNE with international 
experience and its use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
H12. There is a positive relationship between cultural distance and the use of 
wholly owned greenfeld investments and joint venture agreements. 
H13. There is a positive relationship between the resource-seeking MNE and 
minority and 50-50 joint venture agreements. 
H14. There is a positive relationship between government policy towards mode of 
market entry used by foreign firms in the primary sector and the resource-seeking 
MNE. 
6.2 Choice of Research Method 
The choice of a research method was dictated by the need to provide definitive 
answers to the question: How attractive is the Caribbean environment to the MNE? A 
triangulation method was believed to be the most appropriate strategy to use in the 
investigation of this research question. A triangulation method is the combination of 
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both quantitative and qualitative research methods in the study of the same 
phenomenon [Jick 1979: 602]. 
A debate has been raging in the literature on the integrated use of quantitative 
and qualitative research methods within a single study. The argument against the 
combined use of these research methods largely has been on the grounds that they 
represent differing epistemological positions [Morgan and Smircich 1980; Delamont 
and Hamilton 1984]. According to this view, each of these research methods is 
associated with a unique and separate paradigmatic perspective and it is these two 
perspectives that are in conflict [Cook and Reichardt 1979: 9]. Hence, the detractors of 
the use of a triangulation of research methodologies imply that a researcher's choice of 
methods of investigation is dictated by his views on the proper foundation for the study 
of social reality [Bryman 1989: 104]. Moreover, they assume that quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies are rigid and fixed and the choice between them is the only 
one to be available [Cook and Reichardt 1979: 11 ]. However, the protagonists of this 
approach posit that the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is really 
a technical issue where the choice of research method is dictated by its suitability in 
providing answers to particular research questions [Cook and Reichardt 1979: 16; 
Bryman 1989: 109]. Indeed, Bryman convincingly posits: 
".... if the research problem invites a combined approach, there is little to prevent 
such a strategy, other than time, money and possibly inclination. " [Bryman 1989: 
107]. 
Researchers such as Harrigan [1983] have advocated the use of a triangulation 
of methodologies in business research. The use of a triangulation of research methods 
enriches the understanding of research questions since it allows for new or deeper 
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dimensions of the issues to emerge [Jick 1979; Denzin 1989]. Moreover, it is argued 
that this method is an effective research tool since the flaws of one method will be 
compensated by the strengths of another [Campbell and Fiske 1959; Webb et al. 1966; 
Jick 1979; Cook and Reichardt 1979; Denzin 1989]. Also, it has been suggested that 
triangulation allows the researcher to be more confident of his results, helps to uncover 
the `deviant' dimensions of a phenomenon, may lead to a synthesis of theories, and 
serves as the critical test for competing theories [Jick 1979: 608]. Further, the benefits 
of using each research methodology are gained. Quantitative research methods allow 
for broad based generalisation, theory-testing, and comparability of observations. 
Conversely, qualitative research methodologies capture the richness of the data, allow 
for meticulous attention to be paid to detail, and enable the researcher to study the 
phenomenon in its context [Harrigan 1983: 399]. By combining both of these research 
methodologies in one study, the researcher is able to secure the advantages to be 
derived from the use of each of these research techniques. 
In this study, a `between-method' triangulation methodology [Denzin 1989: 
244] was adopted. Here, two different research strategies were combined to study the 
research question. The results of a mailed questionnaire survey, which was 
administered to MNEs operating in the three Caribbean countries, were initially used to 
test the fourteen hypotheses advanced. The quantitative analysis of the results of this 
survey provided greater understanding of the issues to be addressed and provided the 
basis for the selection of twelve core cases for further study. The methodology of a case 
study approach was then used to analyse these twelve firms. Thus, both the quantitative 
and qualitative research methodologies were combined to produce deeper 
understanding of the factors that influence the motivations, locational choices and 
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selection of market entry mode of MNEs operating in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad- 
Tobago. 
6.3 The Quantitative Approach 
6.3.1 The Selection of a Survey Instrument- The Mailed Questionnaire 
It has been suggested that the mail questionnaire is an appropriate yet 
inexpensive survey instrument to use when substantial information is sought through 
structured questions from a large sample that is widely dispersed geographically 
[Sekaran 1992: 220]. These were the factors that influenced the selection of the mailed 
questionnaire as the survey instrument to be employed in the primary analysis of the 
study. Moreover, research has demonstrated that the mail questionnaire could be 
successfully administered to the industrial and commercial population of the Caribbean 
[Klose 1991 ]. 
A nine page questionnaire, which consisted of three sections, was administered 
to executives of MNEs that operate in the three island states (See Appendix, Figures 1 
and 2). The responses to the questions were mainly placed on a likert scale; however, in 
a few cases, some were ranked. Essentially, there were two variants of the pretested 
questionnaire: one of which was sent to the headquarters of the MNEs and the other, to 
its subsidiary in the Caribbean. There were also slight variations in the questions that 
were posed to firms operating in the different islands; for example, the questionnaire 
that was sent to firms which had operations in Trinidad-Tobago was the only one which 
included questions on natural gas reserves. Table 6.1 illustrates the relationship between 
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the questions posed in the questionnaire and the hypotheses developed in Chapters 3 to 
5. 
Table 6.1 The Hypotheses, Related Theories, Key Explanatory Variables and the 
Questions in the Mailed Questionnaire. 
Hypotheses Theories Key Explanatory Variables Questions 
H1 The Monopolist Advantage 1. Monopolistic Advantages Questionnaire 1. 
Theory. " production technology Section 1. 
[Rymer 1960,1976; " managerial skills Qu. 6,7. 
Kindleberger 1969; Caves " marketing skills 
1971,1974] " brand name product Questionnaire 2. 
Critics: [Hood and Young " access to finance Section 1. 
1979; Lall and Mohammed " privileged access to raw materials Qu. 6,8,13. 
1983; Vachani 1985] + product differentiation 
2. Competitors 
" foreign firms 
" local firms 
H2 Oligopolistic Reaction Follow-the-Leader Investment Behaviou Questionnaire 1. 
Theory. " Investment made influenced by Section 1. 
Knickerbocker [1973] previous investment made by Qu. 10.9. 
competitors 
Questionnaire 2. 
Section 1. 
Qu. 11.9. 
H3 Eclectic Paradigm. Unique Advantages Questionnaire 1. 
[Dunning 1980,1981,1988] " production technology Section 1. 
+ managerial skills Qu. 10 & 11. 
" marketing skills 
" distribution networks Questionnaire 2. 
" brand name product Section. 1. 
" access to finance Qu. 11 & 12. 
" access to raw materials 
" new technology 
Locational Advantages 
" low-cost labour 
" labour productivity 
" labour availability 
" levels of unionisation 
" size of market 
" presence of firms in similar 
businesses 
" presence of suppliers 
" political stability 
" government's trade and market 
policies 
" quality of infrastructure 
" price of natural gas 
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H4 FDI influenced by factor Factors Questionnaire 1. 
costs. " low-cost labour Section 1. 
[Vernon 1966; Frobel et al. " productive labour Qu. 10.1-4,16. 
1980] " labour availability Qu. 11.1-4,15. 
" levels of unionisation 
" price of natural gas Questionnaire 2. 
Section 2. 
Qu. 11.1-4,16. 
Qu. 12.1-4,15. 
H5 Export Processing Zones. Export Processing Zones Questionnaire 1. 
[Frobel et al. 1980; Kumar " export processing zones Section 1. 
1994; Woodward and Wolfe Qu. 4,5. 
1993] 
Questionnaire 2. 
Section 1. 
Qu. 4,5. 
H6 Investment Incentives. Investment Incentives Questionnaire 1. 
[Shah and Toyne 1978; " tax holidays Section 1. 
Lim 1983; Wheeler " import duty concessions on raw Qu. 8,9. 
and Mody 1991 ] materials 
" import duty concessions on Questionnaire 2. 
machinery and equipment Section 1. 
" repatriation of profits Qu. 9,10. 
" repatriation of dividends 
" waiver of income tax on profits 
" waiver of income tax on dividends 
" industrial training grants 
" market development grants 
H7 Trade Restrictions Influence Trade Restrictions Questionnaire 1. 
FDI. " tariffs Section 1. 
[Lecraw 1991; Rolfe et al. " quotas Qu. 12. 
1993] " import license 
" import surcharge Questionnaire 2. 
" stamp duties Section 1. 
Qu. 13. 
H8 Preferential Trading Preferential Trading Agreements Questionnaire 1. 
Agreements attracting FDI " 807 Agreements Section 1. 
into recipient country. " CARIBCAN Qu. 1,2,3. 
[Johnson 1968; Joekes 1982; " Lome 
Griffith 1990] " Multifibre Agreement Questionnaire 2. 
" General System of Preferences Section 1. 
Qu. 1,2,3. 
H9 Double Diamond Model. US and British Diamonds Questionnaire 1. 
[Rugman and D'Cruz 1993; US and British MNEs Section 1. 
Rugman and Verbeke 1993] Qu. 10.1-4,6, - 
Caribbean Diamond 7,10-16. 
" low-cost labour Qu. 11.1-4,6-7,9- 
" productive labour 15. 
" available labour 
" levels of unionisation Questionnaire 2. 
" size of domestic market Section 1. 
" presence of similar businesses Qu. 11.1-4,6- 
" presence of suppliers 7,10-16. 
" political stability Qu. 12.1-4,6- 
" government's market and trade 7,10-15. 
policies 
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" quality infrastructure 
" price of natural gas 
H 10 Market entry mode Intra-firm trade Questionnaire 1. 
influenced by intra-firm " mode of investment influenced by Section 2 
trade. output dedicated to foreign affiliates Qu. 16.5. 
[Teece 1981,1983,1986; " percentage of firm's output used by 
Farge and Wells 1982; other affiliates. Questionnaire 2. 
Gomes-Casseres 1990] Section 2. 
Qu. 18.5 & 22 
HII Market entry mode International Experience Questionnaire 1. 
influenced by level of " number of years operating in the Section 2. 
international experience. Caribbean Qu. 16.1 & 20. 
[Johanson and Wiedersheim " percentage of sales obtained from 
Paul 1975; Johanson and overseas markets Questionnaire 2. 
Vahle 1977; Johanson and Section 2. 
Vahle 1990] Qu. 18.1 
H12. Market entry mode Cultural Distance Questionnaire 1. 
influenced by cultural geographic proximity Section 2 
distance. " language similarities Qu. 16.6.7.9. 
[Kogut and Singh 1988; " cultural similarities 
Padmanabhan and Cho 1996 Questionnaire 2 
Section 2 
Qu. 18.6.7.9. 
H13. Market entry mode Mode of market entry Questionnaire 1. 
influenced by industry in " new 50-50 joint venture Section 2. 
which MNE is investing. " acquired 50-50 joint venture Qu. 14 & 18.3 
[Oman 1984,1988; Franko " other modes of market entry 
1989] Questionnaire 2. 
Section 2. 
Qu. 16. 
H14. Government policy Caribbean government's policy with Questionnaire 1. 
influencing selection of respect to mode of market entry Section 2. 
mode. " mode of investment influenced by Qu 16.8 & 18.1 
[Oman 1988; Gomes- policy of government. 
Casseres 1990] " changes in mode of investment Questionnaire 2. 
influenced by government's policy. Section 2. 
Qu. 18.8 & 20.1. 
6.3.2 The Selection of MNEs 
There is no single source that contains a comprehensive listing of all the MNEs 
that presently operate in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago. Hence, several 
secondary sources of data were utilised. These included Dun & Bradstreet. America's 
Leading Public and Private Companies, 1994; Dun & Bradstreet. Key British 
Enterprises, 1995; The Financial Times Information Limited. Major UK Companies 
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Handbook, 1995; The Financial Times Information Limited. European Handbook, 
1995; Caribbean Exporters 1993/1994; A Directory of Caribbean Exporters 1994; 
Trinidad and Tobago Export Development Corporation. Export Directory, 1993-1994; 
One Source; and Data Stream. Additional data were also provided by the various trade 
promotion agencies of the countries studied as well as the British Department of Trade 
and Industry. However, in many cases, the information proved to be rather dated. Thus, 
attempts were made to check the accuracy of the data obtained. To this end, as far as it 
was possible, telephone calls were made to the firms identified to confirm their 
presence in the countries as well as to clarify the name of the respondent, his/her 
address and contact numbers. In addition, research assistants were employed in 
Trinidad-Tobago to check the accuracy of the data that were obtained from the 
secondary sources. These telephone contacts helped to establish a personal relationship 
with some of the respondents which proved to be advantageous during the later research 
stage of face-to-face interviews. 
Attempts were made to obtain firms that reflect the diversity of the types of 
foreign direct investment that is undertaken in the three countries studied. Hence, 
concerted efforts were made to obtain a listing of MNEs that consisted of market- 
seeking, resource-seeking and export-seeking investment. Thus, the list of MNEs that 
was obtained was comprised of firms that ranged from fairly large global players such 
as British Gas, Amoco Oil Company and Nestle to rather small ones, such as Apparel 
Contractors, Tidewater and Tultex (See Appendix, Table 1). This list of firms consisted 
of 139 MNEs originating from the United States of America, Canada, Europe (United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway) and Asia (India, Hong 
Kong and Korea). Twenty-five of these MNEs operated in more than one of the 
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countries studied (See Table 6.2). Thus, the firms used in the mail survey represented, 
as far as could be possibly ascertained, the population of MNEs that are presently 
operating in the three Caribbean countries. 
Table 6.2 Number of MNEs used in mail survey, by country of origin and host 
country 
Home Country Host Country 
Jamaica Barbados Trinidad- 
Tobago 
Total 
United States of 
America 
32 19 27 78 
United Kingdom 19 20 19 58 
Other 10 7 11 28 
Notes: 
1. The category `other' includes investment that originates from Canada, Europe (France, Germany, Switzerland, 
Sweden and Norway), and Asia (India, Hong Kong and Korea). 
2. The total number of enterprises is not 139 as recorded in page 109 since twenty-five of the companies listed 
operate in more than one Caribbean country. 
6.3.3 The Selection of Respondents 
Attempts were made to solicit responses from executives located at both the 
headquarters and the subsidiary. This approach was adopted since it is believed that 
investment decision making is not a one-off, static process. Indeed, Aharoni postulates: 
"We do not see the decision making-process as a sequence of deliberate, logical 
steps, beginning with a well-defined problem and proceeding through a series of 
alternatives and consequences - be they exhaustive or `sufficient'- to a final decision. 
The process of decision is quite often a very erratic one. Problems and perceptions of 
alternatives and of consequences are all redefined continuously throughout the 
process. The decision maker's evaluation of various elements is continuously shifted 
and changed. " [Aharoni 1966: 30] 
Thus, this study adopted the perspective that the investment decision-making 
process is a dynamic one which is influenced by what is occurring in the proximate 
environment of the home country of the MNE as well as that of its subsidiary. Hence, in 
110 
order to capture the dynamism of this process, responses were sought from both the 
executives at the headquarters, who are responsible for the Caribbean operations, and 
the managers of the subsidiary. In addition, the survey instrument that was used in the 
mailed questionnaire survey included questions on the factors that influenced the initial 
investment decision as well as those that influence the decision to continue operating in 
the country. 
Thus, mailed questionnaires were sent to a total of two hundred and ninety-nine 
respondents. These respondents comprised executives located both at the headquarters 
and subsidiary of the MNEs studied. One hundred and forty-five of these respondents 
were executives from US MNEs, one hundred and one were from UK MNEs, and the 
remaining fifty-three were from MNEs that were either European, Canadian or Asian. 
6.3.4 The Mail Survey 
The mail survey was conducted during the period, March to June 1996. Mailed 
questionnaires and an explanatory cover letter were sent to executives in North 
America, Europe, Asia and the three Caribbean countries (Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago 
and Barbados). The managers were given assurance of confidentiality and anonymity. 
In addition, they were promised a summary of the survey results. Two series of follow- 
up actions were implemented. The first was after a period of three weeks, when a 
follow-up letter, together with a questionnaire, was mailed to those managers who had 
not yet responded. The second was implemented two weeks after the first follow-up. In 
this instance, as far as it was possible, telephone calls were made to the managers who 
had not yet responded and the mailed questionnaire and a follow-up letter were faxed to 
their offices. 
111 
The results of the mail survey were analysed using chi-square (x, 2) tests. The 
results of this analysis will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. However, preliminary 
statistical tests were conducted on the data. These tests consisted mainly of conducting 
cross tabulations on the key explanatory variables of each hypothesis. The results of 
these tests revealed that several of the hypotheses which were advanced in the previous 
chapters were valid. The results of these preliminary tests are presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 The Preliminary Results of the Mail Survey 
H1. No relationship exists between the MNE's use of its Supported 
unique advantages and the presence of domestic 
competitors. 
H2. There is a positive relationship between follow- Not Supported 
the-leader' investment behaviour and the use of low- 
cost factors. 
H3 There is a positive relationship between the firm's Supported. The location advantages were identified. 
use of its unique advantages and the locational They were geographic proximity, quality 
advantages of the Caribbean. infrastructure, political stability, labour factors (cost, 
availability and productivity) and natural gas prices. 
H4. There is a positive relationship between the MNE Supported 
and the decision to establish and continue operations in 
the Caribbean because of low-cost factors. 
H5 There is a positive relationship between the export- Supported 
seeking and resource-seeking MNEs and the use of 
preferential trading agreements. 
H6 There is a positive relationship between export Not Supported. 
processing zone and the export-seeking MNE. 
H7 No relationship exists between the investment Inconclusive. 
incentives offered by Caribbean governments and the 
MNE's decision to establish and continue operations in 
the Caribbean. 
H8. There is a positive relationship between the market Inconclusive. 
seeking MNE and trade restrictions. 
H9 There is a positive relationship between the Not Supported 
national `diamond' of the MNE and the `diamond' of 
the Caribbean. 
H10 There is a positive relationship between intra-firm Not Supported 
trade and the use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
H11. There is a positive relationship between the MNE Inconclusive. 
with international experience and the use of joint 
ventures. 
H12 There is a positive relationship between cultural Inconclusive. 
distance and the use of greenfield investment. 
H13 There is a positive relationship between resource- Supported 
seeking MNE and minority and 50-50 joint ventures. 
H14 There is a positive relationship between Inconclusive. 
government policy towards mode of market entry used 
bye foreign firms in the primary sector and the resource- 
seeking MNE. 
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It is important to note that in several cases, notably Hypotheses 2,6,9 and 10, 
the results of this preliminary testing changed after the full testing of the data. 
6.4 The Qualitative Research Method 
Clearly, the essence of an analysis of the factors that influence the behaviour of 
MNEs operating in the Caribbean can be captured through statistical tests. However, 
valuable insights into these firms' behaviour within this environment may be lost by 
using such methods. It is qualitative analysis that is able to capture the nuances, provide 
greater detail and understanding of a phenomenon [Harrigan 1983: 399]. Hence, in 
order to gain deeper insight into the factors influencing the motivations, corporate 
strategy and investment behaviour of MNEs operating in the three countries, a 
qualitative research methodology was employed. 
6.4.1 The Selection of a Qualitative Research Method - The Case Study 
Approach 
The case study method appeared to be ideally suited for the furthur investigation 
of the research question. As Yin notes: 
"Case studies are the preferred research strategy when `how' or `why' questions are 
asked, when the researcher has little or no control over events, and when the focus is 
on contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. " [Yin 1989: 13] 
It seems that all the elements that are necessary for the implementation of a case 
study approach are met by this research. As was earlier noted, the research question 
posed in this study is: how attractive is the Caribbean business environment to the 
MNEs? Clearly, this question is an explanatory one. It does not seek to gain insights to 
a mere snapshot of the Caribbean business environment. Rather, it seeks to understand 
the dynamic aspects of this environment and the factors influencing firms' behaviour 
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within it. In addition, the researcher adopted an `outsider's' perspective because of the 
inability to exercise control over the phenomenon being studied. Moreover, in the 
search for answers to this research question, a diversity of sources of information was 
utilised. Indeed, the unique strength of the case study method is its ability to deal with a 
variety of evidence [Yin 1989: 20]. 
As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, case studies can be classified into four categories. 
Figure 6.1 Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies 
Holistic 
(single unit of analysis) 
Embedded 
(multiple unit of analysis) 
Single-Case Designs Multiple-Case Designs 
TYPE 1 TYPE 2 
TYPE 3 TYPE 4 
Source: Robert Yin, Case Study Research. Design and Methods, (London: Sage Publications, 1989), Figure 2.3. 
The type of case study that is used in this study is Type 4 of Figure 6.1. The 
study adopted a multiple case, embedded design. Twelve cases were selected. A 
grouping of four firms that operate in a sector of each of the three countries was 
analysed (See Table 6.4). Three of these cases were joint venture arrangements. Thus, a 
total of fifteen MINEs were studied. In addition, more than one unit was analysed in 
several of these cases. 
Yin [1989] argues that sampling logic cannot be used in generalising the results 
from a case study. What must be done is analytical generalisation. Here, theory is used 
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as a template to compare the results of a case study. If two or more cases are shown as 
supporting the theory, then replication occurs. Using this replication logic, Yin states 
that in multiple-case studies, each case must be chosen so that it either predicts similar 
results (a literal replication) or produces contrary results but for predictable reasons (a 
theoretical replication) [Yin 1989: 53]. Thus, in this study, literal replication was 
implemented through the examination of the four firms within a single sector. 
Theoretical replication was done by the examination of the firms across the three 
sectors in the three countries. 
Table 6.4 The Twelve Core Cases 
Country/Sector The Cases Parent Company 
Jamaica: 1. Yoffi Industries Limited I. Apparel Contractors Association 
The Apparel Industry 2. Jamaica Needlecraft Limited Incorporated 
3. Akom Limited 2. Maidenform Incorporated 
4. Jockey Jamaica Limited 3. Tultex Corporation 
4. Jockey International 
Trinidad-Tobago: 1. Caribbean Ispat Limited I. Ispat International 
The Natural gas based Industry 2. Caribbean Methanol Company 2. Clico Energy, Ferrostaal AG and 
3. Arcardian Trinidad Ammonia Methanex Corporation 
Limited 3. Arcadian Corporation 
4. Atlantic LNG 4. Amoco Oil Company, British Gas 
plc, Cabot LNG and National Gas 
Company 
Barbados: 1. Caribbean Data Services 1. AMR Corporation 
The Information Service Industr Limited 2. The PRT Corporation Incorporate 
2. Total Technology Solutions 3. Digital Imaging & Technologies 
3. Offshore Keyboarding Incorporated 
Corporation 4. Santype International Limited and 
4. Technotype International Simpsons Motors Incorporated 
Incorporated 
6.5 The Selection of Sectors 
The post 1980's witnessed dramatic changes occurring in several economies of 
the developing world. These economies were rapidly moving out of import-substitution 
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industrialisation into export manufacturing. The emergence of export manufacturing 
largely has been a result of the policy advice given by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund. As part of the conditionalities for loans from these financial 
institutions, developing countries were `advised' inter alia: to implement trade reforms; 
reduce fiscal deficits; adopt competitive exchange rates; deregulate domestic prices; 
rationalise investment regulations; and reform labour market regulations [World Bank 
1987a]. The centre piece of this strategy was its emphasis on outward oriented growth 
[Balassa and Associates 1982; Lal and Rajapatirana 1987; Bhagwati 1988]. 
The three Caribbean countries were not immune to these changes. Since the late 
1970s, many of them have been confronted with declining revenues, high international 
debt, growing levels of unemployment and underemployment, and mounting fiscal 
deficits. The import-substitution strategy which they had been implementing during the 
immediate post independence era, failed to provide a basis for self-sustained growth. 
Thus, `advised' by the international financial institutions from which many sought loan 
financing, these countries now embraced an outward oriented strategy. In addition, 
attempts were made to diversify these economies away from their dependence on a 
limited range of primary products - sugar (Barbados), bauxite (Jamaica) and sugar and 
petroleum (Trinidad-Tobago). These concerns gave impetus to the development of `new 
exports' during the late 1970s and early 1980s [Long 1989]. To this end, export 
enclaves were established in the three island states examined. In addition, it was the 
foreign investor who was actively sought to occupy these export enclaves. Trinidad- 
Tobago was the only country that did not actively seek foreign investment. Awash with 
unprecedented oil revenues, the country's efforts at export manufacturing identified the 
state as the main investor. However, by the late 1980s, faced with declining oil 
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revenues, mounting international debt, growing fiscal deficits and an intractable 
unemployment problem, the country had no option but to embark on a strategy of 
privatisation and to reverse its policy on state ownership of its designated strategic 
sector. Thus, the private foreign investor is now actively courted by policy makers in 
this country. 
Despite the attempts at export diversification, the activities undertaken in these 
export enclaves generally have tended to be dominated by one core activity. These 
activities are considered to be of strategic importance to the countries. Most 
importantly, however, is the fact that these activities have been heralded as the new 
source of economic growth. In Jamaica, this strategic activity is the apparel sector. In 
Trinidad-Tobago, it is the natural gas based sector. In Barbados, it is the information 
services sector. The following quotations are illuminating. 
"Textiles and apparel emerged as a growth industry during the last decade. It 
accounts for 40% of Jamaica's exports. In 1994 exports of apparel amounted to $450 
million, up from $10 million in 1980. " [Corporate Location July/August 19951 
"Since the mid 1970's, Natural Gas has been emerging as the country's most 
important resource. ... 
The natural gas industry contributes significantly to 
government's revenue, national income and foreign exchange earnings. " [The 
National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago. Natural Gas in Trinidad and 
Tobago] 
"... within recent years, the service sector has emerged as the sector capable of 
earning substantial foreign exchange for Barbados.... the information service sub- 
sector, in particular, has emerged as one of the more dynamic growth areas, currently 
employing 2 per cent of the workforce and earning in excess of $60 million 
annually. " [Government of Barbados, 1993-2000 Development Plan 1993] 
It is these sectors that have been selected for the case studies. The firms 
operating in these sectors are all targeting the export market. Hence, the investments 
studied in these case studies are export oriented. 
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6.5 The Selection of Firms 
It has been posited that the researcher, in choosing cases for study, should lean 
towards those that offer the opportunity to learn [Stake 1994: 243]. Thus, the selection 
of firms for the case studies was greatly influenced by the possibilities for learning 
much more about the phenomenon being studied. With the exception of one company, 
all firms chosen for the case studies had participated in the mailed questionnaire survey. 
In the case of the firm that had not participated in the mailed questionnaire, knowledge 
of its activities was only gained when visits were made to Barbados. The company had 
begun its operations in the country a year earlier and thus was missed during the stage 
when data were collected on the MNEs operating in the Caribbean. This company's 
activities are higher up the value chain than those of other firms in this sector. It was the 
first to be involved in software development in Barbados. Thus, it was believed that the 
inclusion of this firm in the study would provide deeper understanding of the issues 
being analysed. 
The selection of the firms for the case study was also determined by the 
possibility of gaining access into the companies. The companies that consented to 
participate in the mail survey were the ones from which the selection was made (See 
Table 6.5). The firms that agreed to participate in furthur interviews were used for the 
case studies. Moreover, as noted above, attempts were made to achieve literal 
replication within the sectors studied and theoretical replication across the sectors 
studied. 
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Table 6.5 The Firms That Were Selected to Participate in the Case Study 
Subsidiary Size of Initial Investment Activities Parent Size of Paren Response 
Company Company 
Jamaica- The Apparel Sector 
1. Yoffi Industries 
Limited 
2. Williamson- 
Dickie Jamaica 
Limited 
3. Akom 
Corporation 
4. Noel of Jamaica 
Limited 
5. Jamaica 
Needlecraft 
Limited. 
6. Jockey Jamaica 
Limited. 
US$ 100,000 Manufacture of 
Undergarments. 
* Manufacture of Jeans 
and other casual wear. 
*I Manufacture of Casual 
Wear 
* Manufacture of 
Undergarments, brande 
products and active wea 
* Manufacture of 
Undergarments. 
Apparel 
Contractors 
Association 
Incorporated 
Williamson- 
Dickie Apparel 
Manufact-urin 
Company. 
Tultex 
Corporation. 
Fruit of the 
Loom. 
Maidenform 
Worldwide 
incorporated 
Manufacture of 
Undergarments 
Jockey 
International 
Incorporated. 
Barbados-The Information Service Sector 
Total Sales 
(1996) 
US$ 25m 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1996) 
4,000 
Total Sales 
(1994) 
US$ 355m 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1995) 
6,000 
Total Assets 
(1995) 
US$ 75.80m 
Total Sales 
(1996) US$ 
636.9m 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1996) 
6,835 
Total Assets 
(1995) 
US$ 
2,919.50m 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1995) 
33,300 
Total Sales 
US$ 400m 
(1996) 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1996) 
8,900 
Total Sales 
US$ 22.5m 
(1994) 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1994) 5,900 
Consented to 
participate in 
case study. 
Refused to 
participate in 
case study. 
Consented to 
participate in 
case study. 
Refused to 
participate in 
case study. 
Consented to 
participate in 
case study. 
Consented 
to participate 
in case study. 
1. Caribbean Data US$ 3.5m. Processing of airline AMR Total Assets Consented 
Services Limited ticket data, payroll and Information (1995) to participate 
general accounting, Service US$ in case study. 
marketing and Incorporated 19,556m 
management reporting, subsidiary of Total Number 
insurance claims AMR of Employees 
processing. Corporation (1995) 
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110,000 
2. R. R. Donnelley US$ 75,000 Pre-paid press and other Donnelley RR Total Assets Refused to 
Barbados Limited print preparation for & Sons (1995) participate 
book and magazine Company US$ 5.4m in case study. 
publishing Total Number 
of Employees 
(1995) 
41,000 
3. NDL * Data processing The Polk Total Sales Refused to 
International Company (1993) participate 
Barbados Limited US$ 20.1 m in case study. 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1993) 
550 
4. Offshore * Data entry, typesetting, Digital Imagin * Consented 
Keyboarding data entry of technical & Technologie to participate 
Corporation manuscripts Incorporated in case study. 
5. Cirrus Logic US$ 130,000 Data entry for Parent Cirrus Logic Total Assets Consented to 
International Company Incorporated (1995) participate in 
US$ 673.5m case study. 
Total Number However, 
of Employees the company 
(1995) was not used 
3,151 in later 
analysis since 
researcher wa 
unable to 
schedule 
interviews 
with 
executives 
at the 
headquarters 
6. Technotype US$ 50,000 Typesetting for Santype Total Assets Consented 
International Parent Company International (1995) to participate 
Incorporated Limited US$ 39m in case study. 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1995) 
66 
7. Scandata * Data Entry G. G. W. E. * Refused to 
Processing Consulting participate in 
Incorporated case study. 
8. Total Technolog * Software Development The PRT Grou Total Sales Consented to 
Solutions Limited Incorporated (1995) participate in 
US$ 20 case study. 
million 
Trinidad-Tobago-The Natural Gas Processing Sector 
1. Phoenix Park US$ loom. Production of Propane, Conoco Total Assets Refused to 
Corporation Butane and Natural Gas Incorporated (1994) participate in 
US $ 36,892 case study. 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1994) 
107,000 
2. Amoco Trinidad US$ 245 m. Oil Exploration and Amoco Total Assets Consented to 
Limited. Production of Liquefied Corporation (1995) participate in 
Natural Gas US$ case study. 
29,845m 
Total Number 
120 
of Employees 
(1995) 
42,689 
3. British Gas US$ 155m. Exploration of oil and British Gas plc Total Assets Consented to 
Trinidad Limited production of liquefied (1995) participate in 
natural gas US$18,290m case study. 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1995) 
55,382 
4. Atlantic LNG US$ 1.5 billion Production of Liquefied Cabot Total Assets Consented to 
Natural Gas Corporation (1995) participate in 
US$165 m case study. 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1995) 
4,700 
5. Arcardian US$ 175m. Production of Ammoni Arcadian Total Assets Consented to 
Trinidad Ammonia and Urea Corporation (1995) participate in 
Limited US$ 1,271m case study. 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1995) 
1,293 
6. Farmland US$300m. Production of Ammoni Farmland Total Assets Was not 
Misschein Limited Industries US$ 1927m approached 
(1994) since the plan 
Total Number is still under 
of Employees construction. 
(1994) 
11,000 
7. Farmland US$ 40m. Production of Ammoni Mississippi Total Assets Was not 
Misschern Limited Chemical (1994) approached 
Corporation US$ 298m since the plan 
Total Number is still under 
of Employees construction. 
(1994) 
960 
8. Caribbean US$ 200m. Production of Methanol Ferrostaal AG Total Assets Consented to 
Methanol Compan I (1995) participate in 
US$ case study. 
2,926,760 
(000s) 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1995) 
1,569 
9. Caribbean US$ 200m. Production of Methanol CL Financial Total Assets Consented to 
Methanol Compan (1994) participate in 
US$ 1,084m. case study. 
10. Caribbean US$ 20m. Production of Methanol Methanex Total Assets Consented 
Methanol Compan (1994) to participate 
US$ in case study. 
1,688.3m 
11. Hydro Agri * Production of Ammoni Norsk Hydro Total Assets Refused to 
Trinidad Limited ASA (1994) participate in 
US$ 13 m case study. 
Total Number 
of Employees 
(1994) 
32,416 
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12. Caribbean Ispat US $ 30m. Production of carbon Ispat Total Assets Consented 
Limited steel billets, carbon stee International (1995) to participate 
wire rod coils and direr subsidiary of US$60.5m in case study. 
reduced iron. Ispat Industries 
Limited. 
Source: Annual Reports of the Companies. 
Notes: * Not Available. 
6.6 The Selection of the Respondents 
It is significant to note that approximately seven-five per cent of the firms 
selected consented to participate in this study. It is difficult to determine the reasons 
why the remaining firms refused to participate in the case studies. In the case of 
Jamaica, it is possible that the difficulties suffered by managers in the apparel industry 
influenced their willingness to grant access to the researcher. 
Interviews were conducted with both the managers of subsidiaries and senior 
executives of the MNEs in the home countries. Thus, the interviewing process which 
was done during the period, July to November 1996, was conducted in Jamaica, 
Trinidad-Tobago, Barbados, North America and the United Kingdom. The managers 
were approached through letters and telephone calls. The managers of the subsidiaries 
were first interviewed. This strategy proved to be useful since they were able to furnish 
the researcher with the name and contact numbers of the appropriate executive of their 
parent company. In some instances, the managers even sought to set up the date and 
time for the later interviews with these executives. 
Attempts were made to control for the inevitable perceptual biases that would be 
present in the information supplied by these managers [Huber and Power 1985; William 
and Mezias 1996]. The informants were assured of the anonymity and confidentiality of 
their responses. In addition, they were apprised of the length of the interview and thus 
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were able to allot sufficient time for the interview in their busy schedules. Moreover, 
where it was possible, an additional person in the organisation was sought for 
interview. 
A questionnaire which consisted of fourteen semi-structured questions that 
require open-ended responses was employed (See Appendix Figure 3). The questions 
were drawn from a refinement of the hypotheses. Several of the hypotheses were 
refined on the basis of the results of the mailed questionnaire survey. In the majority of 
cases, face-to-face interviews that were taped were conducted. However, the exigencies 
of finance together with the geographical dispersion of several of the North American 
firms, influenced the use of telephone interviews. The use of telephone interviews, 
which has been gaining in popularity in recent times, has the advantages of cost- 
efficiency and speed in data collection [Frey and Mertens 1995: 4]. Eight telephone 
interviews were conducted. These interviews averaged forty-five minutes in length. The 
face-to-face interviews were much longer, ranging from one hour to three hours, in one 
instance. 
6.7 The Stakeholders 
As was earlier stated, the business environment was viewed in a dynamic sense. 
Thus, interviews were sought with those policy makers who had the mandate to 
institute change to this environment. A total of thirty-five such officials were 
interviewed (See Appendix Figure 4). These included ministers of government, the 
directors of the investment promotion agencies, heads of educational institutes, the 
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presidents of the local Chamber of Commerce and various private consultants who 
specialised in the sectors studied. 
The data obtained from all these respondents was also complemented by 
secondary data. The sources of this secondary data include goverment reports, 
published economic and social data, company reports, industry reports, newspaper 
articles and other journalistic pieces. 
6.8 Conclusions 
A triangulation methodology was employed to study the research question. 
Firstly, a quantitative strategy was implemented. This essentially involved the 
administration of a mailed questionnaire survey to 299 executives of MNEs that operate 
in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago. The responses to the survey formed the 
basis for the selection of twelve firms that were used for the case studies. Further, the 
executives at both the headquarters and the subsidiaries of these twelve companies were 
interviewed. In addition, interviews were conducted with policy makers who were 
mandated to institute changes in the business environment of the countries concerned. 
Moreover, secondary data were obtained from government reports, company reports, 
newspaper articles and other journalistic pieces. 
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Chapter Seven 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean: A Quantitative Investigation 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results of the mailed questionnaire survey that was 
conducted during the period, March to June 1996. The main objectives of this survey 
were to identify the factors that influence the motivations, locational choices and 
mode of market entry of MNEs operating in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago. 
As was discussed in Chapter 6, mailed questionnaires were sent to 299 executives of 
MNEs that operate in the three Caribbean countries. The results of this survey are 
illustrated in Table 7.1. 
The usable response rate for the survey was 30 per cent. This response rate is 
acceptable according to international standards [Hart 1987]. As Table 7.1 reveals, the 
response rate for Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago was 24,33 and 35 per cent, 
respectively. Evidently, the response rate for Jamaica was the lowest. The relatively 
low response rate for Jamaica was especially troubling since this country has the 
largest number of NINES. One possible explanation for this low response rate is that 
the executives of MNEs operating in Jamaica did not view the questionnaire as 
salient. This apparently was not the case in Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that questionnaires are more likely to be returned if they are 
considered to be important to the respondent [Heberlein and Baumgartner 1978: 45 1]. 
The potential impact of this disproportionate rate of response is that the results of the 
mail survey may not truly reflect the views of all of the managers who operate in 
Jamaica. Undoubtedly, this is a limitation that needs to be taken account of in the 
statistical analysis. 
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Table 7.1. Mailed Questionnaire Survey Response Rates: Total Survey 
US UK Other Total 
Total number of firms mailed 70 45 26 139 
Jamaica 32 19 10 61 
Barbados 19 20 7 46 
Trinidad-Tobago 27 19 11 57 
Total number of respondents 
1. headquarters (1) 70 43 26 139 
Jamaica 32 19 11 62 
Barbados 19 20 7 46 
Trinidad-Tobago 27 19 11 57 
2. subsidiary 75 58 27 160 
Jamaica 32 19 11 62 
Barbados 19 20 7 46 
Trinidad-Tobago 24 19 9 52 
Total 145 161 53 299 
Total number returned because of incorrect address 
1. headquarters 5 1 2 8 
Jamaica 2 1 - 3 Barbados 3 - - 5 Trinidad-Tobago - - - - 2. subsidiary 3 - - 3 Jamaica I - - 1 Barbados 2 - - 2 Trinidad-Tobago - - - - Total 
Total number returned as inappropriate (2) 
1. headquarters 4 13 5 22 
Jamaica 1 6 1 8 
Barbados 0 6 - 6 Trinidad-Tobago 3 5 5 13 
2. subsidiary 5 8 2 15 
Jamaica 3 1 1 5 
Barbados - 5 1 6 
Trinidad-Tobago 2 2 - 4 
Total 9 21 Q 37 
Total number unreturned 
1. headquarters 37 12 16 65 
Jamaica 15 3 9 27 
Barbados 9 4 2 15 
Trinidad-Tobago 13 5 5 23 
2. subsidiary 48 28 19 95 
Jamaica 21 9 11 41 
Barbados 11 9 4 24 
Trinidad-Tobago 16 10 4 30 
Total 85 28 35 160 
Total number of usable responses 
1. headquarters 28 18 5 51 
Jamaica 11 7 1 19 
Barbados 10 8 2 20 
Trinidad-Tobago 11 8 2 21 
2. subsidiary 20 12 8 40 
Jamaica 8 1 2 11 
Barbados 4 5 1 10 
Trinidad-Tobago 8 6 5 19 
Total 48 30 13 91 
Total Usable Response Rate 16.1% 10.0% 4.4% 30.4 % 
Jamaica 24.2% 
Barbados 32.6% 
Trinidad-Tobago 34.8% 
Notes: (1) The total number in several of the columns does not tally since eleven companies operate in more 
than one country. The responses made by these companies have been included in the total score for 
each country in which they operate. 
(2) This category consists of respondents who declined to participate in the survey. The reason 
generally given was that they were too busy. Alternatively, they failed to respond because the 
questionnaire was sent either to the headquarters or subsidiary to be completed. 
126 
In addition, two series of follow-up actions were implemented. The first 
occurred after a three-week period following the initial mailing of the questionnaire. 
The second took place two weeks subsequent to the first follow-up action. Hence, 
there may have been differences in the responses given by those who responded early 
to the questionnaire and those who responded late. Moreover, although relatively 
more managers from the subsidiaries comprised the sample, the majority of the 
responses came from managers located at the headquarters (See Table 7.1). Thus, in 
order to ascertain the possibilities of significant differences in the responses from 
these two sources, t-distribution tests were conducted on the responses made by these 
two groups of respondents. The key explanatory variables of questions posed in the 
questionnaire were tested. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 7.2. As 
Table 7.2 demonstrates, with relatively few exceptions (807-A programme and 
political stability), there is no statistically significant difference in the responses made 
by each of the two groups of respondents. Hence, there appears to be no substantial 
evidence of differences in the responses made by these two groups of respondents. 
Moreover, the characteristics of the sample of respondents are fairly 
representative of the population of MNEs that operate in the three Caribbean countries 
(See Table 7.3). The characteristics of the population of MNEs that have investments 
in the three countries were obtained from the data base of the firms which were sent 
the mailed questionnaire. As noted earlier, one of the key concerns was the under- 
representation of Jamaican companies. This may result in a locational bias in the 
statistical analysis. 
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Table 7.2 Response Bias in the Mailed Questionnaire Survey 
Test for bias in the responses made by executives of the headquarters and subsidiary 
Key Explanatory Headquarters Subsidiary Test of Significance 
Variables 
Mean Score Mean Score t test 
Managerial Skills 2.15 1.97 
. 508 
. 508 
Tariffs 3.45 2.97 
. 
191 
. 
188 
807A programme . 
52 
. 07 . 008** 
. 005** 
CARICOM 3.62 2.64 
. 
089 
. 
092 
Labour Availability 2.27 2.20 . 761 
. 759 
Political Stability 1.67 1.72 . 
826 
. 
830 
Repatriation of Profits 2.21 1.77 . 114 
. 100 
Size of the Caribbean . 
757 
Market 3.39 3.29 . 756 
. 641 
Language Similarities 2.93 3.09 . 643 
Policy of Caribbean . 
321 
Government 2.84 2.54 . 
325 
Test for bias in responses made by early and late respondents 
Key Explanatory Early Response Late Response Test of Significance 
Variables 
Mean Score Mean Score t test 
Managerial Skills 2.00 2.13 . 
635 
. 622 
Tariffs 3.59 2.93 . 071 
. 
071 
807A programme . 583 . 
167 . 017* 
. 027* 
CARICOM 3.38 3.00 . 518 
. 
512 
Labour Availability 2.35 2.16 . 456 
. 451 
Political Stability 2.00 1.47 . 031 * 
. 
021 * 
Repatriation of Profits 2.22 1.86 . 
207 
. 
219 
Size of the Caribbean . 620 
Market 3.44 3.28 . 619 
. 
441 
Language Similarities 3.13 2.88 . 440 
Policy of Caribbean . 
110 
Government 2.97 2.49 . 109 
Notes: . 05 
*, . 01 
* *, . 001 *** 
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Table 7.3 A comparison between characteristics of the population of MNEs and 
those of the sample 
Variable Number in Population Number in Sample 
Country (n =164) (n =91) 
USA 78 (48%) 53 (58%) 
Britain 58 (35%) 25 (27%) 
Other 28(17%) 13(14%) 
Location 
Jamaica 61 (37%) 30(33%) 
Barbados 46 (28%) 26 (29%) 
Trinidad-Tobago 57 (35%) 35 (38%) 
Type of FDI 
Market-seeking 95 (58%) 52 (57%) 
Resource-seeking 18(11%) 13(14%) 
Export-seeking 51 (31%) 26(29%) 
7.2 A Demographic Profile of the Respondents of the Mailed Survey 
7.2.1 Country of Origin of MNEs, Locational Patterns, and Timing of Investment 
It is noteworthy that the majority of the respondents were executives from 
USA owned MNEs. Indeed, they comprised 57 per cent of the sample. The second 
largest group was the British owned MNEs. This group constituted 30 per cent of the 
sample. The `other' category, i. e., respondents from firms that were either European 
or Asian owned, comprised 13 per cent of the sample. Trinidad-Tobago had the 
largest number of respondents. A total of 33 per cent of the executives responding to 
the survey operated in this country. This was followed by Jamaica and Barbados with 
30 and 25 per cent, respectively. Twelve per cent of the respondents were from firms 
that operated in more than one of these countries (See Table 7.2.1.1-2). 
Table 7.2.1.1 Country of Origin of MNEs 
Country Number of 
Respondents 
Percent 
United States of America 52 57 
Britain 27 30 
Other 12 13 
Total 91 100 
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Table 7.2.1.2 Locational Patterns of MNEs 
Location Number of 
Respondents 
Percent 
Jamaica 27 30 
Barbados 23 25 
Trinidad-Tobago 30 33 
More than one country 11 12 
Total 91 100 
The US respondents were domiciled mainly in Jamaica: 43 per cent of the 
respondents from US owned MINEs operated in this country. Trinidad-Tobago had the 
second largest proportion of US respondents: a total of 33 per cent. Barbados had the 
least with 23 per cent. By contrast, Barbados had the largest proportion of respondents 
from British firms. Thirty-six per cent of all respondents from British owned MNEs 
operated in this country. Trinidad-Tobago had the least number of British respondents 
with just 31 per cent. However, Trinidad-Tobago had the largest number of Asian and 
European respondents: a total of 60 per cent of these respondents operated in this 
country (See Tables 7.2.1.3). 
Table 7.2.1.3 Country of origin of MNEs and Locational Patterns 
Country/Location of Jamaica Barbados Trinidad- Total 
Investment Tobago 
United States of America 22 12 17 51 
(43%) (23%) (33%) 
Britain 12 13 11 36 
(33%) (36%) (31%) 
Other 3 3 9 15 
(20%) (20%) (60%) 
Total 3 28 7 02 
The responses indicated that the United States of America has been the 
dominant source of FDI made in these countries. It accounted for 48 per cent of all 
FDI made in the pre-1971 period, 66 per cent in the 1971-1990 period and 53 per cent 
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in the post 1991 era. Britain followed with 39,19 and 29 per cent of all FDI made 
during the respective periods. Asian and European investment played a relatively 
minor role in these countries. Only 12,13 and 18 per cent of all FDI made during the 
specified time periods came from Asia and Europe (See Table 7.2.1.4). 
Jamaica was home to the majority of the FDI made in the pre-1971 era. During 
this period, 52 percent of all FDI was concentrated in this country. The 1971-1991 
period saw Jamaica conceding this dominance to Barbados. During this period, a total 
of 42 per cent of the FDI made in these countries was located in Barbados. 
Interestingly, the post 1991 era has witnessed the emergence of Trinidad-Tobago as an 
important site for FDI. This country accounted for more than half the investment 
made in the post 1991 period (See Table 7.2.1.5). 
Table 7.2.1.4 Country of Origin of MNEs and Timing of Investment 
Country/Timing of Pre-1971 1971-1990 Post 1991 Total 
Investment 
United States of America 20 21 9 51 
(48%) (66%) (53%) 
Britain 16 6 5 27 
(39%) (19%) (29%) 
Other 5 5 3 
. ,. 
3 
(12%) (13%) (18%) 
Total 41 12 17 L 
Table 7.2.1.5 Locational Patterns and Timing of Investment 
Location/Timing of Pre-1971 1971-1990 Post 1991 Total 
Investment 
Jamaica 23 12 2 37 
(52%) (33%) (13%) 
Barbados 10 15 3 28 
(19%) (42%) (20%) 
Trinidad-Tobago 19 9 10 38 
(37%) (25%) (67%) 
Total 12 16 . 
_. M 
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7.2.2 Type of Foreign Direct Investment 
Most of the respondents, a total of 57 per cent, were involved in market- 
seeking FDI. Respondents who were engaged in export-seeking FDI comprised 28 per 
cent of all investment while those involved in resource-seeking FDI were a mere 14 
per cent. Not surprisingly, the majority of these investments was US owned. 
Respondents from US owned MNEs accounted for 50 per cent of market-seeking FDI, 
54 per cent of resource-seeking FDI and 68 per cent of export-seeking FDI (See Table 
7.2.2.1). 
Table 7.2.2.1 Type of FDI, by country of origin 
Type/Country United States Britain Other Total 
of America 
Market-seeking 26 21 5 52 
(50%) (40%) (10%) (57) 
Resource-seeking 7 3 3 13 
(54%) (23%) (23%) (14) 
Export-seeking 17 3 5 25 
(68%) (12%) (20%) £28) 
Total Q 2? 11 94 
It is noteworthy that Jamaica was home to most of the respondents who were 
engaged in market-seeking investment: 40 per cent of this type of FDI was located 
here. By contrast, Trinidad-Tobago had the largest concentration of respondents 
involved in resource-seeking investment. Almost half of the respondents who were 
involved in this type of FDI were located in this country. Barbados, on the other hand, 
had the majority of the responses from those engaged in export-seeking FDI: 42 per 
cent of the respondents who were involved in export-seeking FDI operated in this 
country (See Table 7.2.2.2). 
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Table 7.2.2.2 Type of FDI, by locational patterns 
Type/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad- Total 
Tobago 
Market-seeking 27 16 24 67 
(40%) (24%) (36%) 
Resource-seeking 4 1 8 13- 
(31%) (8%) (61%) 
Export-seeking 6 11 9 26 
(23%) (42%) (35%) 
Total 31 21 41 1Q 
The responses indicated that pre-1971 era was dominated by market-seeking 
FDI. Market-seeking FDI accounted for 75 per cent of total investment in the pre- 
1971 period. This dominance was reversed in the later years. During the 1971 to 1990 
period, resource-seeking and export-seeking FDI accounted for 51 per cent of all 
investment made in the three countries while market-seeking FDI accounted for 48 
per cent. By the post 1991 era, resource-seeking and export-seeking FDI was 76 per 
cent of total investment. The figure for market-seeking FDI was a mere 23 per cent 
(See Table 7.2.2.3). 
Table 7.2.2.3 Type of FDI, by timing of investment 
Type/Timing of investment Pre-1971 1971-1990 Post 1991 Total 
Market-seeking 31 
(75%) 
16 
(48%) 
3 
(23%) 
50 
Resource-seeking 4 
(10%) 
4 
(12%) 
5 
(38%) 
13 
Export-seeking 6 
(15%) 
13 
(39%) 
5 
(38%) 
24 
Total 41 32 13 a7 
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7.2.3 Modes of Foreign Direct Investment 
The wholly owned subsidiary was the preferred mode of FDI used by the 
MNEs responding to the survey. A total of 65 per cent of all respondents used this 
mode of FDI to enter the three Caribbean countries. `Other' modes of FDI, which 
mainly are joint venture arrangements with more than two partners, were also 
considered to be an attractive mode of market entry. Twenty-five per cent of the 
respondents indicated that they utilised this institutional form of foreign involvement. 
By contrast, only 10 per cent of the respondents used 50-50 joint venture 
arrangements. It is noteworthy that it was the non-US MNEs that appeared to use 
minority and 50-50 joint venture arrangements. Indeed, 74 per cent of the respondents 
from the US firms used wholly owned subsidiaries. The figure for the British and 
`other' MNEs was 50 and 58 per cent, respectively (See Table 7.2.3.1). 
Table 7.2.3.1 Mode of FDI, by country of origin 
Mode/Country United States Britain Other Total 
of America 
Acquired 50-50 joint venture 1 - - j 
(2%) 
New 50-50 joint venture 4 3 1 8 
(8%) (11%) (8%) 
Acquired 4 2 1 7 
_ 
subsidiary (8%) (7%) (8%) 
New subsidiary 33 12 6 5 
(66%) (43%) (50%) 
Other 8 11 4 3 
(16%) (39%) (33%) 
Total 5-0 28 12 90 
The wholly owned subsidiary was the dominant market entry mode used in 
Barbados. Seventy-seven per cent of the respondents in this country indicated that 
they used this mode of FDI. The use of other modes of market entry flourished in the 
other two countries. Forty-five per cent of the respondents in Trinidad-Tobago 
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indicated that they used minority and 50-50 joint venture agreements. In Jamaica, the 
comparable figure was 38 per cent. 
Table 7.2.3.2 Mode of FDI, by locational patterns 
Mode/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad- Total 
Tobago 
Acquired 50-50 joint 1 - 1 2 
venture (3%) (3%) 
New 50-50 joint venture 2 1 5 
(6%) (3%) (13%) 
Acquired 2 1 4 2 
subsidiary (6%) (3%) (11%) 
New subsidiary 20 23 17 6 
(57%) (74%) (45%) 
Other 10 6 11 27 
(29%) (19%) (29%) 
Total 33 31 3$ 104 
The preferred mode of market entry of the export-seeking MNE was the 
wholly owned subsidiary. A total of 85 per cent of these firms used this mode of FDI. 
The comparable figure for the market and resource-seeking FDI was 59 and 50 per 
cent, respectively. It was the resource-seeking MNE that used the new forms of 
foreign involvement: 50 per cent of these respondents indicated that their firms were 
involved in joint venture arrangements (See Table 7.2.3.3). 
Table 7.2.3.3 Mode of Investment, by type of investment 
Mode/Type Market- Resource- Export- Total 
seeking seeking seeking 
Acquired 50-50 joint I - - I 
venture (2%) 
New 50-50 joint 5 1 2 $ 
venture (10%) (7%) (8%) 
Acquired subsidiary 4 1 2 2 
(8%) (7%) (8%) 
New subsidiary 26 6 20 48 
(51%) (43%) (77%) 
Other 15 6 2 23 
(29%) (43%) (8%) 
Total 14 21 
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The post 1991 era witnessed the rise in the use of modes of FDI that require 
less equity than that of the wholly owned subsidiary. Indeed, the pre-1991 period was 
characterised by the dominance of the wholly owned subsidiary: 68 and 74 per cent 
in the pre-1971 and 1971-1990 periods, respectively. However, in the post 1991 era, 
this figure had dwindled to a mere 41 per cent (See Table 7.2.3.4). 
Table 7.2.3.4 Mode of investment, by timing of investment 
Mode/Timing of Pre-1971 1971-1991 Post 1991 Total 
investment 
Acquired 50-50 joint 1 - - 1 
venture (2%) 
New 50-50 joint 3 1 4 
venture (7%) (3%) (24%) 
Acquired subsidiary 5 - 2 2 
(12%) (12%) 
New subsidiary 24 23 5 52 
(56%) (74%) (29%) 
Other 10 7 6 23 
(23%) (23%) (35%) 
Total 43 31 17 F9 
7.2.4 The Quantum of Initial Investment 
Most of the initial investment made by the respondents in the three Caribbean 
countries was less than US $10 million. A total of 66 per cent of the respondents 
indicated that their initial investment was less than US $10 million. By contrast, seven 
percent indicated that their initial investment ranged from US $10 to 20 million. 
However, twenty-seven per cent of the respondents stated that this investment was 
more than US $20 million (See Table 7.2.4.1). 
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Table 7.2.4.1 Quantum of initial investment 
Quantum of Investment (US$) Frequency Percent 
Less than 10 million 36 
10 to 20 million 4 7 
More than 20 million 15 27- 
Total 55 BO-0 
Interestingly enough, the majority of the initial FDI made in Barbados was less 
than US $10 million. Indeed, 94 per cent of the initial investment made in this country 
was of this value. The comparable figure for Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago was 80 
and 38 per cent, respectively. Trinidad-Tobago appeared to secure the largest quantum 
of initial investment. Sixty-three percent of the respondents in Trinidad-Tobago 
indicated that their initial investment was more than US $10 million. The comparable 
figure for Jamaica and Barbados was 23 and 6 per cent, respectively (See Table 
7.2.4.2). 
Table 7.2.4.2 Quantum of investment, by locational patterns 
Quantum of Jamaica Barbados Trinidad- Total 
investment/Location Tobago 
Less than US $10 12 15 9 36 
million (80%) (94%) (38%) 
US $10 to 20 million 0 1 3 4 
(0%) (6%) (13%) 
More than US $20 3 0 12 15 
million (20%) (0%) (50%) 
Total if 15 24 55 
It appears that the initial investment made by the British owned MNE tended 
to be relatively low. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents from these firms 
indicated that their initial investment was less than US$ 10 million. The comparable 
figure for the US and `other' (European and Asian) MNEs was 23 and 11 per cent, 
respectively. In addition, it seems that the US owned MNEs invest relatively larger 
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sums in these countries: 60 per cent of the respondents from the US owned firms 
indicated that their initial investment was more than US $20 million. By contrast, the 
figure for respondents from British and European and Asian MNEs was 13 and 27 per 
cent, respectively (See Table 7.2.4.3). [This table should be read horizontally]. 
Table 7.2.4.3 Quantum of investment, by country of origin 
Quantum of United States of Britain Other Total 
investment/Country America 
Less than US $10 19 13 4 36 
million (23%) (37%) (11%) 
US $10 to 20 million 3 1 0 4 
(75%) (25%) (0%) 
More than US $20 9 2 4 j. 
million (60%) (13%) (27%) 
Total II g 
The majority of the respondents who were involved in market-seeking FDI 
stated that their initial investment made in the Caribbean was less than US $20 
million. A total of 87 per cent of these respondents indicated that their initial 
investment was less than US $10 million. In addition, 10 per cent of these respondents 
stated that the value of their initial investment ranged from US $10 to 20 million. 
Conversely, it appears that the initial investment made by those involved in resource- 
seeking and export-seeking FDI is relatively large. Indeed, 75 per cent of those 
involved in resource-seeking FDI indicated that their initial investment was more than 
US $20 million. Fifty-three per cent of the respondents engaged in export-seeking FDI 
stated that their initial investment was more than US $10 million (See Table 7.2.4.4). 
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Table 7.2.4.4 Quantum of investment, by type of investment 
Quantum of Market-seeking Resource- Export-seeking Total 
investment/Type seeking 
Less than US $10 26 2 8 36 
million (87%) (25%) (25%) 
US$10to20 3 0 1 4 
million (10%) (0%) (6%) 
More than US $20 1 6 8 15 
million (3%) (75%) (47%) 
Total 3Q $ 17 5 
The pre-1991 period was characterised by relatively small levels of initial 
investment made in these countries. Seventy-two per cent of the respondents indicated 
that the initial investment made in the pre-1971 era was less than US $10 million. 
Also, 85 per cent revealed that the initial investment made during the period, 1971- 
1990 was under US $10 million. The post 1991 period saw a reversal of these trends: 
67 per cent of the respondents stated that their initial investment made in these 
countries was in excess of US $20 million, 22 per cent revealed that it ranged from 
US $10 to 20 million, and a mere 11 per cent stated that it was under US $ 10 million 
(See Table 7.2.4.5). 
Table 7.2.4.5 Quantum of investment, by timing of investment 
Quantum of Pre-1971 1971-1990 Post 1991 Total 
investment/Timin 
g of Investment 
Less than US $10 18 17 1 336 
million (72%) (85%) (11°10) 
US $10 to 20 1 1 2 4 
million (4%) (5%) (22%) 
More than US $20 6 2 6 14 
million (24%) (10%) (67%) 
Total 2ý 20 g 54 
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7.3 The Results of the Statistical Analysis 
7.3.1 The Statistical Test Used 
The Chi-square (x2) test has been described as being ideally suited for the 
exploratory analysis of data with discrete variables (Lancaster, 1969: 162). Thus, this 
test satisfies the objectives of the empirical investigation. The aim of this investigation 
was to test the validity of the hypotheses developed in Chapters 3 to 5. To this end, 
the Chi-square (X2) tests of independence that were performed sought to determine 
whether there was a statistically significant relationship between the key explanatory 
variables identified in the hypotheses. 
As was discussed in Chapter 6, the responses to the questions posed in the 
mailed questionnaire were recorded on a five point likert scale. In most cases, only 
those responses that obtained frequencies of 40 per cent and more were used. 
However, in instances where the responses had frequencies that were less than 40 per 
cent, the variables that had the highest frequencies were used (See Appendix, Tables 
2-14 ). All responses were recoded into a two point scale labelled `not important' and 
'important'. Recoding was undertaken to make the preliminary analysis of the data 
more manageable and to minimise the possibilities of low cell counts. It was these 
recoded responses that were used for the chi-square tests. This recoding of the data 
resulted in a limited ability to analyse the intensity of the responses [Churchill 1995: 
467]. However, the analysis of the data was made more manageable. 
Further statistical tests were carried out with the following variables: type of 
foreign direct investment, country of origin of the MNE, location of investment, 
quantum of initial investment and identity of respondents. In this instance, the key 
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explanatory variables identified in the hypotheses were individually tested against 
each of these five variables. The further disaggregation of the data resulted in 
relatively low cells counts. It traditionally has been argued that chi-square tests are 
only considered to be statistically significant when the expected frequencies are 
greater than five [Churchill 1995: 925]. However, it has been posited that many of the 
expected frequencies could be as low as unity without affecting the test greatly. 
[Everitt 1992: 39]. The latter argument is used to support the accuracy of several of 
the findings. The following section discusses the results of this analysis. In addition, 
where possible, an interpretation of the findings will be undertaken. 
It is important to note that in two instances, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 7, 
the research hypotheses were not written in the form of the null hypothesis. Indeed, in 
these cases, the hypothesis of interest was the alternative, not the null hypothesis. 
7.3.2 The Testing of the Hypotheses: Results and Interpretation of Findings 
111. No relationship exists between the MNE's use of its unique advantages and 
the presence of domestic competitors. 
The key variables used to represent the MNE's unique advantages were 
product differentiation, production technology, managerial skills, brand name product, 
privileged access to raw materials, possession of new technology, marketing skills, 
distribution networks and access to finance. Except for privileged access to raw 
materials and marketing skills, no statistically significant relationship exists between 
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unique advantages and domestic competitors. Hence, the research hypothesis is 
essentially supported (See Table 7.3.1). 
Table 7.3.1 Testing Hypothesis 1 
Variables Prod- 
uct 
Differ. 
Prod- 
uct 
Tech. 
Man- 
agerial 
Skills 
Brand 
Name 
Prod. 
Access 
to Raw 
Mat. 
New 
Techn- 
ology 
Mark- 
eting 
Skills 
Distr. 
Net- 
works 
Access 
to Fin. 
Domestic 
Firms 
. 169 . 539 . 
957 
. 961 . 047* . 
251 
. 019* . 422 . 508 Country 
. 
024* 
. 663 . 
841 
. 643 . 003** . 
039* 
. 
386 
. 881 . 
639 
Location 
. 
729 
. 769 . 
188 
. 
708 
. 003 ** . 
004** 
. 
671 
. 996 . 
229 
Type 
. 002** . 021* . 458 . 958 . 00*** . 421 . 002** . 535 . 009** 
Quantum 
. 608 . 808 . 489 . 139 . 00*** . 265 . 366 . 967 . 277 
Identity 
. 223 . 286 . 778 . 231 . 438 . 004** . 00*** . 002** . 592 
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Further statistical testing revealed that many of these unique advantages were 
not country-specific. Except for product differentiation, privileged access to raw 
materials and possession of new technology, there was no statistically significant 
relationship between unique advantages and country of origin of MNE. Interestingly 
enough, it appears that the British, and Asian and European MNEs are more likely to 
deploy these unique advantages than the US MNEs. An overwhelming proportion of 
British firms (83 per cent) revealed that product differentiation was important to their 
operations in the Caribbean. Similarly, the unique advantages of privileged access to 
raw materials and the possession of new technology seemed to be important to the 
Asian and European MNEs. Sixty-seven per cent of these firms perceived that 
privileged access to raw materials was critical to their Caribbean operations. Fifty- 
seven per cent of them also considered new technology to be important to their 
operations (See Tables 7.3.2-4). 
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Table 7.3.2 Testing Hypothesis 1- Product Differentiation and Country of Origin 
of MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 12 
(44 %) 
10 
(83%) 
1 
(20%) 
23 
Not Important 15 
(56%) 
2 
(17%) 
4 
(80%) 
21 
777777777777 7 
Table 7.3.3 Testing Hypothesis 1. Privileged Access to Raw Materials and 
Country of Origin of MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 17 
(43%) 
0 
(o%) 
6 
(67%) 
23 
Not Important 23 
(58%) 
16 
(100%) 
3 
(33%) 
42 
Table 7.3.4 Testing Hypothesis 1- New Technology and Country of Origin of 
MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 9 
(21%) 
2 
(11%) 
4 
(57%) 
15 
Not Important 33 
(79%) 
17 
(89%) 
3 
(43%) 
53 
In addition, the tests reveal that two of the unique advantage variables are 
location-specific. Indeed, a statistically significant relationship exists between the two 
variables, possession of new technology and privileged access to raw material, and the 
location of FDI. It appears that the MNEs are more likely to use these unique assets in 
Trinidad-Tobago than in the other two focus countries. Indeed, 65 per cent of the 
firms making investments in Trinidad stated that privileged access to raw materials 
enable them to compete effectively in this country. 
10 It is noteworthy that a smaller 
10 It is difficult to determine where the MNE is obtaining this `privileged assess to raw material'. 
Trinidad-Tobago is endowed with reserves of oil and natural gas. Thus, the notion that the MNE is 
gaining this unique advantage from its operations in Trinidad cannot be dismissed. 
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number - 47 per cent - stated the unique advantage deployed in Trinidad was new 
technology (See Tables 7.3.5-6). 
Table 7.3.5 Testing Hypothesis 1- Privileged Access to Raw Materials and 
Location 
Response/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago Total 
Important 5 
(21%) 
5 
(33%) 
13 
(65%) 
23 
Not Important 19 
(79%) 
10 
(67%) 
7 
(35%) 
36 
Table 7.3.6 Testing Hypothesis 1- New Technology and Location 
Response/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago Total 
Important 1 
(4%) 
6 
(29%) 
8 
(47%) 
15 
Not Important 22 
(96%) 
15 
(71%) 
9 
(53%) 
46 
Further, there was a statistically significant relationship between product 
differentiation, production technology, privileged access to raw materials, marketing 
strategy and access to finance, and the type of FDI. Not surprisingly, it is the market- 
seeking MNEs that are more inclined than other types of MNEs to use the advantages 
of product differentiation and marketing skills as competitive strategies. Seventy-one 
per cent of market-seeking MNEs stated that they used product differentiation in 
competition in the focus countries. Similarly, 63 per cent of market-seeking MNEs 
stated that they used marketing skills in competition (See Tables 7.3.7-8). 
Table 7.3.7 Testing Hypothesis 1- Product Differentiation and Type of MNE 
Response/Type Market-Seeking 
MNE 
Resource-Seeking 
MNE 
Export-Seeking 
MNE 
Total 
Important 20 
(71%) 
2 
(33%) 
1 
(10%) 
23 
Not Important 8 
(29%) 
4 
(67%) 
9 
(90%) 
21 
`I't tr 
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144 
Table 7.3.8 Testing Hypothesis 1- Marketing Skills and Type of MNE 
Response/Type 
Important 
Not Important 
Market-Seeking 
MNE 
29 
(63%) 
17 
(37%) 
Resource-Seeking 
MNE 
1 
10 
(91%) 
Export-Seeking 
MNE 
7 
(33%) 
14 
(67%) 
Total 
37 
41 
On the other hand, it appears that it was the export-seeking and resource- 
seeking MNEs that are more inclined to use the advantages of privileged access to raw 
materials, production technology and finance. As Tables 7.3.9-11 demonstrate, a 
greater percentage of the export-seeking and resource-seeking firms stated that they 
used these advantages in competition in the focus countries. 
Table 7.3.9 Testing Hypothesis 1- Privileged Access to Raw Materials and Type 
of MNE 
Response/Type Market-Seeking Resource-Seeking Export-Seeking Total 
NINE NINE NINE 
Important 6 7 10 23 
(15%) (78%) (56%) 
Not Important 33 2 8 43 
(85%) (22%) (44%) 
Table 7.3.10 Testing Hypothesis 1- Access to Finance and Type of MNE 
Response/Type 
Important 
Not Important 
Market-Seeking 
MNE 
8 
(15%) 
44 
(85%) 
Resource-Seeking 
MNE 
6 
(46%) 
7 
(54%) 
Export-Seeking Total 
MNE 
2 16 
(8%) 
24 71 
(92%) 
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Table 7.3.11 Testing Hypothesis 1- Production Technology and Type of MNE 
Response/Type 
Important 
Not Important 
Market-Seeking 
MNE 
11 
(26%) 
31 
Resource-Seeking 
MNE 
7 
(64%) 
4 
(36%) 
Export-Seeking Total 
MNE 
10 28 
(56%) 
8 43 
(44%) 
It is noteworthy that no statistically significant relationship exists between 
firm size, as measured by the quantum of its initial investment, and use of these 
unique advantages. The only exception is access to raw materials. It appears that the 
larger MNEs, i. e. those whose initial investment is greater than US $20 million, are 
more likely than the other MNEs to use privileged access to raw materials as a 
competitive strategy (See Table 7.3.12). It could be suggested that the resource- 
seeking MNE is able to use its size as a competitive strategy against the domestic 
firms. This proposition may be supported by the fact that the variable, privileged 
access to raw materials had a statistically significant relationship with domestic 
competitors. Moreover, it can be suggested that this competitive strategy is employed 
in Trinidad-Tobago. This country had the majority of respondents who operate the 
larger sized firms. Furthermore, it had the largest number of respondents who are 
engaged in resource-seeking FDI. Hence, it may be speculated that the MNE, in 
competition with the domestic firms, uses its size to gain access to the country's 
resources, i. e., oil and natural gas. 
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Table 7.3.12 Testing Hypothesis 1- Privileged Access to Raw Materials and 
Quantum of Investment 
Response/Quantum Less US$10 m US$ 10 - 20m More US$ 20m Total 
Important 6 
(21%) 
0 
(0%) 
11 
(92%) 
25 
Not Important 22 
(79%) 
2 
(100%) 
1 
(8%) 
17 
<2 <>> ` 
Finally, the respondents at the subsidiary and the headquarters appear to differ 
on the importance of the unique advantages of new technology, marketing skills and 
distribution networks for competition in the Caribbean. It appears that the respondents 
located at the subsidiary were more inclined than those at the headquarters to perceive 
new technology, marketing skills, and the possession of distribution networks as 
important for competition in the Caribbean (See Tables 7.3.13-5). 
Table 7.3.13 Testing Hypothesis 1- New Technology and Identity of Respondents 
Table 7.3.14 Testing Hypothesis 1- Marketing Skills and Identity of Respondents 
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Table 7.3.15 Testing Hypothesis 1- Distribution Networks and Identity of 
Respondents 
Response/Identity Headquarters Subsidiary Total 
Important 4 
(9%) 
13 
(39%) 
17 
Not Important 42 
(91%) 
20 
(61%) 
621 
o 
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H2. There is a positive relationship between `follow-the-leader' investment 
behaviour of MNEs and the use of low-cost factors. 
The term used to measure the `follow-the-leader' investment behaviour of the 
MNEs was `investment in the Caribbean market influenced by actions of 
competitors'. The test showed that no statistically significant relationship exists 
between `follow-the-leader' investment and the factor cost variables (labour 
availability and productivity, and natural gas). However, low-cost labour was a 
significant factor. Thus, the hypothesis was supported (See Tables 7.3.16). 
Table 7.3.16 Testing Hypothesis 2 
Variable Availability of Productivity of Cost of Labour Price of Natural 
Labour Labour Gas 
Follow the Leader 
Investment Behaviour . 
152 . 
171 . Q54* . 334 
In addition, there was no statistically significant relationship between the 
variable measuring the `follow-the leader' pattern of investment and the variables, 
country of origin of the MNE, type of FDI, quantum of initial investment and the 
identity of the respondents. It is noteworthy, however, that a statistically significant 
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relationship exists between the `follow-the-leader' investment behaviour of the MNE 
and location of investment (See Table 7.3.17). 
Table 7.3.17 Testing Hypothesis 2 
Variable Follow-the -leader Investment 
Country 
. 556 
Location 
. 008** 
Type 
. 078 
Quantum 
. 
085 
Identity 
. 
168 
Interestingly enough, it appears that the firms are more likely to engage in this 
pattern of investment in Jamaica and Barbados than in Trinidad. Eighty-two and 
seventy-three per cent of MNEs making investment in Jamaica and Barbados, 
respectively revealed that their decision to invest in these countries was influenced by 
the actions of competitors. 
Table 7.3.18. Testing Hypothesis 2- Follow-the-Leader Investment and Location 
Response/Country Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago Total 
Important 22 
(82%) 
20 
(73%) 
4 
(36%) 
46 
Not Important 5 
(18%) 
3 
(13%) 
7 
(64%) 
15 
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H3. There is a positive relationship between the firm's use of its unique 
advantages and the locational advantage variables. 
The key variables used to test `unique advantages' were production 
technology, managerial skills, marketing skills, distribution networks, brand name 
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product, access to finance, privileged access to raw material, production technology 
and new technology. The key variables that were used to represent locational 
advantages were divided into two categories. The first category was the factor cost 
variables: labour (cost, availability and productivity) and price of natural gas. The 
second category attempted to measure the elements of the institutional and 
infrastructural environment. They included the variables, bureaucracy, political 
stability, telecommunication services, airline services, port services, proximity to the 
US market and government's policies towards trade and market liberalisation. A 
statistically significant relationship was found for six of the variables comprising 
unique advantage and several of the variables measuring locational advantages. 
Hence, with some modifications, the hypothesis was supported (See Tables 7.3.19- 
20). 
Tables 7.3.19 The Testing of Hypothesis 3- The Decision to Establish Operations 
Variables Lab. Lab. Lab. Nat. Pol. Bur- Tele- Air- Port Proxi Gov- 
Avail. Prod. Cost Gas Stab- cracy com. line Ser- -mity ment 
Price ility. Ser- Ser- vice to US Pol. 
vice vice 
Prod. 
Tech. . 170 . 
426 . 0*** . 149 . 299 . 
426 . 
432 . 275 . 784 707 . 194 
Mark 
Skills . 
696 . 813 . 
407 . 
322 . 285 . 
119 . 01** . 
020* 
. 
529 
. 025* . 836 
Mana 
Skills . 141 . 
978 . 
286 . 077 . 
992 . 659 . 129 . 
082 
. 
500 . 815 . 066 
Dist. 
Network . 
542 . 
838 . 
500 . 
780 . 941 . 
146 . 261 . 044* . 054* . 956 . 584 
Brand 
Name 
Product 
. 
154 . 
393 
. 
108 . 
271 . 759 . 
665 . 
475 . 808 761 . 
433 
. 466 
Finance . 918 . 
287 . 
679 . 
032* . 419 . 
147 . 
467 . 436 . 
345 . 
469 
. 
640 
Raw 
Material . 639 . 
895 . 01** . 
00*** . 017* . 035* . 442 . 729 . 
401 . 201 . 106 
Product 
Diff. . 303 . 
949 . 
324 . 
141 . 
887 . 
079 . 165 . 
542 . 
103 
. 
819 
. 393 
New 
Tech. . 
434 . 
544 . 
421 . 
044* . 091 . 
028* . 
606 . 
203 
. 
225 . 275 . 
087 
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It appears that the MNE, in establishing its operations, will initially combine 
six of its firm-specific assets with selected locational endowments of the three 
countries. These firm-specific assets are production technology, marketing skills, the 
possession of distribution networks, access to finance, privileged access to raw 
materials, and new technology. The locational endowments favoured by the MNE 
appear to be the factor cost variables, specifically, low-cost labour and competitively 
priced natural gas and the infrastructural support variables: political stability, 
efficacious bureaucracy, efficient airline, port and telecommunications services, and 
the country's proximity to the US market. Indeed, there was a statistically significant 
relationship between privileged access to raw materials and the decision to establish 
operations in the countries because of each of the factors: low-cost labour, 
competitively priced natural gas, political stability and an efficient bureaucracy. A 
statistically significant relationship exists for possession of new technology, and the 
locational advantage variables, competitively priced natural gas and efficient 
bureaucracy. Further, a statistically significant relationship was found for production 
technology and low-cost labour. In addition, a statistically significant relationship 
exists for access to finance and natural gas prices. Interestingly enough, some of the 
unique advantages appeared to be only used with the institutional variables. Thus, 
there was a statistically significant relationship between distribution networks, and 
port and airline services. There was also a statistically significant relationship between 
marketing skills and the locational variables, telecommunications and airline services, 
and proximity to the US market. 
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It appears that the firm, in its continued operations in the countries, will seek 
to combine six firm specific advantages with specific locational advantages of the 
countries (See Table 7.3.20). 
Table 7.3.20 The Testing of Hypothesis 3- The Decision to Continue Operations 
Variables Lab. Lab. Lab. Nat. Pol. Bur. - Tele- Air- Port Proxi Gov. - 
Avail. Prod. Cost Gas Stab- cracy com. line Ser- -mity ment 
Price ility. Ser- Ser- vice to US Pol. 
vice vice 
Product. 
Tech. . 031* . 035* . 01** . 629 . 241 . 683 . 595 . 104 . 839 . 353 . 386 Mar. 
Skills 
. 399 . 972 . 540 . 051 * . 894 . 802 . 762 . 037* . 500 . 394 . 617 Man. 
Skills 
. 
086 
. 
851 
. 231 . 
087 
. 937 . 842 . 247 . 063 . 169 . 527 . 092 Distr 
Network 
. 
365 
. 
977 
. 684 . 
409 
. 165 . 611 . 
797 
. 136 . 
262 
. 975 . 
516 
Bran. 
Name 
Prod. 
. 432 . 755 . 053* . 846 . 329 . 777 . 329 . 967 . 248 . 384 . 498 
Finance 
. 561 . 
826 
. 602 . 682 . 361 . 166 . 
321 
. 635 . 
262 
. 196 . 134 Raw 
Material 
. 
819 
. 
649 . 099 . 000** . 018* . 196 . 01** . 512 . 079 . 073 . 743 * 
Product 
Diff. . 392 . 205 . 122 . 024* . 887 . 378 . 173 . 072 . 106 . 269 . 822 New 
Tech. 
. 
208 
. 
113 
. 
037* 
. 
011** 
. 057 . 541 . 536 . 037* . 
084 
. 071 . 
974 
The firm-specific advantages used by the firm are production technology, 
marketing skills, brand name product, privileged access to raw materials, product 
differentiation and new technology. The locational advantages that are most attractive 
to the firm in its continued operations in the region are the factor cost variables 
(labour and natural gas) and the institutional variables: political stability, efficient 
airline and telecommunications services. Several of the unique advantages were used 
in combination with selected factor cost variables. Thus, there was a statistically 
significant relationship between production technology and the decision to continue 
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operations in the three countries because of the labour factors (cost, productivity and 
availability). In addition, a statistically significant relationship exists between 
production differentiation and the price of natural gas. Moreover, there was a 
statistically significant relationship between brand name product and the cost of 
labour. 
Other unique advantages were used together with the factor cost and the 
locational advantage variables. Hence, there was a statistically significant relationship 
between the possession of new technology and the decision to continue operations 
because of natural gas prices, low-cost labour and an efficient airline service. A 
statistically significant relationship was also found for marketing skills and the 
variables, natural gas prices and airline services. Finally, a statistically significant 
relationship exists between privileged access to raw material and natural gas prices, 
political stability and telecommunications service. 
Thus, it appears that the unique advantages used by the MNE in its operations 
in the three Caribbean countries are access to raw materials, possession of new 
technology, marketing skills, access to finance, possession of distribution networks 
and production technology. The locational advantages that appear to appeal to these 
firms are the labour factors (cost, productivity and availability), the price of natural 
gas, an efficient bureaucracy, political stability, and an efficient airline, port and 
telecommunications service. Several of the unique advantage variables (possession of 
new technology, access to raw materials, access to finance and production technology) 
suggest that they belong to the export-seeking and resource-seeking MNEs. Thus, it 
can be surmised that the locational advantage variables identified are those that are 
associated with these kinds of MNE operations in the three countries. 
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H4. There is a positive relationship between the resource, export and market- 
seeking MNE and the decision to establish and continue operations in the 
Caribbean because of low-cost factors. 
The variables used to measure low-cost factors were the labour cost factors 
(cost, productivity and availability) and the price of natural gas. Except for the 
availability of labour, a statistically significant relationship exists between the 
resource, export and market-seeking MNEs, and low-cost factors. Thus, the 
hypothesis was supported (See Tables 7.3.21). 
Table 7.3.21 Testing Hypothesis 4- The Decision to Establish Operations 
Variable Availability 
of Labour 
Labour 
Productivity 
Labour 
Cost 
Price of Natural 
Gas 
Type . 187 . 000*** . 000*** . 000*** 
Country . 989 . 379 . 033* . 258 
Location . 306 . 047* . 014** . 000*** 
Quantum . 219 . 165 . 007* . 000*** 
Identity . 612 . 666 . 416 . 258 
It appears that the MNE's decision to establish operations in the three 
countries is influenced by the labour factors, specifically, cost and productivity, and 
by the price of natural gas. It seems that the export-seeking and resource-seeking 
MNEs were more likely to be attracted by these factors than the market-seeking MNE. 
A greater percentage of these two types of MNEs considered low-cost, productive 
labour and competitively priced natural gas to be important to their initial investment 
decision (See Table 7.3.22-24). 
154 
Table 7.3.22 Testing Hypothesis 4- Productive Labour and Type of MNE 
Response/Type Market-Seeking Resource-Seeking Export-Seeking Total 
Important 19 
(42%) 
5 
(50%) 
21 
(88%) 
45 
Not Important 26 
(58%) 
5 
(50%) 
3 
(13%) 
34 
Table 7.3.23 Testing Hypothesis 4- Low-cost Labour and Type of MNE 
Response/Type Market-Seeking Resource-Seeking Export-Seeking Total 
Important 17 
(37%) 
7 
(70%) 
20 
(83%) 
44 
Not Important 29 
(63%) 
3 
(30%) 
4 
(17%) 
36 
Table 7.3.24 Testing Hypothesis 4- Competitively priced Natural Gas and Type 
of MNE 
Response/Type Market-Seeking Resource-Seeking Export-Seeking Total 
Important 4518 
(18%) (83%) (14%) 
Not Important 18 16 25 
(81%) (17%) (86%) 
Interestingly enough, it appears that the non-British MNEs were more likely to 
be attracted by low-cost labour than the US MNEs studied. Sixty-seven per cent of 
these European and Asian firms revealed that the low-cost labour was important to 
their decision to establish operations in the Caribbean. The comparable figure for US 
MNE was 67 per cent. Interestingly, only 28 per cent of British firms stated that low- 
cost labour was important to their initial investment decision (See Table 7.3.25). 
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Table 7.3.25 Testing Hypothesis 4- Low-cost Labour and Country of Origin of 
MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 30 
(61%) 
5 
(28%) 
8 
(67%) 
43 
Not Important 19 
(39%) 
13 
(72%) 
4 
(33%) 
36 
S 9 
Further, it seems that firms locating operations in Jamaica were more inclined 
than those in Barbados and Trinidad to be attracted by the region's low-cost labour. 
Additionally, it appears that MNEs making investment in Barbados were more 
influenced by the country's productive labour force (See Table 7.3.26-27). 
Table 7.3.26 Testing Hypothesis 4- Low-Cost Labour and Location of 
Investment 
Response/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago Total 
Important 16 
(70%) 
11 
(52%) 
16 
(62%) 
43 
Not Important 7 
(30%) 
10 
(48%) 
10 
(39%) 
27 
Table 7.3.27 Testing Hypothesis 4- Productive Labour and Location of 
Investment 
Response/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago Total 
Important 12 
(52%) 
16 
(80%) 
13 
(50%) 
41 
Not Important 11 
(48%) 
4 
(20%) 
13 
(50%) 
28 
Moreover, it appears that the MNE whose initial investment exceeded US$ 10 
million was more inclined than others to be initially attracted to low-cost labour (See 
Tables 7.3.28). Further, those whose initial investment exceeded US$ 20 million were 
more likely to be influenced by competitively priced natural gas (See Tables 7.3.29). 
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Table 7.3.28 Testing Hypothesis 4- Low-Cost Labour and Quantum of 
Investment 
Response/Quantum Less US$ 10m US$ 10 - 20m More US$ 20m Total 
Important 14 
(42%) 
4 
(100%) 
11 
(85%) 
29 
Not Important 19 
(58%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(15%) 
21 
Table 7.3.29 Testing Hypothesis 4- Competitively priced Natural Gas and 
Quantum of Investment 
Response/Quantum Less US$ 10m US$ 10 - 20m More US$ 20m Total 
Important 3 
(23%) 
0 
(0%) 
11 
(100%) 
29 
Not Important 10 
(77%) 
3 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
21 
It appears that the MNE, in its continued operations in the countries, is only 
influenced by the cost of labour and natural gas. Surprisingly, the productivity of 
labour does not seem to play an important role in the MNE's decision to continue 
operations in the three Caribbean countries (See Table 7.3.30). 
Table 7.3.30 Testing Hypothesis 4- The Decision to Continue Operations 
Variable Availability 
of Labour 
Labour 
Productivity 
Labour 
Cost 
Price of Natural 
Gas 
Type 
. 
212 
. 117 . 010** . 
000*** 
Country . 963 . 
281 
. 415 . 230 
Location 
. 
963 
. 
282 
. 035* . 000*** 
Quantum 
. 
196 
. 
317 
. 
282 
. 000*** 
Identity 
. 
477 
. 
403 
. 974 . 
344 
No statistically significant relationship was found for the MNE's decision to 
continue to operate in the Caribbean countries because of low-cost factors and the 
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variables, country of origin of MNE and the headquarters-subsidiary identity of the 
respondents. Nonetheless, a statistically significant relationship was found for the 
variables, location of FDI and quantum of investment. 
It seems that the MNE's decision to continue operations in the Caribbean 
countries is influenced by the cost of labour and the price of natural gas. Those 
variables that measure factor cost advantage all had a statistically significant 
relationship with the location of investment. It appears labour costs considerations 
played a more important role in Barbados than the other two countries. As Table 
7.3.31 shows, 73 per cent of the firms located in Barbados stated that labour costs 
were important to their decision to continue operations in the country. Not 
surprisingly, natural gas price played a more important role in the firms' decision to 
continue operations than in Trinidad (See Table 7.3.32). 
Table 7.3.31 Testing Hypothesis 4- Low-Cost Labour and Location of 
Investment 
Response/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago Total 
Important 16 
(67%) 
16 
(73%) 
17 
(61%) 
33 
Not Important 8 
(33%) 
6 
(27%) 
11 
(39%) 
51 
> 
Table 7.3.32 Testing Hypothesis 4- Competitively Priced Natural Gas and 
Location of Investment 
Response/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago Total 
Important 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
17 
(59%) 
17 
Not Important 2 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
12 
(42%) 
14 
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As noted earlier, the factor cost variables seem to have an influence on the 
quantum of initial investment undertaken in the countries. Indeed, Tables 7.3.28-29 
revealed that the cost of labour and natural gas appear to play a deciding role in the 
amount of initial investment the MNE made in these countries. Interestingly enough, 
it was only the price of natural gas that factored in the firm's decision to continue 
operating in the countries. In fact, the decision to continue operations because of 
natural gas prices was the only factor cost variable that had a statistical significant 
relationship with the quantum of initial investment. A possible explanation for this 
result lies in the fact that low-cost labour may attract the foot loose type of FDI 
characteristic of export processing zones. These firms may be initially attracted to the 
region because of labour cost considerations. However, since their investment is 
highly mobile they may easily relocate when labour costs increase. On the other hand, 
a firm that invests in natural gas processing activity has sunk assets that are not easily 
mobile. Hence, the continued enjoyment of competitively priced natural gas is of 
importance to these firms. 
H5. There is a positive relationship between the export-seeking and resource- 
seeking MNE and the use of preferential trading agreements. 
The key variables used to measure preferential trading agreements were the 
807 and the 807-A trade programme of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and Lome. A 
statistically significant relationship was found for the variables, Lome, the 807 and 
807-A programmes, and resource-seeking and export-seeking MNEs. Thus, the 
hypothesis was supported (See Table 7.3.33). 
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Table 7.3.33 Testing of Hypothesis 5- The Decision to Establish Operations 
Variables 807 Programme 807-A Programme Lome CARICOM 
Type . 
002** . 082 . 
002** 
. 
165 
Country . 
461 . 528 . 
555 
. 
325 
Location . 298 . 537 . 
287 
. 745 
Quantum . 433 . 529 . 059 . 
223 
Identity . 099 . 009** . 196 . 
296 
Indeed, a statistically significant relationship exists between the firm's 
decision to establish operations because of the Lome and the 807 programme, and the 
resource-seeking and export-seeking MNEs. It is noteworthy that no statistically 
significant relationship was found for the decision to establish operations because of 
the 807-A programme. Further, no statistically significant relationship exists between 
the firm's decision to establish operations in the three countries because of these 
trading agreements and the variables, country of origin of the MNEs, location of FDI, 
and the size of initial investment. However, there was a statistically significant 
relationship between the responses made by the managers of the headquarters and 
subsidiary, and the decision to establish operations in these markets because of the 
807-A programme. It appears that these managers disagree on the importance of this 
preferential trading agreement to the firm's initial investment decision. As Table 
7.3.34 shows, the managers at the headquarters were more inclined to perceive the 
807-A programme as important to the 
decision to establish operations in the 
Caribbean. 
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Table 7.3.34 Testing Hypothesis 5- The 807-A Programme and Identity of 
Respondents 
A statistically significant relationship exists between the firm's decision to 
continue operations in the three countries because of the three preferential trading 
agreements, and export-seeking and resource-seeking MNEs. However, no 
statistically significant relationship exists between the firm's decision to continue 
operations in the Caribbean because of the two trading agreements and the variables, 
country of origin of MNE, location of FDI, and the size of initial investment (See 
Table 7.3.35). 
Table 7.3.35 Testing of Hypothesis 5-The Decision to Continue Operations 
Variables 807 Programme 807-A Programme Lome CARICOM 
Type . 
010* . 
003** 001*** . 393 
Country . 
691 . 528 . 
555 . 325 
Location . 164 . 
211 . 
089 . 290 
Quantum . 
732 . 
643 . 
076 . 158 
Identity . 
010* . 
003** . 
264 . 198 
It is noteworthy that there was a statistically significant relationship between 
identity of the respondents and the decision to continue operations because of the 807 
and 807-A programmes. Thus, there seems to be some disagreement on the 
importance of these programmes to the MNE's continued operations in the Caribbean. 
The managers at the headquarters were more likely than those at the subsidiary to 
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consider these agreements critical to their continued operations in the Caribbean (See 
Table 7.3.36-7). 
Table 7.3.36 Testing Hypothesis 5- The 807 Programme and Identity of 
Respondents 
Response/Identity Headquarters Subsidiary Total 
Important 7 
(47%) 
1 
(6%) 
8 
Not Important 8 
(53%) 
15 
(94%) 
23 
Table 7.3.37 Testing Hypothesis 5- The 807-A Programme and Identity of 
Respondents 
In addition, it was considered instructive to ascertain whether the MNE is 
attracted to these countries because of the existing free trade agreement, Caribbean 
Common Market (CARICOM). It is noteworthy that CARICOM appears to have no 
association with the type and origin of MNE which has established and is continuing 
operations in the Caribbean (See Tables 7.3.33 and Tables 7.3.35). 
H6. There is a positive relationship between the export processing zone and the 
export-seeking MNE. 
A statistically significant relationship exists between the firm's decision to 
establish operations in the Caribbean because of the presence of an EPZ and the 
variable, export-seeking MNE. This relationship also was maintained for the decision 
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to continue operations because of the presence of an EPZ, and the export-seeking 
MNE. Thus, the hypothesis was supported (See Tables 7.3.38-9). 
Table 7.3.38 Testing Hypothesis 6- The Decision to Establish Operations 
Variables Export Processing Zone 
Export-Seeking MNE 
. 
003** 
Country 
. 
255 
Location 
. 196 
Quantum 
. 
333 
Identity 
. 
139 
Table 7.3.39 Testing of Hypothesis 6- The Decision to Continue Operations 
Variables Export Processing Zone 
Export-Seeking MNE 
. 
002** 
Country 
. 
677 
Location 
. 573 
Quantum 
. 839 
Identity 
. 
013* 
Further statistically testing revealed that no statistically significant relationship 
exists between EPZ and the variables, country of origin of MNE, location of FDI and 
the quantum of initial investment. It is noteworthy, however, that the variable, identity 
of respondent had a statistically significant relationship with EPZ. Indeed, there 
appears to be some disagreement from respondents, located both at the headquarters 
and the subsidiary, on the importance of the EPZ to the firm's continued operations in 
the three Caribbean countries. It is seems that the respondents at the headquarters 
were more inclined to perceive the EPZ as being important to their continued 
operations in the Caribbean than those at the subsidiary (See Table 7.3.40). 
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Table 7.3.40 Testing Hypothesis 6- Export Processing Zone and Identity of 
Respondent 
Response/Identity Headquarters Subsidiary Total 
Important 12 
(30%) 
2 
(6%) 
14 
Not Important 31 
(72%) 
30 
(94%) 
61 
H7. No relationship exists between the investment incentives offered by the 
Caribbean governments and the MNE's decision to establish and continue 
operations in the Caribbean. 
The investment incentive package was measured by each of the following key 
variables: tax holidays, repatriation of profits, repatriation of dividends, duty free 
concessions, waiver of income tax on profits and waiver of income tax on dividends. 
A statistically significant relationship was found for several elements of the 
investment incentive package and the variable, type of MNE. Thus, the hypothesis 
was not supported (See Tables 7.3.41). 
Tables 7.3.41 Testing Hypothesis 7- The Decision to Establish Operations 
Variable Tax Holiday Duty 
Concessions 
on Mach. & 
Equipment 
Duty 
Concessions 
on Raw 
Materials 
Repatriatio 
n of Profits 
Repatriatio 
n Dividends 
Income Tax 
Relief on 
Dividends 
Type 001*** . 
831 . 
000*** . 
146 . 504 . 
059 
Location . 
796 . 
680 . 
154 . 
103 . 
149 . 638 
Country . 
031* . 
002** . 
190 . 
277 . 
022* 
. 
068 
Quantum . 283 . 
525 . 059 . 
879 . 
869 . 900 
Identity . 
828 . 
460 . 
545 . 
727 . 
381 
. 
025* 
It appears that tax holidays and duty free concessions are associated with the 
type of MNE deciding to establish operations in the Caribbean. As Tables 7.3.42-3 
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show, the export-seeking MNE was more likely to perceive these investment 
incentives as important than the other MNEs. Sixty-two per cent of the export-seeking 
MNEs stated that tax holidays were important to their initial investment decision. In 
addition, 83 per cent of these MNEs believed that duty free concessions were also 
critical to the initial investment decision. 
Table 7.3.42 Testing Hypothesis 7- Tax Holidays and Type of MNE 
Response 
Important 
Not Important 
Market-Seeking 
11 
(21%) 
41 
(79%) 
Resource-Seeking 
6 
(46%) 
7 
(54%) 
Export-Seeking Total 
16 33 
(62%) 
10 58 
(39%) 
Table 7.3.43 Testing Hypothesis 7- Duty Concessions on Machinery and 
Equipment and Type of MNE 
Response/Type Market-Seeking Resource-Seeking Export-Seeking Total 
Important 19 10 20 49 
(40%) (83%) (83%) 
Not Important 41 24 34 
(79%) (17%) (17%) 
Furthermore, a statistically significant relationship exists between several 
elements of the investment incentive package and the country of origin of the MNE. 
These were tax holidays, duty free concessions and repatriation of dividends. It 
appears that the Asian and European MNEs were more likely than the others to 
perceive these incentives as being critical to their initial investment decision. Indeed, 
54 per cent of the Asian and European MNEs identified tax holidays as important to 
their initial investment decision. The comparable figures for duty concessions on 
machinery and equipment, and repatriation of dividends were 83 and 92 per cent 
respectively (See Tables 7.3.44-6). 
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Table 7.3.44 Testing Hypothesis 7- Tax Holidays and Country of Origin of MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 22 
(42%) 
4 
(16%) 
7 
(54%) 
33 
Not Important 30 
(58%) 
21 
(84%) 
6 
(46%) 
57 
Table 7.3.45 Testing Hypothesis 7- Duty Concessions on Machinery and 
Equipment and Country of Origin of MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 19 
(40%) 
10 
(83%) 
20 
(83%) 
49 
Not Important 28 
(60%) 
2 
(17%) 
4 
(17%) 
34 
Table 7.3.46 Testing Hypothesis 7- Repatriation of Dividends and Country of 
Origin of MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 36 
(74%) 
9 
(47%) 
11 
(92%) 
56 
Not Important 13 
(27%) 
10 
(53%) 
1 
(8%) 
24 
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There was also a statistically significant relationship between the decision to 
establish operations because of tax reliefs on dividends, and identity of the 
respondents. The respondents at the headquarters and the subsidiary appear to 
disagree on the importance of this investment incentive to their initial investment 
decision. It seems that the respondents located at the headquarters were more likely to 
perceive tax reliefs on dividends as important to the initial investment decision than 
those at the subsidiary (See Table 7.3.47). 
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Table 7.3.47 Testing Hypothesis 7- Income Tax Relief and Identity of 
Respondent 
Tax holidays, together with tax relief on profits and dividends, were also 
associated by type of MNE deciding to continue operations in the countries (See 
Table 7.3.48). 
Table 7.3.48 Testing Hypothesis 7- The Decision to Continue Operations 
Variable Tax Duty Duty Repatriat Repatriat Income Income 
Holiday Concess- Concess- -ion of -ion of Tax Tax 
ions on ions on Profits Dividend Relief on Relief on 
Mach. & Raw s Dividend Profits 
Equipment Material s 
Type 
. 
000*** 
. 
157 
. 172 . 
207 
. 703 . 000* ** . 
000* 
Location 
. 248 . 637 . 750 . 723 . 666 . 
917 
. 501 
Country 
. 
053* 
. 
057 , 175 . 161 . 086 . 
042* 
. 
068 
Quantum 
. 002** . 577 . 507 . 
608 
. 137 . 
212 
. 
761 
Identity 
. 
601 
. 
258 . 393 . 388 . 100 . 
213 
. 
395 
It appears that the export-seeking MNE was more inclined to consider these 
investment incentives to be important than the other types of MNEs. Indeed, 65 per 
cent of the export-seeking MNEs stated that tax holidays were important to their 
continued operation in the Caribbean. The comparable figures for income tax relief on 
dividends and profits were 58 and 65 per cent, respectively (See Tables 7.3.49-51). 
167 
Table 7.3.49 Testing Hypothesis 7- Tax Holidays and Type of MNE 
Response 
Important 
Not Important 
Market-Seeking 
4 
(8%) 
48 
(92%) 
Resource-Seeking 
6 
(46%) 
7 
(54%) 
Export-Seeking 
17 
(65%) 
9 
(35%) 
Total 
27 
64 
Table 7.3.50 Testing Hypothesis 7- Income Tax Relief on Dividends and Type of 
MNE 
Response/Type Market-Seeking Resource-Seeking Export-Seeking Total 
Important 8 
(15%) 
6 
(46%) 
15 
(58%) 
29 
Not Important 44 
(85%) 
7 
(54%) 
11 
(42%) 
62 
T 7 
Table 7.3.51 Testing Hypothesis 7- Income Tax Relief on Profits and Type of 
MNE 
Response/Type 
Important 
Not Important 
Market-Seekin 
6 
(11%0) 
46 
(89%) 
Resource-Seekin 
4 
(31%) 
9 
(69%) 
Export-Seeking 
17 
(65%) 
9 
(35%) 
Total 
27 
64 
A statistically significant relationship exists between the decision to continue 
operations because of the investment incentives and the variables, country of origin of 
MNE and the quantum of initial investment. The elements of the investment incentive 
package that appeal to the respondents were tax reliefs on dividends and tax holidays. 
It seems that the Asian and European MNEs were more likely than the other MNEs to 
view these incentives as important to their continued operations in the Caribbean. 
Fifty-four per cent of these MNEs indicated that tax holidays were important to their 
decision to continue operations in the Caribbean. The comparable figure for tax reliefs 
on dividends was 46 per cent (See Table 7.3.52-3). 
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Table 7.3.52 Testing Hypothesis 7- Tax Holidays and County of Origin of MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 16 
(31%) 
4 
(16%) 
7 
(54%) 
24 
Not Important 36 
(69%) 
21 
(84%) 
6 
(46%) 
56 
Table 7.3.53 Testing Hypothesis 7- Income Tax Relief on Dividends and Country 
of Origin of MNE 
Response/Country USA Britain Other Total 
Important 19 
(36%) 
3 
(12%) 
6 
(46%) 
28 
Not Important 33 
(64%) 
22 
(88%) 
7 
(54%) 
62 
In addition, it appears that there is a relationship between firm size, as 
measured by the quantum of initial investment, and the decision to continue 
operations because of tax holidays. Not surprisingly, it seems that the larger MNEs, 
those whose initial investment exceeded US$ 20 million, were more inclined than the 
others to consider tax holidays to be important to their continued operations in the 
Caribbean (See Table 7.3.54). Seventy-five per cent of these firms stated that tax 
holidays were important to their continued operations in the Caribbean. 
Table 7.3.54 Testing Hypothesis 7- Tax Holidays and Quantum of Investment 
Response/Quantum Less US$ 10m US$ 10 - 20m More US$ 20m Total 
Important 8 
(22%) 
1 
(25%) 
11 
(75%) 
35 
Not Important 28 
(79%) 
3 
(75%) 
4 
(25%) 
20 
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H8. There is a positive relationship between the market-seeking MNE and trade 
restrictions. 
The key variables used to represent trade restrictions were tariffs, import 
licenses and import surcharges. There was no statistically significant relationship 
between these variables and the market-seeking MNE. The research hypothesis was 
not supported (See Table 7.3.55). 
Table 7.3.55 Testing of Hypothesis 8 
Variables Tariffs Import Licenses Import Surcharges 
Market-Seeking MNE 
. 459 . 404 . 492 
Country 
. 
127 
. 423 . 418 
Location 
. 988 . 
481 
. 319 
Quantum 
. 342 . 061 . 
025* 
Identity 
. 
941 
. 888 . 
908 
Moreover, no statistically significant relationship exists between the variables 
measuring trade restrictions and the country of origin of MNE, the location of 
investment and the headquarters-subsidiary identity of the respondent. Interestingly 
enough, there was a statistically significant relationship between import surcharges 
and quantum of initial investment (See Table 7.3.55). Indeed, it seems that those firms 
whose initial investment was less than US$ 20 million were more inclined than others 
to consider import surcharges important to their operations in the Caribbean. As Table 
7.3.56 reveals, 59 per cent of firms whose initial investment was less than US$ 10 
million considered import surcharges to be important to their operations. In addition, 
75 per cent of firms that initially invested between US$ 10 to 20 million in the 
Caribbean stated that this trade restriction was important to their operations. 
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Table 7.3.56 Testing Hypothesis 8- Import Surcharges and Quantum of 
Investment 
Response/Quantum Less US$ 10m US$ 10 - 20m More US$ 20m Total 
Important 20 
(59%) 
3 
(75%) 
2 
(17%) 
25 
Not Important 14 
(41%) 
1 
(25%) 
10 
(83%) 
25 
H9. There is a positive relationship between the national `diamond' of the MNE 
and the `diamond' of the Caribbean. 
It was only the US and British MNEs that were used in this analysis. It was 
believed that the numbers of firms belonging to Europe and Asia were too small: 12 
and the countries were too diverse - Norway, Switzerland, Germany and India, to 
allow for meaningful statistical examination. The variables that separately measured 
the `diamond' were the firm-specific variables. These were production technology, 
marketing skills, managerial skills, distribution networks, brand name product, access 
to finance, privileged access to raw materials, production differentiation and new 
technology. Chi-square tests were conducted with these variables, and the US and 
British MNEs. It appears that the determinants of the home country `diamond' 
employed by US MNEs in the focus countries were product differentiation, privileged 
access to raw materials and new technology. Alternatively, those used by the British 
MNEs were privileged access to raw materials and product differentiation (See Table 
7.3.57). 
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Table 7.3.57 Testing of Hypothesis 9 
Variables Prod. 
Diff. 
Prod. 
Tech. 
Man. 
Skills 
Brand 
Name 
Raw 
Mat. 
New 
Tech. 
Mark 
Skills 
Fin- 
ance 
Distri- 
bution 
US MNE 
. 024* . 
066 
. 
841 
. 
643 
. 003* . 
038* . 386 . 639 . 881 
British MNE . 034* . 159 . 844 . 
433 
. 002* . 
321 . 431 . 
674 . 551 
These three variables were tested against the elements that constituted the 
Caribbean 'diamond'. These were the factor cost advantage variables (labour- costs, 
productivity and availability, and natural gas prices) and the other locational 
advantage variables (political stability, government committed to trade and market 
liberalisation policies, quality infrastructure, proximity to US market and efficient 
bureaucracy). It is interesting that a statistically significant relationship was found for 
several of the variables measuring the US and British `diamond' and several of those 
measuring the `diamond' of the Caribbean. Thus, to a limited extent, the hypothesis 
was supported (See Tables 7.3.58-9). 
Table 7.3.59 The "Double Diamond" hypothesis and the initial investment decision 
Variable Labou Labou Labou Prox. Pol. Gover Quality Natural Bureau 
r r r Prod. to US Stab- n-ment Infras. Gas -cracy 
Avail. Cost Marke ility Policie Price 
t s 
Prod. 
. 
303 . 324 . 
949 . 819 . 
751 . 822 . 
622 . 141 . 
079 
Differ. 
Access to 
. 639 . 016* . 
896 . 201 . 
017* . 743 . 486 . 
000*** . 035* Raw Mat. 
New Tech . 
434 . 
420 . 
544 . 
275 . 
091 . 
974 . 167 . 
045* . 029* 
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It appears that the US and British MNEs initially use their privileged access to 
raw materials, which they obtain from their operations in their home country, with 
several elements of the Caribbean diamond. These are low-cost labour, political 
stability, competitively priced natural gas and efficient bureaucracy. In addition, the 
US MNEs initially use the new technology, that is secured from their home country, 
with competitively priced natural gas and the efficient bureaucracy of the focus 
countries (See Table 7.3.58). 
In their continued operations in the three Caribbean countries, the US and 
British MNEs seem to use their privileged access to raw material obtained in their 
home country, with several determinants of the Caribbean 'diamond'. These are the 
countries' proximity to the US, political stability and competitively priced natural gas 
(See Table 7.3.59). Strangely enough, it seems that these two MNEs also use product 
differentiation together with the competitively priced natural gas of Trinidad. Finally, 
the US MNE employs the new technology developed in its home country together 
with selected determinants of the Caribbean `diamond'. They are the factor cost 
variables (low-cost labour and competitively priced natural gas), the countries' 
proximity to the US, and efficient bureaucracy. 
Table 7.3.59 The "Double Diamond" hypothesis and the decision to continue operations 
Variable Labour Labour Labour Prox. Pol. Govern Quality Nat. Bureau 
Avail. Cost Prod. - to Stab- -ment Infras. - Gas -cracy 
ivity US ility Policies ucture. Price 
Market 
Product 
. 392 . 
122 . 
205 . 402 . 
889 . 
393 . 819 . 
007** 
. 378 Differ. 
Access to 
Raw 819 . 
099 . 
649 . 015* . 
018* . 106 . 
192 . 
000*** . 196 Material 
New Tech. . 208 . 
037* . 
113 . 010* . 
057 . 087 . 
348 . 011* . 541 
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H10. There is a positive relationship between intra-firm trade and the use of a 
wholly owned subsidiary. 
The key term that individually constituted the variable, intra-firm trade was 
more than 25 per cent of firm's local output dedicated to foreign affiliates". The key 
variables that served to separately measure wholly owned subsidiary, were "new" 
wholly owned subsidiary and "acquired" wholly owned subsidiary. No statistically 
significant relationship was found for the term measuring intra-firm trade and the 
variables measuring wholly owned subsidiary. The hypothesis was not supported (See 
Table 7.3.60). 
Table 7.3.60 Testing Hypothesis 10 
Variables More than 25 percent of output dedicated 
to foreign affiliates 
New Wholly Owned Subsidiary 
. 805 
Acquired Wholly Owned 
Subsidiary 
. 797 
HI I. There is a positive relationship between the level of international experience 
of the MNE and the use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
Wholly owned subsidiary was separately measured by the terms "new" wholly 
owned subsidiary and "acquired" wholly owned subsidiary. The term that used as a 
measure for the international experience of the firm, was "more than 25 per cent of 
firm's sales obtained in overseas markets". No statistically significant relationship 
exists for variable measuring international experience and the variables measuring 
wholly owned subsidiary. The hypothesis was not supported (See Table 7.3.61). 
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Table 7.3.61 Testing Hypothesis 11 
Variables More than 25 percent of sales obtained abroad 
New wholly owned subsidiary . 964 
Acquired wholly owned subsidiary . 900 
H12. There is a positive relationship between cultural distance and the use of a 
wholly owned greenfield investment and joint venture agreements. 
Cultural distance was individually measured by the terms language 
similarities, geographic proximity and cultural similarities. A statistically significant 
relationship was only found for "new" wholly owned subsidiary and geographic 
proximity. Thus, to a limited extent, the hypothesis was supported (See Table 7.3.62). 
Table 7.3.62 Testing Hypothesis 12 
Variables Language Geographic 
Proximity 
Cultural 
Similarities 
New wholly owned subsidiary . 275 . 049* . 447 
New 50-50 joint venture . 363 . 
907 
. 
802 
H13. There is a positive relationship between the resource-seeking NINE and 
minority and 50-50 joint ventures. 
The variables that separately constituted joint ventures were "acquired" 50-50 
joint venture, "new" 50-50 joint venture and "other" modes of market entry. The term 
`other modes of market entry' essentially included those forms of market entry that 
use less equity than that of a 50-50 joint venture. No statistically significant 
relationship was found for the variables, "new" 50-50 joint venture and "acquired" 50- 
50 joint venture and resource-seeking MNE. However, there was a statistically 
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significant relationship between "other" modes of market entry and resource-seeking 
MNE. Thus, the hypothesis was largely supported (See Table 7.3.63). 
Table 7.3.63 Testing Hypothesis 13 
Variable Acquired 50-50 Joint 
Venture 
New 50-50 Joint 
Venture 
Minority Joint 
Venture 
Resource-seeking MNE . 
849 
. 551 . 
040 
Country . 846 . 846 . 211 
Location . 001 
*** 
. 290 . 
748 
Quantum . 764 . 390 . 
235 
Identity . 844 . 247 . 417 
Interestingly enough, no statistically significant relationship was found for the 
variables, 50-50 joint venture and "other" modes of market entry and the variables, 
country of origin of MNE, quantum of investment and the headquarters-subsidiary 
identity of the respondents. However, there appeared to be a statistically significantly 
relationship between acquired 50-50 joint venture and the location of investment. It 
appears that the firms locating investment in Trinidad and Jamaica were more likely 
to use this market entry mode than firms in Barbados (See Table 7.3.64). 
Table 7.3.64 Testing Hypothesis 13 - The Use of an Acquired 50-50 Joint Venture 
and Location 
Response/Location Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago Total 
Yes 1 
(3%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(3%) 
2 
No 25 
(96%) 
23 
(100%) 
30 
(97%) 
78 
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H14. There is a positive relationship between the government policy towards 
mode of market entry used by foreign firms in the primary sector and the 
resource-seeking MNE. 
The terms used to measure the influence of the Caribbean government was 
"selection of mode because of policy of Caribbean government" and "changes in 
mode of investment influenced by government's policy". It is noteworthy that no 
statistically significant relationship was found for "changes in mode of investment 
influenced by government's policy" and resource-seeking MNE. However, a 
statistically significant relationship exists between "the selection of market entry 
mode because of policy of Caribbean government", and resource-seeking MNE. Thus, 
the hypothesis is supported (See Table 7.3.65). 
It is worth noting that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between the terms, "the selection of mode because of policy of the Caribbean 
government" and "changes in mode of investment influenced by government's 
policy", and the other variables tested (See Table 7.3.65). 
Table 7.3.65 Testing Hypothesis 14 
Variable Resource- 
seeking MNE 
Country Location Quantu 
m 
Identit 
y 
Selection of market entry 
mode influenced by 
government's policy. . 
029* . 
338 
. 
608 . 951 . 335 
Changes in mode of 
investment influenced by 
government's policy . 
691 . 189 . 
233 . 464 . 645 
7.4 Summary 
Ten of the fourteen hypotheses advanced in Chapter 3 to 5 were supported by 
the statistical analysis (See Table 7.4). Further statistical testing of these hypotheses 
using the variables: type of FDI, country of origin of MNE, location of investment, 
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quantum of initial investment and identity of respondent was instructive. Greater 
insights into the factors influencing the motivations of the NINE, its choice of location 
and mode of market entry were obtained. 
Table 7.4 The Results of the Statistical Tests 
Hypothesis Results 
Hl. No relationship exists between the MNE's use of its Supported. 
unique advantages and the presence of domestic 
competitors. 
H2. There is a positive relationship between `follow-the- Supported. 
leader' investment behaviour of MNEs and the use of low- 
cost factors. 
H3. There is a positive relationship between the firm's use Supported, 
of its unique advantages and the locational variables. 
H4. There is a positive relationship between the MNE and Supported. 
the decision to establish and continue operations because of 
low-cost factors. 
H5. There is a positive relationship between export-seeking Supported. 
and resource-seeking MNEs and the use of preferential 
trading agreements. 
H6. There is a positive relationship between the export Supported. 
processing zone and the export-seeking MNE. 
H7. No relationship exists between the investment Not supported. 
incentives offered by the Caribbean government and the 
MNE's decision to establish and continue operations in the 
Caribbean. 
H8. There is a positive relationship between the market- Not supported. 
seeking MNE and trade restrictions. 
H9. There is a positive relationship between the national Supported. 
`diamond' of the MNE and the `diamond' of the Caribbean. 
H 10. There is a positive relationship between intra-firm Not supported. 
trade and the use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
H 11. There is a positive relationship between the level of Not supported. 
international experience of the MNE and the use of a 
wholly owned subsidiary. 
H12. There is a positive relationship between cultural Supported, 
distance and the use of a greenfield investment. 
H 13. There is a positive relationship between the resource- Supported. 
seeking MNE and minority and 50-50 joint ventures. 
H14. There is a positive relationship between government Supported. 
policy towards mode of market entry used by foreign firms 
in the primary sector and the resource-seeking MNE, 
It will be useful to compare the findings of this empirical analysis with those 
of other researchers. In the following section, this comparison will be undertaken. 
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7.5 Comparison of the Research Findings with those of other Researchers 
This comparative analysis will be done sequentially. The empirical results 
derived from the testing of each hypothesis together with an analysis of the extant 
literature will be separately discussed. 
Researchers have argued that the monopolistic advantage theory is 
inapplicable to developing countries [Hood and Young 1974; Vachani 1985; 
Aswicahyono and Hill 1995]. The empirical investigation of this hypothesis supports 
this argument. Furthermore, it provides fresh insights to the debate on foreign 
investment in the less industrialised world. 
As demonstrated by Dunning [1981: 48], it appears that the MNE's use of its 
unique advantages is specific to the type of FDI that is undertaken. Indeed, this 
analysis revealed that the resource-seeking and export-seeking MNEs are inclined to 
use the unique advantages of production technology, finance and privileged access to 
raw materials. In addition, the market-seeking MNE is likely to use product 
differentiation and other marketing strategies in competition in the Caribbean. The 
latter finding contradicts the hypothesis that product differentiation is not used as a 
significant competitive strategy by MNEs in the less industrialised countries [Lall and 
Mohammed 1983; Vachani 1985; Aswicahyono and Hill 1995]. Indeed, the results of 
these tests suggest that British firms, which are market-seeking, engage in product 
differentiation in the three Caribbean countries. 
The results of the tests also reveal that the use of these unique advantages is 
location-specific. It appears that the MNE judiciously employs some of its unique 
advantages in particular locales. Researchers have explored this phenomenon in the 
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developed countries ['Vernon 1966; Caves 1974; Lall 1980]. Lall [1979] and Lall and 
Mohammed [1983] also examined this phenomenon in the less industrialised 
economies of Malaysia and India. In this study, however, the tests reveal that the 
MNE is inclined to use new technology and privileged access to raw materials in its 
operations in Trinidad-Tobago. In addition, the tests disclose that there is a possible, 
positive relationship between the size of the MNE and its use of the asset, privileged 
access to raw material. 
The statistical tests support the arguments advanced by Knickerbocker [1973] 
and Vernon [1983]. The firms operating in the focus countries engaged in the pattern 
of defensive investment behaviour. The low-cost labour of the region was the factor 
that motivated this investment behaviour. 
Empirical investigations that use Dunning's eclectic paradigm are limited 
[Dunning 1980; Kumar 1994]. However, the findings of the statistical tests reveal that 
this theory provides an adequate explanation for foreign investment behaviour in the 
three Caribbean countries. Indeed, the statistical tests show that the NINE uses its 
assets of production technology, marketing skills, the possession of distribution 
networks, access to finance, privileged access to raw materials and new technology 
with the locational advantages of the three Caribbean countries. The locational 
advantages favoured by the resource-seeking and export-seeking MNEs, that are 
establishing operations, are low-cost labour, competitively priced natural gas, political 
stability, an efficient bureaucracy a reliable telecommunications, airline and port 
service, and the country's proximity to the US. The locational advantage factors that 
influence the firm to continue using these unique advantages in its operations are the 
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labour factors (cost, productivity and availability), the price of natural gas, political 
stability, and an efficient airline and telecommunication service. 
It has been widely argued that factor costs are a major consideration in the 
MNE's decision to locate production in the less industrialised countries [Vernon 
1966; Moxon 1975; Sharpston 1975; Wallace 1990; Kumar 1994]. This hypothesis 
has been supported by the empirical investigations conducted in this study. What is 
interesting, however, is the transient role that factor costs play in the MNE's decision 
to continue operations in these countries [Porter 1990]. The tests revealed that low- 
cost labour had limited influence on the firm's decision to continue operations. The 
type of activity that this resource attracts is highly mobile [Sharpston 1975], Hence, 
labour costs play a limited role in the MNE's decision to remain in operations in a 
country. Interestingly, this was not the case with the resource-seeking investor. His 
investment entails a higher proportion of sunk costs than that of the foot loose export- 
seeking MNE [Coyne 1995]. Thus, the continued enjoyment of competitively, priced 
natural gas is important to this MNE. 
Researchers postulate that the granting of preferential access to the market of 
an advanced industrialised economy stimulates the flow of FDI into the recipient 
country [Johnson 1968; Joekes 1982; Griffith 1990]. Market widening schemes, such 
. as the creation of 
free trade areas are also posited to have a similar effect on FDI 
inflows [Johnson 1968]. It appears that preferential trading agreements do have a 
positive impact on the inflow of FDI into the three Caribbean countries. What is 
significant however, is the limited role that CARICOM plays in attracting FDI to the 
region. It is noteworthy that Coyne [1995 also arrived at a similar conclusion. 
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The important role that the EPZ plays in attracting FDI has been noted by 
several researchers [Sharpston 1975; Frobel et al. 1980; UNCTAD 1985; Kaplinsky 
1992; Roberts 1992; Woodward and Rolfe 1993; Kumar 1994]. The results of the 
statistical tests support this argument. EPZs do play a critical role in the MNE's 
decision to establish and to continue its operations in the three countries. 
The evidence on the significance of investment incentives in attracting FDI 
into the less industrialised countries is inconclusive. One group of scholars maintains 
that these incentives have little or no impact on the firm's investment behaviour in 
less industrialised economies [Shah and Toye 1978; Agodo 1978; Lim 1983; Wheeler 
and Mody 1991; Guisinger and Loree 1995]. Others argue that they are important to 
the investment decision of MNEs [Wallace 1990; Woodward and Rolfe 1993; Rolfe et 
al. 1993; Coyne 1995]. The findings of this study are compatible with those of the 
latter group. It appears that investment incentives play an important role in attracting 
the MNE into the three countries. However, there are several inconsistencies in the 
findings of this study and those that also focused on the Caribbean region [Woodward 
and Rolfe 1993; Rolfe et al. 1993; Coyne 1995]. No evidence was found to support 
their hypothesis that profit and dividend repatriations are crucial to the investment 
decision of the MNE operating in the Caribbean. Also, the evidence demonstrates that 
tax relief on profits and dividends was not significant to the firm's initial investment 
decision. This finding contradicts those advanced by Coyne [1995]. However, the 
findings that import duty concessions are critical to the foreign investor are consistent 
with those of other researchers. 
Despite the arguments posed by several theorists [Hindleberger 1969; Horst 
1972; Reuber 1973; Guisinger 1985; Rolfe et al. 1993], trade restrictions do not 
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induce foreign direct investment into the three Caribbean countries. A similar 
conclusion was reached by Coyne [1995] who also examined foreign direct 
investment in these three countries. Interestingly enough, there appears to be a 
positive relationship between the quantum of initial investment made by the MNE and 
the use of import surcharges. A similar relationship was found to exist for quotas 
[Rolfe et al. 1993]. Rolfe's study revealed that the larger investors (investments in 
excess of US$ 1 million) gave a relatively lower ranking to quota protection than did 
the smaller investors (investments less than US$ 1 million). In this study, it appears 
that it is the smaller M, NEs (initial investment less than US$ 20 million) that are 
attracted to the countries because of the imposition of import surcharges. 
The "Double Diamond" hypothesis appears to be applicable to the foreign 
investment behaviour of US and British MNEs operating in the Caribbean. It seems 
that the US MNE will use three elements of its home country `diamond' (product 
differentiation, privileged access to raw material and new technology) with those of 
the Caribbean `diamond. ' Alternatively, the British MNE use only product 
differentiation and privileged access to raw material. The determinants of the 
Caribbean `diamond' that were generally used by these MNEs were low-cost labour, 
competitively priced natural gas, political stability and efficient bureaucracy The 
testing of this hypothesis is still very much preliminary. Furthur analysis of this 
hypothesis needs to be done. 
There is a wealth of literature that supports the hypothesis that a positive 
relationship exists between intra-firm sales and the MNE's use of a wholly owned 
subsidiary [Teece 1983; Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Gomes-Casseres 1989,1990]. 
However, the empirical investigations failed to demonstrate any statistically 
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significant relationship between intra-firm sales and the MNE's selection of a wholly 
owned subsidiary. It is possible that other factors influence the firm's selection of a 
wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of market entry into these three countries. 
Theorists postulate a positive relationship between the international experience 
of a MNE and its choice of market entry mode. It is argued that the MICE with 
international experience use a wholly owned subsidiary [Johanson and Wiedersheirn- 
Paul 1975; Johanson and Vahle 1977,1990; Davidson 1980; Li 1994; Loree and 
Guisinger 1995; Tan and Vertinsky 1996]. This theory was not supported by the 
empirical tests. Apparently, the level of international experience of the NINE does not 
influence its selection of a new wholly owned subsidiary to enter the market of the 
three Caribbean countries. 
It has been proposed that the cultural distance between the home and host 
country plays an important role in the MNE's selection of market entry mode [Kogut 
and Singh 1988; Padmanabhan and Cho 1996]. The empirical investigation provided 
limited support for this theory. 
Country-specific factors have been identified as influencing the MNE 
selection of a mode of market entry. Indeed, it has been argued that MNEs use 
minority and 50-50 joint venture arrangements in the primary sectors of less 
industrialised countries [Oman 1984; Vernon 1983; Gomes and Casseres 1990]. The 
empirical investigations lend support to this theory. In fact, minority joint ventures are 
apparently used in this sector. Furthermore, these forms of institutional involvement 
seem to be the preferred entry mode of the non-US MNEs [Oman 1984; Franko 
1989]. Further, Oman [1984,1988] and Gomes-Casseres [1990] argue that the 
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government plays a critical role in the MNE's choice of market entry mode in the 
primary sector. This hypothesis was supported by the empirical investigations. 
7.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Several germane issues have emerged from this analysis. First, it is instructive 
to note that the variable, country of origin of MNE, failed to demonstrate a 
statistically significant relationship with most of the other variables tested. The few 
exceptions were product differentiation, access to raw material, new technology, 
investment incentives and the locational advantage variable, low-cost labour. It 
appears that the factors that motivate a firm to engage in foreign direct investment in 
the Caribbean, to select a location for its operations, and to choose a mode of market 
entry are not country-specific. Indeed, country affiliations do not seem to have an 
influence in the MNE's foreign investment decisions in the Caribbean. 
The tests reveal that the Asian and European MNEs operating in Trinidad- 
Tobago appear to use the assets, new technology and privileged access to raw 
materials. It will be interesting to explore this issue in greater depth. Further, there 
appears to be a positive relationship between the firm's size and the unique advantage, 
privileged access to raw materials. The statistical analysis failed to provide any 
meaningful explanation for this relationship. 
The empirical investigations reveal that follow-the-leader investment 
behaviour occurs in these countries. It seems that the firm, motivated by low-cost 
labour, engages in this pattern of investment in the Caribbean. Also, the findings 
contradict the hypothesis that profit and dividend repatriation schemes are critical to 
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initial investment decision. It will be interesting to determine the efficacy of this 
investment incentive. 
It is noteworthy that some of the theories that purport to explain the factors 
influencing the MNE's selection of a market entry mode were not supported by the 
statistical tests. It will be useful to ascertain the possible limitations of these theories 
when applied to the MNE's behaviour in the three Caribbean countries. 
Finally, the statistical tests conducted on the "Double Diamond" hypothesis 
proved to be statistically significant. It will be instructive to further explore the extent 
to which this theory explains the foreign investment behaviour of MNEs operating in 
the Caribbean. 
These issues as well as the hypotheses were subjected to further empirical 
analysis as reported in Chapters 8 to 10.11 Qualitative methods were implemented to 
fully explore the phenomenon of foreign direct investment in the three Caribbean 
countries. The objective of this analysis was to capture the nuances of firm's 
behaviour that were barely revealed in the statistical analysis. To this end, a case study 
methodology was employed. Twelve firms that operate in Jamaica, Barbados and 
Trinidad-Tobago formed the core cases. These case studies will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
" One hypothesis was not examined in the qualitative analysis. This was Hypothesis 8 which relates 
specifically to market-seeking FDI. 
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Chapter Eight 
Foreign Direct Investment in Jamaica: A Case Study of The Apparel Industry 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a case study of four MNEs operating in the apparel industry of 
Jamaica. The main objective of this case study is to examine the factors that influence 
the foreign investment decisions of these four firms. In so doing, it analyses the 
factors that influence their motivations for FDI, their choice of location and their 
selection of market entry mode. 
As was noted in Chapter 6, the four firms that were used for this case study 
were Tultex Corporation, Maidenform Worldwide Incorporation, Jockey International 
Incorporation and Apparel Contractors Association Incorporated. Except for 
Maidenform Worldwide Incorporation, interviews were obtained from executives at 
both the headquarters and the subsidiary of the MNEs. In the case of Maidenform 
Worldwide Incorporation, only the managers of the subsidiary were interviewed (See 
Appendix Figure 5). 12 The responses from these ten managers were used in this 
analysis. In addition, interviews were conducted with heads of various organisations 
and ministries in Jamaica (See Appendix Figure 4). Secondary data such as company 
annual reports, stockbrokers' reports, and newspaper articles were also used. 
12 Despite previous assurances, the executives based at the New York 
headquarters of Maidenform 
Worldwide Incorporated were reluctant to participate in the survey. It appears that at the time when 
interviews were being solicited, the company was in the process of being acquired 
by its rival, Vanity 
Fair Corporation. See Wendy Bounds, "VF restructures, plans acquisition of Maidenform. " The Wall 
Street Journal, 26 March 1997, B 12 (W). 
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8.1.1 The Apparel Industry of Jamaica 
The apparel industry is one of the most important industries in Jamaica. Over 
the last decade, its performance has been spectacular. Indeed, Jamaica's exports of 
apparel products grew from a mere US$ 7.05 million in 1980 to US$ 599.3 in 1995. In 
1995, this industry accounted for 33 per cent of Jamaica's total exports. It is the 
largest export sector in the manufacturing industry of the country. Moreover, it 
provides employment for approximately 35 per cent of the industrial work force [The 
Jamaican Garment Confederation 1996]. 
Apparel production comes from the 221 plants located in the country. Twenty 
of these plants account for 85 per cent of garment exports [ibid., 21]. Most 
importantly, 80 per cent of the apparel produced in Jamaica are under the 807 
programme. Indeed, Jamaica is presently the third largest supplier of 807 products to 
the US. The other two large exporters of 807 products are Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic . 
8.1.2 US Policy and the Emergence of the Apparel Industry in Jamaica 
The phenomenal growth of Jamaica's apparel industry during the post 1983 
period was primarily a result of US development policy for the Caribbean and Central 
American region. In August 1983, the US government enacted the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act. This legislation, which is known as the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), was the US response to the growing economic, political and social 
instability in the region. US development policies during this period were predicated 
on two propositions. First, development assistance was thought to play a marginal role 
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when compared with the foreign exchange that less developed countries are able to 
earn through trade. In addition, it was believed that for trade to be successful, it must 
be supported by private investment and aid related to commerce [Haar 1990]. These 
are the premises that informed the establishment of the CBI. 
The CBI allows for duty free access to the US market for a designated range of 
Caribbean products. The basic tenet of this Act lies in items 806.3 and 807 of the US 
Special Tariff Provisions. ' 3 These tariffs allow for special treatment for imports 
containing US components. Hence, under the CBI, designated Caribbean exports that 
contain 35 per cent of local value added were granted duty free status for twelve years. 
The CBI stipulates that 15 per cent of this value added should come from US 
materials. Thus, in effect, the real requirement is only 20 per cent [Deere et al. 1990: 
155-156]. However, several industries, including the apparel industry, were not 
granted duty free status. 14 Duties are paid on the Caribbean value added component. 
The success of the CBI in surmounting the economic problems faced by the 
countries in the region was limited [Pelzmau and Schoeffle 1988; Deere et al. 1990; 
Azel 1991; Corbett 1992]. Thus, in 1986, the US supplemented the CBI with several 
new programmes: one of which was its `special access programme'. This programme 
increased the quotas for certain apparel imports from CBI countries. It is referred to as 
807-A or Super 807. It applies to only apparel assembled in the region that are cut in 
13 As discussed in Chapter 4, in the new Harmonised System nomenclature introduced on January 1 
1989, these items were designated 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80. However, offshore enterprises 
operating under this schedule are still referred to as '807' operations. 
14 The industries were petroleum, footwear, flat goods (gloves, belts, luggage, wallets, etc. ), canned 
tuna, and watches (containing materials from countries 
ineligible for Most-Favoured Nations treatment 
by the United States). Cited in William P. Corbett, "A Wasted Opportunity: Shortcomings of the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative Approach to Development in the West Indies and Central America, " Law 
and Policy in International Business 
23 (1992): 957. It is noteworthy that the CBI beneficiaries 
possessed a competitive advantage in several of these 
industries, notably petroleum and apparel. 
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the US from US made fabric. Bilateral agreements determine the guaranteed access 
levels to which CBI beneficiaries can aspire. Like the 807 programme, apparel 
products entering the US pay duty on the Caribbean value-added component [Deere 
1990: 160]. 
Despite the 1986 modifications that were made to the CBI, it was apparent that 
this initiative was an inadequate mechanism for transforming the countries of the 
region. Thus, attempts were made to remove some of the glaring deficiencies of the 
programme. This effort was known as the CBI II. Unfortunately, many of the 
modifications proposed were not adopted [Corbett 1992: 965-966]. Nonetheless, in 
1990, the CBI agreement was made permanent. 
It has been argued that one of the underlying objectives of the 807 programme 
was to reduce the competitive disadvantage of the US garment industry [Steele 1988: 
48]. Since the mid 1970s, there has been a substantial increase in apparel imports into 
the US market. Most of these imports emerged from three Asian countries: Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. In response to its loss of competitiveness, the US 
from 1982 entered into a series of bilateral trade agreements with these `three Tigers'. 
These trade agreements had the effect of curtailing apparel exports from these 
countries [ibid., 26-29]. 
Despite the limitations placed on apparel exports from the `three Tigers', 
apparel imports still penetrate the US market. They mainly come from two sources: 
China and the CBI beneficiaries. The US, for political reasons, has adopted a more 
lenient apparel trade policy with China than it did with the other three Asian countries 
[ibid., 43-44]. However, its textile trade policy with the CBI countries serves a dual 
purpose. The US government is able to secure 
its strategic interests in the region by 
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promoting the development of labour-intensive, export-oriented activity in these 
countries. This is very much in keeping with its trade, not aid policy that was earlier 
discussed. In addition, by making it feasible for US producers to site the more labour- 
intensive parts of their operations offshore, the US producers are able to achieve 
substantial savings on their manufacturing costs. Thus, US manufacturers are able to 
concentrate on the capital-intensive aspects of their operations and transfer overseas 
those in which they suffer from a competitive disadvantage because of high labour 
costs [ibid., 48-49]. As one researcher notes, the CBI favours the "US retention of the 
highly modernised and automated `sunrise' fibre and textile industry and the 
outsourcing of low technology, low skill `sunset' industries like apparel assembly" 
[Green 1995: 67]. 
Indeed, the US trade policy proved to be successful in reversing the country of 
origin of its apparel imports. In 1990, apparel imports from South East Asia were 63 
per cent of total US imports while those from Mexico and the CBI beneficiaries were 
16 per cent. By 1996 these figures were reversed. During the period January to June 
1996, apparel imports from South East Asia comprised a mere 37 per cent of US total 
imports while those from Mexico and the CBI beneficiaries rose to 35 per cent [King 
Associates 1996: 3]. These figures mask the fact that many of the East Asian 
companies, facing quota limits in their home countries, have relocated their apparel 
operations to the CBI countries [World Bank 1988; Deere et al. 1990]. Since 1983, 
Asian firms have been locating operations in Jamaica. East Asian investment is 
actively sought since the companies tend to establish integrated subsidiaries, that 
involve the full range of production requirements, rather than the component assembly 
operations that are characteristic of US 807 operators. The East Asian companies 
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normally carry out cut, make and trim (CMT) operations in the host countries. Thus, 
their operations provide more local value-added, involve much higher levels of 
investment, and provide for greater possibilities for the transfer of technologies than 
the 807 operations [Steele 1988: 121]. 
The outsourcing of apparel assembly under the 807 programme was 
enthusiastically embraced by Jamaica. By the late 1970s, the country was 
experiencing grave economic difficulties. During the period 1970 to 1981, its average 
annual rate of growth of real GNP fell by a 1.3 per cent; per capita income declined 
annually by 2.6 per cent; inflation rates soared to 18.5 per cent; the external debt rose 
from US$ 192 million in 1970 to US$ 1809 in 1981; and by 1981, the country had 
foreign reserves to cover a mere six months of imports [World Bank 1987b]. In 1980, 
the ruling regime was voted out of office and replaced with one whose political and 
economic philosophy was more compatible with that of the US government 
[Braveboy-Warner 1984]. Indeed, subsequently, Jamaica was to be regarded as the 
model of US policy towards the region. 
The ruling regime in Jamaica attempted to make the country the most 
advanced apparel assembly location in the region. In 1984, the government launched a 
major campaign to train workers and to build a complex of 20 factories to house its 
new investment. It managed to gain the support of the US Agency for International 
Development that funded pre-training courses for sewing machine operators [The 
Resource Centre 1984a: 20}. By 1996, the apparel assembly industry was firmly 
established in the country. 
Clearly, the phenomenal growth of the apparel industry in Jamaica is a result 
of US policies. It is thus ironic that more recent US policies will likely result in its 
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demise. In 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was enacted. 
This agreement has considerably enhanced Mexico's locational advantages. The 
country now enjoys the freest access to the US market than any other developing 
country [Rugman and Gestrin 1993]. Thus, it seems that Mexico will soon be the 
preferred site for apparel manufacturing MNEs that are seeking free access to the US 
market. This prediction spells the death knell for Jamaica's apparel industry. Mexico 
was also a beneficiary of the US 807 and 807-A programmes. Its apparel exports, 
which are presently dominated by 807 production, have grown by 60 per cent since 
the enactment of the NAFTA [King Associates 1996: 2]. Conversely, Jamaica 
experienced a5 per cent decline in employment in the apparel industry. In addition, 
during the period January to June 1996, Jamaica's apparel exports to the US declined 
by 11 per cent in terms of volume and 2 per cent in terms of value [ibid., Appendix I 
and II}. Alarm bells sound on the relocation of garment companies away from the CBI 
beneficiaries into Mexico [The Wall Street Journal, March 22 1996: 13]. 
It is against this background that an analysis will be done of the foreign 
investment decisions of four MNEs that operate in the apparel industry of Jamaica. 
These four companies are all US owned. Attempts were made to include East Asians 
MNEs in this analysis. However, these firms were unwilling to participate in this 
exercise. They all failed to respond to the mailed questionnaire survey as well as later 
repeated requests for face-to-face interviews. Clearly, the failure to include East Asian 
MNEs in the analysis will result in some degree of bias. This analysis will only be 
able to capture the dynamics of FDI behaviour of MNEs originating from the USA. 
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8.2. The US Apparel Industry 
The US apparel industry is composed of a multitude of small independent 
producers and large transnational firms that produce both textile and apparel goods. 15 
Apparel assembly is highly resistant to mechanisation, the capital outlay needed to 
establish a factory is relatively low, and the incentive to concentrate production 
facilities to achieve economies of scale is small. Further, many of the firms in this 
industry are privately owned [Toyne et al. 1984: 70-84; Steele 1988: 6]. One of the 
main sources of competitive advantage in this industry is low-cost, easily trained 
labour. 
The following section gives a brief profile of the four US apparel MNEs that 
have made investments in Jamaica. 
8.2.1 The Four Apparel Multinationals in Jamaica 
Tultex Corporation 
Tultex Corporation is the only publicly owned company examined. The 
company, which was established in 1937, is vertically integrated. It owns and operates 
textile mills in the Carolinas and uses the fabric that is produced in these mills in its 
manufacturing operations. The company is one of the leading manufacturers and 
marketers of activewear and licensed sports apparel in the USA. Its core product line 
includes fleeced sweats, jersey products as well as decorated caps and jackets. It also 
13 A distinction needs to be made between the textile and the apparel industry. The textile industry has 
four cycles involving fibre suppliers, textile mill producers and wholesale buyers. Its serves a diversity 
of end markets, ranging from automobile producers to the apparel manufacturers. Conversely, the 
apparel industry is highly specialised. Its end market is composed of consumers and retailers. Its 
product can be produced on a small or medium scale by subcontractors or in a factory. On the other 
hand, textile production is designed for larger-scale, high technology production. See Leah Vosko, 
`Fabric Friends and Clothing Foes: A Comparative Analysis of Textile and Apparel Industries under 
NAFTA, " Review of Radical Political Economics 25, no. 4 (1993): 46 
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manufactures private label products. Tultex Corporation was the largest of all four 
MNEs studied. Its annual sales for 1996 totalled US$ 636.9 million. Its total number 
of employees for this year was 6,835. Akom Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Tultex Corporation, operates in Jamaica. This company, which was formed in 
1984, is the first investment that Tultex has made offshore. Akom Corporation, with a 
staff of 820, manufactures tee shirts and jersey products. It supplies twenty-five to 
thirty per cent of the total garment production of its parent company. 
Maidenform Worldwide Incorporated 
Maidenform Worldwide Incorporated is a fairly large player in the US apparel 
industry. In 1996, this 75 year-old company had estimated sales of US$ 400 million 
and 8,900 employees. The company manufactures, markets and distributes its brand 
name product, Maidenform bras and private label undergarments. Maidenform 
Worldwide Inc. is the most internationalised company studied: it owns and operates 
facilities in United States, Puerto Rico, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, 
Ireland, Mexico and Jamaica. Its Jamaican subsidiary, Jamaica Needlecraft Limited, 
started operations in 1982. This company, which employs 1,000 persons, 
manufactures the entire range of the company's products. 
Jockey International Incorporated 
Jockey International Incorporated is the oldest of the four MNEs studied. The 
company was founded in 1876 in Ludington, Michigan. It is a vertically integrated 
apparel company. Jockey International Inc. owns and operates textile mills in North 
Carolina and uses the fabric produced in these mills in its manufacturing operations. 
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Its product line includes men and women undergarments, hosiery and athletic socks. 
This company was one of the smaller firms studied. In 1994, its total sales were US$ 
280 million and it employed 6,000 persons. The company has offshore facilities in 
Costa Rica, Honduras and Jamaica. The Jamaican operations, Jockey Jamaica 
Limited, was set up in 1984. Its workforce of 550 produces `Jockey for her' 
underwear. This is one of the more upmarket products that the company 
manufactures. 
Apparel Contractors Association Incorporated 
Apparel Contractors Association Inc. is a subcontractor. The company, which 
has been in operations since 1979, manufactures apparel products for large US 
enterprises. Its core product is intimate apparel. It also produces baby wear and sleep 
wear for females. Apparel Contractors Association Inc. is the smallest of the four 
MNEs studied. In 1996, its annual sales totalled US$ 25 million. The number of 
employees for this year was 4,000. The company has offshore facilities in Guatemala, 
Colombia and Jamaica. Its Jamaican subsidiary, Yoffi Industries Limited, which was 
formed in 1981, was one of the first apparel assembly companies to be established in 
this country. Yoffi Industries has a staff of 565 that manufactures intimate apparel. It 
accounts for fifty per cent of the parent company's total production. 
8.3. The Motivations for FDI in the Apparel Industry of Jamaica 
This study proposes that the possession of superior advantages over domestic 
competitors does not fully explain the motivations of firms investing in Jamaica since 
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this study contends that the country lacks effective domestic competitors [Hood and 
Young 1979; Vachani 1985; Aswicahyono and Hill 1995]. It is also suggested that 
MNE investment in Jamaica is influenced by the earlier investment made by its 
competitors in the country [Knickerbocker 1973]. The study also proposes that MNE 
investment in Jamaica is likely to be motivated by the potential synergies it could gain 
from using its firm-specific assets in combination with the locational endowments of 
the country [Dunning 1979,1980,1981]. 
8.3.1 H1: The Monopolistic Advantage Hypothesis 
It appears that the monopolistic advantage theory (1-11) does not explain the 
motivations for the foreign direct investment undertaken in the Jamaica by the four 
MNEs studied. These firms were all engaged in export-oriented production. They 
were involved in the manufacture of apparel products under the 807 agreement. As 
Steele notes, this agreement was designed to benefit the US apparel producers. The 
role of the CBI beneficiaries was merely to provide low-cost labour to strengthen the 
international competitiveness of the US apparel producers [Steele 1988: 48]. The four 
firms studied did not view the domestic apparel producers as potential competitors 
since they believed that these producers do not possess the resources needed to 
compete effectively in the global industry. It is noteworthy that since 1986 
subcontracting arrangements have been made between the 807 producers and the 
domestic apparel firms. These arrangements were established to relieve the production 
pressures that the 807 producers were experiencing with meeting deadlines and 
international orders as well as to assist the ailing local apparel sector [Nurse 1995: 
212]. Nonetheless, none of the four MNEs used the services of local firms for this 
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activity. Rather, the larger companies, Maidenform Worldwide and Jockey 
International Inc., subcontracted work to Apparel Contractors Association Inc. 
Curiously enough, it appears that the four apparel producers studied used firm- 
specific advantages in competition with the other apparel MNEs that operate in 
Jamaica. Thus, there appears to be a strange twist to the monopolistic advantage 
theory. It seems that the four MNEs invested in Jamaica because they perceived that 
they possessed superior advantages over the existing foreign operators. The main 
source of competitive advantage that Jamaica offers these companies is low-cost 
labour. The firm-specific advantage that was deployed to maximise Jamaica's 
competitive advantage was managerial skills, specifically, human resource 
management. This firm-specific asset was used to attract and maintain a well- 
motivated, low-cost work force. Three of the companies implemented several methods 
to improve employee-management relations. Akom Corporation, the subsidiary of 
Tultex Corporation, employs a disportionate number of local managers. It has three 
foreign and five local managers. It has invested in and has developed its local 
management team. The local staff is sent on courses both in Jamaica and in its North 
Carolina headquarters. The company also hires consulting firms to conduct short-term 
training courses at its local facility. The manager at Akom Corporation cites its local 
management staff as its competitive strength vis-a-vis the other foreign owned apparel 
producers in Jamaica. The top management of Jamaica Needlecraft Limited, the 
subsidiary of Maidenform Worldwide Inc., is from the Caribbean. The manager of 
Jamaica Needlecraft Ltd. stated that they have managed to instil discipline in their 
workforce. In so doing, he said that they have been able to develop an organisation 
that is efficient and is able to produce a quality product. He revealed that this has 
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made the company one of the most efficient in Jamaica. While the top management at 
Jockey Jamaica Ltd. is from the US, they excelled at employee-management relations. 
Human resource management is perceived to be a critical issue at Jockey Jamaica Ltd. 
The company implements a mix of financial and `psychic' rewards to motivate its 
employees. The management style of Jockey Jamaica Ltd. is lauded nationally and the 
company is often used by the national economic development agency in its 
investment promotion activities abroad. 
Indeed, the possession of superior managerial skills was regarded as a unique 
advantage by the apparel MNEs. As noted earlier, the main source of competitive 
advantage in apparel assembly lies in the supply of low-cost labour. However, the 
ability to maintain high rates of productivity was seen as critical to the companies' 
operation in Jamaica. It seems that the parent companies clearly understand the 
importance of human resource management to the success of their offshore operations 
in Jamaica. Hence, they may hire locals to manage their subsidiary as was done at 
Jamaica Needlecraft Ltd. Alternatively, the company may hire a manager who has had 
previous experience operating in the country, as was the case of Akom Corporation 
and Yoffi Industries Ltd.. 
The importance of MNEs having superior managerial skills is heightened by 
the present unavailability of skilled labour in Jamaica [Krammer 1991: 160]. The 
unavailability of skilled labour in Jamaica is characteristic of a regional trend where 
less than five per cent of the Caribbean work force has a university education [World 
Bank 1993b]. Moreover, Jamaica experiences a tremendous loss of skilled labour 
through emigration: between 1980 to 1986, half of the graduates from its tertiary 
institutes migrated [ibid., xv]. 
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8.3.2 H2: The `Follow-the-Leader' Hypothesis 
It appears that Knickerbocker's `follow-the-leader' investment behaviour does 
not adequately explain what motivated these four MNEs to locate their apparel 
assembly operations in Jamaica. The executives at Tultex Corporation and Jockey 
International Inc. noted that in the mid to late 1980s, all major competitors sought to 
become more globally competitive by locating their apparel assembly operations 
offshore. With the enactment of the CBI, the Caribbean and Central American region 
became popular locations for this investment. The major attractions of these countries 
were their proximity to the US and the availability of low-cost labour. The managers 
argue that during this period, all US apparel producers were moving offshore and 
some of the big players in the industry went to the Jamaica. The following statements 
are illuminating. 
We came to Jamaica about twelve years ago. Every manufacturer in the US was 
looking for offshore locations to manufacture more cost competitively in order to 
compete in the world market. 
All of our global competitors were locating offshore. Lots were moving to Central 
America and Mexico........ We came to Jamaica. This was I believe more than twelve 
years ago. 
All of our major competitors have located offshore in the Caribbean and Latin 
America. In 1982, we came to Jamaica. 
All of our competitors have been locating offshore for a while now. Many have gone 
to Santo Diego, Mexico and to a lesser extent, Haiti. These countries are serious 
competitors. We came to Jamaica. In 1981, we started production in Jamaica. 
However, these managers stated that their decision to enter Jamaica was not 
influenced by the fact that some of their competitors already had located their offshore 
activity in this country. Other factors played a more important role. Two MNEs were 
lured into Jamaica by the promotional efforts of the country's investment promotion 
agency. In another firm, its president had previously operated in the country for 
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twenty years before setting up his company. Conversely, the president of the other 
company was a member of a consultancy firm that was hired by the Jamaican 
government to develop its apparel industry. The president of this company thought 
that it made good business sense to invest in Jamaica. 
8.3.3 H3: The Eclectic Paradigm Hypothesis 
The four MNEs all implemented an export strategy. All of their higher value 
added, upstream activities were located in the USA [Yip 1992: 104]. Thus, textile 
production, garment design, pre-assembly operations (grading, marking and cutting), 
product engineering, production scheduling and monitoring were all carried out in 
their home country [Hoffman 1985: 375-376]. The activity that demanded less value 
added - apparel assembly was undertaken in Jamaica. 
The relocation of apparel assembly operations to countries with a low-cost 
work force makes financial sense to US apparel producers. The wage levels in the 
apparel industry in the US are much higher than those of its competitors [Steele 1988: 
23]. Moreover, the assembly of garments requires considerable manual manipulation 
of the material by sewing operators at all stages of manufacture. As noted earlier, this 
process has been difficult to mechanise. Thus, apparel assembly remains very labour- 
intensive and material handling accounts for 80 per cent of total manufacture time 
[Hoffman 1985: 373]. Jamaica also confers an additional advantage to the US apparel 
MNEs. This country is merely one hour and a half by air from Miami. Its close 
proximity to the USA is advantageous for those MNEs that have adopted `quick 
201 
response' systems. 16 In the cases of other MNEs, the cost advantages arising from 
Jamaica's proximity to the US are two-fold: The costs of international freight are 
comparatively low when compared with other sources. In addition, inventories can be 
maintained at fairly low levels. Thus, the labour-intensive operations, apparel 
assembly, which is compatible with the locational endowments of Jamaica, was 
undertaken by the four MNEs in this country. 
The MNEs studied all appeared to combine their firm-specific assets with 
Jamaica's locational endowments. Tultex Corporation, which is a vertically integrated 
apparel company, sought to integrate its core competencies in textile manufacturing, 
garment design, garment production, marketing and distribution with Jamaica's 
comparative advantage of low-cost labour and proximity to the US market. Its 
Jamaican operations, Akom Corporation, serves to provide the company with 
tremendous cost savings in labour. The parent company benefits from quality work 
that is undertaken relatively cheaply in Jamaica. These cost savings enable the 
company to effectively operate in those segments of the US garment market where 
price is the main determinant of competition. Moreover, Tultex Corporation, which 
has adopted quick response systems, has gained further cost advantages over its 
competitors. The product from its Jamaican operations is shipped to an agent in 
Miami. Some of this shipment goes to the company's headquarters in Martinsville 
where it is then sent to California. The implementation of quick response has 
16 `Quick response' is an attempt by the US apparel producer to capitalise on its proximity to its 
customers. It requires the firm implementing the technologies and business systems that would allow 
for a speedy flow of data from its sales outlet to the fibre warehouse. In so doing, the apparel producer 
is able to monitor and even forecast the demands of its customer and thus react very rapidly to market 
changes. Companies that have offshore locations in the Caribbean stand to benefit from this system. 
Their operations are located sufficiently near to the US market to respond to the need for short delivery 
times and low inventories. See Peter Steele, The Caribbean Clothing Industry, London: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (1988): 14-16. 
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alleviated the company's need to set up a central distribution point. It has been able to 
maintain inventories at a minimum and has gained tremendous cost savings from 
reducing distribution costs. As one of its executives revealed: 
[Quick response systems] has allowed us to eliminate the need for our producers to 
send the apparel product back to the headquarters for distribution. It alleviates the 
need for us having a distribution point. It gives us considerable cost savings. 
Similarly, Jockey International Inc., which is also a vertically integrated 
apparel company, manages to gain tremendous synergies from the integration of its 
activities in the USA with its highly productive facility in Jamaica. The fabric that is 
used in the Jamaican operations comes from textile mills in North Carolina that are 
owned and operated by Jockey International Inc.. The design work, merchandising 
and product development is undertaken in its corporate office at Wisconsin. Its 
Jamaican operations carries out the assembly of the garments that are designed in 
Wisconsin. Jockey Jamaica Limited has attained the highest internal record for 
efficiency. Thus, Jockey International Inc. is able to achieve tremendous cost savings 
from the quality work that is produced by its highly productive, low-cost Jamaican 
work force. While the managers at Jockey International Inc. revealed that they had 
several quick response systems, these systems appear to be less developed than those 
at Tultex Corporation. The product manufactured in Jockey's Jamaican operations is 
shipped to its central distribution centre at North Carolina where it is redistributed. 
Hence, the company is able to achieve cost savings from its highly productive plant in 
Jamaica as well as minimise warehousing and distribution costs. 
The competitive strengths of these vertically integrated companies arise from 
several sources. All the fabric produced in the companies' facilities are used in-house. 
This allows the companies tremendous flexibility and better operating margins. Since 
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they do not have to time incoming fabric shipments with their cutting and sewing 
operations, warehousing expenses are minimised. Moreover, the fabric is 
manufactured on an as needed basis that lowers the companies' working capital 
requirements [Auerbach Pollak & Richardson, Inc. 1996: 5]. Further, the companies 
are able to become more cost competitive by locating those labour-intensive segments 
of their operations in Jamaica. Additionally, the terms and conditions of the 807-A 
trade agreement facilitate the assembly of garments produced with fabric obtained 
from their textile mills in this country. Moreover, the adoption of quick response 
systems, minimises the warehousing and distribution costs. The companies also gain 
the advantage of speed since they could quickly respond to the needs of their 
customers. 
Maidenform Worldwide Inc. has a less integrated production process than that 
of the two MNEs previously discussed. However, the parent company carries out the 
higher value, upstream activities of purchasing, garment design, pre-assembly 
(grading, marking and cutting) product engineering in the USA. The company also 
markets and distributes its product globally. Its Jamaican operations undertakes the 
labour-intensive aspect of its operations: apparel assembly as well as some ancillary 
cutting. Labour costs play an important role since the majority of the undergarments 
produced by this Jamaican plant is aimed at the lower to middle segments of the 
market where price is the main determinant of competitive success. In addition, the 
close proximity of Jamaica to the US means that the finished product could be easily 
transported by air to the US and the company could maintain fairly low inventories. 
As one of its executives stated: 
The principal factors in Jamaica are its labour costs..... and the location, its proximity 
to the US. For example, when we are short of something, we can just get on the 
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telephone and call Maidenform's central cutting facility in Jacksonville, Florida. We 
can get the item tomorrow and if we need it urgently, we can even get it today. The 
same thing applies to our shipping with them. We can ship fairly easily. In fact, the 
distance is so close that we can afford to do it by air. 
Conversely, it is the customers of Apparel Contractors Associates Inc. who 
provide the design, patterns and fabric that are necessary to produce the garment. The 
company then undertakes the assembly of the product offshore. Its firm-specific assets 
include production design, production engineering, quality control and market 
knowledge. The company uses these assets in combination with the low-cost labour of 
Jamaica to produce a competitively priced, quality product. The close proximity of 
Jamaica to the US is also advantageous to Apparel Contractors Associates Inc. Like 
Maidenform Worldwide Inc., its product is transported by air to the US. In addition, 
its warehousing expenses are minimised since it can maintain fairly low levels of 
inventories. 
8.4. The Choice of Locating Apparel Production in Jamaica 
This study proposes that the decision to establish and continue operations in Jamaica 
is influenced by the cost of labour [Vernon 1966; Moxon 1975; Sharpston 1975; 
Wallace 1990; Kumar 1994]. In addition, it is suggested that preferential trading 
agreements play an important role in motivating MNE's investment in Jamaica 
[Johnson 1968; Joekes 1982; Yannopoulos 1986; Griffith 1990]. Moreover, it is 
posited that the presence of export processing zones greatly influences the decision to 
locate apparel assembly operations in the country [Sharpston 1975; Frobel et al. 1980; 
UNCTAD 1985; Kaplinsky 1992; Roberts 1992; Woodward and Rolfe 1993; Kumar 
1994]. This study also proposes that the investment incentive package offered by the 
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Jamaican government has no influence on the location decisions of the four MNEs 
[Shah and Toyne 1978; Agodo 1978; Lim 1983; Wheeler and Mody 1991; Loree and 
Guisinger 1995]. Finally, it contends that the apparel MNEs integrate elements of the 
US diamond with the diamond of Jamaica [Rugman and D'Cruz 1993; Rugman and 
Verbeke 1993]. 
8.4.1 H4: The Low-Cost Factor Hypothesis 
As was earlier emphasised, the main motivation for the apparel MNEs 
establishing operations in Jamaica was the availability of low-cost labour. The ten 
managers interviewed all emphasised that labour cost was the main factor that drove 
their apparel assembly operations from the USA to Jamaica. The wages offered by the 
firms studied ranged from US $ 0.77 to US $ 1.13 per hour. Indeed, the wage level in 
the apparel industry of Jamaica is fairly competitive with that of other countries (See 
Table 8.1). 
Table 8.1 Index of Labour Costs in the International Clothing Industry, 1992 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994, (Switzerland: United Nations, 1994), Table IV. 13. 
However, the managers emphasised that while labour costs are important to 
their operations, productivity levels are critical, especially in the light of recent 
increases in labour costs. Indeed, one manager estimated that over the last three years, 
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the average direct labour costs per hour rose by thirty-eight per cent. Thus, to offset 
increases in labour costs, several of these firms attempted to increase productivity 
levels by offering productivity bonuses. In one company, when a 125 per cent level of 
efficiency is attained, the worker receives a twenty-six per cent increase in her hourly 
wage rate. In another, when a 100 per cent level of efficiency is attained, the worker 
receives a productivity bonus equal to a forty-eight per cent of her hourly wages. 
In an attempt at boosting productivity levels, several of the companies have 
implemented various schemes that are aimed at improving industrial relations. 
Attendance bonuses are given to the workers who work for forty hours per week. 
These bonuses range from US $ 6.60 to 14.30 per week. Additionally, two of the 
companies offer subsidised lunches to their workers. One company has been 
especially innovative in its attempts at boosting worker morale and thus productivity. 
It hosts an annual day of festivities where its employees are celebrated. They are 
presented with various gifts (bicycles, refrigerators, televisions) and are feted by the 
top local entertainment. The company also shows weekly movies, serves free 
breakfast daily and hosts weekly employee-management meetings. This company has 
attained productivity levels of 111 per cent. The Jamaican operation is the most cost 
effective facility of the MNE. 
By contrast, another company complained of high rates of absenteeism, theft 
and worker violence. Its managers noted that the present tax system penalises the 
worker who attempts to increase her productivity. Similar claims were made by 
Roberts [1992: 93]. In Jamaica, no tax is paid on the first J$ 50,544 (US$ 1,444) of an 
individual's annual income. A tax rate of twenty-five per cent is applied to the 
remainder. The president of this company alleged that because the workers operate on 
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a piece rate system, they are able to calculate how hard they must work to earn a 
certain level of income. Since it takes considerable effort to produce at the level where 
they will earn only seventy-five cents on every dollar, they have little incentive to 
increase output. Indeed, one researcher noted that the present tax threshold has been 
negatively affected by the present high rates of inflation. He advises raising it to J$ 
104,000.00 (US$ 2,971) [King 1996]. The managers of the company also stated that 
two years ago his company derived a twenty per cent cost savings from its Jamaican 
operations. This cost savings has now been reversed. The company is losing an 
estimated US$ 10,000 a week from its Jamaican operation. The following statement is 
illuminating: 
Up to 1992, everything was fine, productivity was high and absenteeism was much 
better. I do not know what is happening now in Jamaica....... What can we do? We 
have out of 600 employees, some 550 stealing our goods. What can we do? ... The 
rates of absenteeism and the lack of punctuality is very high. For example, on 
Monday, 152 workers were late and 85 absent, on Tuesday, 132 were late and 48 
absent, on Wednesday, 182 were late and 48 absent, and on Thursday, 161 were late 
and 51 were absent. This is out of a total of 595 workers! 
It is noteworthy that this company has recently introduced some of the fringe benefits 
that the other three MNEs use to motivate their employees. 
None of the four MNEs had a unionised work force. All the managers at the 
subsidiary interviewed were opposed to operating with trade unions. One manager 
revealed that if his employees were to become unionised, his company will leave the 
country. Another stated that he believes that in Third World countries, unions do more 
harm than good to the employees. Interestingly, one manager stated that Jamaicans are 
the most militant people in the Caribbean. Thus, he believes that a unionised work 
force will not enhance his company's competitiveness. 
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It is argued that low wages and a docile work force are not the primary factors 
affecting the locational decisions of foreign companies. It seems that innovative job- 
training programmes which produce a custom-trained work force are an irresistible 
incentive [Kanter 1995: 247]. Indeed, this is one of the main objectives of the Human 
Employment and Resource Training Trust (HEART) of Jamaica. HEART, which was 
established in 1982, is responsible for providing skilled workers for industry. The 
operations of HEART are funded by firms that operate in the country. Companies, 
whose annual wage bill exceeds US$ 4,952, pay three per cent of their total wage bill 
to this training programme. HEART operates several institutes in Jamaica that are 
devoted to training for the garment industry. Its two major facilities are located in the 
capital, Kingston, and in the west of the country, at Hanover. HEART also operates 
several small centres throughout the country. 
The institute offers a variety of courses aimed at the garment industry. These 
are garment construction, machine operating, tailoring, machine embroidery, pattern 
making and machine mechanics. The course, machine operating, trains workers for 
the 807 operations. Interestingly enough, the managers at the Jamaican operations of 
the MNEs studied were not impressed with the graduates from HEART. They all 
stated that this institution fails to adequately prepare the workers for the realities of 
the industry where speed and proficiency are essential skills. In addition, they 
complained about the poor work ethic of the graduates and stated that they prefer to 
conduct their own training. 
Conversely, the directors at HEART revealed that they have trouble in 
recruiting students for the machine operating course. They noted that work in the 807 
operations has a negative public image. It is the students, who fail the entrance 
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examinations for the garment training courses, who are recruited for the machine 
operating course. They often require remedial classes in basic Mathematics and 
English. The machine operating course is the lowest level of all the training courses 
for the garment industry that are offered by HEART. The directors of HEART added 
that the wages offered in this industry are not attractive. In some cases, the women 
employed in the 807 operations are barely able to meet their basic needs [Dunn 1994: 
27]. In addition, the directors claimed that there have been complaints about the 
working conditions in the factories, particularly those owned by the Asian MNEs. 
Further, they noted that employment in this sector is variable since product demand is 
dictated by the vagaries of the fashion industry. They said that when the firms 
experience a fall in product demand, they reduce the numbers employed. The directors 
stated that these factors all contribute to the negative image of the 807 operations. 
Indeed, since 1987, there has been an eighty per cent decline in the numbers of 
graduates from the garment training programmes (See Table 8.2). Also, it has been 
estimated that less than eight per cent of those who have graduated over the last six 
years remained in the industry [King 1996]. 
Table 8.2 The Number of Graduates From HEART's Garment Training 
Programme 
1987/1988 4,585 
1988/1989 3,845 
1991/1992 1,587 
1992/1993 1,492 
1993/1994 611 
1994/1995 904 
Source: The Planning Institute of Jamaica, Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica, (various issues) Kingston, 
Jamaica: The Planning Institute. 
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Porter argues that competitive advantage achieved by low-cost labour is 
unsustainable [Porter 1990: 79]. Indeed, Jamaica's advantage in low-cost labour has 
been described as a `competitive advantage of misery': It was gained through a 
successive series of devaluations that were implemented at the considerable social 
expense of its citizens [Deere et al. 1990: 46-47]. Additionally, the wage 
competitiveness achieved by Jamaica is not a result of a general upgrading of the 
skills of its workforce or even improvements in industrial efficiencies that arise from 
technological innovation [Watson 1994c: 81]. Clearly, this low-cost labour advantage 
is unsustainable. Hence, it is not surprising that one of the more productive MNEs 
studied is contemplating moving its operations to Central America or Mexico. The 
manager claimed that it is more cost efficient to operate in these countries. 
8.4.2 H 5: The Preferential Trading Agreement Hypothesis 
As discussed earlier, the emergence of the apparel assembly industry in 
Jamaica was solely a result of the US development policy for the Caribbean and 
Central America. All four MNEs examined are 807 producers. In addition, all 
manufacture apparel goods from US made fabric that is cut in the US. According to 
the terms of the 807 agreement, these companies pay a twenty per cent duty on the 
apparel goods that are manufactured in Jamaica and exported to the US. The 
executives of the four companies all emphasised that the 807 agreement is critical to 
their operations in Jamaica. In fact, two managers bluntly stated that if it were not for 
this trade agreement, their companies would not have initially invested in Jamaica. 
The CBI has been criticised for failing to provide the investor with a 
sustainable competitive advantage over its competitors [Azel 1991: 23]. Sustainability 
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is viewed as critical to the export-oriented producers, such as the 807 operators, since 
their main motivation for engaging in FDI is securing cost advantages over their 
competitors. The strategic value of this cost advantage rests on its sustainability. 
Sustainability exists if competitors find it difficult to replicate or imitate the sources of 
the firm's cost advantage [ibid., 23]. It seems that Azel's assertions have proven to be 
correct. The enactment of the NAFTA has nullified the competitive advantage that 
apparel MNEs gain from operating in Jamaica. As noted earlier, the NAFTA gives 
foreign companies that operate in Mexico free access to the US and Canadian 
markets. Unlike the CBI beneficiaries, no duties are paid on apparel goods 
manufactured in Mexico. Moreover, Mexico is an attractive location for foreign 
investment in apparel assembly. This is a result of its improved investment climate, 
competitive wage rates, greater labour availability, proximity to the US market, and 
improved access to its domestic market [Glasmeier et al. 1993]. 
Not surprisingly, the four apparel producers studied all claimed that their 
operations in Jamaica were adversely affected by the NAFTA. The following 
quotations illustrate this point. 
Several companies with operations in Mexico, for example, Sara Lee, now that they 
have NAFTA parity, are more cost effective than us. This has affected us and it will 
continue to affect us until we get some sort of parity here in Jamaica. In Mexico, you 
do not have to pay transportation costs. Forty per cent of our costs are due to duty 
and transportation. Moreover, you do not have to pay any duties and transportation 
costs are virtually nothing in Mexico. The producers in Mexico can be forty per cent 
more cost efficient than we are. 
Jamaica never took NAFTA seriously. ... 
Most of our competitors are moving to 
Mexico. Mexico enjoys a significant cost advantage over Jamaica. Labour costs are 
US$ 10.50 in Jamaica and US$ 7.00 in Mexico. The cost of electricity and rent is 
half that of Jamaica. 
Indeed, the costs of operating in Mexico do seem to be lower than those in 
Jamaica (See Table 8.3). Evidently, the implementation of the NAFTA has eroded the 
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advantages that the CBI conferred on these four MNEs which, since the mid 1980s, 
have located their apparel assembly operations in Jamaica. Several of the managers 
interviewed stated that it is imperative that Jamaica gains NAFTA parity. They were 
uncertain whether they would continue operating in the country if it fails to gain 
NAFTA parity. 
Table 8.3 A Comparison of Selected Industrial Costs in Mexico and Jamaica 
Variables US dollars) MeXICOM 
Electricity Rates 
kilowatt per hour) ( 
........................ 
0.024 
Wage Rates (hourly rate) 
Skilled 0.54-0.81 
Unskilled 11 0.40-0.53 
Rental Rat es of Factory 
Space 
s uarefeet per annum ý9 ) 
. 00-4: 00 
2 
. 
Sources: The Mexican Bank for Foreign Trade, Industrial Costs In Mexico: A Guide For Foreign Investors, 
November 1 1996. Jamaican Promotions Corporation, A Description of Business Costs and Infrastructure in 
Jamaica, August 1996. 
Notes: (1) These costs are for the Fipaiy industrial park located in the Merida region. The region is the same 
distance from the US market (by air) as Jamaica. 
8.4.3 H 6: The Export Processing Zone Hypothesis 
All four MNEs entered Jamaica in the early 1980s. To a large extent, they 
were lured by the promotional campaigns conducted by the country's investment 
promotional agencies. One of the mechanisms that was used to induce apparel MNEs 
into Jamaica was the creation of export processing zones (EPZs). At present, Jamaica 
has three EPZs: Kingston Free Zone (KFZ), Montego Bay Free Zone (MBFZ), and 
Garmex Free Zone. The Kingston Free Zone, established in 1976, was the first to be 
created in the island. This fifty-seven hectare estate is located in the industrial section 
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of the capital city. The KPZ is situated close to a modern port that is served by major 
shipping lines. It is also near to one of the country's international airports. The 
Montego Bay Free Zone was created in 1982. It is situated at Montego Bay, the 
country's second city. The MBFZ occupies nine hectares with an additional twenty- 
eight being developed for expansion. This EPZ is near to a port and the country's 
second international airport. Finally, the Garmex Free Zone, established in 1987, 
occupies eighteen hectares. Like the Kingston Free Zone, it is situated in the industrial 
sections of Kingston. 
Two of the MNEs studied were located in the EPZs. One was situated at the 
Kingston Free Trade Zone and the other at the Montego Bay Free Trade Zone. The 
other two firms operated outside of the EPZs. One was sited on an industrial estate 
several miles away from Kingston. The other was located in a rural area of the 
country. This company owns the land on which its operating and administrative 
facilities are sited. It was the only firm surveyed that owned property in Jamaica. It is 
noteworthy that the two apparel MNEs that decided to located in the EPZs, were 
attempting to avoid the excessive bureaucracy and infrastructural difficulties that 
usually plague business operations in developing countries. On the other hand, the 
manager, who operated in the industrial estate, worked for several years in Jamaica 
before setting up his company. He did not perceive that he would gain any additional 
benefits from operating in an EPZ. The motivation for the MNE locating its 
operations in a rural area of Jamaica is unclear. It is assumed that the parent company 
preferred total ownership of its facilities in Jamaica. Thus, it was not willing to locate 
its operations in the EPZs since the factory space there is leased. 
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It seems that for two of the MNEs studied, the presence of EPZs played a 
decisive role in their decision to locate operations in Jamaica. This study also sought 
to ascertain what elements of the industrial infrastructure are important to these firms. 
The results of this examination are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
The managers of the four MNEs believed that the quality of the industrial 
infrastructure in Jamaica is adequate and has improved since they initially started 
operations in the country. However, the major concern expressed was the escalating 
cost of utilities. 
Indeed, the managers of the MNEs that operate in the EPZs concur that the 
quality of the electricity service in Jamaica is generally good, and has been improving 
over the past few years. It was only the manager, with operations in the rural area, 
who complained about an unreliable electricity supply. In fact, his company was 
forced to invest in a generator to ensure constant production. He revealed that there 
were times when the company was compelled to use this generator for several days at 
a time. 
One issue on which there was consensus was the astronomical cost of 
electricity. A manager stated that since 1981, the cost of electricity increased at least 
two-fold. Another claimed that electricity costs in Jamaica are forty-five per cent 
higher than those in other CBI countries. Further, one noted that although his 
company was operating at fifty per cent capacity, his monthly electricity bill was US$ 
12,857. Several researchers support these claims [Roberts 1992: 94]. The policy 
makers in Jamaica are aware of the relatively high cost of electricity (See Table 8.3). 
Over the last few years, attempts have been made to increase generating capacity: at 
present, the country has a generating capacity of 606 megawatts to meet a peak 
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demand of 424 megawatts. Nevertheless, attempts at lowering the costs of this service 
were not as successful. The policy makers note that it is difficult to decrease 
electricity rates because of the small size of the system and the inability of the country 
to connect with other suppliers (to achieve economies of scale) due to its island 
geography [Government of Jamaica 1996: 77-80]. The Government is presently 
considering proposals aimed at decreasing the cost of its electricity service. One of 
these proposals is the establishment of co-generating projects involving the state- 
owned electricity company and the large users of power in the country. 
Similarly, the managers all agreed that although the telephone service was 
adequate, the rates were too high. Several managers at the subsidiary noted that these 
rates exceeded those of other CBI countries. In addition, the managers located in the 
EPZs protested that their rents are too high and not compatible with those in 
competing countries (See Table 8.3). In 1996, the rents at the KFZ were increased 
from US$ 3.50 to US$ 4.10 per square foot. The rates in the MBFZ are relatively 
higher at US$ 4.25 per square foot. The managers complain that their operating 
margins are low and the market for their products in the US is soft. Thus, they cannot 
pay such high rents. On the other hand, the directors of the companies that manage 
these EPZs stated that they have outstanding loan obligations. Moreover, they argued 
that the rents charged reflect the cost of the services that are provided to the investor 
located on the estates. The services that the KFZ and the MBFZ provide include 
garbage collection, landscaping, security and maintenance of buildings. 
There appears to be some differences in the services enjoyed by the MNEs that 
are located in these two EPZs. The KFZ is located near to the country's largest port. 
This port, which is one of the largest in the region, is served by several major shipping 
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lines. However, this is not the case with the MBFZ. Its port is only served by one 
shipping line. Thus, there is a vast disparity in the shipping rates charged at Montego 
Bay and Kingston. The present freight cost from the port of Kingston to Miami for a 
forty foot container is US$ 1,000. Conversely, the comparable cost from Montego 
Bay to Miami is US$ 2,185.17 Further, as one manager stated, the port at Montego 
Bay is not equipped with crane facilities. Hence, his company is forced to pay for 
stevedore services. In addition, the managers of the companies that use the port 
services all claimed that they incur additional operating costs since they need to 
ensure that drugs are not smuggled on board their shipments. One manager revealed 
that if drugs are found in any of his shipments, the resultant fines would totally 
bankrupt his company. Thus, these firms have instituted several measures to prevent 
this from occurring. In one case, the company employs two security guards to protect 
its cargo from being tampered with. In another, the senior management, significantly, 
the foreign managers, are the ones who ensure that drugs are not placed on board their 
shipment. Evidently, these additional security measures have resulted in increased 
operating costs. One source estimates that these security measures add an additional 
eight per cent to the costs of operating in Jamaica [King 1996: 3.7.4]. By contrast, 
those managers who air cargo their products to the US were satisfied with the quality 
of the service. They did not experience the problems of drug smuggling. 
The public transportation system was identified as an infrastructural problem 
that has deteriorated over the last few years. This has resulted in difficulties in getting 
17 These data were obtained from conversations with Ms. Andrea Philip, Marketing Manager of the 
Kingston Free Zone Company Limited, interview by author, telephone conversation, Coventry, UK, 24 
April 1997. The figure quoted for freight costs from Montego Bay to Miami is that charged by the 
shipping line which serves both the ports of Kingston and Montego Bay. The clients at Kingston pay 
the same costs as those at Montego Bay. However, the freight costs quoted for Kingston are those 
offered by the competing shipping lines that only serve the port of Kingston. 
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workers to work night shifts. In addition, issues of punctuality are a major source of 
management concern. Two managers have attempted to overcome this problem by 
granting bonuses to workers who manage to be consistently punctual. The 
Government has also attempted to alleviate this problem by introducing larger buses; 
acquiring additional ones which are leased to the private sector; and leasing bus 
depots to franchise holders to enable greater control over dispatching and scheduling 
of buses [The Planning Institute of Jamaica 1995: 13.3]. These efforts, which have 
been limited to Kingston, have achieved minimal success. 
There appeared to be some ambivalence on the issue of the quality of service 
provided by the country's economic development agency, Jamaica Promotions 
Corporation (DAMPRO). ' 8 One manager stated that once his company was 
established, he had very little use for the services of JAMPRO. He only interacts with 
the managers of the EPZ. By contrast, two managers stated that JAMPRO's post 
investment service is limited. One said that it was not very effective in resolving the 
problems he experienced with duty exemptions for imported equipment. Another 
stated that JAMPRO is not an effective liaison between the MNEs and the 
government. He noted that he had to negotiate with the power companies and shipping 
lines without its assistance. JAMPRO admits that it has not been effective in the post 
investment stage. It has recently instituted a client service promotion division with the 
mandate to provide `after care services' to its clients. It is too early to evaluate the 
performance of this division. It must be pointed out, however, that there is no single 
department within JAMPRO that is completely dedicated to the needs of the apparel 
18 JAMPRO was created in 1988. It resulted from the merger of three existing development 
organisations. These included Jamaica National Export Corporation, Jamaica Industrial Development 
Corporation and Jamaica National Investment Promotions. It is the last institute that was responsible 
for attracting MNEs to the country in the early to mid 1980s. 
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industry. The interests of this industry are handled by three different departments 
within JAMPRO. In addition, several external bodies, such as the Garment Council, 
and the Central American and Caribbean Textile and Apparel Council, provide 
oversight to this industry. There is obviously a need to integrate the functions of these 
diverse institutes into one body. This would not only reduce the possible duplication 
of functions, but also prevent the stretching of resources (human and financial) in this 
resource indigent country. This sentiment was also expressed by the Garment 
Confederation of Jamaica [The Garment Confederation 1996: 13]. 
The managers interviewed also stated that the general bureaucracy in Jamaica 
is adequate. Many revealed that they receive a favourable service at Customs. Some 
claimed that over the last few years, the service offered in the government 
departments has improved. Yet, one issue that was repeatedly discussed is the 
growing economic and social instability in the country. One manager stated that 
despite the relatively low value of the Jamaican dollar, the costs of operating in the 
country are high. He noted that labour is not the only operating costs that his company 
incurs in Jamaica. He stated that the costs of services, for example, car rentals, are 
prohibitive. Moreover, many complained that these services were not only costly but 
also inefficient. Most importantly, the managers at the subsidiary all referred to the 
level of crime in the country and the apparent impotence of the authorities in 
controlling it. They warned that these issues have a negative impact on the country's 
investment climate and thus on their long-term investment. 
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8.4.4 H 7: The Investment Incentive Hypothesis 
There was unanimous agreement on the question of the attractiveness of the 
incentive package offered by the Jamaican government. It seems that the investment 
incentive package offered by the Jamaican government did and continues to have a 
positive influence on the locational decisions of these firms. 
The Jamaican government offers a fairly comprehensive package of 
incentives. The investor who operates within its EPZ enjoys income and profits tax 
exemptions in perpetuity; property tax exemptions; exemption from import licensing; 
and duty free imports and exports of all goods. The investor does not have to operate 
within an EPZ to enjoy these incentives. Enterprises are granted single entity free 
zone status provided that their operations conform to standards governing such a 
designation. On the other hand, the foreign investor who operates outside of the EPZ 
(in a customs territory) is exempted from income and dividend taxes for up to ten 
years. After the expiration of the tax relief period, the investor may be granted tax 
credits of a maximum of fifty per cent of the income tax payable on export profits. He 
may carry forward unrecovered losses incurred during that period. The foreign 
investor also enjoys import duty exemptions on raw material and machinery [Deloitte 
Touche Tomatsu International 1995; JAMPRO 1996]. In addition, all foreign 
investors enjoy free repatriation of profits and dividends. Further, all exporters pay 
registration and certification fees. Those who operate in an EPZ pay an annual 
registration fee of US$ 250 per annum and a certification fee of US $30 for every US$ 
10,000 worth of exports. By contrast, those who operate in a customs territory, who 
exported less than J$ 2 million (US$ 57,143) in the previous year, pay annual 
registration fees of J$ 500 (US$ 14.30) while those whose exports exceed J$ 2 million 
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(US$ 57,143), pay annual registration fees of J$ 1,000 (US$ 28.60). These investors 
also pay a certification fee of J$ 25 (US$ 0.72) for every J$ 25,00 (US$ 714.30) worth 
of exports. It is noteworthy that Jamaica has a double taxation treaty with the USA. 
Generally, all the managers believed that the tax holidays and duty exemptions 
on machinery and equipment were attractive elements of the investment incentive 
package. These elements were identified as necessary to their continued operations in 
Jamaica. Interestingly enough, the managers who operated in the customs territory 
believed that the cost savings derived from operating in the EPZ are negligible. One 
manager made the following statement. 
Our entire shipping costs will increase between US$ 70,000 to 80,000 if we get free 
zone status. In the free zone, the company has to pay a much larger visa than those 
out of the free zone. For exporting a product, under the tax holiday system, shipping 
costs about US$ 15.00 per container. If you are in a free zone, it is about US$ 
400.00. What this means if we don't include a customs officer on site, it will cost our 
company about an increase of US$ 80,000 if we get free zone status. This is a result 
of the costs involved in the visa treatment of exports. This will increase the cost of 
doing business..... So we have to weigh that against the taxes we may pay with the 
loss of our tax holiday. The impact of going into a free zone is negligible. 
Indeed, it appears that the export fees (registration and certification fees) 
which the investor pays in the EPZs are much higher than the ones charged to the 
investor in the customs territory. This disparity in export fees charged to the operator 
in the EPZ and customs territory is a result of the differences in the currencies used 
for the payment of these fees. The EPZ operator pays his fees in US dollars while the 
operator in the customs territory pays his in Jamaican dollars. Over the last decade, 
the Jamaican dollar has been devalued by an estimated five hundred per cent [World 
Bank 1995a]. Evidently, these devaluations have benefited the operator in the customs 
territory. Hence, these investors believed that there was little incentive for them to 
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relocate their operations to the EPZs or assume the status of a single entity free zone 
operator. 
In 1991, Jamaica removed all restrictions on the movement of foreign 
exchange. Thus, the managers interviewed did not identify free repatriation of profits 
and dividends as an important incentive. However, firms that operated in EPZs always 
enjoyed this incentive. Free repatriation of profits and dividends was one of the 
incentives used to attract the EPZ operator to Jamaica. This incentive was not made 
available to those who operated in the customs territory. Thus, it is surprising that the 
executives of the two MNEs that operated in the customs territory did not regard this 
incentive as important to their continued operations in Jamaica. 
8.4.5 H 9: The "Double Diamond" Hypothesis 
It appears that the "Double Diamond" hypothesis is an adequate explanation 
for the investment behaviour of the four apparel MNEs in Jamaica. The strategic 
management style these firms used for their Jamaican operations can be illustrated by 
Quadrant 2 of Diagram 5.1. 
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Diagram 5.1. The Role of the Jamaican Operations in the Corporate Strategy of 
the Apparel MNEs 
Role of Host Country 
National Diamond on 
Development of Core 
Competencies of Apparel 
MNEs 
None 
High 
Diamond 
Network 
Integration of Jamaican Operations with Other 
Operations of the Apparel NNE 
Low High 
H .,,,:: a'aa s 
3 4 
5 6 
Source: Adapted from Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Multinational Strategic 
Management: An Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework. " Management International 
Review 33 Special Issue (1993), Figure 4. 
The Jamaican operations were passively incorporated into the overall 
corporate strategy of these four apparel MNEs. Jamaica was merely used as a source 
of low-cost labour that was relatively near to the companies' home country. The 
operations of the Jamaican subsidiary were only linked to the downstream activities of 
distribution and marketing. All upstream activities were carried out in the US. 
Moreover, the activities undertaken in Jamaica could be easily carried out in another 
country, notably Mexico. Thus, Jamaica's diamond was of little relevance to the 
development of the core competencies of the four MNEs. Those elements of 
Jamaica's diamond that were significant to the four firms are demonstrated in 
Diagram 5.2. 
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II. - 
Diagram 5.2 Double Diamond Approach to the Apparel Industry 
of Jamaica 
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Source: Adapted from Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Multinational Strategic 
Management: An Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework. " Management International 
Review 33 Special Issue (1993), Figure 3. 
The main elements of Jamaica's diamond that were of importance to the four 
apparel MNEs were low-cost labour, proximity to the US, and, until recently, the 807 
agreement. As noted earlier, these advantages are unsustainable. Jamaica's low-cost, 
productive labour force can be easily sourced in any of the CBI beneficiaries or, as is 
presently the case, Mexico. Mexico and several of the CBI beneficiaries, significantly, 
the Dominican Republic are in fact closer to the US than Jamaica. In addition, the 
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NAFTA has nullified the benefits to be derived from locating apparel assembly 
operations in Jamaica. 
The other elements of Jamaica's diamond are noticeably weak. The 
institutional framework for foreign investment appears to be inefficient. The training 
programme instituted by HEART for the 807 operations fails to produce graduates 
with the quality of skills demanded by the industry. Additionally, the services offered 
by JAMPRO appear to be inadequate. Despite the overwhelmingly important role that 
the apparel industry has played in the Jamaican economy over the last decade, 
JAMPRO fails to have an in-house capability that would allow it to, inter alia, 
effectively respond to, and anticipate the needs of the investor; examine domestic, 
regional and global investment trends and disseminate this information to the 
domestic industry; and analyse the investment climate of competing countries. Thus, 
not surprisingly, JAMPRO has failed to adopt the pre-emptive measures necessary to 
counter the effects of the NAFTA on its domestic apparel industry. 
Other elements of Jamaica's diamond are also weak. While the quality of the 
utilities service is adequate, the costs are prohibitive. Many of the managers 
complained about the astronomical electricity rates. In addition, rental rates for factory 
space in the EPZs were considered to be too high. Several managers noted that the 
rents charged were uncompetitive. Moreover, the port services, significantly those 
offered at Montego Bay, were said to be inadequate. Further, managers stated that 
they were forced to incur additional costs to prevent the smuggling of drugs. The 
inadequacy of the public transportation system adversely affected worker 
productivity. Also, in cases where the managers attempted to counter the inefficient 
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bus service by offering attendance bonuses, their costs of operations increased. 
Interestingly, many managers revealed that the repair and maintenance service for the 
equipment used in the apparel sector is efficient. All managers interviewed stated that 
they had an in-house maintenance service that was devoted to the repair of sewing 
machines. 
It appears that the government in Jamaica does not have a positive impact on 
the country's development of a sustainable competitive advantage for the apparel 
assembly industry. Its present tax system seems to discourage the productivity of the 
worker who operates under the piece rate system. In addition, its investment 
incentives are apparently biased to the investor who operates in the customs territory. 
Most importantly, however, is the present economic and social instability in the 
country. Jamaica's protracted economic problems have given rise to uncertainties 
about the political stability in the country. As the managers revealed, this situation is a 
serious deterrent to their long term investment in the country. 
8.5 The Modes of Investment Used by the Four Apparel MNEs in Jamaica 
This study suggests that the MNE involved in intra-firm trade in Jamaica will use a 
wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of market entry [Teece 1983; Anderson and 
Gatignon 1986; Gomes-Casseres 1989,1990]. It is also posited that the level of 
international experience of a firm influences its selection of a market entry mode. The 
MNE with international experience will use a wholly owned subsidiary as its 
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international entry mode [Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; Johanson and 
Vahlne 1977,1990; Davidson 1980; Li 1994; Loree and Guisinger 1995; Tan and 
Vertinsky 1996]. Additionally, it is suggested that the cultural distance between the 
home and host country plays an important role in the MNE's selection of a market 
entry mode [Kogut and Singh 1988; Padmanabhan and Cho 1996]. 
All four MNEs studied used the wholly owned subsidiary as their mode of 
market entry into Jamaica. There were differing reasons for this selection of market 
entry mode. 
8.5.1 H 10: The Intra-Firm Trade Hypothesis 
The theory advanced by researchers such as Gomes-Casseres on the 
relationship between intra-firm trade and the use of the wholly owned subsidiary 
clearly explains the factors influencing the choice of mode of investment for two 
MNEs studied. As noted earlier, two MNEs were vertically integrated apparel 
companies. The fabric that was used in their operations in Jamaica was produced in 
their textile mills. The managers of these firms noted that this intra-firm trade greatly 
influenced their choice of a wholly owned subsidiary. The two MNEs choose either 
subcontractors or wholly owned subsidiaries as their mode of entry into international 
markets. Tutlex Corporation operates a wholly owned subsidiary in Jamaica and uses 
subcontractors in Mexico. It also uses the subcontracting services of two apparel 
MINEs in Jamaica. Interestingly, Jockey's selection of market entry mode is 
influenced by the product manufactured. Jockey International Inc. tends to use 
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subcontractors for its low volume products and wholly owned subsidiaries for its high 
volume ones. 
It is noteworthy that the issue of control was paramount in both of these 
vertically integrated companies [Stopford and Wells 1972: 113-117]. The managers at 
Tultex Corporation revealed that their operation in Jamaica was their first offshore 
investment. Thus, they wanted to have total control over it. A similar sentiment was 
expressed by the executives at Jockey International Inc. They stated that they wanted 
to be able to control the operations of their Jamaican subsidiary. The following 
statement demonstrates the important role that control played in Jockey International 
Inc. 's selection of a wholly owned subsidiary for its Jamaican operation. 
We are a privately owned company so when we decided to locate a segment of our 
operations offshore, we wanted it to be totally owned by the company. I think that 
the question of control was what made this form of investment most attractive to us. 
However, Jockey International Inc. went a step further than Tultex 
Corporation. They owned the land and buildings on which their Jamaican operations 
is located. 
8.5.2 H 11: The International Experience Hypothesis 
Maidenform Worldwide Inc. used the mode of a wholly owned subsidiary in 
Jamaica. Maidenform Worldwide Inc. is the most internationalised of the companies 
studied. It has operations in several Central American and Caribbean countries, 
Ireland and Mexico. Thus, its choice of market entry mode supports the arguments 
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advanced by such scholars as Johanson and Vahlne. It appears that since the firm had 
considerable experience operating in other international markets, it chose the mode of 
a wholly owned subsidiary to enter the Jamaican market. Its executives stated that 
they did not perceive the benefits of using any other mode of market entry. 
Apparel Contractors Associates Inc. was not as internationalised as 
Maidenform Worldwide Inc. However, the president of the company had operated in 
Jamaica twenty years before establishing his company in this country. He claimed that 
he had sufficient knowledge of the country to choose this mode of market entry. Thus, 
in this case, country-familiarity played a decisive role in the selection of market entry 
mode [Davidson 1980]. 
8.5.3 H 12: The Cultural Distance Hypothesis 
Finally, it could be argued that cultural distance played a significant role in 
these firms' choice of a market entry mode. The cultural distance between Jamaica 
and the US is not large. Jamaica is an English-speaking country that is located a mere 
hour and half by air from Miami. Thus, it is possible that cultural similarities could 
have influenced the selection of a wholly owned greenfield investment or a joint 
venture. Nonetheless, none of the managers interviewed identified culture as a factor 
that influenced their choice of market entry mode. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Several of the theories identified in this study appeared to explain the 
motivations, locational choices, and choice of market entry mode of the four apparel 
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MNEs operating in Jamaica. As Table 8.4 demonstrates, seven of the hypotheses 
developed in Chapters 3 to 5 were supported by this analysis. 
Table 8.4 The Results of the Testing of the Hypotheses in the Apparel Industry of 
Jamaica 
Hypotheses Results 
HI. No relationship exists between the MNE's use of Not fully supported 
its unique advantage and the presence of domestic 
competitors. 
H2. There is a positive relationship between follow- Not supported. 
the-leader' investment behaviour of MNEs and the use 
of low-cost factors. 
H3. There is a positive relationship between the firm's Supported. 
use of its unique advantages and the locational 
advantage variables. 
H4. There is a positive relationship between the MNE Supported 
and the decision to establish and continue operations 
because of low-cost factors. 
H5. There is a positive relationship between the Supported. 
export-seeking and resource-seeking MNE and its use 
of preferential trading agreements. 
H6. There is a positive relationship between the Supported 
presence of an export processing zone and the export- 
seeking MNE. 
H7. No relationship exists between the investment Not supported 
incentives offered by the Jamaican governments and 
the MNE's decision to establish and continue 
operations in Jamaica. 
H9. There is a positive relationship between the Supported. 
MNE's use of its home country's 'diamond' and the 
'diamond' ofJamaica. 
H10. There is a positive relationship between intra- Supported. 
firm trade and the use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
HI1. There is a positive relationship between the MNE Supported 
with international experience and its use of a wholly 
owned subsidiary. 
H12. There is a positive relationship between cultural Not supported 
distance and the use of a wholly owned greenfield 
investment and a joint venture agreement. 
Interesting insights were gained into the investment behaviour and corporate 
strategy of MNEs investing in low-skill, labour-intensive activities in a small, less 
developed country. These are discussed in the subsequent section. 
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" The Motivations for FDI in the Apparel Industry of Jamaica 
The monopolistic advantage theory does not fully explain what motivated the 
four apparel MNEs to engage in FDI in Jamaica. What is interesting, however, is that 
these companies use their firm-specific asset of human resource management to 
compete with other apparel MINES for access to low-cost labour in Jamaica. This 
finding gives a curious twist to the monopolistic advantage theory as an explanation 
for the investment behaviour of MNEs that are involved in export-oriented production 
in a less developed country. Also, it appears that the `follow-the-leader' theory does 
not satisfactorily explain the investment behaviour of the four apparel MNEs. 
Admittedly, they all sought to locate the labour-intensive segments of their operations 
offshore. However, their decision to invest in Jamaica was not influenced by the 
actions of their competitors. Further, it seems that Dunning's eclectic paradigm is a 
more likely explanation for the motivations of these MNEs to invest in Jamaica. 
These firms, to varying degrees, all sought to integrate their firm-specific assets with 
the locational endowments of the country. 
" The Choice of Locating Apparel Production in Jamaica 
The locational theories used in this study seem to provide a clear explanation 
of the investment behaviour of the four apparel MNEs in Jamaica. This analysis also 
highlighted several other issues that are not suggested by the theories. First, low- cost 
labour is certainly an inducement for the export-oriented MNE. However, the 
productivity of this labour and the need for efficient, customised training programmes 
are critical. It also seems that preferential trading agreements did motivate the four 
MNEs to engage in FDI in Jamaica. However, it appears that the viability of these 
231 
investments is now threatened by NAFTA. Additionally, the presence of an EPZ does 
lure investment into less developed countries. Yet the creation of EPZs is not 
sufficient. Infrastructural services not only must be of a high quality, but also they 
must be competitively priced. Moreover, institutions that are established to promote 
foreign investment need to operate with efficacy. Further, investment incentives do 
play a decisive role in attracting FD1. However, it seems that in this era of trade and 
financial liberalisation, the incentives that are significant to the foreign investor are 
tax holidays and duty free concessions on machinery and equipment. The analysis 
also suggests that the "Double Diamond" hypothesis (H 9) provides a satisfactory 
framework to explain the investment behaviour of the four apparel MNEs in Jamaica. 
The "Double Diamond" framework emphasises the limited role that this country plays 
in the global corporate strategy of these firms. 
9 The Mode of Investment Used by the Apparel MNEs in Jamaica 
The factors that appear to influence the four apparel MNEs selection of a 
market entry mode were intra-firm trade and level of international experience. All the 
MNEs used a wholly owned subsidiary to enter Jamaica. The firms that were involved 
in intra-firm trade appeared to exercise high levels of control over the operations of 
their subsidiaries. The wholly owned subsidiary was their means of achieving this 
control. The MNEs, with international experience gained in foreign markets or the 
host country, also selected the wholly owned subsidiary. By contrast, the analysis 
suggests that despite the cultural similarities between Jamaica and the US, cultural 
distance did not appear to influence the choice of market entry mode. 
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These are the issues which are pertinent to MNEs making investment in low- 
skill, labour-intensive activities in small, developing countries. It will be instructive to 
ascertain the extent to which these issues are relevant to MNEs investing in higher 
skilled, labour-intensive operations in less developed countries. This is the subject of 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter Nine 
Foreign Direct Investment in Barbados: A Case Study of the Information Service 
Industry 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the second of three case studies on FDI in the Caribbean. It 
examines the foreign investment decisions of four MNEs that operate in the 
information service industry of Barbados. The main objective of this study is to 
analyse the attractiveness of the business environment of Barbados to these four 
MNEs. In so doing, this chapter examines the factors that influence their motivations 
for engaging in FDI, their choice of location, and their selection of market entry 
mode. 
The four MNE used in this case study were AMR Corporation, Digital 
Imaging & Technologies Incorporated, PRT Corporation of America and Santype 
International Limited. Interviews were conducted with executives at both the 
headquarters and subsidiary of the MBEs. A total of ten managers were interviewed 
(See Appendix Figure 5). In addition, interviews were conducted with, policy makers, 
heads of ministries and government departments as well as managers of locally owned 
companies (See Appendix Figure 4). This information was supplemented by company 
annual reports and newspaper articles. 
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9.2. The Emergence of the Information Service Industry in Barbados 
Interestingly, the emergence of the information service industry in Barbados 
arose from recommendations made by the international consulting firm, Booz, Allen 
and Hamilton to the government in 1983. The late 1970s were marked by a dramatic 
decline in the performance of the manufacturing sector in Barbados. The rate of 
growth of this sector fell from 36 per cent in the 1970 to 1975 period, to 14.5 per cent 
in the 1976 to 1979 period. This decline continued into the first half of the 1980s with 
growth rates decreasing to an estimated 14 per cent [World Bank 1995a]. These 
falling output levels were matched by decreases in the inflow of FDI. During the years 
1977 to 1985, inflows of FDI into the manufacturing sector fell by an estimated 20 per 
cent [Codrington 1987: Table 2(a)]. 19 Thus, attempts were made to identify new 
activities to absorb the unemployed as well as to generate new sources of foreign 
exchange earnings. Booz, Allen and Hamilton identified four activities as having the 
greatest potential for Barbados to develop a competitive advantage in ten to fifteen 
years. These were electronics, medical supplies, `up-market' garments, and 
information services [Nurse 1996a: 5]. However, it was the targeted development of 
the information service industry that proved to be the success story. 
Within the past twelve years, the information service industry has emerged to 
be one of the most dynamic growth industries in Barbados. During this period, its size 
has increased six-fold: there are presently thirty-six companies operating in this 
19 The decline in the performance of the manufacturing sector was mainly caused by the collapse of the 
electronics sector. During the years 1982 to 1985, exports of electronics grew from 26 per cent to 61 
per cent of total domestic exports. By 1987, they had declined to 24.4 per cent. See Hilbourne Watson, 
"The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Semiconductors and a Case Study from Barbados, " 
In The Caribbean in the Global Political Economy. ed. Hilbourne Watson (Boulder, USA: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 1994), 127-146. In addition, it is argued that high labour costs and poor trading 
conditions were responsible for the decline of this sector. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Country Profile. Jamaica, Barbados. 1994-1995, The Economist Intelligence Unit. 1994. 
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industry. The numbers employed in this industry have risen by more than 200 per 
cent: it currently employs 2,845 people - approximately two per cent of the labour 
force. In 1995, this industry earned US$ 50 million in foreign exchange and 
contributed an estimated US$ 60 million to the country's Gross Domestic Product. 
The information service industry is expected to grow by ten per cent per annum in the 
next decade. [Nurse 1996a: 8; Nurse 1996b: 2]. Moreover, the activities undertaken by 
firms in this industry have steadily moved higher up the value-added chain. In the 
early years, the information service industry was dominated by firms performing basic 
data entry activities. At present, the range of activities undertaken by firms in this 
industry has increased tremendously. The information services activities that are 
currently undertaken in the country range from the processing of airline tickets and 
financial information to software development. Indeed, this industry has been 
identified as the one that will propel Barbados into developed country status 
[Financial Times, 26 April 1995: 35]. 
9.3 Global Technological Changes and the Birth of a New Industry 
Since the late 1960s, there has been a discernible trend towards the relocation 
and suburbanisation of what was then termed `back office work' [Nelson 1986]. 
20 The 
forces propelling the relocation of office work from the metropolis into the suburbs 
were the dramatic increases in the costs of land and clerical labour. Attempts were 
20 Nelson describes `back office work' as being highly automated and employing a disproportionate 
number of low-wage clerical workers. Examples of such services include computer operations, 
accounting, payroll, billing, credit card services and word processing. See K. Nelson, "Labour demand, 
labour supply and the suburbanisation of low-wage office work, " In Production, Work, Territory. The 
geographical anatomy of industrial capitalism. ed. Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper (Boston: Allen 
and Unwin, 1986), 149-171. 
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thus made to decrease office costs and improve efficiency. Efficiency gains were 
realised from the fragmentation of the secretarial task into basic typing and 
administrative duties. Administrative activities were kept at the head office while data 
entry activities were relocated. Similarly, reductions in office costs were obtained by 
moving the data entry functions out of the metropolitan offices into suburbs and small 
towns [Nelson 1986: 155; Posthuma 1987: 25]. This fragmentation of tasks that was 
applied intra-nationally is now being implemented internationally. Work that was 
previously performed in the suburbs and small towns of industrialised countries is 
increasingly being carried out in low-wage, developing countries. 
The forces propelling these changes were two fold: the technological advances 
in the telecommunications industry, and the automation and computerisation of office 
and clerical work. Tremendous changes occurred in the international 
telecommunications industry in the post 1970s. Computer technologies were now 
applied to telecommunications. This not only resulted in a reduction in the costs of 
telecommunications equipment, but also an increase in the reliability and capacity of 
individual equipment units. One result of these developments was that 
telecommunications systems capable of efficiently transmitting large quantities of 
data emerged [Pearson and Mitter 1993: 54; Saunders et al. 1994: 37-38]. In addition, 
several technological changes occurred in office equipment. In the 1980s, the personal 
computer was developed. Further, electronic links to mainframe computer systems 
were introduced. At the same time, the costs of office equipment decreased 
dramatically. One researcher stated that the real price of microcomputers fell at an 
average annual rate of 28 per cent between 1982 and 1988 [Braga 1996: 36]. 
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The development of the offshore information service industry was accelerated 
by organisational changes occurring in firms in the industrial countries. The need to 
achieve time and cost efficiencies has resulted in companies implementing techniques 
such as just-in-time systems and electronic data interchange. One result of these 
organisational changes was the increasing tendency of companies to outsource non- 
strategic activities like data entry and information processing [Schware and Hume 
1996: 3]. 
Hence, advances in telecommunications, together with the automation and 
computerisation of office work, and the results of organisational change, have 
spawned a new industry - information services. Firms are now able to disaggregate 
those labour-intensive aspects of their information processing activities and perform 
them in low-wage countries. The main factor driving firms to establish offshore 
information processing operations in developing countries is the availability of low- 
cost, relatively skilled labour. Indeed, the savings in labour costs that are obtained 
from establishing offshore information processing operations are tremendous. 
Researchers estimated that the use of offshore operations reduces the cost of data 
entry by more than fifty per cent [Pearson and Mitter 1993: 57]. Thus, firms have 
established offshore information processing operations in low-wage, English-speaking 
developing countries. Companies prefer to establish offshore information processing 
activity in English-speaking countries since they seek to avoid the complications of 
crossing language barriers [Office of Technology Assessment 1985: 217]. 
A diversity of enterprises has taken advantage of these opportunities. 
Moreover, a spectrum of activities ranging from data entry at the lowest level, to 
software development at the highest, is performed offshore. 
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In the following sections, an examination will be made of the foreign 
investment decisions of four MNEs that operate in the information service industry of 
Barbados. As noted in Section 9.1, these four MNEs are AMR Corporation, Digital 
Imaging & Technologies Incorporated, PRT Corporation of America and Santype 
International Limited. A profile of these companies will be made in the following 
section. 
9.4. The Four Information Service Multinationals in Barbados 
AMR Corporation 
AMR Corporation, which is publicly owned, is the largest of the firms studied. 
In 1995, this company had total assets of US$ 19,556 million. Its total number of 
employees for this year was 110,000. AMR Corporation has three main divisions: the 
American Airlines Group, the Sabre Group and the Management Services Group. The 
largest division of the Management Services Group is AMR Services. AMR Services 
has six main operating divisions, one of which is Data Management Services. 
The Data Management Services division provides data capture and document 
management services to American Airlines and to companies in the insurance, 
financial services and transportation industries. In 1996, this US$ 150 million 
company had a staff of 5,000. Its headquarters are located at Fort Worth, Texas. It 
operates three offshore locations in Santo Domingo, Mexico and Barbados. The 
Barbadian facility, Caribbean Data Services, is the largest of the three offshore 
operations. In 1996, it had a staff of 1,200 persons. Caribbean Data Services was 
established in 1983 at a cost of an estimated US$ 3.5 million. The company was 
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initially formed to process airline tickets for the American Airlines Group. However, 
in the late 1980s, it began processing tickets for other airlines. More recently, it has 
widened its range of information service activities to include the processing of health 
insurance claims, payroll and general accounting, as well as management reporting. 
Digital Imaging & Technologies Incorporated 
Digital Imaging & Technologies Incorporated was established in 1980 in 
Anaheim, California. The company, which is privately owned, is involved in data 
entry, text processing for the publishing industry and document conversion. The 
company has production sites in California and Texas. It is also involved in an 
alliance with a Chinese firm. In addition, it has three offshore locations in Mexico, 
Grenada and Barbados. Its Barbadian operations, Offshore Keyboarding, is the largest 
of the three offshore sites. 
Offshore Keyboarding is a wholly owned subsidiary of Digital Imaging & 
Technologies Incorporated. This company was purchased from Cable & Wireless in 
1992. It presently employs 450 persons. Offshore Keyboarding was initially involved 
in type setting. It has recently extended its range of activities to include data entry and 
text processing. Text processing involves the conversion of edited manuscripts to CD- 
ROMs. 
PRT Corporation of America 
The privately owned, PRT Corporation of America, which is located in New 
York, was established in 1989. This US$ 14 million firm is a computer consulting 
company. It offers services in strategic technology consulting, project management 
and staffing. Since 1989, PRT's sales volume has grown at an average annual rate of 
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100 per cent. In 1995, it surpassed US$ 20 million in sales. As a result of this rapid 
sales growth, in 1995 the company was ranked as the 42nd fastest growing private 
company in the United States [PRT Insider 1995: 1]. PRT has four branch offices in 
the US and international offices in London, India and Barbados. Its Barbadian 
operations, Total Technology Solutions Limited (TTSL), was established in 1995. 
This facility, with a staff of 110, offers services in software development and project 
management. 
Santype International Limited and Simpson Incorporated 
Santype International Limited is one of the oldest of the MNEs studied. 
Moreover, it is the only British company examined. It is also the only MNE studied 
that is involved in a joint venture with a local firm. Santype International Limited, 
which was incorporated in 1940, is located in Salisbury, UK. In 1995, its total assets 
were US$ 4 million and it employed 60 persons. This privately owned company is a 
complex type setter. It engages in typesetting for scientific and technical books and 
journals. Its Barbadian operation is its first offshore operation. 
Simpson Incorporated is a holding company that is located in St. Michael, 
Barbados. This privately owned company, which was incorporated in 1972, is 
involved in financial services, real estate and the retail of automobiles. 
Santype International Limited and Simpson Incorporated both own and 
operate the Barbadian company, Technotype International. However, Simpson 
Incorporated is a minority share holder, owning just 20 per cent of the equity of the 
joint venture company. Technotype International, which was established in 1994, is 
the smallest of the offshore operations studied. In 1996, it employed 15 persons. 
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Technotype International performs key board operations for its British parent 
company. 
9.5 The Motivations for FDI in the Information Service Industry of Barbados 
As discussed in Chapter 8, this study contends that the possession of superior 
advantages over domestic competitors does not motivate a firm to engage in FDI in 
Barbados since it argues that the country does not have effective domestic competitors 
[Hood and Young 1979; Vachani 1985; Aswicahyono and Hill 1995]. In addition, it is 
suggested that MNE investment in Barbados is influenced by the earlier investment 
made by its competitors in the country [Knickerbocker 1973]. Further, the MNE's 
investment in Barbados is likely to be motivated by the synergies it can obtain from 
using its firm-specific assets in combination with the locational endowments of the 
country [Dunning 1979,1980,1981 ]. 
9.5.1 H1: The Monopolistic Advantage Hypothesis 
It seems that these four MNEs were not motivated to locate their offshore 
information service activity in Barbados simply because they possessed firm-specific 
assets that are superior to those of the local information service companies. The firm- 
specific assets of the four MNEs were production technology, human resource 
management and marketing skills. However, these assets were not used for 
competition with domestic information service firms. Interestingly enough, the four 
MNEs did not perceive the domestic firms to be their competitors. Their competitors 
were global firms that had offshore facilities outside of Barbados. Indeed, the 
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managers of Digital Imaging & Technology Incorporated (DIT) stated that their 
competitors have established offshore operations in Asia and other Caribbean 
countries, such as St. Lucia, Jamaica and Grenada. Similarly, the manager of Santype 
International Limited revealed that his major competitors all have offshore operations 
in the Philippines, Indonesia and mainland China. Also, the manager of Caribbean 
Data Services (CDS) stated that his major competitors have established operations in 
Mexico. Further, the executives of PRT Corporation (PRT) revealed that none of their 
competitors are located in the Caribbean region. Instead, they have set up offshore 
operations in India, Eastern Europe and Ireland. 
What is interesting, however, is that the domestically owned firms in this 
industry do not pose a competitive threat to these four MNEs. An overwhelming 
number of enterprises in the information service industry of Barbados is locally 
owned. Nurse reveals that domestically owned firms comprise fifty-eight per cent of 
the total number of firms in this industry [Nurse 1996a: 8]. Thus, it is surprising that 
none of these firms was a source of competition to the four MNEs especially since 
many of them are also engaged in export-oriented activity. Clearly, this has 
implications for the competitive strengths of the locally owned information service 
firms. Moreover, it is worth noting that the local partner of the joint venture studied 
was not involved in information services. Rather, its main business was the retailing 
of automobiles, financial services and real estate. 
The investment promotion agency of Barbados, Barbados Investment and 
Development Corporation (BIDC), has recognised the weakness of the domestic 
information service companies. In 1993, it launched the programme, `INFOTECH 
2000'. This programme attempts to involve local companies in the development of the 
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information service industry. In so doing, it seeks to find international markets for the 
services of the local firms. Thus, the BIDC, inter alia, attempts to match the local 
companies with potential foreign joint venture partners; secure subcontracting work 
for them; and provide incentives for these companies to participate in international 
trade shows. While this programme has achieved moderate success, the domestic 
firms in this industry are not yet internationally competitive [Nurse 1996a: 31-32]. 
9.5.2 H 2: The `Follow-the-Leader' Hypothesis 
It appears that Knickerbocker's `follow-the -leader' hypothesis (H 2) does not 
fully explain the decisions of the four MNEs to set up operations in Barbados. As was 
earlier discussed, advances in the telecommunications industry, together with the 
automation and computerisation of office work, have resulted in firms locating the 
labour-intensive segments of their information service operations offshore. The main 
factor that drove these activities out of the home countries into developing countries 
was the availability of low-cost, relatively skilled labour. The four information service 
MNEs studied have all implemented this global strategy. However, they maintained 
that their decision to locate their labour-intensive activities in Barbados was not 
influenced by the actions of their competitors. As was discussed above, the managers 
stated that while their competitors have offshore operations, none of them have made 
investments in Barbados. 
The manager of CDS stated that his company was the pioneer in the offshore 
processing of airline tickets. He said that the parent company, AMR Corporation, in 
an attempt at reducing the cost of office services, established offshore data processing 
operations in Barbados. He noted that their activities in Barbados were quickly 
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imitated by competing airline companies. However, he stated that none of his 
competitors established operations in Barbados. Their operations are located in other 
developing countries, for example, Mexico. 
The manager of Santype also revealed that low-cost labour was the main factor 
influencing his decision to establish operations in Barbados. He noted that the firms in 
the publishing industry presently are experiencing tremendous pressures to reduce 
operating costs. Thus, many companies are setting up offshore locations in low-wage 
developing countries to achieve cost competitiveness. He further stated that some 
companies even engage in subcontracting arrangements in low-wage locales. 
However, he noted that none of his competitors has established operations in 
Barbados. 
Similarly, the managers of PRT said that several of their competitors have 
begun to establish offshore operations. They are all attempting to locate operations in 
low-wage developing countries to gain savings in labour costs. However, the 
managers maintained that they are the only firm in their segment of the industry that 
has operations in the Caribbean. Finally, the executives at DIT revealed that while all 
of their competitors have offshore locations, none of them has established operations 
in Barbados. Indeed, they stated that their decision to set up offshore operations in 
Barbados was not influenced by the actions of their competitors. In 1992, the firm 
bought its offshore operations, Offshore Keyboarding, from the original owners, 
Cable & Wireless. Their motivation for acquiring the company was to expand their 
operational base since they already had a production site in a neighbouring Caribbean 
country. 
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Evidently, the `follow-the-leader' investment behaviour does not adequately 
explain what motivated these MNEs to establish operations in Barbados. These four 
MNEs followed their competitors offshore. However, they did not follow them into 
Barbados. 
9.5.3 H3: The Eclectic Paradigm Hypothesis 
It appears that these four MNEs sought to combine their firm-specific assets 
with the locational advantages of Barbados. In 1983, AMR Corporation established 
CDS in Barbados to process the airline tickets obtained from the operations of its 
subsidiary company, American Airlines. AMR Corporation, in its decision to establish 
operations in Barbados, initially sought to combine its core competencies in 
production technology and human resource management with the locational 
advantages of the country. The locational endowments of Barbados were its low-cost, 
skilled labour force, its proximity to the US, and its time zone equivalence with the 
eastern seaboard of the US. The processing of airline tickets is a high volume 
operation that requires quick turn-around times. The production techniques required to 
undertaken this information service activity resided in AMR Corporation. The 
company simply transferred these techniques to its Barbadian subsidiary. In addition, 
the company possessed the necessary telecommunications technology needed to 
successfully establish and operate an offshore data processing facility. Indeed, AMR's 
initial investment in its offshore operations was substantial. It invested an estimated 
US$ 2 million in a satellite channel to transmit data [Posthuma 1987: 34-35]. 
Further, because of the multinationality of its operations, AMR Corporation 
possessed staff who were experienced in operating in foreign locations. During the 
earlier years of its operations, CDS was managed by a staff of expatriates. However, 
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recognising the importance of productivity levels to the success of its Barbadian 
operations, AMR Corporation sought to ensure that the managerial staff at CDS was 
local. The manager at CDS was drawn from the American Airlines Group. The local 
management successfully managed to motivate the workers to achieve high levels of 
productivity. In fact, within nineteen months of its operations, AMR Corporation was 
able to recoup its initial investment and generate profits from its Barbadian operations 
[ibid., 351. 
The close proximity of Barbados to the US, together with its time zone 
equivalence to the eastern seaboard of the US, facilitated fast turn-around rates. Speed 
is critical to the processing of the airline tickets. CDS was able to speedily verify a 
passenger's airline ticket to credit-card companies and other airlines. This meant that 
American Airlines was able to collect cash in a relatively short period. It was revealed 
that within three to four days of receiving the used airline ticket stub, CDS was able to 
relay data to American Airline's financial data base in Tulsa, Oklahoma [ibid., 34]. 
Thus, the Barbadian operations contributed tremendously to the lowering of operating 
costs for the American Airlines Group. As one executive of this company noted: 
The models typically show that locating in Barbados lowers our operating costs from 
30,40 to 50 per cent. 
The success of CDS resulted in the AMR Corporation relocating more of its 
office work to its offshore facility in Barbados. CDS currently processes financial 
information for its parent company. It is involved in processing data for revenue 
accounting, on-line vendor invoices, and reservations editing for the Sabre Group. 
In the late 1980s, AMR Corporation sought to introduce additional 
information service activities to its subsidiary in Barbados. In so doing, the company 
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used another of its core competencies together with the locational endowments of 
Barbados. AMR Corporation now deployed its marketing skills in combination with 
the locational advantages of Barbados. It began to market the services of its Barbadian 
facilities to other airlines. CDS was now engaged in the processing of airline tickets 
for five other airlines. In addition, it processed insurance claims for five US health 
insurance companies. These new activities not only have increased the profitability of 
CDS, but also have resulted in the upgrading of the skills of its workers. The skills 
required for processing insurance claims are greater than those needed for processing 
airline tickets. The processing of airline tickets involves manipulation of data: the 
operator has to learn the specific code letters of various airports before typing in the 
relevant data. However, processing health claims is more skill-intensive. The workers 
are trained in medical terminology as well as different aspects of the US health policy. 
Moreover, this activity requires the operator to exercise judgement in deciding 
whether the information is complete, and if action needs to be taken based on the 
available information. 
It is noteworthy that the introduction of new activities to CDS resulted in the 
improvement of the skills of its workforce. Barbados is presently viewed as the most 
proficient of AMR Corporation's offshore locations. An executive of AMR 
Corporation revealed: 
What we have found is that the Barbadian operation is a standard setter in setting up 
good processes. ..... 
The company there normally gives advice to the other 
subsidiaries on process establishment. When the other subsidiaries encounter 
difficulties in setting up a process, they normally telephone Barbados. The personnel 
there will normally work them through the process or they will fly to the location to 
provide assistance. 
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The corporate strategy that AMR Corporation has adopted is that of moving 
the lower value-added operations out of Barbados and relocating them to Mexico and 
Santo Domingo. Thus, the lower value-added activities that have the greatest volume 
are carried out in Mexico and Santo Domingo. The Barbados facility undertakes those 
activities that have a higher value-added and are more skill-intensive. 
Interestingly enough, the Barbadian facility also serves as a site where the 
company undertakes activities that its clients deem to be confidential. Apparently, 
potential customers feel `comfortable' with the environment of Barbados. Their 
concerns about the security of their sensitive data are allayed by what the manager of 
CDS described as the "overall confidentiality" of the location. Thus, he noted that 
since clients are comfortable with the environment of Barbados, they trust CDS to do 
their most confidential work. 
Similarly, Santype International sought to combine its firm-specific advantage 
of production technology with the locational advantages of Barbados. Santype 
International is a complex typesetter. It is involved in the typesetting of scientific and 
technical books and journal. The company, which has been in business for the past 
fifty years, was able to relocate its core competency in typesetting to its operations in 
Barbados. The main locational attraction of Barbados was the availability of low-cost, 
skilled labour. As noted earlier, firms in the publishing industry are under increasing 
pressure to reduce costs. Santype International was able to achieve substantial cost 
reductions from its operations in Barbados. The manager of Santype International 
noted that his company has been able to compete in an increasingly competitive 
industry because of its Barbadian operations. The Barbadian operations, Offshore 
Keyboarding, initially did the relatively simple work of origination. The workers 
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typed manuscripts in a style that is chosen by the client. These manuscripts are typed 
into computers. The completed work is transmitted through the telephone lines to 
Santype International's office at Salisbury, UK. The entire transmission process takes 
a mere ten minutes. The operation in the UK undertakes the finishing work and 
transfers the results either to the client's printer or to a disk to be sent to the publisher. 
In addition, Santype International was able to capitalise on the difference in 
the time zones between these two countries. Its manager revealed that time difference 
between the two countries was beneficial to his operations since he was able to 
synchronise the activities undertaken in his two production facilities. He stated that 
when his facility in Barbados is operating, England is asleep. However, the finished 
work from Barbados is transmitted to the Salisbury operations in time for the start of 
the workday. The manager noted that he has managed to obtain tremendous gains in 
efficiency from these synchronised operations. 
It is noteworthy that the work carried out at Santype's offshore facility in 
Barbados is becoming increasingly complex. The manager of Santype revealed that 
the workers at Barbados are becoming more proficient. Thus, the parent company has 
sent them increasingly complex work. Indeed, the manager of Santype International 
stated that within one year, his two operations would be operating in unison. The 
work done in Barbados will be comparable to that undertaken in Salisbury. 
Digital Imaging & Technologies Incorporated (DIT) also sought to integrate 
its firm-specific assets of production technology with the locational advantages of 
Barbados. The locational attractions of the country were its low-cost, skilled labour 
and its strategic geographical location. DIT is involved 
in data entry, text processing 
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and data conversion. However, it only carried out data entry and text processing at its 
Barbadian facility, Offshore Keyboarding. 
DIT undertakes data entry work for clients such as Federal Express, Xerox and 
Blue Cross of America. The managers of DIT described the company as a pioneer of 
imaging technology. This technology allows the company to accommodate data from 
images created by its scanners located in its offices at California and Texas. Using this 
system, DIT scans the data using optical character recognition techniques, and 
transmits via satellite, these images to its operations in Barbados. The operators in 
Barbados, key in specified data from the images displayed and then transmit the 
completed data to the client's office in the USA. This entire operation takes less than a 
day. Thus, DIT is able to combine its technological mastery with the relatively cheap 
labour of Barbados to achieve competitiveness in an industry where price is the main 
determinant of competition. Offshore Keyboarding is also involved in text processing. 
This involves the imaging of books to CD ROMs for libraries. As mentioned earlier, 
the publishing industry is under tremendous pressure to reduce costs. Thus, DIT is 
able to compete on the basis of price by locating its text processing operations in low- 
wage Barbados. 
It appears that Barbados is the site for the more skill-intensive activities 
undertaken by DIT. Indeed, one of its executives noted: 
Barbados has a good match of skills and complexity. Hence, we do our publishing 
work there. We are unable to do this type of work in Grenada, for instance, it is too 
complex. In Mexico, we suffer from a language problem. Barbados is the best place 
for this type of work. 
It seems that the labour force at Barbados is more proficient than that of the 
company's three operations in Mexico, China and the Caribbean country of Grenada. 
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Hence, the company has located the more skill-intensive activity of text processing in 
Barbados. Data entry activities are carried out primarily in Grenada, Mexico and 
China. However, Barbados with its low-cost, skilled labour is the site for text 
processing. 
In addition, the managers of DIT stated that one of the locational attractions of 
Barbados is its strategic geographical location. DIT has clients in both Britain and the 
USA. Barbados' strategic location means that it is possible to serve both groups of 
clients from this country. The managers noted that the US is their main market for 
data entry: an activity that is characterised by quick turn-around times. Thus, the fact 
that Barbados is on the same time zone as the eastern seaboard of the US is 
advantageous to the company. Conversely, Britain is its main market for text 
processing. Text processing is not characterised by such fast turn-around times as data 
entry. Thus, DIT is able to effectively serve its British clients from its operations in 
Barbados since the country is only five hours behind Britain. 
The managers at the PRT Corporation of America (PRT) also sought to 
integrate their core competencies with the locational endowments of Barbados. PRT is 
a computer consulting firm. Its specialises in strategic technology consulting, project 
management and staffing services. Its offshore operations in Barbados, Total 
Technology Solutions Limited (TTSL), is involved in software development and 
project management. It is only within recent times that PRT has acquired 
competencies in software development. The company has sought to develop this skill 
in its offshore site in Barbados. To this end, PRT recruited the former chief executive 
officer of Citicorp Overseas Software Limited in India to head its Barbadian 
operations. Thus, the core competencies that PRT sought to deploy in Barbados were 
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its newly acquired skills in software development and marketing. The locational 
attractions of Barbados were its proximity to the US, its ambience, and the ease of 
recruiting low-cost, highly skilled labour. 
It is interesting to note that PRT relocated its offshore operations from India to 
Barbados. The manager of PRT noted that the company had experienced difficulties 
operating in India. These difficulties appear to have been related to concerns with the 
infrastructure and bureaucracy of the country as well as its geographical distance from 
the US. Thus, not surprisingly, the manager of PRT stated that one of the locational 
attractions of Barbados was its time zone equivalence with the eastern seaboard of the 
US. He revealed that it is easy to serve clients from Barbados since the country is 
easily reached from New York, where his headquarters are located, and London, 
which is the site of his marketing office. Further, the manager stated that the 
environment in Barbados is much more appealing than that of India. He said that his 
clients prefer to conduct business in Barbados. It appears that PRT has successfully 
managed to marry the country's attractions as a tourist resort with the marketing of its 
software services. 
Moreover, PRT is able to secure low-cost, skilled labour to staff its Barbadian 
operations. It is noteworthy that Barbados does not possess many workers with the 
requisite software skills demanded by PRT. Its local university only graduates 
approximately thirty to forty computer science undergraduates annually. The manager 
of TTSL admitted that when the company decided to establish operations in Barbados, 
it recognised that it would not have been able to recruit the quantum of professionals 
it needed. However, he stated that the Barbadian government was willing to adopt a 
flexible policy towards its recruitment needs. To this end, the government has assisted 
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the company by reducing the bureaucracy involved in securing work permits. Thus, 
TTSL is presently staffed with professionals drawn from various Caribbean countries, 
Nigeria, Canada and India. It is noteworthy that the Indian operations of PRT 
presently serves as a site for the recruitment of software engineers for its Barbadian 
facility. 
The workers at the Barbadian operations earn less than their counterparts in 
the US. They use software designs that have been developed in the US and London. 
These software designs are programmed and tested at the Barbadian facility. The 
completed design is transmitted via satellite from Barbados to clients' offices in the 
US. Hence, TTSL is able to produce high quality, low-cost service. This give the 
parent company significant cost advantages over its US competitors. As one executive 
of TTSL revealed: 
Our Barbadian investment is a strategic investment. Our company there has the 
ability to produce a high quality, low-cost solution. This gives us a tremendous 
advantage over our US based competitors. 
9.6 The Choice of Locating Information Service Activity in Barbados 
This study contends that the decision to establish and continue operations in 
Barbados is influenced by the cost of labour [Vernon 1966; Moxon 1975; Sharpston 
1975; Wallace 1990; Kumar 1994]. It is also suggested that preferential trading 
agreements play an important role in motivating MNE's investment in Barbados 
[Johnson 1968; Joekes 1982; Yanopoulos 1986; Griffith 1990]. Moreover, it is 
postulated that the presence of export processing zones greatly influences the decision 
to locate information service activities in the country [Sharpston 1975; Frobel et al. 
1980; UNCTAD 1985; Woodward and Rolfe 1993; Kumar 1994]. This study also 
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posits that the investment incentive package offered by the Barbadian government has 
no influence on the location decisions of the four MNEs [Shah and Toyne 1978; 
Agodo 1978; Lim 1983; Wheeler and Mody 1991; Guisinger and Loree_ 1995]. 
Finally, it is suggested that the information service MNEs integrate elements of their 
home country's diamond with the diamond of Barbados [Rugman and D'Cruz 1993; 
Rugman and Verbeke 1993]. 
9.6.1 H 4: The Low-Cost Factor Hypothesis 
The post 1980s has seen a wave of foreign investment into the information 
service industry of the Caribbean. The main factor driving this investment into the 
region is the availability of a low-cost, relatively skilled, English-speaking labour 
force. Indeed, all the managers emphasised that labour cost considerations played a 
decisive role in their decision to establish operations in Barbados. The manager of 
Santype International disclosed that the cost of key board operators in Barbados is 
nearly one-third that of England. Similarly, the manager of DIT stated that labour cost 
considerations were a major factor influencing his decision to establish operations in 
Barbados. Alternatively, it was revealed that the basic salary of the office worker at 
AMR Corporation was approximately four times that of her counterpart at CDS 
[Posthurra 1987: 31 ]. The PRT is a unique case. Labour cost considerations did play a 
critical role in its decision to establish operations in Barbados. However, much of its 
workforce were not Barbadians. Rather, the company has adopted a global recruitment 
policy. It is recruiting workers from different parts of the world. The manager of 
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TTSL revealed that these workers earn a salary that is between 10 to 30 per cent less 
than that of their counterparts in the USA. 
This low-cost work force is not unionised. In none of the four MNEs studied 
was the workforce unionised. The comments made by several of the managers on the 
issue of unionisation were illuminating. 
I do not envisage a stage where unionisation would be feasible for us. 
Our work force is not unionised. Our company is attractive to trade unions. However, we treat 
our workers right so there is no need for them to look for membership in any trade unions. 
Our work force is not unionised because we just happen to be one of the best employers in 
Barbados. 
It has been suggested that the workers in the information service industry are 
encouraged to think of themselves as white collar employees to pre-empt the 
militancy that characterises industrial workers. Moreover, the management style 
adopted in this industry is consensual rather conflictual [Pearson and Mitter 1993: 61 ]. 
In addition, some suggest that employment in the information processing industry is 
considered prestigious in the Caribbean. Thus, turnover rates are generally low [Office 
of Technology Assessment 1985: 226; Posthuma 1987: 48]. 
It is noteworthy that the cost of labour in Barbados is relatively higher than 
that of other developing countries. As Table 9.1 demonstrates, the wage rates in the 
information service industry of Barbados are the highest in the Caribbean region. 
Indeed, except for Ireland, the cost of labour in the information service industry of 
Barbados is the highest among developing countries. 
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Table 9.1 Selected Wage Rates in the Information Processing Industry, 1995 
(Hourly Wages, As a percentage of US Wage Rates) 
Country Data Entry Secretary Voice Operator 
Operator 
Caribbean 
Trinidad-Tobago 21.0 
St. Kitts & Nevis 20; 0 
Grenada 18.0-23.0 
Jamaica 16.0-33.0 
St. Lucia 16.0-19.0 
Dominica 16.0-18.0 
St. Vincent & Grenadines 16.0-18.0 
Dominican Republic 14.0-14.0 
Other Developing Countries 
Ireland 71.0-127 
Mexico 18.0-220 
India 11.0-17.0 
Philippines 10.0-0.90 
Developed Countries 
United States 100-100 
26.0 
28.0 
21.0 
25.0-25.0 
21.0 
25.0 
71.0-90.0 
100-100 
23.0 
38.0 
14.0 
21.0 
14.0 
20.0 
100-100 
Source: Adapted from Robert Schware and Susan Hume, Prospects for Information Service Exports from the 
English-speaking Caribbean, The World Bank, March 1996, Table 2.1. 
Since 1977, Barbados has adopted a fixed exchange rate policy of US$ 1 to 
B$2. Unlike several of its Caribbean neighbours (Trinidad-Tobago and Jamaica), it 
has not used devaluation as a strategy for improving its economic conditions. This has 
resulted in its relatively high cost of labour. Interestingly, the relatively high cost of 
labour in Barbados has had a positive impact on developments in the information 
service industry. Some of the information service firms that were operating at the 
lower end of the industry were forced to leave the country. Their operations could not 
compete with those of lower cost locations such as Mexico, Dominican Republic or 
Jamaica. Thus, the activities that have remained in Barbados are less price sensitive, 
more up market and demand greater levels of skills [Nurse 1996a: 10]. 
As Diagram 9.1 shows, information processing skills increase in value as skills 
or technology are added to labour. The most basic operation is data entry. Minimum 
skills are required to perform this activity: the operator possesses a rudimentary 
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knowledge of English and a minimum level of computer literacy. The simple key 
strokes for data entry normally are similar to those for typing. The industry standard 
for this operation is 10,000 key strokes per hour. A higher level process is rules-based 
operations. This activity requires that the operator learn a system for keying data. An 
example of this type of operations is the processing of airline tickets. Activities on 
levels higher than that of rules-based operations, require the use of technology to 
either simplify a task or improve quality by reducing key errors. Further, operations at 
a higher level may demand the use of judgement. Here, the operator may be required 
to decide whether the information is complete and if action needs to be taken based on 
its contents. An example of this type of activity is the processing of health insurance 
claims. At the highest level of the process is knowledge based activities. These 
activities require that the operator possess the requisite knowledge for tasks such as 
data base development or software conversion [Schware and Hume 1996: 5]. 
Diagram 9.1 The Creation of Value in the Information Service Industry 
Key Strokes + Rules 
Data Entry 
j- Manipulation 
+ Technology + 
Data 
Conversion 
Judgment 
Information 
Processing 
+ Knowledge 
Information 
Managemen 
Software and systems engineering increasingly 
important as a platform for success 
Source: Robert Schware and Susan Hume, Prospects for Information Service Exports from the English-speaking 
Caribbean, The World Bank, March 1996, Figure 2.2 
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The information service industry of Barbados is characterised by a mixture of 
the activities described above. However, there has been a discernible movement away 
from basic data entry activities to the higher level ones such as software development. 
This movement towards the higher value, skill-intensive operations is clearly seen 
among the MNEs studied. Caribbean Data Services was established in 1983 to process 
airline tickets for its parent company, AMR Corporation. By the late 1980s, the 
company was involved in higher value-added activities. It currently processes 
financial information for its parent company and adjudicates health claims. Data entry 
activities now account for only twenty per cent of its work [Financial Times, 26 April 
1995: 37]. Similarly, Offshore Keyboarding was initially involved in data entry and 
typesetting. At present, it is also converts manuscripts to CD ROMs. Further, 
Technotype, the subsidiary of Santype International, originally performed the 
keyboard operations for its parent company. As the manager of Santype International 
revealed, his offshore facility is presently performing increasingly complex tasks. 
Finally, PRT, the most recent entry into the industry, is involved in software 
development. It is undertaking the highest level of the information service processes. 
Evidently, the work force employed in the information service industry of 
Barbados is flexible. This has implications for the levels of education and training of 
the country's labour force. Indeed, Barbados' literacy rate of 98 per cent, is one of the 
highest in the developing world. Moreover, during the years 1989 to 1994, its gross 
enrolment ratio was 85 per cent. 21 The comparable figure for upper middle income 
21 The Gross Enrolment Ratio is the percentage of the country's school age population attending 
secondary school. 
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countries was 59 per cent [World Bank 1996a: 29]. Thus, these MNEs had access to a 
relatively well educated labour force. What is noteworthy, however, is that the skills 
of this work force were continuously upgraded. Porter states that a competitive 
advantage derived from low-cost labour is easily nullified. He emphasises that the 
skills of this low-cost labour force need to be continuously enhanced if this 
competitive advantage is to be sustained [Porter 1990: 79]. This seems to be the case 
of the MNEs studied. Several implemented training schemes for their workers. The 
manager of CDS stated that his company provides each worker with seven days of 
training annually. The courses offered by CDS aim at the academic and social 
development of the worker. Some of these training programmes are conducted in- 
house. Alternatively, workers are sent abroad for training. The company presently has 
seven internationally accredited engineers who were trained in Dallas and Miami. 
Similarly, the managers of Offshore Keyboarding stated that they also offer training 
courses to their workers. They revealed that the majority of their workers emerge from 
a training school which is located on their premises. This school, which caters to the 
needs of the entire industry, teaches basic data entry skills. In addition, the company 
sends workers abroad for training when it introduces a new technology. It is 
noteworthy that the BIDC supports the training programmes offered by these 
companies. It provides grants for the training and retraining of workers. 22 In addition, 
some of these MNEs have intervened in the education system to improve its quality. 
The manager of the CDS stated that his company was an initial sponsor of the 
22 The Barbados Investment and Development Corporation provides funds of a maximum of US$ 
35.00 weekly for a maximum of eight weeks for the training of workers. These funds are available 
during the first two years of a company's operation. It also grants a maximum of US$ 50.00 weekly for 
a maximum of twelve weeks for retraining. See Barbados Investment & Development Corporation, 
Barbados. A World Class International Business Centre, (Barbados: COT Printery, n. d. ) 
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associate degree programme offered at the local community college. It also sponsors 
the executive management programme at the local management development centre 
as well as the electronic programme offered at the local polytechnic. 
Despite the high levels of literacy in the country, there appears to be a critical 
shortage of highly skilled personnel in the information service industry. Indeed, while 
Barbados has the profile of an upper-middle to high income country for secondary 
education, its enrolment ratio for tertiary schooling is much lower than the average for 
this group [World Bank 1993: 116-117]. During the years, 1985 to 1986, the tertiary 
enrolment ratio for Barbados was 18 per cent. The comparable figure for middle 
income Latin America countries such as Brazil and Argentina was 50 per cent and 47 
per cent, respectively [ibid., 116, Table 6.6]. Thus, not surprisingly, the manager of 
Offshore Keyboarding complained of the dearth of programmers in the country. He 
noted that it is much easier for the offshore facility to do the necessary work at its 
parent company than to attempt to use the highly priced services of the local 
programmers. Further, the manager of PRT stated that there is a critical shortage of 
trained software professionals in the region. While the regional university offers 
degree programmes in engineering and computer sciences, it seems that its graduates 
may not have the requisite skills demanded by industry. It is posited that the 
undergraduate degree programme in computer sciences offered at the local university 
tends to focus on the technical rather than the business aspects of the discipline. It 
seems that the associated degree programme offered at the local community college 
provides its graduates with skills that are more relevant to the needs of the industry 
[Financial Times, 26 April 1995: 37; The Broad Street Journal, 19 August 1996: 
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5A]. 23 It is noteworthy that the managers of PRT are proposing to offer a course in 
computer science at the local university. They perceive this to be a long-term 
investment in their company's future. 
9.6.2 H 5: The Preferential Trading Agreement Hypothesis 
It appears that the preferential trading agreements that Barbados enjoys with 
the US, Europe and Canada played no role in motivating the MNEs to locate their 
offshore operations in the country. The managers interviewed all emphasised that their 
decision to establish and continue operations in Barbados was not dependent on their 
gaining preferential access to the markets of industrialised countries. Indeed, none of 
the information service activities undertaken in Barbados benefit from preferential 
trading agreements. The CBI, Lome and CARIBCAN do not grant preferential market 
access to information service activities. In addition, it seems that the Barbadian 
government consciously has adopted a policy of encouraging economic activity that is 
independent of precarious preferential trading agreements [USA Today, 6 August 
1996: 6]. However, it must be pointed out that no duties are charged on the data that 
are reimported from the Barbadian subsidiaries to the home countries of the parent 
companies. It seems that duties are not charged on the reimported data because of the 
23 In July 1996, the local University employed an international consultant to identify the deficiencies of 
its computer science programme. He noted that the computer science department needed to deepen its 
links with industry; strengthen the first year of its undergraduate programme; update the software used 
for teaching purposes; and send more students abroad to pursue doctoral degrees. Professor Haggar, 
Consultant, interview by author, tape recording, Barbados, 4 September 1996. It is noteworthy that the 
Community College already implements several of these proposals. The programme offered at this 
institute benefits from interventions made by members of the business sector. Moreover, its students 
are taught both the technical and management aspects of the discipline. In addition, the College has 
sought to continuously upgraded its computer software. Dr. Best, Head of Computer Department, 
Barbados Community College, interview by author, tape recording, Barbados, 27 August 1996. 
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difficulties of measuring and monitoring these offshore information service activities 
[Office of Technology Assessment 1985: 221; Pearson 1991: 19]. 24 
9.6.3 H 6: The Export Processing Zone Hypothesis 
The four MNEs were all located on an industrial park at Harbour View near to 
the capital city, Bridgetown. Barbados does not have export processing zones. It 
seems that its policy makers sought to avoid the negative images associated with these 
zones. Thus, they prefer to call their enclaves of export-oriented activity, `industrial 
parks'. The site where these four MNEs are located is termed an `information service 
park'. Interestingly, it appears that the four MNEs were all satisfied with the facilities 
offered at this information service park. They all stated that the presence of this park 
played a decisive role in their decision to establish operations in Barbados. However, 
it seems that the four foreign investors, in deciding to establish operations in 
Barbados, were also concerned about the quality of the general industrial 
infrastructure in the country. Indeed, it was these elements of the infrastructure that 
played a greater role in their decision to set up operations in Barbados. 
The four MNEs all emphasised that they generally were satisfied with the 
quality of the industrial infrastructure. All stated that they found the public 
transportation system to be efficient. They said that their workers did not experience 
any difficulties in securing public transport. In addition, several concurred that the 
24 It is noteworthy that information services were included in the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) at the end of the last Uruguay Round. Barbados is a signatory to the GATS so its 
information service exports have `most favoured nation' status. This means that members of the World 
Trade Organisation are bound to grant its information service exports no less favourable treatment than 
that accorded to the information service exports of other countries. World Trade Organisation, "A 
Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, " available from 
http: /www. wto. org/wto/ursum_wpf. html#mAgreement; Internet; accessed 10 June 1997. 
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quality of the electricity service was world class. However, one manager revealed that 
he had to install a generator to smooth out fluctuations in the electricity supply. Yet, 
he emphasised that the quality of the electricity supply in Barbados was superior to 
that of another Caribbean country where he also operated. Further, they all were 
satisfied with the airline services. Barbados has daily flights to New York and Miami 
as well as twice-weekly flights to London and Frankfurt. Hence, the managers stated 
that Barbados is globally well connected and it is easy for executives from their parent 
company as well as clients to visit their offshore operations. Moreover, since the 
country is a tourist destination, it possesses several internationally renowned hotels. It 
is noteworthy, however, that one manager stated that these hotels are not adequately 
prepared to deal with the business traveller who needs electronic connections to his 
office and internet. Additionally, most appeared to be contented with the quality of the 
buildings in which their operations are housed. 25 They noted that the rental rates at the 
industrial park were competitively priced. 
It is important to note that the managers of the four MNEs emphasised that the 
services offered by the Barbados Investment and Development Corporation (BIDC) 
were excellent. One manager, whose firm has been operating in the country for the 
past five years, noted that the services provided by the BIDC throughout this period 
were invaluable. Another, who was introduced to the corporation by his local partner, 
stated that he was very happy with its services. One manager also stated that his 
company is very satisfied with the services of this organisation. In fact, he said that 
executives in the parent company participate in the international promotions activities 
25 It is noteworthy that these buildings are called `intelligent buildings'. They are distinct from factory 
shells since they have acoustic ceilings and raised floors. Ms. Peggy Griffith, Director of International 
Business, Barbados Investment and Development Corporation, interview by author, tape recording, 
Barbados, 5 September 1996. 
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hosted by BIDC in the US. Interestingly, another manager stated that one of the 
factors that influenced his company's decision to establish operations in Barbados was 
the excellent marketing strategy employed by the BIDC. He said that the company 
was made to feel very welcome when they first visited the country. 
Indeed, one official at the BIDC stated that the organisation takes great pains 
to ensure that the potential investor is encouraged to establish operations in the 
country. She describes these efforts as a "very comprehensive, hand holding 
exercise". The corporation's marketing strategy is extensive. It arranges an itinerary 
for the potential investor that is sent to him for his approval. On arrival to the country, 
the investor is met at the airport. The BIDC also makes the necessary arrangements 
for his accommodation and attends all official meetings with him. In addition, the 
organisation assists the investor with the mandatory documentation needed to set up 
operations in the country. Moreover, it assists the investor in securing staff. Also, 
since 1992, the corporation has hosted a biannual international telecommunications 
service conference. Participants include Fortune 500 companies as well as 
professionals with specialities in areas such as banking, information technology and 
communications. In addition, the BIDC provides a comprehensive post investment 
service. The BIDC is in contact with the investor on a quarterly basis during the first 
year of his operations. Over time, these contacts become more infrequent. However, 
the corporation ensures that a good rapport is maintained between itself and the 
investor. While its officials do not pay quarterly visits to the company's premises, 
they maintain telephone contact with its managers. 
The managers of the four MNEs unanimously agreed that while the quality of 
the telecommunications service was acceptable, its costs were too high. The following 
265 
comments illustrate their views on the costs of the telecommunications service in the 
country. 
The telecommunications rates are too high. The international dialling rates are 
extremely high. I have been hearing of deregulation of the market. I believe that the 
present situation is resulting in unnecessary high costs. 
The telecommunication rates were too high during the first few years of our 
operations. In the last eighteen months, it has improved somewhat.... The voice lines 
are still very expensive. I believe that this is a result of the monopoly position 
enjoyed by Cable & Wireless. 
The telecommunication infrastructure is excellent but the costs are too high. There is 
not too much they [the government] can do because Cable & Wireless has the 
monopoly for twenty years. This has come out of colonial times. The company pretty 
much has the entire Caribbean tied up. 
Indeed, as Table 9.2 shows, the telecommunications rates for selected services 
in Barbados are higher than those in Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. 
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Table 9.2 The Cost of Telecommunications Services in Several Caribbean 
Countries, 1995 (US$) 
Type of Service i Jamaica Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Rest of Jamaica 
Jamaica Di Por i tat 
:.; ":. ;..:::.,..:; Montego 
Bay Free 
.:.; ".:;.:..::..: " .....:.:.:..:::.:.:. Zone 
International direct 3.23-3.82 0.57-1.68 3.10 
ID dial D toll rates 
based on 3 min. call 
International 800 :...............:..:..:...::::::.. 
service. 
Rate by minute b 1.14 0.19-0.56 0.05 
Monthly charges . a. 
n na: 0.00 4 
Analogue private 
lease lines (voice 
ade 
Installation charges Ö±Ö 0 16800 3,830.00 na. 
Monthly rates n. a. n. a. 316.00 
Leased circuits 
T- l half 
channel/month 21 980.00 18,000.00 30,400.00 
RT-1 full 
channel/month 49 500.00 a. n n a. 
Installation charge iiiili ii* 5,000.00 n. a. a. n. 
th 56 0 2800.0 812.04 3800.00 
Installation charge >- 1 500.00 ma. 0 30.00 
From New York, USA To The Caribbean (c) 
IDD toll rates based X: X 1.99-4.43 1,99-4.43 2.23-4.43 
on 3 min. call 
From London, UK To The Caribbean (d) 
IDD toll rates based 1.44 1.44 1.44 
on 3 min. call 
Source: Adapted from Robert Schware and Susan Hume, Prospects for Information Service Exports from the 
English-speaking Caribbean, The World Bank, March 1996, Appendix 2. 
Notes (a): Special rates for firms in the information service industry. 
(b): One hour minimum for international 800 services. 
(c): Based on AT&T's Customnet Plan for large volume business users 
(d): Based on British Telecom international rates 
There are two telecommunications companies in Barbados: the Barbados 
Telephone Company (BARTEL) provides domestic services and the Barbados 
External Communications Limited (BET) provides international services. BARTEL is 
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80 per cent owned by Cable and Wireless, which also owns 85 per cent of BET. Thus, 
in effect, Cable and Wireless (C&W) has a monopoly over the provision of 
telecommunications services in Barbados. The monopoly position that C&W enjoys 
has been assured by the Barbadian government through various licensing agreements. 
These agreements provide C&W with near total control of the telecommunications 
system with little control left to the government [Schware and Hume 1996: 27]. 
Nonetheless, the Barbadian government, understanding the vital role that 
telecommunications pricing plays in the development of the information service 
industry, has sought to ensure that the rates are decreased. Thus, in 1994, there was a 
fifty per cent reduction in the rates of leased circuits. They are now comparable to 
those offered in Jamaica's Montego Bay Free Zone and to the Canadian rates in North 
America [ibid., 13]. In addition, the telecommunications companies offer special 
services to the information service companies. Companies in this industry, that have 
more than ten employees, receive a fifty per cent discount in the rates of dedicated 
leased circuits. 
The government is still not fully satisfied with the quality of the service 
provided by C&W. In many parts of the country, the existing telecommunications 
infrastructure consists of the Plain Old Telephone System (POTS). 26 This 
infrastructure is rapidly being replaced by fibre optic cables and digital systems. 
C&W has also invested in a second international telephone switching centre and a 
26 This is the traditional telecommunications system that is based on a standard set of telephones 
connected by two pairs of copper wire, routed through an electromechanical switching system. It is 
also characterised by analogue electrical signals that are transmitted between exchanges by means of 
underground and undersea cables. This system is being replaced by digital exchanges with optical 
fibres being used for transmission. The result is a telecommunications system that operates at greater 
speeds, with greater technical efficiency and greater levels of capacity. See United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation, New Technologies and Global Industrialisation, (Vienna: UNIDO, 1989), 
34-37. 
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second earth station. It is argued that these new investments provide the state-of-the 
art telecommunications technologies that are capable of supporting services such as 
Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDN)27, high speed switched data and dial-up 
video conferencing [Barbados External Communications Limited, Annual Report 
1995: 4]. Despite the recent investments made by C&W, the Barbadian government is 
demanding that further changes be made to the telecommunications infrastructure. 
They stated that the telecommunications service in the country must be competitive 
on a "first world level". Thus, they are pressing for the introduction of the latest 
telecommunications technology, Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM). 28 Moreover, 
they are contemplating the introduction of "competitive forces" into the market where 
the existing licensing agreements allow new technologies to be entertained. 29 
9.6.4 H 7: The Investment Incentives Hypothesis 
There were mixed reactions on the issue of the attractiveness of the investment 
incentive package offered by the Barbadian government. The Barbadian government 
offers international business status to companies with less than 10 per cent 
CARICOM ownership that export all their goods and services outside of the 
Caribbean. Three of the MNEs studied were international business companies. These 
firms enjoy taxation rates of 21 /2 per cent; full exemption from import duties on 
production-related equipment; full repatriation of capital, profits and dividends; 
27 ISDN is a mechanism that allows the telephone network to easily carry all types of voice and data 
services. 
28 ATM is an emerging technology for efficiently transmitting voice, data and video on the same 
network. It requires a large bandwidth (the amount of data that could be transmitted on a circuit) and 
connectivity between all network stations. 
29 Mr. Philip Goddard, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Business, 
interview by author, tape recording, Barbados, 26 August 1996. 
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subsidised office space; and training grants. [Barbados Investment and Development 
Corporation]. The MNE that was involved in the joint venture with the local firm was 
not eligible for the incentives provided by the International Business Act. Moreover, 
since it was not involved in manufacturing, the joint venture company did not qualify 
for the investment incentives available under the Fiscal Incentives Act. Nonetheless, 
under a special arrangement with officials of the BIDC, the company enjoyed several 
investment incentives. 30 Thus, it had a ten year tax holiday; duty free exemptions on 
production-related equipment; subsidised office space; free repatriation of capital, 
profits and dividends; and training grants. 
There seemed to be an ambivalence on the issue of the attractiveness of the 
investment incentives offered by the Barbadian government. One manager, who 
enjoyed international business status, revealed that it was the low taxes and duty free 
import of equipment that were important to his decision to establish operations in the 
country. Another also cited the low rates of taxation but, in addition, included the 
incentive of subsidised office space. The other manager, who also enjoyed 
international business status, stated that low taxes and import duty concessions played 
a decisive role in the initial decision to set up operations in Barbados. However, he 
noted that at present, other locations offer more attractive investment incentives than 
Barbados. Moreover, he stated that several of the incentives enjoyed by the 
international business firm are now granted to the local investor. It is noteworthy that 
the MNE, that did not have international business status, stated that duty free imports 
of equipment played an important role in its decision to set up operations in the 
30 This information was obtained from an official of the Barbados Investment and Development 
Corporation. However, because of the confidentiality of the information provided, the officer shall 
remain anonymous. Official of Barbados Investment and Development Corporation, interview by 
author, telephone conversation, Barbados, 29 August 1996. 
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country. Hence, the investment incentives that seem to be most favoured by these four 
MNEs were low taxes and duty free imports of equipment. What is significant, 
however, is that none of these firms considered free repatriation of profits, capital and 
dividends to be critical to their decision to establish and continue operations in 
Barbados. 
9.6.5 H 9: The "Double Diamond" Hypothesis 
It appears that the "Double Diamond" hypothesis clearly explains the 
investment behaviour of the four information service MNEs in Barbados. The 
strategic management style these firms used for their Barbadian operations can be 
illustrated by Quadrant 4 of Diagram 9.2. 
Diagram 9.2 The Role of the Barbadian Operations in the Corporate Strategy of 
the Information Service MNEs 
Role of Host Country 
National Diamond on 
Development of Core 
Competencies of 
Information Service 
MNEs 
Integration of Barbadian Operations with Other 
Operations of the Information Service MNE 
Low 
None 
High 
Diamond 
Network 
High 
1 2 
3 4 
5 6 
Source: Adapted from Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Multinational 
Strategic Management: An Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework. " 
Management International Review 33 Special Issue (1993), Figure 4. 
271 
The Barbadian operations were increasingly becoming an integrated part of the 
corporate strategy of these four MNEs. Barbados was initially used as a site for the 
outsourcing of low value-added, low skill activity. However, the country is no longer 
regarded as a location for this type of information service process. The activities 
carried out in Barbados have steadily moved up the vertical chain of value-added. In 
so doing, the Barbadian facility has become increasingly important to the parent 
company's global strategy. Thus, Barbados' diamond is positively impacting on the 
development of the core competencies of the MNEs. The elements of Barbados' 
diamond that were of importance to the four firms are demonstrated in Diagram 9.3. 
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Diagram 9.3 Double Diamond Approach to the Information Service 
Industry of Barbados 
US and UK 
Resources 
Telecommunication Infrastructure 
Supporting Infrastructure Computer Equipment Manufacturers 
R&D Institutes 
Universities 
Engineers 
Entrepreneurs 
Venture Capital 
Markets 
I. T. Technology 
Airline, 
US and UK 
Publishing, 
Customers 
Insurance, 
Companies 
US and UK Informa- 
tion Service Firms 
Barbadian 
Resources 
US and UK Government 
Low-cost, Investment Incentive 
productive labour arbadian Economic, political 
Proximity to US Government and Social Stability IF I 
Time zone equivalence Creation of IT Socie 
Education System 
BIDC 
Public Transportation 
Supporting Electricity Services 
Infrastructure Airport Services 
Intelligent Buildings 
Telecommunications 
Repair and Maintainence Services 
Computer Suppliers 
Ambience of location 
Source: Adapted from Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Multinational Strategic 
Management: An Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework. " Management International 
Review 33 Special Issue (1993), Figure 3. 
The main elements of Barbados' diamond that were of significance to the 
MNEs were low-cost, skilled labour; time zone equivalence with the USA and the 
UK; efficient bureaucracy; and ambience of the country. Several of these factors are 
easily duplicated. The MNE could easily relocate its information service activity to a 
low-wage location that is on the same time zone as its major markets. However, what 
is noteworthy is that in Barbados several of these factors were continuously upgraded. 
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In so doing, these factors became even more critical to the international 
competitiveness of the four MNEs. 
Barbados was initially used as a location for low-cost, semi-skilled labour. 
However, its relatively high wages have since precluded the relocation of low value- 
added activity. Moreover, the MNEs, supported by training grants provided by the 
BIDC, continuously upgraded the skills of their workers. In addition, some of the 
MNEs have intervened in the education system to ensure that its graduates would 
have the requisite skills and training. Thus, the four firms were steadily relocating 
more of their skill-intensive information service processes to their Barbadian 
operations. 
The other elements of Barbados' diamond were noticeably strong. Its 
institutional framework for foreign investment operated with efficacy. The services 
provided by BIDC were described as being excellent. In addition, the public 
transportation system, the electricity service, and airport services were all efficient. 
Moreover, the rental rates of the work sites were competitively priced. 
There were several elements of Barbados' diamond that were weak. 
Telecommunications services were not competitively priced. Moreover, the local 
university failed to produce graduates with the skills and training demanded by 
operators in the higher value-added segments of the industry. Thus, it appears that the 
locally trained computer scientists do not possess the requisite skills needed by firms 
in this industry. In addition, there seems to be an inherent bias in the investment 
incentive system. The firms that are owned by CARICOM nationals are not given the 
same incentives as foreign owned firms. This could only accentuate the weaknesses of 
domestic firms in the industry. Further, it seems that the capability of the local 
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maintenance and repair companies in this industry is limited. Indeed, few of the 
MNEs studied have extensively used the services of local computer suppliers and 
domestic maintenance and repair companies. Two of the MNEs studied used the 
services of their parent company for the maintenance and repair of equipment as well 
as for troubleshooting. One company had made limited use of the local support firms 
in the information service industry. However, its manager noted that there is an 
absence of local expertise for certain specialist skills. By contrast, another company 
has its own maintenance and repair department. This department is staffed by twenty 
highly trained professionals who are responsible for the network administration, 
programming and development needs of the company. 
It appears that the government has a positive impact on the country's 
development of a sustainable competitive advantage in the information service 
industry. Its adoption of a fixed exchange rate has forced the relocation of firms that 
operate in the low value-added segments of the industry. Its flexible policy to the 
recruitment needs of PRT has encouraged the establishment of what is said to be the 
first offshore investment in software development in the region. In addition, its 
maintenance of economic, social and political stability has facilitated the inflow of 
foreign investment into this industry. This stability, coupled with the ambience of the 
country, has made Barbados a preferred location for information service activity. 
Finally, the government plans to transform the country into an "information age 
society" in less than a generation [Financial Times, 26 April 1995: 35]. To this end, it 
plans to introduce computers into schools and promote on-line applications and data 
bases for hospitals, courts and customs [Schware and Hume 1996: 13]. Undoubtedly, 
the foreign investor is likely to benefit from these initiatives. 
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9.7 The Modes of Investment Used by the Four Information Service MNEs in 
Barbados 
This study suggests that the MNE involved in intra-firm trade in Barbados will 
use a wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of market entry [Teece 1983; Anderson 
and Gatignon 1986; Gomes-Casseres 1989,1990]. It is also posited that the level of 
international experience of a firm influences its selection of a market entry mode. The 
study also contends that the MNE with international experience uses a wholly owned 
subsidiary as its market entry mode [Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; Johanson 
and Vahlne 1977,1990; Davidson 1980; Li 1994; Loree and Guisinger 1995; Tan and 
Vertinsky 1996]. In addition, it is suggested that the cultural distance between the 
home and host country plays an important role in the MNE's selection of a market 
entry mode [Kogut and Singh 1988; Padmanabhan and Cho 1996]. 
Three of the MNEs studied were wholly owned subsidiaries. The other was 
involved in a joint venture arrangement with a local firm. There appeared to be 
different reasons for their selection of a market entry mode. 
9.7 H 10: The Intra-Firm Trade Hypothesis 
The theory advanced by researchers such as Anderson and Gatignon [1986] 
and Gomes-Casseres [1989,1990] on the relationship between intra-firm trade and the 
firm's selection of a market entry mode has been supported by this study. The four 
MNEs were involved in intra-firm trade. The Barbadian operations served as the 
offshore information processing site for the parent company. Data were transmitted 
using various telecommunications modes to Barbados. These data were processed in 
Barbados and retransmitted either to the parent company or to its clients. 
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It appears that these firms' selection of a market entry mode was largely 
influenced by their need to exercise control over the operations of their Barbadian 
facility [Stopford and Wells 1972: 113-119]. The comments made by an executive of 
AMR Corporation supports this argument. 
I think in the first instance we wanted to have total control over the operations of the 
company from a fiduciary stand point. The initial objective of Caribbean Data 
Services was to handle all the data processing needs for American Airlines. It was a 
wholly owned subsidiary that reported to the data processing and computer 
department of American Airlines. It was a matter of control from the very 
beginning.... It is a type of operations in which confidentiality is vital so we did not 
consider any other form of investing in Barbados. 
Similarly, the managers of PRT chose the mode of a wholly owned subsidiary 
because they wanted to exercise control over their Barbadian operations. Indeed, they 
claimed that they did not perceive the need for any other form of institutional 
involvement in Barbados. Conversely, the managers of Digital Imaging and 
Technologies Incorporated stated that the Barbadian subsidiary was purchased from 
Cable & Wireless. They chose the mode of a wholly owned subsidiary because they 
wanted to have total control over the operations of their Barbadian company. Finally, 
it appears that Santype International, which was the smallest of the MNEs studied, 
was willing to concede to a form of foreign involvement that resulted in reduced 
control. The manager stated that it was important for the company to have a local 
partner who possessed knowledge of the "local scene" [Beamish 1988,1994]. 
Evidently, the local partner contributed skills to this venture. As the manager of 
Santype revealed, the local partner knew the officials at BIDC, the government and 
other influential people. He thought that it would have been too difficult for them to 
acquire this knowledge on their own. 
277 
9.7.2 H 11: The International Experience Hypothesis 
It seems that the level of international experience of the companies influenced 
the selection of market entry mode. Three MNEs had experience operating in foreign 
locations before establishing operations in Barbados. DIT operated in another 
Caribbean country before acquiring its Barbadian subsidiary. Thus, the managers felt 
that they possessed the requisite knowledge of the region to operate a wholly owned 
subsidiary in Barbados. In this case, it appears that familiarity with the Caribbean 
region or "regional experience" played a great role in influencing their selection of a 
wholly owned subsidiary [Davidson 1980; Li 1994]. Similarly, PRT operated in India 
before relocating its software development facility to Barbados. The managers 
possessed several years of experience operating in a developing country. Thus, they 
selected a wholly owned subsidiary as their mode of market entry in Barbados. The 
AMR Corporation was the most internationalised of the companies studied. Its 
American Airlines Group operates in several countries of the world. Thus, it appears 
that AMR Corporation possessed the "worldwide" experience needed to select a 
wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of market entry in Barbados Li [1994]. By 
contrast, Santype International had no international experience. Its Barbadian facility 
was the first investment it had made abroad. Thus, not surprisingly, it did not select a 
wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of market entry. Instead, it opted for a majority 
owned joint venture arrangement with a local firm. It is interesting to note that this 
local partner was described as an "old family friend". 
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9.7.3 H 12: The Cultural Distance Hypothesis 
It is significant to note that none of the four MNEs stated that culture played a 
decisive role in their selection of a mode of market entry. The cultural distance 
between Barbados and the home country of these MNEs is not great. Indeed, in one 
instance, Barbados was a former colony of the home country of a MNE. In addition, 
the country is English speaking and is located in fairly close proximity to the home 
countries of the four MNEs. Thus, there should be some cultural similarities between 
Barbados and its home country. Yet, none of the managers attributed their choice of 
market entry mode to cultural distance. 
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9.8 Conclusions 
As Table 9.3 demonstrates, seven of the eleven hypotheses were supported by 
this case study. 
Table 9.3 The Results of the Testing of the Hypotheses on the Information 
Service Industry of Barbados 
Hypotheses Results 
Hl. No relationship exists between the MNE's Supported 
use of its unique advantage and the presence of 
domestic competitors. 
H2. There is a positive relationship between Not supported 
follow-the-leader' investment behaviour of 
MNEs and the use of low-cost factors. 
H3. There is a positive relationship between the Supported 
firm's use of its unique advantages and the 
locational advantage variables. 
H4. There is a positive relationship between the Supported. 
MNE and the decision to establish and continue 
operations because of low-cost factors. 
H5. There is a positive relationship between the Not supported 
export-seeking and resource-seeking MIVE and 
its use of preferential trading agreements. 
H6. There is a positive relationship between the Supported 
presence of an export processing zone and the 
export-seeking MNE. 
H7. No relationship exists between the Not supported 
investment incentives offered by the Barbadian 
governments and the MNE's decision to 
establish and continue operations in Barbados. 
H9. There is a positive relationship between the Supported 
MNE's use of its home country's `diamond' and 
the `diamond' of Barbados.. 
HIO. There is a positive relationship between Supported 
intra-firm trade and the use of a wholly owned 
subsidiary. 
Hl 1. There is a positive relationship between Supported 
the MNE with international experience and its 
use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
H12. There is a positive relationship between Not supported 
cultural distance and the use of a wholly owned 
greenfield investment and a joint venture 
agreement. 
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Moreover, the following insights were obtained on the factors that influence 
the motivations, locational choices and market entry mode of MNEs investing in 
relatively high skilled, labour-intensive activities in a small developing country. 
9 Motivations for FDI in the Information Service Industry of Barbados 
It appears that the monopolistic advantage theory does not adequately explain 
what motivated the four MNEs to establish operations in Barbados. These firms 
clearly did not view the domestic information service companies as competitors. 
Rather, they considered the foreign firms that had offshore investments outside of 
Barbados to be their competitors. Thus, they did not use their unique advantages in 
competition with the local firms. In addition, it appears that the `follow-the-leader' 
theory does not explain what motivated the four firms to set up operations in 
Barbados. It seems that these four MNEs, like many in their industry, sought to 
achieve cost competitiveness by establishing offshore operations. Three MNEs did 
follow their competitors offshore. However, they did not follow them into Barbados. 
By contrast, it seems that Dunning's eclectic paradigm is more likely a satisfactory 
explanation of what motivated the four MNEs to establish and continue operations in 
Barbados. The firms did seek to locate their firm-specific assets (production 
technology and marketing skills) with the locational advantages of Barbados (spatial 
proximity, low-cost, skilled labour and time zone equivalence). 
" The Choice of Locating Information Service Activity in Barbados 
It appears that the decision to establish and continue operations in Barbados 
was influenced by the presence of low-cost, skilled labour. However, what is 
noteworthy is that the skills of the labour force were continuously enhanced. This has 
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allowed the Barbadian operations of the four MNEs to move out of low value-added 
activities into higher value-added ones. Interestingly enough, the four MNEs were not 
motivated to set up operations in Barbados because of the existence of preferential 
trading agreements. In fact, the information service activities conducted by these firms 
did not benefit from preferential market access. It is significant to note that it seems 
that the four MNEs were attracted to the country because of the presence of its 
industrial parks. However, several elements of its infrastructure appeared to be critical 
to their decision to continue operations in the country. The cost and quality of its 
telecommunications service are a notable example. The study further suggests that 
there appears to be some ambivalence on the attractiveness of the investment 
incentives. The preferred incentives appears to be low taxes and duty exemptions on 
equipment. It is important to note that the repatriation of profits and dividends had no 
influence on the investment decision. Furthermore, this analysis suggests that the 
"Double Diamond" hypothesis (H 9) seems to explain the factors influencing the 
locational choices of these four MNEs. It reveals that the Barbadian subsidiary is 
increasingly playing a critical role in the operations of these four MNEs. 
" The Mode of Investment Used by the Information Service MNEs in Barbados 
It seems that two theories explain the factors influencing the firms' selection of 
a market entry mode in Barbados. It appears that the theories postulated by 
researchers such as Gomes-Casseres [1989,1990] explain the firms' selection of a 
wholly owned subsidiary. All four MNEs were involved in intra-firm trade. However, 
three of them wanted to exercise total control over their Barbadian operations. Hence, 
they selected the mode of a wholly owned subsidiary to enter the country. The other 
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company, which was smallest of the MNEs studied, chose the mode of a majority 
owned joint venture. It was willing to concede to a market entry mode that gave it 
reduced control in order to acquire knowledge of the local culture and politics. In 
addition, the study suggests that the level of international experience of the companies 
seems to have influenced their selection of a market entry mode. The MNEs with 
accumulated experience operating abroad used a wholly owned subsidiary as their 
market entry mode in Barbados. Conversely, the MNE that did not have any 
international experience, selected a joint venture arrangement. Interestingly enough, 
while there does not seem to be any great cultural dissimilarities between Barbados 
and the home country of the MNEs, none of the managers cited culture as influencing 
their selection of a market entry mode. It appears that cultural distance did not 
influence these firms' selection of an international entry mode. 
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Chapter Ten 
Foreign Direct Investment in Trinidad-Tobago: A Case Study of The Natural Gas 
Sector 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the last of the three case studies on foreign direct investment in the 
Caribbean. It examines the foreign investment decisions of seven MNEs that operate in 
the natural gas sector of Trinidad-Tobago. To this end, this case study analyses the factors 
that influence their motivations for engaging in FDI, their choice of location, and their 
selection of market entry mode. 
As was noted in Chapter 6, the seven MNEs used for this case study were Cabot 
Corporation, British Gas p1c, Amoco Corporation, Arcardian Corporation, Ferrostaal AG, 
Methanex Corporation, and Ispat Group of Companies. In the case of Arcardian 
Corporation and Ispat Group of Companies, interviews were conducted with managers 
located at both the headquarters and subsidiary of the MNEs. The other six firms were 
partners in joint venture agreements. In these cases, interviews were conducted with 
executives representing each partner in the joint venture. Thus, a total of eleven managers 
were interviewed (See Appendix Figure 5). Interviews were also conducted with 
government ministers, heads of government bodies, and managers of locally owned 
companies (See Appendix Figure 4). Additional information was obtained from company 
annual reports, stock brokers' reports and journalistic articles. 
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10.2 The Emergence of the Natural Gas Sector in Trinidad-Tobago 
Trinidad-Tobago, like other oil exporters, experienced unprecedented windfalls in 
1973 to 1974 and again in 1979 to 1980. The years 1973 to 1982 were indeed halcyon 
days for this country. Its gross domestic product increased six-fold from US$ 1,309 
million in 1973 to US$ 8,140 million in 1982. Per capita income soared from US$ 1,190 
in 1973 to an astonishing US$ 6,450 in 1982. Its foreign reserves leapt from a mere US$ 
47 million in 1973 to a phenomenal US$ 3,080 in 1982 [World Bank 1994: 672-673]. 
Interestingly, the decade preceding these oil-boom years was marked by growing 
economic and social instability caused by declining oil revenues. Thus, awash with oil 
windfalls, the government sought to place its economy on the path of self-sustaining 
growth. Not surprisingly, one of its main objectives was to wean the economy away from 
its dependence on oil. 
In the early 1970s, Trinidad-Tobago was a classic example of an oil dependent 
economy. Its non-oil tradables, agriculture and manufacturing accounted for only 22.7 per 
cent of non-mining GDP as opposed to the norm of 42 per cent for countries at 
comparable levels of per capita income [Auty and Gelb 1986: 1163]. Moreover, its 
economy was dualistic. In 1973, agriculture accounted for one-sixteenth of the value- 
added per worker in oil refining and one-fifth that of chemicals. In addition, the salaries 
of the workers employed in the oil industry, who were less than 4 per cent of the labour 
force, was almost seven times that of non-oil workers [ibid., 1163]. Hence, the 
government sought to accelerate industrial diversification out of oil. In so doing, it 
attempted to monetarise the country's abundant gas reserves. To this end, the government 
used a substantial proportion of its oil windfall to develop industries that were intensive 
in the use of natural gas. As Table 10.1 demonstrates, the government developed five gas 
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based projects. These gas based activities were all export oriented. Moreover, all of these 
companies were located on the specially built industrial estate, the Point Lisas Industrial 
Estate. 
Table 10.1. The Gas Based Projects developed by the Trinidad-Tobago Government 
during the Oil Boom Period 
The Iron and Steel Compan Iron and steel 100 % GOTT(l) US$ 350 million 
of T&T (ISCOTT) 
Trinidad and Tobago Nitrogen 51 % GOTT US$ 111.4 million 
Nitrogen Company 49 % W. R. Grace 
(TRINGEN) 
Trinidad and Tobago Urea Urea 100 % GOTT US$ 117.1 million 
Company (TTUC) 
Trinidad and Tobago Methanol 100 % GOTT US$ 179.2 million 
Methanol Company (TTMC 
Fertilisers of Trinidad and Ammonia 51 % GOTT US$ 350 million 
Tobago Limited (FERTRIN) 49 % Amoco 
Source: Trevor M. A. Farrell, Worship on the Golden Calf. An Oil Exporter's Industrial Strategy, Technology Policy 
and Project Planning during the Boom Years, (University of the West Indies, Trinidad, 1987), 97. 
Notes: (1) Government of Trinidad and Tobago 
The government also adopted a strategy of state ownership of what it deemed to 
be the `commanding heights' of the economy. Hence, the majority of these new 
enterprises in the gas sector were totally state-owned. Great hopes were pinned on these 
gas-intensive projects. Not only were they to wean the economy away from its 
dependence on oil, but also they were to place Trinidad-Tobago firmly on the path of 
self-sustaining growth. Unfortunately, the gas based projects failed to achieve these 
expectations. By 1983, the country fell into a recession that lasted for seven years. The 
GDP in 1990 was approximately 20 per cent less than that of 1982. Per capita income 
declined by an average of 5 per cent per annum between 1982 and 1990. The country's 
foreign reserves plummeted from US$ 3,080 in 1982 to a mere US$ 492 million in 1990. 
The numbers unemployed escalated from 9.9 per cent in 1982 to 20 per cent in 1990. 
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Additionally, in 1990, the external debt rose to an astronomical US$ 2,508.3 million 
[World Bank 1994: 672-674]. This economic situation was caused by the collapse of the 
international oil market, the decline in domestic oil production, and economic 
mismanagement [Auty and Gelb 1986: 1166-1169; Ramesar 1993: 220]. Moreover, the 
highly touted gas-intensive activities failed to replace oil as the major source of foreign 
exchange earnings. 31 Hence, in 1989, the government of Trinidad-Tobago was compelled 
to approach the international lending agencies for financing. 
As part of the loan conditionalities, Trinidad-Tobago entered into stablisation and 
structural adjustment programmes. Under these programmes, the government, in a 
complete volte-face, departed from its previous economic policies. Hence, it inter alia 
liberalised trade and foreign exchange markets; divested state assets, including the newer 
enterprises in the natural gas sector; and implemented policies to attract private foreign 
investment. The state no longer assumed an active role in the economic development of 
the country. Rather, its role was redefined as one of policy maker and regulator. It was the 
private sector that was now given the task of economic transformation. 
At present, Trinidad-Tobago is described as one of the most sought-after locations 
for energy-related activities in the western hemisphere. International investors are 
encouraged to acquire existing energy based industries or establish greenfield investments 
[Renwick 1995: 7]. Indeed, foreign investment in its energy sector is estimated to soar to 
US$ 4 billion in the next three years [Financial Times, 18 February 1997: 16]. The main 
factor driving this investment is the availability of low-cost natural gas. Trinidad's proven 
31 The development of gas-based activities was fraught with difficulties. The projects experienced 
tremendous cost overruns. Moreover, there was weak international demand for their products. In 
addition, one company, ISCOTT, experienced serious problems of market access. For an excellent 
treatment of Trinidad-Tobago's venture into the downstream development of its natural gas sector, see 
Trevor M. A. Farrell, Worship on the Golden Calf. An Oil Exporter's Industrial Strategy, Technology 
Policy and Project Planning during the Boom Years, (University of the West Indies, Trinidad, 1987). 
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gas reserves is estimated to be 10.09 trillion cubic feet [The Economist Intelligence Unit 
1995: 15]. 
It is against this background that an examination will be done of the foreign 
investment decisions of seven MNEs that operate in the natural gas sector of Trinidad- 
Tobago. Two of these MNEs purchased divested state assets in the energy sector. The 
other five firms established greenfield investments. In the following section, a profile of 
these seven firms will be undertaken. 
10.2. The MNEs that operate in the Natural Gas Sector of Trinidad-Tobago 
Atlantic LNG Company of Trinidad and Tobago 
Atlantic LNG Company of Trinidad and Tobago is a joint venture arrangement 
comprising four companies. These are Cabot Corporation, British Gas p1c, Amoco 
Corporation and the National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago. The other 
shareholder is Repsol, a subsidiary of Enagas. This company owns a 20 per cent stake in 
Atlantic LNG. Repsol was not included in this case study. Unfortunately, difficulties 
were experienced in contacting its managers for interviews. The Atlantic LNG Company 
of Trinidad and Tobago was incorporated in June 1996. The LNG plant is presently under 
construction. It is scheduled to be commissioned in 1999. 
Cabot Corporation 
Cabot Corporation is an 114-year old global manufacturing organisation with 
speciality chemicals and energy businesses. This publicly owned company is located in 
Boston, USA. In 1995, its total assets were US$ 1,654 million and it employed 4,100 
288 
people in 22 countries. Cabot Corporation has two main divisions: the Speciality 
Chemicals and Materials Group, and the Energy Group. The Energy Group has two 
operating businesses, one of which is Cabot LNG. 
Cabot LNG Corporation was founded in 1969. This company is involved in the 
transportation of liquefied natural gas to meet the specialised needs of gas and electric 
utilities, independent power producers, and industry. In 1995, its sales were an estimated 
US$ 343 million. Its total number of employees was 72. This company owns 10 per cent 
of the equity of Atlantic LNG, a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility in Trinidad- 
Tobago. 
British Gas plc 
British Gas is a leading gas company with interests in over 40 countries. Its 
activities range from exploration and production to gas transmission, domestic utilisation 
and power generation. In 1994, the company had a total asset base of US$ 39,750 million. 
British Gas Trinidad was established in 1989. This company is involved in the 
exploration and production of oil and natural gas. The company is also a 26 per cent 
shareholder in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) company, Atlantic LNG Company of 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
Amoco Corporation 
Amoco Corporation and its consolidated subsidiaries form a large integrated 
petroleum and chemical enterprise. In 1995, the total assets of this public company were 
US$ 29,845 million. In this year, it employed 42,689 workers. The company, which is 
located in Chicago, is one of the most internationalised of the MNEs studied. It not only 
operates in the North America, but also in Europe, West Africa, Australia, China, South 
289 
America and Trinidad. Amoco Corporation is comprised of three main divisions: Amoco 
Production Company, Amoco Oil Company and Amoco Company. 
Amoco Trinidad Oil Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Amoco 
Production Company. This company, which was established in 1961, is involved in the 
exploration and production of oil. It is presently the largest producer of oil and natural gas 
in the country, accounting for 50 per cent of the total domestic oil production and 
approximately 75 per cent of total gas production. Amoco Trinidad Oil Company, which 
employed 400 persons in 1995, is also a major shareholder in the first LNG plant in the 
country. It owns a 34 per cent stake in the Atlantic LNG Company of Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago 
The National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago was formed in 1972. This 
state-owned company was initially involved in the purchase, transportation and sale of 
natural gas in the country. In 1992, its activities were expanded to include evaluating 
investment proposals and developing natural gas-based projects; advising the government 
on investment incentives for the downstream industries in the energy sector; and 
promoting the country as a location for gas-based investments. In 1995, the company's 
activities were further increased. It presently owns a 10 per cent share in the Atlantic 
LNG Company of Trinidad and Tobago. 
Arcardian Corporation 
Arcardian Corporation is the largest producer and marketer of nitrogen fertilisers 
and nitrogen chemicals in the western hemisphere. In 1995, its total assets were US$ 
1,270 and it employed 1,293 persons. This publicly owned company operates plants in 
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the USA. Its operation in Trinidad is its first international venture. In 1993, Arcardian 
Corporation acquired 100 per cent shareholdings in Fertilisers of Trinidad and Tobago 
(Fertrin) and Trinidad and Tobago Urea Company (TTUC) for US$ 175 million. Fertrin 
manufactured and marketed ammonia and carbon dioxide while TTUC manufactured and 
marketed urea. The Arcardian Corporation merged the operations of these two companies 
and renamed the resulting entity, Arcardian Trinidad Limited. Arcardian Trinidad 
Limited is located on the Point Lisas Industrial Estate. It presently employs 350 persons. 
Caribbean Methanol Company Limited 
Caribbean Methanol Company is a joint venture agreement between three 
companies. They are Ferrostaal AG, Methanex Corporation and CL Financial. This 
company, which is located on the Point Lisas Industrial Estate, was established in 1993. 
Ferrostaal AG 
Ferrostaal AG, which was formed in 1930, is a publicly owned company with 
headquarters in Essen, Germany. It is a subsidiary of the MAN AG., Group of Germany. 
The MAN Group is one of the largest manufacturing and engineering companies in 
Europe. In 1996, this company had an asset base of US$ 7,891 million and 57,648 
employees. 
Ferrostaal AG is involved in activities related to the planning, supplying, erecting 
and financing of turn-key installations. It also exports finished and semi-finished steel 
products, plant, machinery and other equipment. In 1996, this company had a total asset 
base of US$ 2,539 million and employed 1,581 persons. Ferrostaal owns 25 per cent of 
the equity in the joint venture company, Caribbean Methanol Company Limited. 
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Methanex Corporation 
Methanex Corporation is the world's largest methanol producer, with a worldwide 
production, marketing and distribution capability. Indeed, it is estimated that this 
company controls 40 per cent of the methanol traded internationally [Midland Walwyn 
Capital Incorporated, 18 April 1997: 3]. Methanex, with headquarters in Calgary, had a 
total asset base of US$ 1,744 million in 1995. This company is fairly well 
internationalised: it owns production facilities in Canada, the US, Chile and Trinidad. 
Methanex Corporation owns 10 per cent equity in the Caribbean Methanol Company. It is 
solely responsible for the marketing of the output of this joint venture company. 
CL Financial Limited 
CL Financial Limited is the holding company of the Colonial Life Insurance 
Group of companies. This company with headquarters in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad is the 
only privately owned, domestic firm studied. In 1994, its total asset base was US$ 1,084 
million. CL Financial is fairly internationalised. The company has 60 subsidiaries 
located throughout the Caribbean, North and South America, and Europe. CL Financial 
has expanded beyond its insurance origins into a diversified range of activities. It is 
involved in banking and finance; property development; trading and distribution; 
communications; forestry and agriculture; and energy and manufacturing. The Caribbean 
Methanol Company is one of its subsidiaries. CL Financial owns 64.9 per cent of the 
equity of this company. 
Ispat Group of Companies 
Unlike the other three companies discussed previously, the Ispat Group of 
Companies is not involved in the production of gas-based products. Its core business is 
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the production of iron and steel. However, the iron and steel production is an energy- 
intensive process. In Trinidad-Tobago, natural gas is the only source of energy. Hence, 
for all practical purposes, Ispat's activities in Trinidad-Tobago can be considered to be 
gas-intensive. 
The Ispat Group of Companies is located in Calcutta, India. In 1996, this privately 
owned company had a total asset base of US$ 6,000 million and employed 45,000 
persons. It has two main operating divisions: Ispat Industries and Ispat International. Ispat 
International was formed in 1976 in Jakarta, Indonesia. However, in 1996, the company 
moved its headquarters to London. Ispat International is a global steel company. It has 
operations in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Canada, the USA and Trinidad- 
Tobago. With an annual production of more than 12.5 million metric tons, this company 
has been ranked the fourteen largest steel producer in the world [CARISPAT, January- 
March 1996: 2]. 
In 1988, Ispat International signed a ten-year lease for US$ 10.84 million a year to 
manage the ailing state-owned iron and steel company. Under the terms and conditions of 
this lease, Ispat International had the option to buy the company after five years. Indeed, 
in 1994, Ispat International purchased the state-owned iron and steel company for US$ 
70.5 million. The company, whose total assets in 1994 were valued at US$ 101.4 
million, has been renamed Caribbean Ispat Limited (CIL). 
10.3 The Motivations for Foreign Investment in the Natural Gas Sector of 
Trinidad-Tobago 
As was discussed in Chapter 9, this study suggests that the possession of superior 
advantages over domestic competitors does not motivate a firm to engage in FDI in 
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Trinidad-Tobago since it contends that the country does not have effective domestic 
competitors [Hood and Young 1979; Vachani 1985; Aswicahyono and Hill 1995]. The 
study also posits that MNE investment in Trinidad-Tobago is influenced by the earlier 
investment made by its competitors in the country [Knickerbocker 1973]. Further, this 
analysis contends that MNE's investment in Trinidad-Tobago is likely motivated by the 
synergies it could gain from using its firm-specific assets in combination with the 
locational endowments of the country [Dunning 1979,1980,1981 ]. 
10.3.1 H 1: The Monopolistic Advantage Hypothesis 
It seems that the monopolistic advantage hypothesis (H 1) does not adequately 
explain what motivated these seven MNEs to engage in FDI in Trinidad. It is worth 
noting that none of these MNEs perceived the domestic firms to be their competitors. 
Thus, while they did use their monopolistic advantages in Trinidad, they did not use them 
in competition with locally owned firms. It appears that their competitors were foreign 
firms, which in some cases, operated in the country. 
It is significant to note that the MNEs that bought privatised state-owned 
companies used selected monopolistic advantages to compete with foreign firms that 
were also seeking to acquire the state-owned enterprises. Arcardian Corporation bought 
the privatised urea and methanol companies. Its managers stated that the monopolistic 
advantage which they deployed in Trinidad was access to finance. Arcardian Corporation 
was able to expedite the financing arrangements for the purchase of the privatised 
companies much more speedily than its competitors. One of its managers claimed that 
this was their major "selling point" with the cash-strapped Trinidadian government. 
Conversely, the managers of Ispat International stated that they were able to use their 
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monopolistic advantage in production technology to compete with firms that were also 
attempting to acquire the iron and steel company. Ispat's core competency lies in 
production technology. Its managers stated that Ispat has a wealth of experience operating 
mini mills similar to the one in Trinidad. The technology used in the Trinidadian steel 
mill is direct reduced iron. 32 Ispat has mastered this technology in its operations at home 
and abroad. This technological mastery has given the company tremendous leverage over 
its competitors. Hence, Ispat was able to successfully manage the steel mill when other 
competitors such as Voest-Alpine Industries of Austria and Hamburger Stahlwereke of 
Germany were unable to do so. 33 Indeed, the managers admitted that their fast turn- 
around of the state-owned steel mill so impressed the Trinidad government, that they 
allowed them to buy the iron and steel company. 
By contrast, it seems that two MNEs used their monopolistic advantage in 
production technology to compete with each other. Ironically, they were both partners in 
the same joint venture company. It appears that they were competing for control over the 
supply of main feed-stock, natural gas, to the LNG company. Amoco Trinidad Company 
is sole supplier of natural gas to Atlantic LNG, eclipsing British Gas Trinidad Company 
which had hoped to be co-supplier. The managers of Amoco Trinidad Company stated 
that one of monopolistic advantages deployed in Trinidad was production technology. 
They said that the company possesses a synergy of technologies developed by Amoco 
internationally. It seems that some of these technologies are used in their operations in 
32 Direct reduced iron is a low-cost, high-quality alternative to scrap or blast furnace technology for 
producing steel. While the direct reduced iron technology is not proprietary, it is complicated and hard 
to copy. See "Making steel. The Carnegie from Calcutta. " The Economist, 10 January 1998,69-70. 
33 These European companies unsuccessfully managed the state-owned iron and steel company before 
it was leased to Ispat. However, it was Hamberger Stahlwereke, North Star Steel of Minneapolis and 
Nucor Corporation of USA (this company operates an iron carbide plant in Trinidad) that were bidding 
for the assets of the privatised iron and steel company. See Trinidad Express, 9 January 1995,16. 
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Trinidad. Thus, the managers revealed that they used a new drilling technique called 
horizontal drilling in one of their oil fields. They claimed that it was the first time that 
this technique was used in Trinidad. Hence, in early 1995, Amoco discovered sufficient 
recoverable gas reserves to satisfy the demands of the LNG plant over a 20 year contract 
life span. British Gas, by contrast, found no gas in its exploration well [The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 1995: 15]. 
It is noteworthy that the other MNEs used selected monopolistic advantages in 
their Trinidadian operations. However, these monopolistic advantages were not used for 
competition with foreign or local firms operating in the country. Instead, they were used 
in a manner that sought to increase the overall profitability of their Trinidadian 
operations. Thus, Atlantic LNG stands to benefit from the marketing expertise deployed 
by Cabot LNG Corporation. This MNE intends to market 60 per cent of the plant's output 
to the US and Europe. Similarly, the operations of Caribbean Methanol Company gained 
from the synergies arising from the use of Methanex's marketing skills and Ferrostaal's 
purchasing skills and its ability to access finance. Methanex Corporation is one of the 
largest marketers of methanol internationally. It is also solely responsible for marketing 
the methanol produced by the joint venture company. Similarly, Ferrostaal, which is a 
subsidiary of the MAN Group, used its significant purchasing power to procure 
equipment at very favourable prices for the methanol plant. In addition, it arranged the 
loan financing for the project. 
10.3.2 H 2: The `Follow-the-Leader' Hypothesis 
It appears that the `follow-the-leader' hypothesis (H 2) does not fully explain the 
motivations for all seven MNEs engaging in FDI in Trinidad. Indeed, the managers all 
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stated that their investment in Trinidad was not influenced by the earlier investments 
made by competitors. Moreover, some of the managers noted that their competitors did 
not have operations in Trinidad-Tobago. The foreign joint-venture partners of Caribbean 
Methanol Company (CMC) stated that their investment in Trinidad was not influenced by 
the earlier actions of their competitors. The manager of Ferrostaal revealed that his 
company's business is building industrial plants, not methanol production. Hence, his 
competitors are engineering companies. He noted that none of his competitors has entered 
into methanol production. Similarly, the manager of Methanex stated that his firm's 
decision to enter into methanol production in Trinidad was not influenced by the actions 
of his competitors. It seems that not many of his competitors operate in the Caribbean 
region. 
In the same vein, the managers of Ispat and Arcadian emphasised that their 
decision to buy the divested state companies was not influenced by earlier investments 
made by their competitors in the country. The manager of Ispat noted that none of his 
competitors operate in Trinidad. Rather, they have made investments in Latin America. In 
addition, the manager of Arcadian Corporation stated that his decision to acquire the 
privatised assets of the ammonia and urea companies was not influenced by the actions of 
his competitors. He revealed that the decision to enter Trinidad was influenced by the 
parent company's desire to become internationalised. 
Similarly, the foreign joint-venture partners of Atlantic LNG concurred that their 
decision to establish operations in Trinidad was not influenced by the earlier investments 
made by competitors. The manager of Cabot LNG said that none of his competitors 
operate in the Caribbean. Additionally, the managers of British Gas Trinidad Company 
stated that the government, in an attempt at reducing the monopoly position enjoyed by 
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Amoco Corporation, actively encouraged the company to invest in Trinidad. Thus, the 
company's decision to establish operations in Trinidad was not influenced by the actions 
of its competitors. Alternatively, the managers of Amoco admitted that they were the first 
oil company to enter the country in the post independence era. They stated that their 
decision to invest in Trinidad was not influenced by earlier investments made by 
competitors. 
Interestingly enough, it appears that the decision of the two oil and gas companies 
to become involved in the LNG project was a result of their oligopolistic rivalry. Amoco 
and British Gas are keen competitors in the Trinidadian market. Indeed, Amoco fought 
vigorously to keep British Gas out of Trinidad by offering incremental gas at a very 
favourable price to the National Gas Company [Trinidad Guardian, 18 October 1993: 7]. 
Not surprisingly, both sought to pre-empt the other's control over the LNG project. As 
was earlier mentioned, they actively sought to become gas suppliers to the plant. Hence, 
to a large extent, their investment in the LNG project can be characterised as `follow-the- 
leader' [Vernon 1983: 196-198]. However, it is unclear which company followed the 
other into this LNG investment. What is clear is that neither one would have allowed the 
other to invest in this project without its involvement. 
10.3.3. H 3: The Eclectic Paradigm Hypothesis 
It appears that Dunning's eclectic theory explains the decision of these seven 
MNEs to establish and continue operations in Trinidad. It seems that these seven MNEs 
sought to combine their firm-specific assets with the locational advantages of the country. 
In 1993, Arcardian Corporation acquired the divested assets of the ammonia and urea 
companies. These assets consisted of one ammonia plant and one urea producing facility. 
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In establishing operations in Trinidad, the managers of Arcadian sought to combine their 
core competency in marketing with the locational attractions of the country. The main 
locational advantages of Trinidad were its low-cost natural gas and its strategic location. 
The managers noted that natural gas in Trinidad is competitively priced. This allows 
Arcardian to compete in an industry characterised by increases in the number of suppliers 
and the production capabilities of existing plants. In addition, the forecasted demand for 
ammonia is expanding at a lower rate than production increases [Trinidad Express, 25 
August 1996: 11 ]. 
Arcardian's Trinidadian facilities are the largest of all its ammonia and urea 
operations. As Table 10.2 shows, they account for one-quarter of the company's total 
ammonia and urea production. With the acquisition of the Trinidadian facilities, 
Arcardian's total capacity presently exceeds three hundred thousand tons. This expansion 
in output enables Arcadian to strengthen its competitiveness since it achieves scale 
economies in the production of ammonia and urea. 
Table 10.2 Total Plant Capacities in Arcardian Corporation, January 1996 
(thousands of short tons) 
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The benefits of Trinidad's strategic location are two-fold. The ammonia from its 
Trinidadian operations provides feed-stock for Arcadian's US nitrogen plants and is a 
major source of granular urea fertiliser. Thus, the close proximity of the Trinidadian 
plants to east and south USA allows for the expeditious shipment of their output to 
Arcadian's nitrogen plants in Louisiana and North Carolina. Moreover, Trinidad's 
strategic position offers excellent potential for expanding Arcadian's sales in Latin 
America, Europe and Africa [Arcardian Corporation, 1995 Annual Report: 7]. 
Similarly, Ispat International sought to combine its firm-specific assets with the 
locational endowments of the country. Ispat International has adopted a strategy of 
buying ailing, state-owned iron and steel companies at relatively low prices and 
transforming them into profit-making entities [Business Week, 13 May 1996: 19]. The 
core competencies that Ispat deployed in Trinidad were production technology and 
marketing skills. Trinidad's locational advantages were the low-cost and availability of 
its natural gas, and its strategic location. The manager of Caribbean Ispat Limited (CIL) 
revealed that the company's strength lies in production technology. Ispat International has 
years of experience in the steel-making industry. It has mastered the technology needed to 
successfully operate mini mills with electric arc furnaces. These mills use direct reduced 
iron ore (DRI) as their feed-stock. 34 Ispat is a pioneer of the DPI process [CARISPAT, 
January-March 1996: 2]. All of its plants use this technology. Hence, the company was 
able to deploy its core competency in the DRI process in its Trinidadian operations. Not 
surprisingly, Ispat was able to achieve a phenomenal turn-around in the performance of 
34 Other mills used scrap iron. The price of this feed-stock fluctuates widely. Hence, products from 
mills that use DRI enjoy a US$ 50 price advantage over scrap-based mills. In addition, the DRI mills 
use feed-stock of the purest form. Hence, the quality of its product is superior to that of scrap-based 
mills. Mr. R. S. Misra, Managing Director, Caribbean Ispat Limited, interview by author, tape 
recording, Trinidad, 23 July 1996. 
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the mill. Within three months of its take-over, CIL was able to double production levels 
[Trinidad Express, 24 November 1994: 4]. Ispat complemented its efficient use of the 
DRI process with heavy investments in the upgrade and repair of its Trinidadian facilities. 
Indeed, during 1984 to 1994, the company invested US$ 60 million in capital upgrades to 
these facilities [Trinidad Express, 25 August 1996: 3]. This tremendously increased the 
performance efficiency of the plants (See Diagram 10.1). At present, its Trinidadian 
facilities operate at 120 per cent beyond rated capacity. In addition, CIL is the first steel 
company in the world to achieve ISO 9002 registration [ibid., 3]. 
Diagram 10.1 Production Levels at Caribbean Ispat Limited, 1988 to 1995 
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Ispat was not only able to achieve operational efficiency, its Trinidadian operation 
was also cost efficient. The production of iron and steel is an extremely energy-intensive 
process. In Trinidad-Tobago, natural gas is used to generate electricity. Hence, Trinidad's 
low-cost natural gas positively influences the cost of electricity. This is how Ispat has 
been able to achieve cost efficiency in its Trinidadian operations. Its cost-efficient 
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Trinidadian operations has enabled it to compete in an industry experiencing declines in 
steel prices and increases in iron ore prices [CARISPAT, January-March 1996: 4]. 
Additionally, the managers of Ispat stated that Trinidad enjoys a strategic 
location. The country is strategically positioned to the sources of raw materials as well as 
the global markets for the finished products. CIL sources its direct reduced iron from 
Venezuela and Brazil. It also exports iron and steel products to the Far East, Central 
America, Latin America and the Middle East. 
The foreign partners of the joint venture companies also sought to combine their 
firm-specific assets with the locational endowments of the country. Ferrostaal's firm- 
specific assets were access to finance and purchasing skills. One of its manager stated that 
the locational advantages of Trinidad were its cheap natural gas and its proximity to the 
major methanol markets. Ferrostaal's access to finance in Germany enabled it to arrange 
the loan financing needed for the establishment of the joint venture company. It also used 
its core competency in the procurement of equipment to supply industrial machinery at 
very favourable prices for the construction of the methanol plant. The company continues 
to use its core competency in equipment procurement in Trinidad. It supplies needed 
equipment and provides engineering assistance to the methanol plant. In addition, the 
manager stated that one of Trinidad's locational assets is its proximity to the US. He 
noted that Trinidad is closer to the US than any other gas-rich, developing country. Thus, 
the company could easily export methanol to the US. 
Similarly, a manager at Methanex stated that Trinidad's locational endowments 
were its large proven reserves of natural gas and its proximity to the most of the major 
markets in the world. The core competency that Methanex used in Trinidad was its 
marketing skills. It appears that Methanex, in an attempt at improving its global market 
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position, sought to combine its core competency in marketing with the country's 
identified locational assets. Methanex enjoys a take or pay contract with the Caribbean 
Methanol Company for the 500 thousand metric tons of methanol initially produced by 
the company. It presently has the first option to offtake the plant's increased production 
volume of 100 thousand metric tons per annum. Its manager stated that the critical issue 
in the company's investment in CMC was flexibility in supply and logistics. He stated: 
We wanted to juggle our supply chain to take Advantage of supply discontinuities. 
Trinidad, with its strategic logistics, was an excellent source of supply. It is 
logistically advantaged. 
The foreign joint venture partners of Atlantic LNG also sought to combine their 
core competencies with the locational advantages of Trinidad. Hence, the manager of 
Cabot LNG stated that the main locational endowments of Trinidad were its proven 
natural gas reserves and its proximity to the eastern seaboard of the US. The core 
competencies used by Cabot LNG in the country were its project development 
capabilities and marketing skills. The manager said that Cabot LNG was the first MNE to 
be allowed to develop a LNG plant in Trinidad. He revealed that since the early 1970s, 
major petroleum companies such as Amoco, Texaco and Tenneco attempted to develop 
LNG projects in the country. However, the Trinidadian government was unwilling to 
consent to their proposals. It seems that Cabot's success was due to the nature of its 
proposed project. It was market-driven. The company was the major buyer of the offtake 
of the LNG plant. The LNG projects previously proposed were producer-driven. Thus, 
the government was wary about the marketability of the output from these proposed LNG 
plants [The LNG Observer, Winter 1993/4: 22]. Cabot LNG also combined its core 
competency in marketing with the locational endowments of the country. Cabot will 
market 60 per cent of Atlantic LNG's 300 million cubic feet per day output. These 
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shipments will be transported from Trinidad to Boston on a company-owned LNG 
carrier. They will enter a LNG terminal that is owned and operated by Cabot LNG. This 
company owns the only offshore terminal for LNG in the north-east US. Thus, it has total 
control over LNG access to this market. Further, Cabot is expanding its marketing reach 
in north-east US by connecting its import facility with the Tennessee pipeline. This 
pipeline covers a major portion of the US Northeast market [World Gas Intelligence, 9 
February 1996: 12]. 
Similarly, British Gas combined its core competency in production technology 
with the locational endowments of Trinidad. The locational advantage used by British 
Gas was the country's abundant gas reserves. The manager of British Gas Trinidad noted 
that the parent company possesses extensive knowledge of the technology needed to 
produce LNG. Thus, it was able to deploy this core competency in Trinidad. Indeed, the 
parent company has relocated several of its personnel to the local LNG project. These 
persons have backgrounds in construction and engineering design. 
The managers of Amoco Trinidad also stated that the country's locational 
advantage was its proven gas reserves. The core competencies that this NINE deployed in 
Trinidad were production technology and managerial skills. Amoco Trinidad is sole 
supplier of gas for the first tranche of the LNG plant. It will provide 450 million cubic 
feet of gas per day for an initial contract period of 20 years. The company has a wealth of 
expertise operating in Trinidad. Moreover, as was noted earlier, it is able to access 
technologies developed by its parent company. These production technologies are used 
for gas exploration in Trinidad. In addition, the managers revealed that Amoco possesses 
proprietary techniques for managing major projects. One such technique is the `Amoco 
Common Process'. This is a method that the parent company developed for implementing 
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long-term investment projects. The Amoco Common Process consists of a series of pre- 
defined steps that identify what processes need to be done at each stage of project 
implementation. This management technique is currently being used in the LNG project. 
Hence, Amoco has combined this proprietary management technique with Trinidad's 
abundant gas reserves to develop its LNG plant. 
Interestingly, the managers of both British Gas and Amoco Corporation stated 
that the LNG project in Trinidad was a strategic investment. It appears that Amoco 
Corporation is changing its corporate strategy. The company has decided to move further 
up the value-added chain to the sale of natural gas. The managers of both companies 
stated that executives in the parent company are avidly observing the development of the 
LNG project in Trinidad. These companies apparently are attempting to acquire the 
technologies needed for the development of greenfield LNG projects. It appears that they 
are seeking to replicate these technologies in other gas-rich, developing countries. The 
gas market has been deregulated in many industrialised countries. Thus, tremendous 
opportunities exists for these companies to transport LNG from gas-rich, developing 
countries to major markets in the industrialised world. 
10.4 The Choice of Location of Gas Intensive Activity in Trinidad-Tobago 
This study posits that the decision to establish and continue operations in Trinidad 
is influenced by the cost of natural gas [Frobel 1980; Dunning 1988; Wallace 1990]. In 
addition, it is suggested that preferential trading agreements play an important role in 
motivating MNE's investment in Trinidad-Tobago [Johnson 1968; Joekes 1982; 
Yannopoulos 1986; Griffith 1990]. Further, this study contends that the presence of 
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export processing zones greatly influences the decision to locate gas-intensive activities 
in the country [Frobel 1980; Woodward and Rolfe 1993]. The study also postulates that 
the investment incentive package offered by the Trinidadian government has no influence 
on the locational decisions of the seven MNEs [Shah and Toyne 1978; Agodo 1978; Lim 
1983; Wheeler and Mody 1991; Guisinger and Loree 1995]. Finally, it posits that these 
seven MNEs integrate elements of their home country's diamond with the diamond of 
Trinidad [Rugman and D'Cruz 1993; Rugman and Verbeke 1993]. 
10.4.1 H 4: The Low-Cost Factor Hypothesis 
It appears that the cost and availability of natural gas greatly influenced these 
seven firms' decision to establish and continue operations in Trinidad-Tobago. The 
products produced by six of these MNEs are commodities. Thus, cost considerations are 
the key driver in the industries in which they operate. Clearly, operating costs play a great 
role in determining the competitiveness of these six MNEs. The cost of the feed-stock, 
natural gas, is one of their major operating costs. Hence, to a large extent, their decision 
to locate gas-intensive activity in a country is determined by the price of its natural gas. 
Indeed, the executives of these seven MNEs all stated that the cost and availability of 
natural gas were one of the major factors influencing their decision to locate operations in 
Trinidad. 
As was discussed in Section 10.2, the state-owned National Gas Company (NGC) 
is mandated to purchase, transport and sell natural gas to domestic consumers. This 
company determines the gas prices offered to the foreign investor. The gas contracts that 
the NGC initially offered to foreign firms consisted of a fixed gas price which mirrored 
the upstream price. This gas pricing system was changed after 1989. Apparently, the 
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downturn which occurred in the ammonia industry in the 1980s, together with the 
attendant losses suffered by producers, prompted a revision in the NGC's gas pricing 
regime [Nitrogen, March-April 1995: 24]. Since 1989, NGC's gas pricing system has 
become more market oriented. The price of gas offered to the MNE varies with the 
market price for its product. Hence, when the product market price is depressed, the 
natural gas price automatically declines. Conversely, when the product market prices 
increases, natural gas price rises. This gas pricing regime allows the producer operating in 
Trinidad to make a profit even in depressed market conditions. 
Each producer, including those who produce the same product, has a separate gas 
contract which is negotiated when the project is coming on stream. The gas contract is 
normally for five years [ibid., 20]. Trinidad-Tobago was the first country to implement 
this gas pricing regime. Within recent times, however, neighbouring gas-rich countries, 
such as Venezuela, have imitated this pricing system. 
Several of the MNEs stated that the gas pricing regime implemented by the NGC 
was extremely important to their decision to establish operations in Trinidad-Tobago. The 
manager of Arcardian Corporation stated: 
Natural gas comprises 70 per cent of the cost of ammonia so the price of natural gas 
was very critical to our decision to invest in Trinidad. The country is an attractive 
environment for gas. The price of gas and the gas contract are the most important 
factors for us here. 
He also noted that ammonia prices fluctuate so widely that it is advantageous for a 
company to have its gas prices tied to natural gas prices. The gas pricing regime 
implemented by the NGC offers Arcardian a degree of profit protection [Arcardian 
Corporation, 1995 Annual Report: 22]. 
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Similarly, the foreign joint venture partners of Caribbean Methanol Company 
agreed that the price of natural gas was important to their decision to establish and 
continue operating in Trinidad. It is noteworthy that the manager of Ferrostaal stated that 
the gas pricing system implemented by the NGC played a crucial role in the company's 
attempts to secure financing for the methanol plant. He noted that this unique pricing 
system made it was very easy for the company to obtain the requisite financing. 
By contrast, the manager of Caribbean Ispat Limited (CIL) stated that natural gas 
contributes a small proportion of its total production costs. CIL is a large consumer of 
electricity: it consumes one-quarter of the total electricity generated in the country. 
However, the cost of electricity is dependent on natural gas prices. Thus, the price of 
natural gas is important to the operations of CIL. 
It is significant to note that the NGC is not the gas supplier for the LNG plant. As 
was earlier discussed, Amoco Trinidad Oil Company is the main supplier of natural gas 
to this project. It seems that financial considerations forced the NGC to concede the gas 
supply function to Amoco. 35 Thus, the foreign firms involved in this venture are not 
beneficiaries of the NGC's gas pricing regime. Nonetheless, it appears that the gas price 
system adopted by Amoco is similar to the one offered by the NGC. The gas price 
charged to Atlantic LNG is tied to the world market price for LNG. 36 The foreign partners 
of this joint venture, like the other four MNEs studied, emphasised that the price of 
35 One of the loan conditions demanded by the financiers of the LNG project was security in the supply 
of natural gas. Thus, if there are supply disruptions to the plant, the gas supplier is to be held liable for 
all liquidation damages. NGC, with its total asset base of US$ 394 million, did not want the risks of 
being held liable for a US$ 1000 million plant. Mr. Gregory McGuire, Manager, Strategic Planning 
and Marketing, The National Gas Company, interview by author, tape recording, Trinidad, 8 August 
1996. 
36 This information was obtained from one of the executives of the Atlantic LNG Company of Trinidad 
and Tobago. Mr. Steven Haynes, Vice President of Finance and Administration, Atlantic LNG 
Company of Trinidad and Tobago, interview by author, tape recording, Trinidad, 26 July 1996. 
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natural gas was crucial to their decision to establish LNG operations in Trinidad. One 
manager of British Gas stated that Atlantic LNG's international competitiveness is based 
on low-cost gas. Similarly, the manager of Cabot LNG revealed that the price of natural 
gas was critical to his decision to invest in Trinidad. Amoco Trinidad Oil Company 
enjoys the unique role of being both shareholder and feed-stock supplier to this venture. 
However, the managers interviewed noted that the price of natural gas was a crucial 
factor in this investment. Indeed, they stated that the viability of the LNG project hinged 
on low-cost natural gas. 
10.4.2 H 5: The Preferential Trading Agreement Hypothesis 
It appears that the preferential trading agreements Trinidad-Tobago enjoys with 
the US, Canada and Europe do not fully explain these firms' decision to establish and 
continue operations in the country. Several of these MNEs benefited from the Lome and 
CBI agreements. However, their managers emphasised that while these preferential 
agreements are important to the firm, they did not play a major role in their decision to 
establish operations in the country. The manager of Ispat stated that the company benefits 
from both the CBI and Lome agreements. He revealed that Lome is not very significant to 
his Trinidadian operations since there is presently surplus capacity in Europe. However, 
he stated that the CBI is very important to his activities in Trinidad. Nevertheless, he said 
that his decision to continue operations in the country is not influenced by the existence 
of the CBI. Similarly, the manager of Arcardian Corporation stated that Lome is not 
important to his Trinidadian operations since its product is not exported to Europe. 
Further, he revealed that the company does not benefit from the CBI. Interestingly 
enough, he stated that the CBI does not give his company any additional marketing 
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advantage since the output produced in Trinidad is sent directly to the parent company in 
the US. Alternatively, the managers of Atlantic LNG noted that the company does not 
benefit from the preferential trading agreements enjoyed by Trinidad. Their decision to 
establish and continue operations in the country was not influenced by the existence of 
these agreements. By contrast, the managers of Caribbean Methanol Company stated that 
their product enjoys the preferential market access accorded by the CBI and Lome 
agreements. They noted that these agreements give their product a competitive edge in 
the US and European markets. However, they emphasised that their decision to continue 
operations in Trinidad is not influenced by these preferential trading agreements. 
10.4.3 H 6: The Export Processing Zone Hypothesis 
Trinidad-Tobago, in the mid 1970s to mid 1980s, did not seek to attract FDI 
through the creation of export processing zones. What the policy makers did was to 
establish a well-developed industrial estate, the Point Lisas Industrial Estate. This 800 
hectare industrial estate is located 25 miles south of the capital city, Port-of-Spain. It has 
well-developed road networks, a captive port, excellent telecommunications services and 
is feed with natural gas from two pipelines. This estate was built to house the gas- 
intensive activities developed during Trinidad's oil-boom years. Thus, three of the 
companies studied were located on the Point Lisas Industrial Estate. The other was 
located in south Trinidad. The presence of the Point Lisas industrial estate played an 
important role in attracting four of these MNEs to establish operations in Trinidad. Yet it 
appears that the quality of the general infrastructure was also important to their 
investment decision. 
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While the managers believed that the infrastructure in the country was adequate, 
several expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of service offered by several of the 
utility companies. A few stated that the electricity supply was unreliable. A reliable 
supply of electricity is critical to the operations of these companies. Indeed, one manager 
stated: 
Whenever there is a power failure, there was one yesterday, the plant shuts down and it takes 
two to three days for it to be restarted. It is not like a light switch, which one turns on after the 
electricity is resumed. These plants, because of their technical complexity, will need several 
days before they can be restarted after a power failure. ... Another problem 
is that these plants 
operate using very high temperatures and pressures, so when the power goes, the process has 
to shut down. It is difficult to move from an atmospheric pressure of 1500 degrees in a minute. 
It must be done in several hours. Generally, when you have a power failure, it shuts the plant 
down. So from the time when you lose production to the time when you can regain 
production, it is a minimum of two days. 
It is significant to note that in 1994, the state-owned electricity company in 
Trinidad was partially divested. The government now owns 51 per cent of the shares of 
the new company. The remaining equity is divided between two US corporations: Amoco 
and Southern Electric. The partial divestment of the electricity company has resulted in 
an injection of US$ 35.9 million for plant refurbishment and maintenance; an availability 
of expertise in power plant operations; the transfer of technology in power analysis and 
design; and the training of personnel [Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 1996: 18]. 
Several managers attested that the quality of the electricity service has improved since the 
divestment. Additionally, one company is working with the local electricity service 
company to improve the quality of its service. This company is investing US$ 2.5 million 
in the improvement of electrical lines. 
Several managers believed that while water rates were internationally competitive, 
its supply was unreliable. Most of these plants are process operations. They convert 
natural gas under extremely high temperatures to products such as ammonia and 
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methanol. These plants use considerable volumes of water for cooling and generating 
steam. Hence, a reliable supply of water is vital to their operations. The managers stated 
that they have never been forced to shut down operations because of an insufficiency in 
the water supply. However, they all expressed concern over the ability of the state-owned 
water company to maintain or improve its service with the present rapid industrialisation 
occurring in the country. 37 One manager estimated that the new plants coming on stream 
will result in a 30 to 40 per cent increase in water demand. He noted that there have not 
yet been any attempts to increase the water supply. It is worth noting that one MNE is 
working with the local water company to improve the reliability of its service. In 
addition, in 1996, the government secured a World Bank rehabilitation loan to finance the 
restructuring of the state-owned water company [Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 1996: 
23]. 
There are four international airlines and one national airline operating in Trinidad. 
The country is serviced by four weekly flights to Canada (Toronto), two weekly flights to 
Europe (Frankfurt and London) and four weekly flights to the US (Miami and New 
York). Several of the managers stated that the present airline services were inadequate. 
One noted that there are only two airlines (one international and the national airline) that 
fly out of Trinidad into Europe. Moreover, he said that the services of the national airline 
were unreliable. Hence, he frequently experienced difficulties in securing airline services 
to Trinidad. This sentiment was echoed by another manager who was based at the 
headquarters. He stated that it takes him one and half days to get to Trinidad. 
37 There are presently two new methanol plants, two new ammonia plants and an iron and steel plant 
that are coming on stream in Trinidad. In addition, the existing methanol plants are increasing their 
production capacities. 
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Most of the managers believed that the port services were adequate. The port at 
the Point Lisas industrial estate was built to satisfy the specialised shipping needs of its 
tenants. As Table 10.4 shows, the port is designed to handle two types of activity. 
Specialised bulk handling operations are undertaken at the ISPAT docks and the 
Savonetta Piers. In addition, dedicated facilities exist for the handling of steel, ammonia, 
methanol, base oil and lube oil. At the ISPAT docks is a marine terminal which is used 
for the import of iron ore and the export of iron and steel products. The Savonetta Pier 
has specialised facilities for the handling of anhydrous ammonia, urea and methanol. 
Table 10.4 The Specialised Bulk Terminals of the Port at the Point Lisas Industrial 
Estate 
Savonetta Pier #1 115 m7m Handling of base oil 
(North) for Lube Oil Plant 
Savonetta Pier #1 220 m 11.6 m 240 m 
(South) 
Savonetta Pier #2 312 m 11.6 m 180 m Specialised 
(South) Installation for loading 
methanol 
ISPAT Dock 470 m 11.6 m Specialised installation 
for discharge of bulk 
iron ore and loading 
Direct Reduced Iron. 
Maximum rate - 1,200 
tonnes per hour 
NUCOR 11.67 m 254 m Iron Carbide Dock 
Terminal 
Source: Charter International, Trinidad and Tobago Air and Seaports Handbook, 1995/1996, (London: PDI 
Handbooks, 1995), 29. 
Notes: (1) Dock Length is the length of the dock where the ship goes into berth. 
(2) Maximum Draft is the depth of water needed for a ship to safely enter the harbour. 
(3) Maximum LOA is the length of the side of the vessel entering the dock. 
The managers believed that the facilities at the Point Lisas industrial estate were 
world class. However, this estate presently has reached full capacity. Thus, the most 
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recent gas-intensive investment was initially relocated to a new site in south Trinidad. 
The initial site chosen was at the newly created La Brea industrial estate. However, the 
proposed industrial estate was "littered with old oil and gas wells" which needed to be 
filled in before construction could begin [The Economist Intelligence Unit 1995: 15]. 
Moreover, its topography features were considered to be unsuitable for the construction 
of industrial plants [Carib-Latin Energy Consultant, January-February 1996: 27]. Thus, 
the project was relocated to an alternative site further down the west coast at Point Fortin, 
near to an oil refinery. This area has a benign marine environment, a substantial 
infrastructure and possesses a work force experienced in plant construction and 
operations [ibid., 27]. The managers noted that they are presently working with the 
relevant state companies to undertake the requisite improvements in the road networks, 
water and electric supply in this location. 
It is significant to note that all managers stated that the bureaucracy in Trinidad 
was efficient. These companies deal directly with the government ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Finance. All of the managers interviewed stated that they were satisfied with 
the quality of service provided by the bureaucracy in Trinidad-Tobago. The following 
quotations are illuminating. 
Despite the change in government, the climate still remains very business-friendly. 
The government has been very aggressive in trying to encourage industries in the 
country. 
The government system, that is the bureaucracy, is good. Decisions concerning 
industrial development are made quickly. 
If one compares Trinidad to other countries, one must say that decisions are made 
very quickly here. 
Trinidad is blessed with low levels of bureaucracy. The government of Trinidad and 
the environment is very industry supportive. The country has an industry-supportive 
bureaucracy. 
The bureaucracy is Trinidad is better than in most places. We are satisfied with the 
services we receive from the ministries. 
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It appears that the bureaucracy in Trinidad operates with efficacy. However, there 
seems to be a lack of co-ordination in the activities of the institutions mandated to 
stimulate industrial development in the country. 
There are several institutions that are responsible for stimulating industrial 
development in Trinidad. As was earlier discussed, the National Gas Company (NGC) is 
mandated to promote investment in the gas-based industries. Also, the Point Lisas Port 
Development Corporation Limited (Plipdeco) is responsible for the management of the 
Point Lisas Industrial Estate. To this end, it carries out the requisite maintenance of the 
industrial estate; engages in cargo handling activities at the port; and undertakes the 
management of the harbour. The Tourism and Industrial Development Corporation 
(TIDCO) is another organisation mandated to stimulate industrial activity in the country. 
It is responsible for the development of the non-oil sector and administers the investment 
incentives offered to the investor. 
It is noteworthy that there appears to be little co-ordination of activity among 
these organisations. The NGC operates in isolation of the activities of Plipdeco and 
TIDCO. In some cases, this results in duplication of activities. Thus, both Plipdeco and 
the NGC market the country as a site for gas-intensive activities. To this end, both 
Plipdeco and the NGC individually attempted to expand the infrastructural facilities 
offered to the foreign investor. One result of this lack of co-ordination of activity was the 
NGC's unsuccessful attempt at the creation of an industrial estate at La Brea. It is 
noteworthy that Plipdeco recently acquired neighbouring tracts of land for the expansion 
of the Point Lisas Industrial Estate. Moreover, TIDCO's efforts at stimulating the 
development of the non-oil sector is not conducted in concert with the NGC's efforts of 
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developing the natural gas sector. Thus, these two organisations fail to capture the 
synergies that could arise from a joint marketing strategy. One activity that has been 
adversely affected by this lack of co-ordination of activity is the development of the 
domestic firm in the natural gas sector. It appears that none of these institutions 
aggressively attempts to stimulate the development of this activity. 
10.4.4 H 7: The Investment Incentive Hypothesis 
The investment incentive package offered by the Trinidad-Tobago government 
played an important role in the decision of these seven MNEs to establish and continue 
operations in the country. The government offers tax holidays of a maximum of ten years 
to highly capital-intensive enterprises. Capital-intensive enterprises are those with capital 
investment of a minimum of US$ 8 million. These capital-intensive enterprises are also 
exempted from the payment of value-added taxes. In addition, the country offers import 
duty concessions on plant, equipment, raw material and intermediate goods. Further, 
firms enjoy free repatriation of profits and dividends. Moreover, enterprises are granted 
an initial allowance of 50 per cent of their capital cost of plant and machinery. Also, firms 
that export outside of CARICOM are entitled to an allowance for their export sales. 
Finally, Trinidad enjoys double taxation treaties with Canada, Germany, United Kingdom 
and the US [Price Waterhouse 1995: 35-44]. 
It seems that the preferred investment incentives were tax holidays and duty 
concessions on plant, equipment, raw material and intermediate goods. The manager of 
Atlantic LNG stated that the most important investment incentives were tax holidays, 
duty free importation of machinery and equipment, and exemptions of withholding tax on 
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dividends. 38 Similarly, the manager of Arcardian noted that tax holidays were important 
to the decision to establish operations in Trinidad. He revealed that his company benefits 
from the double taxation treaty that Trinidad enjoys with the US. He said that the tax 
rates in Trinidad are much lower than those in the US. The managers of Caribbean 
Methanol Company also agreed that tax holidays were important to the decision to 
establish operations in Trinidad. They noted that the waiver of withholding tax on 
dividends and duty exemptions on equipment were also important to their investment 
decision. Conversely, Ispat does not benefit from tax holidays. However, the favoured 
investment incentives were import duties exemptions on raw materials and the export 
allowance. The latter incentive was especially important to the company's decision to 
continue operations in the country since it exports more than 85 per cent of its output. It 
is noteworthy that none of these firms cited free repatriation of profits and dividends as 
influencing their decision to establish and continue operations in Trinidad. It was only in 
1993 that Trinidad-Tobago liberalised its foreign exchange markets. Yet, these firms did 
not perceive this investment incentive to be important to their decision to invest in 
Trinidad. 
10.4.5 H 9: The "Double Diamond" Hypothesis 
The "Double Diamond" hypothesis clearly explains the factors influencing the 
locational decisions of the seven MNEs operating in Trinidad's natural gas sector. The 
strategic management style these firms adopted for their Trinidadian operations can be 
illustrated by Quadrant 4 of Diagram 10.2. 
38 The LNG partners assumed the expenses arising from the relocation of the LNG plant from the La 
Brea industrial estate to Point Fortin. They were thus given additional concessions by the government. 
These concessions affected the length of the tax holiday; depreciation allowances; and interest on 
withholding tax. See Carib-Latin Energy Consultant, 20 (January-February 1996): 27. 
317 
Diagram 10.2 The Role of the Trinidadian Operations in the Corporate Strategy 
of the Gas-Intensive MNEs 
Role of Host Country 
National Diamond on 
Development of Core 
Competencies of Gas- 
Intensive MNEs 
Integration of Trinidadian Operations with Other 
Operations of the Gas-Intensive MNEs 
Low 
None 
High 
Diamond 
Network 
High 
1 2 
3 4 
5 6 
Source: Adapted from Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Multinational Strategic 
Management: An Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework. " Management International 
Review 33 Special Issue (1993), Figure 4. 
The Trinidadian operations were an integral part of the corporate strategy of the 
seven MNEs studied. Trinidad was initially viewed as a location for low-cost, gas- 
intensive activities. However, the NGC has adopted a unique gas pricing system which 
allows these firms to remain in operation even when the industry conditions are 
depressed. Moreover, their Trinidadian investments are extremely capital intensive. Thus, 
these investments have a high proportion of sunk costs which prevents the MNEs from 
freely relocating their operations to other gas-intensive locales. Further, as Diagram 10.3 
demonstrates, several elements of the Trinidadian diamond impact positively on the 
development of the core competencies of these seven MNEs. These elements will be 
discussed in the following section. 
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Diagram 103 Double Diamond Approach to the Natural Gas 
Industry of Trinidad-Tobago 
R&D Centres 
Supporting Infrastructure Machinery and Equipment Suppliers 
Natural Gas Pipelines 
Tankers 
US and Engineers 
European Capital Markets 
Resources DR1 Technology 
US and European Gas 
Intensive Firms 
Competitively pric 
Trinidadian natural gas 
Resources Skilled Labour 
Strategic Location 
US and Commercial 
European Users of methanol, 
Customers ammonia, LNG 
Steel Users 
US and European Government 
Lome and CBI 
Trinidadian Investment Incentive 
Government 
Double taxation treaties 
NGC 
National Skills Development Programme 
Point Lisas Industrial Estate 
Supporting Electricity Supply 
Water Supply 
Infrastructure 
Repair & Maintenance Companies 
Engineering Institute 
Downstream Steel Companies 
Source: Adapted from Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Strategic Management: An 
Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework, Management International Review 33 Special Issue 
(1993), Figure 3 
As discussed above, Trinidad was initially perceived as a low-cost location for 
gas-intensive activities. However, the NGC has adopted an innovative gas pricing 
mechanism which allows the MNEs to remain profitable even under depressed industry 
conditions. This gas pricing system has impacted favourably on the foreign investment 
decisions of the companies studied. Many MNEs attributed it to their decision to establish 
and continue operations in Trinidad. In addition, Trinidad enjoys a strategic geographic 
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location. Most of the major markets are easily accessed from this country. It is 
noteworthy that the advantages provided by an innovative pricing system and a strategic 
geographic location are unsustainable. It seems that Trinidad's most formidable 
competitor, neighbouring Venezuela, has also implemented this pricing system. 
Moreover, Venezuela also enjoys the same strategic geographic advantage as Trinidad. 
Nonetheless, Trinidad has not only relied on an innovative gas pricing system and 
its strategic geographic location to attract gas-intensive foreign investment. Its labour 
force is highly skilled. It possesses a labour force that seems to have mastered the 
technologies needed to operate plants with process operations. Indeed, two companies 
studied (Arcardian Trinidad Limited and Caribbean Methanol Company) were totally 
operated and managed by locals. Moreover, several of these companies, notably 
Caribbean Ispat Limited and Arcardian Trinidad Limited, have adopted comprehensive 
training schemes. The training programmes implemented by Arcardian Trinidad Limited 
is worthy of mention. This firm has structured training programmes for all categories of 
its workforce. 39 It offers a two-year engineering training programme. The recruits are 
usually drawn from the local university. The company also offers a training programme 
for process operators that lasts for five years. The trainees are normally graduates of the 
process operator course offered at the local technical school. In addition, the company 
sends its managerial staff to its corporate headquarters for training. It also uses the 
services of the local management centre for the training of its executives. 
39 It seems that these training programmes have been in place since the establishment of the state- 
owned company, Fertrin in 1980. The employees who initially worked at this plant emerged from 
Federation Chemicals (a joint venture between the government and WR Grace), the oil industry and the 
electrical company. Apparently, these workers, imbued with a strong sense of nationalism, sought to 
ensure that there will be a supply of well trained workers in the energy sector. It is noteworthy that the 
Process Operators course offered at the local technical institute was developed by the NGC. Mr. 
Praskash Boochon, Arcardian Trinidad, interview by author, tape recording, Trinidad, 24 July 1996. 
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The training schemes offered by these companies are complemented by a 
structured skills development programme introduced by the government. This is the 
National Skills Development Programme. This programme was a response to the growing 
shortage of skilled workers in the energy sector as well as the inadequacy of the existing 
training programmes offered at the local technical institutes. 40 The National Skills 
Development Programme is based on the apprenticeship system practised in Germany. 
The accreditation and certification for this programme is under the German national 
system. Fitz Werner of Germany, a sister company of Ferrostaal, is supplier of technical 
assistance, training and equipment for this programme. A local organisation, the Metal 
Industries Company, is the implementing agency. The areas earmarked for development 
include the disciplines of metals and electrical engineering, and advanced technology. 
This programme intends to graduate approximately 1100 persons annually. It also seeks 
to provide continuous training for workers employed in the energy sector. To this end, it 
plans to offer part-time evening classes and specialised seminars to an estimated 4,000 
persons [Gasco News, July 1995: 15]. Further, it seems that the policy makers understood 
the importance of increasing linkages between the business sector and the technical 
institutes [World Bank 1993: xxvi; Kanter 1995: 261-266]. The National Skills 
Development Programme relies heavily on the support and the initiative of the private 
sector. At present, foreign companies investing in the country's natural gas sector are 
mandated to invest in the development of the skills of the labour force. Thus, one of the 
40 It is appears that the facilities at the local technical and vocational institutes are obsolete. It was 
revealed that students are being trained on equipment that is more than thirty years old. In addition, the 
training programmes do not include courses on new technologies such as CAD/CAM or electronic 
transmissions for automobiles. This information was obtained from Mr. Rudy Serrette, former officer 
with the National Skills Development Programme, interview by author, tape recording, Trinidad, 17 
October 1996. 
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conditions of the Atlantic LNG investment was its development of a US$ 8 million 
training centre. 
Further, it is noteworthy that the NGC has sought to deepen its ties with the local 
university. In 1994, the Faculty of Engineering established the Engineering Institute. The 
NGC provided the initial funding needed to establish this institute [Gasco News, 
December 1995: 5]. The Engineering Institute uses the resources (human and capital) of 
the Faculty of Engineering for industry-related research and development, training and 
projects [ibid., 2-5]. One of the MNEs studied has successfully used the services of this 
institute. In addition, one MNE utilised the services of the local industrial research 
institute. It designed an environment management system for this company. 
Some of the MNEs stated that they use the services of local maintenance and 
repair firms. Indeed, it is part of Plipdeco's mandate to encourage firms that provide 
support to these gas-intensive MNEs. The Point Lisas Industrial Estate houses 
approximately 15 large petrochemical plants. However, it also has 75 firms that are 
engaged in service-type activities for these companies. These services offered by these 
companies range from instrumentation for the maintenance and repair of electronic 
equipment to janitorial services. In addition, it appears that the government has recently 
sought to stimulate the development of local companies that provide support to firms in 
the natural gas sector. Indeed, one of the government's conditions for the development of 
the LNG project is that the foreign joint venture partners spend US$ 100 million on the 
services of local companies. To this end, these MNEs are using the services of local 
companies during the construction phase of the project. They also intend to use local 
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companies for some of the routine maintenance work needed when the plant is 
operational. 41 
It seems that the downstream activities have emerged from one of these foreign 
investments. There are approximately fifteen local firms engaged in the downstream steel 
industry. These firms are engaged in a myriad of activities including the production of 
electrodes, nails, commercial fasteners and merchant items. All obtain their raw material 
from the Caribbean Ispat Limited (CIL). However, these firms consume a mere 5 per cent 
of CIL's total production. Ispat appears to encourage the development of this local 
industry. The company, through its involvement in the local Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce, has suggested possible activities for the development of the downstream steel 
industry [Trinidad Express, 12 August 1996: 29]. 
There were elements of Trinidad's diamond that were noticeably weak. Several 
managers described the facilities offered at the Point Lisas Industrial Estate as world 
class. Paradoxically, however, this industrial estate highlights the limitations of the 
government's strategy of developing an industrial enclave without undertaking the 
necessary improvements in the general infrastructure. Thus, several managers complained 
that the water and electricity services were inefficient. Moreover, some stated that the 
airline services were inadequate. Further, the MNEs that located gas-intensive activity 
outside of the Point Lisas Industrial Estate have to make considerable investments in 
improving the quality of roads, and the electricity and water supply in this location. In 
addition, while the bureaucracy appears to operate with efficacy, there seems to be a lack 
of co-ordination in the activities of the organisations mandated to stimulate industrial 
¢' This information was obtained from one of the executives of the Atlantic LNG Company of Trinidad 
and Tobago. Mr. Steven Haynes, Vice President, Finance and Administration, Atlantic LNG Company 
of Trinidad and Tobago, interview by author, tape recording, Trinidad, 26 July 1996. 
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activity in the country. This could only result in duplication of activity and a needless 
waste of resources (human and financial). 
It appears that the Trinidad government has had a fairly positive impact on its 
diamond. Its investment incentive system plays an important role in attracting foreign 
investment. The investment incentives favoured by the seven MNEs studied were tax 
holidays and duty concessions on raw materials, equipment and intermediate goods. 
Moreover, the government through its establishment of the National Skills Development 
programme, is seeking to provide the calibre and quantum of workers demanded by the 
natural gas sector. 
10.5 Modes of Market Entry used in the Natural Gas Sector of Trinidad-Tobago 
This study suggests that the MNE involved in intra-firm trade in Trinidad- 
Tobago will use a wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of market entry [Teece 1983; 
Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Gomes-Casseres 1989,1990]. It is also posited that the 
level of international experience of a firm influences its selection of a market entry 
mode. The study contends that the MNE with international experience uses a wholly 
owned subsidiary as its market entry mode [Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne 1977,1990; Davidson 1980; Li 1994; Loree and Guisinger 
1995; Tan and Vertinsky 1996). In addition, it argues that the cultural distance 
between the home and host country plays an important role in the MNE's selection of 
a market entry mode [Kogut and Singh 1988; Padmanabhan and Cho 1996]. Further, 
it posits that there is a positive relationship between the resource-seeking MNE and its 
use of minority and 50-50 joint ventures [Oman 1984,1988; Franko 1989]. Finally, 
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the study posits that the Trinidadian government plays a critical role over the MNE's 
selection of a market entry mode in the natural gas sector [Oman 1984,1988; Franko 
1989; Gomes-Casseres 1990]. 
10.5.1 H 10: The Intra-Firm Trade Hypothesis 
Only one MNE in this case study was involved in intra-firm trade. This was 
Arcardian Corporation. As was previously mentioned, the ammonia produced by its 
Trinidadian operations was sent to its US nitrogen plants for further processing. This 
company used a wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of market entry in Trinidad. Two 
of the MNEs studied marketed the output produced by their Trinidadian operations. 
However, this activity was not considered to be intra-firm trade. 42 
10.5.2 H 11: The International Experience Hypothesis 
Many of the MNEs studied possessed a wealth of experience operating in foreign 
markets. Yet these firms did not use a wholly owned subsidiary as their mode of entry 
into Trinidad. Amoco Corporation, British Gas plc, Cabot Corporation, and to some 
extent, Ferrostaal and Methanex, are highly internationalised companies. They possess 
what has been termed "worldwide experience" Li [1994]. However, their mode of entry 
used in Trinidad was a minority joint venture. It appears that the quantum of initial 
42 It is instructive to note that the transaction costs theory explains the firms' selection of minority joint 
ventures. Atlantic LNG and Caribbean Methanol could be described as a "link" joint ventures. In this 
arrangement, the joint venture partners are involved in different stages of the production process of the 
good. The presence of inefficiencies in the market, for example, the high transaction costs that may 
arise in the distribution of commodities - methanol and LNG - is a necessary condition for the joint 
venture to emerge. The equity participation of the distributor, in this case, Methanex and Cabot LNG, 
allows the firm to avoid bargaining stalemates that may result from the presence of a limited number of 
distributors. For further discussion, see Jean-Francois Hennart, "A Transaction Costs Theory of Equity 
Joint Ventures, " Strategic Management Journal 9 (1988): 361-378. 
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investment demanded by the Trinidadian venture influenced their choice of market entry 
mode [Stopford and Wells 1972: 118; Vernon 1983: 202; Gomes-Casseres 1990: 12]. The 
Atlantic LNG project, which is jointly owned by Amoco Corporation, British Gas plc, 
Cabot Corporation, Enagas and the NGC is a US$ 1000 million investment [World Gas 
Intelligence 1996: 10]. Evidently, this project was too costly for any of these firms to 
enter this investment alone. In contrast, Arcardian Corporation, the least internationalised 
of the firms studied, used the mode of a wholly owned subsidiary to enter Trinidad. The 
Trinidadian investment was the first that Arcardian Corporation had made abroad. Its 
manager stated that this investment was "too attractive" to share with another company. 
Clearly, Arcadian's implementation of a strategy of internationalisation outweighed any 
concerns that its managers may have had about their lack of worldwide and country 
experience. 
10.5.3 H 12: The Cultural Distance Hypothesis 
It is unclear whether the cultural distance between Trinidad-Tobago and the home 
countries of the MNEs influenced their selection of market entry mode. These firms used 
a variety of market entry modes in Trinidad. Two MNEs acquired the privatised assets of 
state-owned companies, while five were involved in minority joint ventures. It is thus 
remarkable that none of the managers cited the cultural dissimilarities between their home 
country and Trinidad as influencing the selection of international entry mode. Indeed, for 
several of the MNEs studied, the cultural distance between their home country and 
Trinidad was not large. Amoco Corporation, Cabot Corporation and Arcardian 
Corporation are US owned. Moreover, the home country of British Gas is the UK. 
Indeed, Trinidad-Tobago is a former colony of the UK. Hence, there are few cultural 
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dissimilarities between Trinidad and the home countries of these MNEs. Trinidad is 
English-speaking and lies in fairly close proximity to the US. However, with the 
exception of Arcardian Corporation, all choose the mode of greenfield, minority joint 
ventures. Yet none of these companies cited cultural distance as influencing their 
selection of a market entry mode. 
Curiously enough, the MNE whose home country seemed to be culturally 
dissimilar from Trinidad, selected a wholly owned acquisition as its international market 
entry mode. The cultural distance between Ispat, an Indian company, and Trinidad is 
fairly large. However, Ispat's Trinidadian operations is a wholly owned by the parent 
company. 43 By contrast, it seemed that cultural distance may have influenced Ferrostaal's 
selection of a market entry mode. Ferrostaal, which is a German company, used a 
minority owned joint venture to engage in methanol production in Trinidad. Its manager 
stated that his parent company always enters foreign markets with a local partner. 
Apparently, the local partner, CL Financial provided Ferrostaal with knowledge of the 
local economy, politics and culture [Beamish 1988,1994]. In addition, CL Financial 
provided production technology since Ferrostaal's core business was not methanol 
production. 
10.5.4 H 13: The Reduced Equity Modes in the Primary Sector Hypothesis 
It is clear that most of these firms, which were all resource-seeking, selected the 
mode of minority joint ventures in the natural gas sector. Interestingly enough, the 
43 It should be noted that Ispat, under a leasing arrangement, operated the iron and steel plant for five 
years before its purchase. Thus, it could be argued that the company had ample time to resolve any 
possible managerial difficulties that may arise from it operating in a culturally distant location. 
Moreover, to some extent, Trinidad-Tobago may not be culturally dissimilar from India since almost 
fifty per cent of its population are ethnically East Indians. 
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reasons for these firms' use of minority joint ventures does not appear to be consistent 
with the explanations advanced by the extant literature. Indeed, they were not using low- 
technology in their operations in Trinidad [Oman 1984; Franko 1989]. Moreover, several 
were not newcomers to the industry [Stopford and Wells 1971; Oman 1984,1988; Franko 
1989; Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992]. In fact, several of them, notably British Gas plc, 
Methanex and Amoco, were industry leaders. In addition, this reduced equity mode was 
not country-specific [Oman 1984; Dunning 1988; Pan 1996]. Not only European firms 
used minority joint venture agreements. Several US MNE, such as Cabot LNG and 
Amoco also selected this form of foreign involvement. The main reason for these firms' 
use of minority joint ventures in the natural gas sector appears to be finance. As noted 
earlier, many of these investments were heavily capital intensive. Thus, the firms forced 
to conclude these agreements in order to become involved in what many considered to be 
a strategic investment. 
10.5.5 H 14: The Role of Government Hypothesis 
The Trinidadian government played a critical role in these firms' selection of 
market entry mode used in its strategic sector. Interestingly, the government's 
intervention was not in the manner as postulated by Oman [1988]. These firms 
investment in the natural gas sector was a response to a change in the government's 
policy towards state ownership of this sector. As was discussed in Section 10.2, it was 
only in the late 1980s that the government reversed its policy on state ownership of the 
`commanding heights' of the economy. The state's role is presently limited to facilitating 
and regulating industrial activity. Most importantly, the government also relaxed its 
policy on foreign, wholly owned subsidiaries in the natural gas sector. To this end, it 
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privatised several of the state-owned companies in this sector. Indeed, two of the MNEs 
studied acquired the privatised assets of state-owned companies and established wholly 
owned subsidiaries. The other MNEs developed green field investments. These 
investments were actively courted by the NGC. It is interesting to note that that the NGC 
only became involved in one of the companies studied at the request of its foreign joint 
venture partners [LNG Observer, Winter 1993: 23]. These foreign investments are 
welcomed by the government since it is seeking to monetarise its natural gas reserves. 
Faced with a deteriorating economic situation, it is thus vulnerable to the MNE's 
demands [Gomes-Casseres 1990: 15]. Hence, it exercised no control over the mode of 
market entry that these seven MNEs used to enter Trinidad-Tobago. 
329 
10.6 Conclusions 
As Table 10.5 shows, eight of the thirteen hypotheses were fully supported by this 
case study. 
Table 10.5 The Results of the testing of the Hypotheses in the Natural Gas Sector of 
Trinidad-Tobago 
Hypotheses Results 
HI. No relationship exists between the MNE's use of its Not fully supported 
unique advantage and the presence of domestic competitors. 
H2. There is a positive relationship between follow-the- Not fully supported 
leader' investment behaviour of MNEs and the use of low- 
cost factors. 
H3. There is a positive relationship between the firm 's use Supported 
of its unique advantages and the locational advantage 
variables. 
H4. There is a positive relationship between the MNE and Supported 
the decision to establish and continue operations because of 
low-cost factors. 
H5. There is a positive relationship between the export- Supported 
seeking and resource-seeking M7VE and its use of 
preferential trading agreements. 
H6. There is a positive relationship between the presence of Supported 
an export processing zone and the export-seeking MNE. 
H7. No relationship exists between the investment incentives Not supported 
offered by the Trinidadian governments and the MNE's 
decision to establish and continue operations in Trinidad. 
H9. There is a positive relationship between the MNE's use Supported 
of its home country's `diamond' and the `diamond' of 
Trinidad. 
H10. There is a positive relationship between intro firm Supported 
trade and the use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
HI 1. There is a positive relationship between the MNE with Not supported 
international experience and its use of a wholly owned 
subsidiary. 
H12. There is a positive relationship between cultural Not supported 
distance and the use of a wholly owned greenfield 
investment and a joint venture agreement. 
H13. There is a positive relationship between the resource- Supported 
seeking MNE and minority and 50-50 joint venture 
agreements. 
H14. There is a positive relationship between the Supported 
government policy towards mode of market entry used by 
foreign firms in the primary sector and the resource-seeking 
MNE. 
Most importantly, the case study also provided rich detail on the factors that 
influence the resource-seeking MNE's motivations for engaging in foreign investment, its 
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locational choice, and its mode of market entry in the natural gas sector of Trinidad- 
Tobago. These issues will be discussed in the following section. 
" The Motivations For FDI in the Gas Sector of Trinidad-Tobago 
It seems that the monopolistic advantage hypothesis (HI) does not fully explain 
what motivated these seven firms to establish gas-intensive activities in Trinidad. These 
firms did not use their monopolistic advantages to compete with local firms. In fact, they 
did not perceive the domestic firms to be their competitors. It is noteworthy, however, 
that two MNEs used their monopolistic advantage in production technology to compete 
with each other. Further, it appears that the follow-the-leader hypothesis (H 2) does not 
fully explain the motivations for all seven firms to establish operations in Trinidad. 
However, two MNEs appeared to be engaged in oligopolistic rivalry. They seemed to 
have followed each other into a joint venture agreement. It is noteworthy that Dunning's 
eclectic paradigm appears to be a likely explanation for the decision of these seven MNEs 
to establish and to continue operations in Trinidad. These firms all sought to combine 
their core competencies (production technology and marketing skills) with the locational 
advantages (competitively priced natural gas and strategic location) of the country. 
" The Choice of Locating Gas-Intensive Activity in Trinidad-Tobago 
It appears that the low-cost natural gas played an important role in the decision of 
the seven MNEs to establish and continue operations in Trinidad. It is significant to note 
that the innovative gas pricing system implemented by the NGC has been influential in 
sustaining this investment. Also, it seems that these seven MNEs were not motivated to 
establish and continue operations in Trinidad because of the preferential trading 
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agreements the country enjoys with the USA, Europe and Canada. While several MNEs 
benefited from these trading agreements, none stated that they played an important role in 
their decision to establish and continue operations in Trinidad. In addition, while 
Trinidad-Tobago does not have EPZs, it did establish an industrial enclave at the Point 
Lisas Industrial Estate. As several managers emphasised, this estate has played an 
important role in their decision to establish operations in the country. Nonetheless, there 
were several factors in the general infrastructure that were deficient. The most notable 
ones were the reliability of the supply of water and electricity. In addition, it appears that 
the airline service is inadequate. Further, this study suggests that the investment 
incentives offered by the Trinidad government played an important role in these firms' 
decision to establish operations in the country. The preferred incentives appear to be tax 
holidays and duty free imports of raw material and equipment. Finally, the "Double 
Diamond" hypothesis (H 9) seems to explain the factors influencing these seven MNEs to 
establish and continue operations in Trinidad-Tobago. The "Double Diamond" 
framework revealed the integral role that Trinidad plays in the corporate strategies of the 
seven MNEs. 
" The Modes of Market Entry used in the Natural Sector of Trinidad-Tobago 
It is significant to note that a few of the theories on market entry mode were not 
supported by this analysis. There was only one firm involved in intra-firm trade in this 
case study. It is noteworthy that it chose a wholly owned subsidiary to enter Trinidad- 
Tobago. However, it appears that the firms that possess experience operating in foreign 
markets did not select a wholly owned subsidiary to enter Trinidad-Tobago. Instead, they 
formed minority joint venture arrangements. It seems that the costs of the investment 
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preclude their selection of a wholly owned subsidiary. In addition, cultural distance was 
not an influential factor in most of these seven firms' choice of a market entry mode. The 
only exception was Ferrostaal which entered a joint venture arrangement with a local and 
a foreign partner. Further, five of these firms used minority joint ventures in the natural 
gas sector. Their reasons for selecting this market entry mode appear to be financial. 
Finally, these firms' selection of a market entry mode was indeed influenced by the 
policy of the Trinidadian government. Faced with declining oil reserves and the need to 
monetarise its gas reserves, the government was vulnerable to the demands of the MNEs. 
Hence, it exercised no control over their choice of market entry mode. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean: A Cross-Industry Case Study 
Analysis 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a cross-industry analysis of the foreign investment decisions 
made by the 15 MNEs investigated for the purpose of the case studies. To this end, it 
analyses the factors that affect their motivations for FDI, their choice of location, and 
their selection of a market entry mode. The main objectives of this chapter are to 
increase the generalisability, deepen the understanding, and provide fuller 
explanations of the factors influencing the foreign investment decisions of the fifteen 
MNEs that operate in the three Caribbean countries studied [Miles and Huberman 
1994: 172-173]. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the generalisability of this cross- 
industry analysis is limited by the differences in the industries and countries studied. 
11.2 The Motivations for FDI in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago 
As Table 11.1 demonstrates, several of the hypotheses advanced on the 
motivations for FDI in the three Caribbean countries were supported by the three case 
studies. Indeed, it seems that Dunning's eclectic paradigm satisfactorily explains the 
motivations for FDI in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago. In addition, to some 
extent, the hypothesis advanced from the monopolistic advantage theory was 
supported by the analysis. The analysis also appears to suggest that the hypothesis 
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developed from Knickerbocker's follow-the-leader theory does not explain the 
motivations for FDI in the three Caribbean countries studied. 
Table 11.1 The Results of the Testing of the Hypotheses on Motivations for FDI 
in the Caribbean 
Hypothesis 
Country Jamaica Barbados Trinidad-Tobago 
Sector Apparel Information Natural Gas 
Services 
No relationship exists 
between the MNE's use of its 
unique advantages and the 
presence of domestic ?  ? 
competitors. 
There is a positive 
relationship between follow- 
the-leader' investment 
behaviour of MNEs and the X X ? 
use of low-cost factors. 
There is a positive 
relationship between the 
firm's use of its unique 
advantages and the locational    
advantage variables. 
11.2.1. The Monopolistic Advantage Hypothesis 
The hypothesis, which was developed from Hymer's monopolistic advantage 
theory, states that no relationship exists between the MNE's use of its unique 
advantage and the presence of domestic competitors. This hypothesis was supported 
by the analysis. The fifteen MNEs studied did not perceive the local firms to be their 
competitors. Although there were locally owned firms operating in the three industries 
examined, none of them was a source of competition to the MNEs studied. It appears 
that the local firms in the Caribbean are not internationally competitive [Worrell 1987; 
Watson 1990]. Indeed, in Barbados, the domestic firms in the information service 
industry outnumbered the foreign firms [Nurse 1996a: 8]. Yet, none of them posed a 
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competitive threat to the four MNEs that operated in the information service industry 
of Barbados. 
Interestingly, it seems that in two of the industries examined, MNEs used their 
firm-specific assets to compete with other MNEs. In the apparel industry of Jamaica, 
the four MNEs studied used their firm-specific asset of human resource management 
to compete with other apparel MNEs. As was discussed in Chapter 8, the main source 
of competitive advantage in the apparel industry is low-cost labour. Thus, the main 
motivation for the four apparel MNEs investing in Jamaica was its relatively low-cost 
labour. However, the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Jamaican labour force meant 
that productivity rates were critical to the operations of these firms. Moreover, there 
was a paucity of workers with managerial skills in the country [Krammer 1991: 160; 
World Bank 1993b: xxv]. Thus, the four MNEs studied were compelled to use their 
firm-specific asset of human resource management to compete with one another for 
access to low-cost labour in Jamaica. They were all seeking to attract and maintain a 
well motivated, low-cost work force. 
Alternatively, three MNEs operating in the natural gas sector of Trinidad- 
Tobago used their firm-specific assets to compete with other foreign firms in this 
sector. The firm-specific asset that was mainly used in competition was production 
technology. Ispat International used its unique advantage in the direct reduced iron 
production process to compete with other MNEs that also were seeking to acquire the 
privatised iron and steel company. Relatedly, Amoco Corporation and British Gas plc 
used firm-specific assets to compete with each other. They were competing for control 
over the LNG investment in Trinidad. These MNEs perceived this investment to be 
strategic. Thus, they both sought to be gas suppliers to the LNG plant. To this end, 
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they used their firm-specific asset in gas exploration to compete with each other for 
control over the investment. 
Hence, the monopolistic advantage theory as posited by Hymer [1976] is not 
applicable to the three Caribbean countries studied. These countries simply do not 
possess locally owned firms which are internationally competitive. However, it seems 
that this theory can be used to explain the investment behaviour of some of the MNEs 
involved in export-oriented production in these countries. Several of the MNEs 
engaged in FDI in Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago because they perceived that they 
possessed superior advantages (human resources management and production 
technology) over existing MNEs competitors. 
11.2.2 The `Follow-the-Leader' Hypothesis 
The follow-the-leader theory does not appear to explain the investment 
behaviour of most of the MNEs studied. The eight MNEs that operated in Jamaica and 
Barbados sought to become more globally competitive by locating their labour- 
intensive processes in countries with low-cost labour. The offshore investment in the 
apparel industry of Jamaica was facilitated by the enactment of the CBI. In Barbados, 
the catalysts were the technological advances in the telecommunications industry 
together with the automation and computerisation of office work. It appears that many 
of the firms in the apparel and information service industries implemented this global 
strategy [Hoffman 1985; Posthuma 1987; Steele 1988; Pearson and Mieter 1993]. 
However, most did not relocate operations to Jamaica and Barbados. Indeed, the 
managers of these eight MNEs stated that while they followed their competitors 
offshore, they did not follow them into these two countries. Offshore investments in 
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the apparel and information service industries were made throughout the Caribbean 
and Latin American region. These investments were not confined to Jamaica and 
Barbados. 
It is thus questionable whether the follow-the-leader theory could be used as 
an explanation for the investment behaviour of firms operating in small, developing 
countries. In 1995, the size of the labour force of Barbados and Jamaica was 126,000 
and 1,150,000, respectively. Hence, the possibilities of MNEs following their 
competitors to invest in labour-intensive activities in each of these two countries 
appear to be remote. Neither Jamaica nor Barbados possesses the labour force to 
satisfy the manpower requirements of these firms. 
Nonetheless, this theory seems to explain the investment behaviour of two 
MNEs operating in the natural gas sector of Trinidad-Tobago. These two firms, that 
were rivals in the domestic gas market, competed for control over the first LNG 
investment made in this country. To this end, they both sought to become gas 
suppliers to the LNG plant. Only one was successful. However, both are presently 
joint venture partners in the LNG company. It appears that the LNG investment was 
considered to be strategic. Hence, neither gas company would have allowed the other 
to invest in this project without its involvement. 
It seems that Knickerbocker's follow-the-leader theory may explain the 
investment behaviour of some firms in the natural resource sector [Vernon 1983: 
202]. However, it does not appear to explain the motivations for MNEs investing in 
labour-intensive activities in small, developing countries. 
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11.2.3 The `Eclectic Paradigm' Hypothesis 
The eclectic paradigm appears to explain what motivated the fifteen MNEs to 
engage in FDI in the three Caribbean countries studied. These firms sought to 
combine selected firm-specific assets with the locational endowments of these 
countries. It is significant that most of these MNEs tended to use the same firm- 
specific assets in combination with similar locational advantages of the countries (See 
Diagram 11.1). 
Diagram 11.1 The Application of the Eclectic Paradigm to Jamaica, Barbados 
and Trinidad-Tobago 
Low -cost 
Production labour 
Technology Low-cost 
natural gas 
Marketing Strategic 
Skills pp- Location 
As Diagram 11.1 shows, the fifteen MNEs tended to combine their core 
competencies in production technology and marketing with the factor variables (low- 
cost labour and natural gas) and the strategic location of the three Caribbean countries. 
In general, the objective of their operations in these three countries was to achieve 
cost competitiveness. 
Indeed, in Jamaica, the four apparel MNEs, to varying degrees, integrated their 
core competencies in textile manufacture, garment design, product engineering, 
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marketing and distributing with the low-cost, semi-skilled labour and strategic 
location of the country. Most of the apparel produced in Jamaica is directed to the 
middle segments of the US market [Steele 1988: 10]. This was also the case with the 
four MNEs studied. Their apparel products were aimed at the lower to middle 
segments of the market where price is the main determinant of competition. Thus, the 
low-cost labour of Jamaica played a critical role in these firms' cost competitiveness. 
Moreover, Jamaica's close proximity to the US meant that these MNEs could 
maintain fairly low levels of inventories and thus reduce warehousing expenses. In 
addition, they gained the advantage of speed since they could quickly respond to the 
needs of the customer. Further, Jamaica's proximity to the US allowed for the 
implementation of `quick response' systems. These systems were used by two of the 
M, NEs studied. 
Similarly, the four information service MNEs in Barbados combined their core 
competencies in production technology (data conversion, information processing, 
software development) and marketing with the low-cost, skilled labour force of the 
country. These firms emerged from industries such as the airlines, publishing and 
software development. However, they all sought to achieve cost savings by relocating 
their labour-intensive activities to relatively low-wage Barbados. Further, Barbados' 
close proximity to the US, together with its time zone equivalence to the eastern 
seaboard of the US, facilitated quick turn-around times. 
The seven MNEs in Trinidad-Tobago, in varying degrees, sought to combine 
their core competencies in production technology (direct reduced iron process, gas 
exploration) and marketing with the competitively priced natural gas of the country. 
As was discussed in Chapter 10, the products produced by most of these firms are 
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commodities. Thus, price is the main determinant of competition in the markets in 
which they operate. Trinidad's competitively priced natural gas allowed the firms to 
achieve cost competitiveness. Moreover, its strategic location allowed the seven 
MNEs to easily access most of the major global markets. 
Interestingly, the application of Dunning's eclectic paradigm to FDI 
undertaken in these three Caribbean countries has unintentionally highlighted their 
limited success in progressing to the development of "advanced factors" [Porter 1990: 
77-80]. These countries still offer the MNEs "basic factors" of low-cost, semi-skilled 
labour, natural resources (natural gas) and location. They have achieved limited 
success in developing advanced factors such as a highly educated work force [World 
Bank 1993b]. 
11.3 The Choice of Locating FDI in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago 
As Table 11.2 shows, most of the hypotheses that were advanced from the 
location literature were supported by the three case studies. Overwhelming support 
was found for the hypotheses drawn from the `Double Diamond' and the low-cost 
factor arguments. Conversely, the hypothesis advanced from the theories on the 
investment incentives was not supported by the qualitative analysis. Furthermore, 
there was limited evidence that EPZs play an important role in attracting FDI into the 
three Caribbean countries. Finally, there was mixed support on the issue of the 
attractiveness of preferential trading agreements on the initial investment decision as 
well as the decision to continue operations in these countries. 
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Table 11.2. The Results of the Testing of the Hypotheses on the Locational 
Choices for FDI in the Caribbean 
Hypothesis 
Country Jamaica Barbados Trinidad- 
Sector Apparel Information Tobago 
Services Natural Gas 
There is a positive 
relationship between the MNE 
and the decision to establish 
and continue operations 
because of low-cost factors.    
There is a positive 
relationship between the MNE 
and its use of preferential 
trading agreements.  X ? . There is a positive 
relationship between the 
presence of an EPZ and the 
export-seeking MNE  ? ? 
No relationship exists 
between the investment 
incentives offered by the 
Caribbean governments and 
the MVE's decision to 
establish and continue 
operations in the Caribbean. X X X 
There is a positive 
relationship between the 
MNE's use of its home 
country's `diamond and the 
`diamond' of the Caribbean.    
11.3.1 The Low Cost Factors Hypothesis 
As noted earlier, the competitive advantage that these three Caribbean 
countries offered to the fifteen MNEs studied was based on low-cost factors. Indeed, 
Jamaica was regarded as a site for low-cost, semi-skilled labour. Similarly, Barbados 
was perceived as a location for low-cost, skilled labour. Conversely, Trinidad was 
viewed as a location for competitively priced natural gas. These three countries all 
have adopted policies for the development of their low-cost factors. In so doing, they 
have greatly influenced the international competitiveness of the fifteen MN Es studied. 
342 
Moreover, these policies impacted on the sustainability of the countries' competitive 
advantage. 
The four apparel MNEs invested in Jamaica because of the availability of low- 
cost labour. However, while labour costs were important to the operations of these 
firms, productivity levels were crucial. Hence, most of these MNEs implemented 
financial and psychic incentives to improve worker morale and thus increase 
productivity. It is worth noting that the institute, the Human Employment and 
Resource Training Trust (HEART), whose operations are funded by firms operating in 
the country, offer training programmes to workers in industry. It appears that the 
programme designed to produce workers for the apparel industry was ineffective. The 
managers of the four apparel MNEs studied complained that the HEART graduates do 
not possess the skills and work attitude required by industry. Interestingly, work in the 
807A operations has a negative public image. Moreover, it seems that it is the 
students who fail to achieve the requisite qualifications for matriculation into the 
training courses for the garment industry, who are recruited into the 807A training 
programme. In addition, it appears that Jamaica's competitive advantage in low-cost 
labour was not achieved through the continuous upgrading of the skills of its work 
force. Rather, it was gained through a series of currency devaluations. This 
competitive advantage is thus unsustainable. Not surprisingly, apparel MNEs 
operating in this country were easily induced to relocate their `footloose' investment 
to more favourable locations, notably Mexico. 
By contrast, Barbados' implementation of a fixed exchange rate has influenced 
its labour costs. As Chapter 9 revealed, Barbados' wage rates in the information 
service industry are the highest in the Caribbean. These relatively high wages have 
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forced the relocation of the lower value-added information service activity out of the 
country. The activities that have remained in Barbados are less price sensitive and 
more skill intensive. However, the Barbadian government did not only rely on 
exchange rate policy to increase its competitiveness. It also sought to upgrade its stock 
of basic factors. The four information service MNEs were actively encouraged to 
improve the skills of their work force. To this end, the Barbados Investment and 
Development Corporation (BIDC) offered grants for the training and retraining of 
workers. In addition, the companies that operated in this industry were allowed to 
intervene in the education system to improve its quality. It is noteworthy that while 
Barbados' stock of basic factors appears to be well developed, its stock of advanced 
factors seems to be limited. Several managers complained of the dearth of skilled 
workers in the information service industry. Moreover, the local university does not 
appear to be producing computer science graduates with the skills demanded by 
industry. Clearly, Barbados' successful progression to the higher value added 
activities of the information service industry is dependent on its developing a labour 
force with the requisite specialised skills. 
Trinidad's competitive advantage lies in its competitively priced natural gas. 
This country has adopted an innovative gas pricing regime. In so doing, it has sought 
to differentiate itself from other gas-rich locations offering a similar competitive 
advantage. This gas pricing regime allows the gas-intensive MNEs to remain 
profitable in depressed market conditions. Most managers of the MNEs studied stated 
that the gas pricing system offered in Trinidad was important to their decision to 
establish and continue operations in the country. Yet, the competitive advantage 
which Trinidad derives from this pricing system is fleeting. It is easily supplanted by 
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competing locales. It is worth mentioning that gas-rich Venezuela, which neighbours 
Trinidad-Tobago, has recently implemented this pricing system. 
11.3.2 The Preferential Trading Agreement Hypothesis 
The preferential trading agreement hypothesis partly explains the motivations 
for FDI in two of the three Caribbean countries studied. It is noteworthy that the four 
MNEs that operated in the information service industry of Barbados did not benefit 
from preferential market access. In fact, their services were not subjected to duty 
charges in export markets. It seems that the difficulties of measuring and monitoring 
these information service activities deter the imposition of duty charges [Office of 
Technology Assessment 1985: 221; Pearson 1991: 19]. By contrast, the MNEs in the 
apparel industry of Jamaica, and most of the MNEs in the natural gas sector of 
Trinidad-Tobago, benefited from the preferential trading agreements that these 
countries enjoy with the US and Europe. It is significant that the CBI agreement was 
critical to the four apparel firms' decision to establish operations in Jamaica. As was 
discussed in Chapter 8, the four MNEs studied were all 807 producers. They 
manufacture apparel goods from US fabric that is cut in the US. According to the 
terms of the 807 agreement, these MNEs pay a 20 per cent duty on the apparel goods 
manufactured in Jamaica and exported to the US. Interestingly, while the CBI 
agreement was vital to the firms' initial investment decision, it is not important to 
their decision to continue operations in Jamaica. The viability of the four firms' 
continued operations in Jamaica is presently threatened by the NAFTA. 
Conversely, two of the four companies studied in Trinidad enjoyed 
preferential access to the US and European markets. Yet, none stated that these 
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preferential trading agreements were important to their decision to establish and 
continue operations in Trinidad. The investments made by the seven MNEs in 
Trinidad-Tobago were highly capital intensive. Indeed, the investment in the LNG 
plant was a recorded US$ 1000 million [World Gas Intelligence 1996: 10]. These 
investments thus have a high proportion of sunk costs. Hence, these MNEs, unlike 
their counterparts in the apparel industry of Jamaica, cannot easily relocate their 
operations when existing preferential trading agreements are nullified. It is because of 
these sunk costs that preferential trading agreements were not critical to the firms' 
decision to establish and continue operations in Trinidad-Tobago. Herein lies the 
major difference in the influence that preferential trading agreements have on the 
foreign investment decisions of MNEs operating in Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. 
The investments made by the apparel MNEs in Jamaica were not capital intensive 
[Toyne et al. 1984; Steele 1988]. Thus, it is fairly easy for these four N4NEs to 
relocate their operations to a more favourable location, notably Mexico, when the 
preferential trading agreements are revoked. As discussed above, it is difficult for 
MNEs to adopt this strategy in the natural gas sector of Trinidad-Tobago. Hence, 
preferential trading agreements played a less important role in these firms' decision to 
establish and continue operations in the country. 
11.3.3 The Export Processing Zone Hypothesis 
Interestingly, only one of the three countries actually established export 
processing zones (EPZs). This was Jamaica that had three EPZs. The other two 
countries also possessed enclaves for export-oriented industrial activity. However, 
these enclaves were not termed EPZs. Instead, Barbados marketed its enclave as an 
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industrial park, while Trinidad's was termed an industrial estate. Nevertheless, all the 
managers of the fifteen MNEs studied stated that their decision to establish operations 
in the countries was influenced by the presence of these 'zones'. 
It is important to note that while these industrial enclaves played an important 
role in the initial investment decision, the decision to continue operations in the 
countries studied was very often influenced by the quality of the general 
infrastructure. This was clearly seen in Jamaica. As discussed in Chapter 8, the 
managers of the four apparel MNEs complained about the escalating costs of utilities. 
The costs of electricity and telephone services were described as astronomical. In 
addition, the manager whose operations were located outside of the EPZ, in a rural 
part of the country, stated that these services were inadequate. The public 
transportation was also considered to be inefficient. This adversely affected worker 
productivity. Moreover, the MNEs that used the services of the local ports incurred an 
increased operating expense. They were compelled to employ security guards to 
prevent the smuggling of drugs on board their apparel shipments. The inefficiency of 
the general infrastructure, together with the economic and social instability in the 
country, adversely influenced the managers' decision to continue operations in 
Jamaica. 
The quality of the general infrastructure in Trinidad-Tobago was also 
questionable. The managers of the seven MNEs studied complained that the electricity 
service was unreliable. Nonetheless, they stated that its quality has marginally 
improved since the partial divestment of the state-owned electricity company in 1994. 
In addition, these managers said that the services of the state-owned water supply 
company were ineffective. They all voiced concerns about its ability to meet the 
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increasing demands on its service in the light of the recent increase in the number of 
firms operating in the natural gas sector. Moreover, the present airline service in 
Trinidad appears to be inadequate. Several managers stated that they experienced 
difficulties in securing flights to the country. 
By contrast, the quality of the general infrastructure of Barbados was 
described as being world class. The managers of the four MNEs studied stated that the 
public transportation system, and the electricity and airline services were efficient. 
Their only source of complaint was the relatively high telecommunications costs. It is 
noteworthy that the Barbadian government is presently attempting to reduce 
telecommunications costs as well as to introduce state-of-the-art telecommunications 
technology. 
Clearly, the strategy of developing enclaves for export-oriented activity as 
implemented by Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago is flawed. The limitations of 
establishing industrial enclaves without making the requisite investment in 
infrastructural improvements are evident. It seems that the sustainability of FDI 
inflows is dependent on the governments making concomitant investments in 
improving the general infrastructure. Interestingly, Barbados appears to have 
successfully adopted this strategy. 
Another element of the general infrastructure examined was bureaucracy. It is 
noteworthy that the managers of the MNEs studied, who invested in Barbados and 
Trinidad-Tobago, stated that the bureaucracy in these countries operated with 
efficacy. The managers of the four information service MNEs in Barbados 
emphasised that the service offered by the Barbados Investment Development 
Corporation (BIDC) during the pre-investment and post-investment stages were 
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excellent. Similarly, the managers of the seven gas-intensive MNEs in Trinidad stated 
that the services of the local government ministries were efficient. However, this was 
not the experience of the four apparel MNEs of Jamaica. The managers of these 
MNEs noted that the Jamaican Promotion Corporation (JAMPRO)'s post investment 
service was limited. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of co-ordination of activity 
among the diverse institutes and departments established to promote the apparel 
industry in Jamaica. This lack of co-ordination of activity also characterised the 
institutions mandated to stimulate industrial development in Trinidad-Tobago. One 
result of their failure to co-ordinate activity is the lack of attention paid to the 
development of domestic firms in the natural gas sector. Interestingly enough, it 
seems that Barbados has successfully managed to overcome these problems. It has 
adopted a "country-team" approach towards the development of its information 
service industry. This approach co-opts the services of the relevant ministries (Foreign 
Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Business, and Industry and Commerce), the 
BIDC, and other government organisations in the promotion of this industry. In this 
way, there is a shared understanding among all relevant policy makers of the 
strategies that Barbados is implementing for the development of this industry. Hence, 
Barbados is able to maximise the use of its resources (human and financial), improve 
the co-ordination of promotional activities, and reduce the incidences of duplication of 
functions. 44 
44 This information was obtained from Ms. Peggy Griffith, Director of International Business, 
Barbados Investment and Development Corporation, interview by author, tape recording, 5 September 
1996. 
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11.3.4 The Investment Incentives Hypothesis 
It seems that the argument advanced by theorists such as Shah and Toyne 
[1978] were not supported by this qualitative analysis. Investment incentives played 
an important role in the fifteen firms' decision to establish and continue operations in 
the Caribbean countries. It is noteworthy that the preferred investment incentives 
seemed to be low taxes or tax holidays, and duty concessions on industry-related 
imports. It is significant that the free repatriation of profits and dividends did not 
appear to have any influence on the locational decisions of these firms. All three 
countries liberalised their foreign exchange markets in the early 1990s. Four of the 
NfNEs were operational before this liberalisation and thus did not benefit from this 
investment incentive. Yet, none cited free repatriation of profits and dividends as 
influencing their locational decisions. This finding strongly contradicts those 
advanced by researchers such as Rolfe et al. [1993], Woodward and Rolfe [1993] and 
Coyne[1995]. One possible explanation for this finding is that this investment 
incentive has become so ubiquitous in this region that it no longer influences the 
locational decision. 
It is important to note that there are biases in the investment incentives 
package offered by two of these countries. In Barbados, companies owned by 
CARICOM nationals and locals enjoy less generous investment incentives than the 
foreign investor. In Jamaica, the EPZ operators pay higher export fees than those in 
the customs territory. In addition, the local apparel investor in Jamaica does not 
receive the same investment incentives as the foreign investor [Nurse 1995: 201-204]. 
These biases in the investment incentives system have had a negative influence on the 
development of the domestic firm in the industries studied. This was clearly seen in 
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Barbados where the locally owned information service firms are not internationally 
competitive. 
11.3.5 The "Double Diamond" Hypothesis 
The application of the "Double Diamond" hypothesis to the three Caribbean 
countries provided a comprehensive framework for analysing the factors that 
influence the foreign investment decisions of the fifteen MINEs studied (See Diagram 
11.2). The testing of this hypothesis clearly demonstrated the role that these three 
countries play in the global corporate strategy of the fifteen MNEs. Moreover, it 
highlighted the extent to which these MNEs used elements of the countries' enabling 
environment for the development of their core competencies. In so doing, it illustrated 
the deficiencies in the three countries' business environment for FDI. 
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Diagram 11.2. The Double Diamond Approach to Selected Industries in Jamaica, 
Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago 
Source: Adapted from Alan Rugman and Alain Verbeke, "Foreign Subsidiaries and Strategic Management: An 
Extension and Correction of Porter's Single Diamond Framework, " Management International Review 33 Special 
Issue (1993): Figure 3. 
As Diagram 11.2 demonstrates, the fifteen MNEs sought to integrate elements 
of their home countries' diamond to the diamond of the three Caribbean countries. It 
is important to note that the level of integration varied among the countries studied. 
Jamaica appeared to be passively incorporated into the global corporate strategy of the 
four apparel MNEs. The comparative advantage that Jamaica offered to these four 
firms was insubstantial. Its low-cost, semi-skilled labour force and strategic location 
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could be easily obtained in another low-wage developing country that enjoyed close 
proximity to the US. Moreover, the elements in Jamaica's enabling environment 
provided very little to the development of the core competencies of these four apparel 
MNEs. Its institutional framework for industrialisation, notably HEART and 
JAMPRO, failed to operate with efficacy. In addition, its industrial infrastructure 
appeared to be inadequate: The utilities rates were considered to be astronomical, the 
rental rates for factory space were prohibitive, the public transport service was 
inefficient, and the port service at the Montego Bay Free Zone was inadequate. 
Further, the government did very little to enhance the country's diamond. The social 
and political instability in the country was a serious deterrent to the long-term 
investment plans of the four apparel MNEs studied. All in all, Jamaica's diamond was 
weakly integrated into the US diamond of the four apparel MNEs. 
By contrast, Barbados was increasingly becoming fully integrated into the 
global operations of the four information service MNEs studied. The country was 
originally a location for low-cost, skilled labour. However, its relatively high wages 
prompted the introduction of higher value-added information service activities in the 
country. Moreover, the four MNEs, supported by training grants offered by the BIDC, 
upgraded the skills of their workforce. In addition, several of the MNEs intervened in 
the education system to improve its quality. In so doing, they sought to develop 
workers with the requisite skills demanded by industry. Most importantly, Barbados' 
institutional framework for industry operated with efficacy. Its infrastructure was 
described as world class. In addition, its bureaucracy was efficient. The government 
has also sought to improve the country's diamond. Its maintenance of economic, 
social and political stability, and its attempts at the creation of an information 
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technology society have positively influenced the sustainability of the investment 
made by the four MNEs studied. 
The testing of the "Double Diamond" hypothesis has also highlighted the 
deficiencies in the business environment of Barbados. The costs of its 
telecommunications services were relatively high. In addition, there appears to be a 
dearth of highly skilled workers, such as software engineers and programmers in the 
country. Further, the graduates from the local university do not seem to have the 
necessary skills and training required by the information service industry. Moreover, 
the capabilities of the local repair and maintenance companies appear to be limited. 
Finally, the investment incentive system is biased against the local firms. This only 
could serve to accentuate their weaknesses. 
Similarly, the diamond of Trinidad-Tobago appeared to be firmly integrated 
into the home country's diamond of the seven MNEs studied. It is interesting to note 
that like Jamaica, the competitive advantage which Trinidad offered to the MNEs was 
not substantial. Its competitively priced natural gas and strategic location were widely 
available in competing locations such as Venezuela. However, there were several 
elements of the Trinidad's diamond which positively influenced the core 
competencies of the seven MNEs studied. Thus, Trinidad was able to play a much 
more meaningful role than Jamaica in these firms' global corporate strategy. 
The labour force in Trinidad-Tobago appeared to have mastered the 
technologies needed to operate plants with process operations. Indeed, two of the 
companies studied were managed and operated by locals. In addition, several of these 
MNEs implemented comprehensive training programmes. These training programmes 
were complemented by the skills development scheme introduced 
by the government 
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in 1993. Moreover, a cluster of firms that provide support services to the MNEs in the 
natural gas sector seems to have emerged in Trinidad. The country appears to possess 
a nascent maintenance and repair industry which services firms in the natural gas 
sector. In addition, a few local firms have developed in the downstream steel industry. 
Further, there appears to be links between the natural gas sector and academia. In 
1994, an institute was formed at the local university to provide industry-related 
research and development, and training. 
The testing of the "Double Diamond" hypothesis in Trinidad also highlighted 
the weaknesses of the country's business environment. The general infrastructure for 
industrialisation is inadequate: the water, electricity and airline services were 
inefficient. Moreover, there appeared to be a lack of co-ordination of activity among 
the organisations established to stimulate industrialisation in the country. 
The foregoing analysis emphasises the utility of the "Double Diamond" 
framework as a technique for evaluating the attractiveness of the business 
environment of the three Caribbean countries. The "Double Diamond" framework 
demonstrated that the business environment of Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago was 
fairly attractive to the MNEs studied. It also showed that the Jamaican business 
environment was not supportive of the foreign investor. 
11.4. The Selection of Market Entry Mode in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad- 
Tobago 
Most of the hypotheses drawn from the literature on market entry modes were 
supported by the qualitative analysis. The results of this analysis confirmed the 
hypothesis advanced on the relationship between intra-firm trade and the selection of 
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a wholly owned subsidiary. In addition, with the exception of Trinidad-Tobago, the 
international experience hypothesis was supported by the qualitative analysis. Further, 
support was found for the arguments posited on the relationship between 
government's influence on the mode of market entry used in the primary sector and 
the firm's selection of a form of foreign involvement. Surprisingly, the findings did 
not confirm the theories advanced by researchers such as Kogut and Singh [1988] and 
Padmanabhan and Cho [1996]. The cultural distance between the home and host 
country appeared to have little influence over these fifteen firms' selection of a market 
entry mode. 
Table 11.3. The Results of the Testing of the Hypotheses on Mode of Market 
Entry of FDI in the Caribbean 
Hypothesis 
Country Jamaica Barbados Trinidad- 
Sector Apparel Information Tobago 
Services Natural Gas 
There is a positive 
relationship between intra- 
firm trade and the use of a 
wholly owned subsidiary    
There is a positive 
relationship between the MNE 
with international experience 
and its use of a wholly owned 
subsidiary.  
 X 
There is a positive 
relationship between cultural 
distance and the use of wholly 
owned greenfield investments 
and joint venture agreements. X X X 
There is a positive 
relationship between the 
resource-seeking MNE and 
minority and 50-50 joint n. a. n. a. 
 
venture agreements. 
There is a positive 
relationship between 
government policy towards 
mode of market entry used by 
foreign firms in the primary 
sector and the resource- n. a. n. a. 
 
seeking MNE. 
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11.4.1. The Intra-Firm Trade Hypothesis 
It is noteworthy that all of the firms that were involved in intra-firm trade 
chose the wholly owned subsidiary as their mode of market entry into the three 
Caribbean countries studied. The two vertically integrated apparel MNEs selected a 
wholly owned subsidiary as their market entry mode into Jamaica. Similarly, the 
majority of the information service MNEs in Barbados chose a wholly owned 
subsidiary. This was also the case of the sole firm involved in intra-firm trade in the 
natural gas sector of Trinidad. 
The issue of control appeared to play a crucial role in these firms' selection of 
a market entry mode. All the managers stated that the choice of a wholly owned 
subsidiary was greatly influenced by the parent company's desire to exercise control 
over the operations of its subsidiary in the Caribbean [Anderson and Gatignon 1986; 
Gomes-Casseres 1989,1990]. It is noteworthy that one of the firms involved in intra- 
firm trade selected a majority owned joint venture as the mode of entering the 
Barbadian market. It conceded to a form of foreign involvement that resulted in 
reduced control in order to gain knowledge of local culture and politics. 
11.4.2 The International Experience Hypothesis 
The level of international experience of the MNEs studied played an important 
role in their selection of a wholly owned subsidiary as their mode of market entry into 
the three Caribbean countries. The three MNEs that possessed considerable 
international experience chose the wholly owned subsidiary as their mode of market 
entry into the Jamaican market. Similarly, the three MNEs that had a wealth of 
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experience operating in foreign markets selected the wholly owned subsidiary as the 
form of foreign involvement in Barbados. It is noteworthy that the firm that lacked 
international experience used the route of a majority owned joint venture to enter 
Barbados. The Trinidadian case was an interesting one. Most of the MNEs studied 
were highly internationalised. However, several chose a minority owned joint venture 
as their form of foreign involvement in Trinidad. It seems that the costs of the 
investment played a far more important role in these firms' selection of market entry 
mode [Stopford and Wells 1972: 118; Vernon 1983: 202; Gomes-Casseres 1990: 12]. 
11.4.3 The Cultural Distance Hypothesis 
It is significant to note that the cultural distance between the home country of 
the fifteen MNEs and the three Caribbean countries had no influence on their selection 
of a market entry mode. Interestingly enough, the cultural distance between the home 
country of many of the MNEs studied and the three Caribbean countries was not 
great. Indeed, ten of the MNEs were American; two were British; one was Canadian; 
and the remaining two were German and Indian. Thus, there were few cultural 
dissimilarities between the home country of thirteen of the fifteen MNEs (North 
America and the UK) and the focus countries. However, none of these firms cited 
culture as influencing their selection of market entry mode. Indeed, it seems that 
culture did not play a critical role in these firms' selection of a institutional form of 
foreign involvement in the Caribbean. 
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11.4.4 The Use of Reduced Equity Modes in the Primary Sector Hypothesis 
It is noteworthy that five of seven firms studied used minority joint ventures in 
the natural gas sector of Trinidad-Tobago. What is interesting, however, is that their 
motivations for using this market entry mode was inconsistent with the explanations 
advanced by the extant literature. Indeed, their operations did not use mature 
technologies. Moreover, several were US MNE that were industry leaders. The 
possible reasons for their use of this form of foreign involvement in Trinidad was 
finance. These projects were highly capital-intensive investments. Most of the firms, 
notably Amoco, British Gas and Methanex, considered the investments to be strategic. 
However, because the investments were costly, the firms, specifically Amoco and 
British Gas, had no recourse but to use minority joint ventures. 
11.4.5 The Role of Government Hypothesis 
It is only in Trinidad-Tobago that the government has attempted to control the 
market entry mode used by the MNEs in the primary sector. As was discussed in 
Chapter 10, in the late 1980s, the government reversed its policy of state ownership in 
the energy sector. Additionally, it relaxed all controls placed on total foreign 
ownership of companies in this sector. The investment made by the seven MNEs 
studied was a response to these changes in the government's policy. Two of the 
MNEs acquired the privatised assets of state-owned companies, while the others 
established greenfield investments. Indeed, the government's policy towards its 
natural gas sector played a decisive role in these firms' selection of a market entry 
mode. 
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11.5 Conclusions 
As Table 11.4 shows, nine of the thirteen hypotheses that were advanced from 
the foreign direct investment literature were supported by the cross-industry analysis. 
Table 11.4. The Results of the Cross-Industry Case Study Analysis 
Hypotheses Results 
No relationship exists between the MNE's use of its unique Supported 
advantages and the presence of domestic competitors. 
There is a positive relationship between follow-the-leader' Not Totally Supported 
investment behaviour of MNEs and the use of low-cost factors. 
There is a positive relationship between the firm 's use of its Supported 
unique advantages and the locational advantage variables. 
There is a positive relationship between the MIVE and the Supported 
decision to establish and continue operations because of low- 
cost factors. 
There is a positive relationship between the export-seeking and Not Totally Supported 
resource-seeking MNE and its use of preferential trading 
agreements. 
There is a positive relationship between the presence of an EPZ Supported 
and the export-seeking MNE. 
No relationship exists between the investment incentives offered Not Supported 
by the Caribbean governments and the MNE's decision to 
establish and continue operations in the Caribbean. 
There is a positive relationship between the MNE's use of its Supported 
home country's `diamond' and the `diamond' of the Caribbean. 
There is a positive relationship between intra-firm trade and the Supported 
use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
There is a positive relationship between the MNE with Supported 
international experience and its use of a wholly owned 
subsidiary. 
There is a positive relationship between cultural distance and Not Supported 
the use of wholly owned greenfield investment and joint 
ventures. 
There is a positive relationship between the resource-seeking Supported 
MNE and minority and 50-50 joint venture agreements. 
There is a positive relationship between government policy Supported 
towards mode of market entry used by firms in the primary 
sector and the resource-seeking MNE. 
This cross-industry case study analysis has provided rich detail on the 
investment behaviour and corporate strategy of the fifteen MNEs that operate in the 
export-oriented sector of the three Caribbean countries studied. It would be instructive 
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to compare these findings with those of the quantitative analysis. This will be one of 
the subjects discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Twelve 
The Future of Foreign Investment in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Conclusions 
and Recommendations 
12.1 Introduction 
The objectives of this chapter are two-fold: It seeks to compare the research 
findings of the qualitative and quantitative studies. In addition, it attempts to articulate 
policy for the improvement of the business environment of the three countries studied. 
12.2. A Comparison of the Research Findings from the Quantitative and 
Qualitative Analyses 
There are difficulties in conducting a comparative analysis of the research 
findings from the quantitative and qualitative studies. The main difficulty arises from the 
difference in the units of analysis used in these two approaches. In the quantitative study, 
all three types of FDI were examined. However, the qualitative analysis was limited to 
only resource-seeking and export-seeking FDI. The focus on these two types of FDI was 
not misplaced. One researcher emphasises that it is only in export-seeking FDI that the 
Caribbean countries possess "a comparative advantage (i. e., less disadvantage) to attract 
FDI" [Azel 1991: 22]. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 6, the Caribbean governments 
currently are actively courting foreign investment in this area. Further, as Chapter 7 
revealed, most of the FDI made in the three Caribbean countries in the post 1991 era were 
resource-seeking and export-seeking. Nonetheless, the limitations of this analysis are 
evident. The research findings on market-seeking FDI that were obtained in the 
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quantitative study were not examined in the qualitative analysis because as noted above, 
the latter study sought to analyse only resource-seeking and export-seeking FDI. 
12.2.1 The Motivations for FDI in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago 
The Monopolistic Advantage Hypothesis 
No relationship exists between the MNE's use of its unique advantages and the 
presence of domestic competitors. 
It is noteworthy that the hypothesis developed from the monopolistic advantage 
theory as postulated by Hymer [1960,1976], Kindleberger [1969] and Caves [1971] was 
supported by both analyses. Indeed, the research findings support the argument posed by 
several researchers that the monopolistic advantage theory is inapplicable to developing 
countries [Hood and Young 1979; Vachani 1985; Aswicahyono and Hill 1995]. In 
addition, some of the relationships that were hinted at in the quantitative analysis were 
fully revealed in the qualitative study. The quantitative analysis demonstrated that MNEs 
competing with domestic firms were inclined to use their firm-specific asset of access to 
raw materials. The case study on Trinidad showed that this asset was used together with 
that of production technology for competition with domestic firms. One of the MNEs 
studied used its core competency in production technology for gas exploration. However, 
these assets were not used for competing against locally owned, or what Hymer termed 
national, firms [Hymer 1976]. They were used for competition with other MNEs 
operating in the country. This is one of the main findings of this study. Several of the 
MNEs that operated in Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago used their firm-specific assets in 
competition. However, the competitor was not the locally owned firms. The local firms 
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generally were not internationally competitive. It was the other MNEs that operated in the 
host country that were the competitors. Indeed, for all practical purposes, these MNEs 
may be considered to be the domestic competitors. 45 
It is noteworthy that the quantitative analysis showed a relationship between the 
size of the firm and the use of the firm-specific asset of privileged access to raw 
materials. However, the qualitative study failed to find any support for this finding. There 
possibly was a spurious correlation between firm size and the use of access to raw 
materials in competition. 
The `Follow-the-Leader' Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between follow-the-leader' investment behaviour of 
MNEs and the use of low-cost factors. 
It is noteworthy that the quantitative study demonstrated that the MNEs were 
involved in `follow-the-leader' investment behaviour in two of the focus countries. The 
study revealed that MNEs followed their competitors into Jamaica and Barbados to 
secure low-cost labour. The qualitative analysis was able to provide a more illuminating 
analysis on this defensive pattern of investment. All the MNEs that located their labour- 
intensive activities in Jamaica and Barbados followed their competitors offshore. What is 
noteworthy, however, is the fact that they did not follow them into these two countries. 
These countries' labour force was too small to support the manpower requirements of the 
investing firms. Interestingly enough, that this theory seems to explain the behaviour of 
some firms in the natural gas sector of Trinidad-Tobago [Vernon 1983: 202]. Apparently, 
as It does not seem that Hymer [ 1960,1976] and his followers (Kindleberger [ 1969] and Caves [ 1971 ]) 
considered the other MNEs that operate in the host country to be competitors to the investing foreign 
firm. Moreover, Hymer's theory was based on market-seeking FDI in the manufacturing industry. It 
did not examine export-seeking, efficiency-seeking FDI. This difference in emphasis may account for 
the findings obtained in the present study. The author credits Professor Norman Girvan, Director of 
Consortium Graduate School, The University of the West Indies, Jamaica for making this distinction. 
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some gas MNEs sought to pre-empt competitors from gaining first-mover advantages in 
the LNG industry. 
The Eclectic Paradigm Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the firm's use of its unique advantages and the 
locational advantage variables. 
Interestingly, both of these analyses lent support to Dunning's eclectic paradigm 
[Dunning 1979,1980,1981]. The quantitative study revealed that the MNE, in 
establishing operations in these three countries, sought to combine selected firm-specific 
variables with several locational advantage variables. The firm-specific variables that 
were used were production technology, new technology, marketing skills, distribution 
networks, access to finance and privileged access to raw materials. These firm-specific 
variables were used in combination with selected locational advantage variables. They 
included the factor cost variables (low-cost labour and natural gas) and the infrastructural 
support variables (political stability, efficient bureaucracy, efficient airline, port and 
telecommunications services, and proximity to the US market). The firms, in their 
decision to continue operations in the countries, sought to combine six firm-specific 
variables with fewer locational advantage variables. The firm-specific advantages used by 
the MNEs were production technology, marketing skills, brand name product, privileged 
access to raw materials, product differentiation and new technology. The locational 
advantage variables selected were factor cost variables (labour - availability, productivity 
and cost, and cost of natural gas), political stability, and efficient airline and 
telecommunications services. 
Essentially, the qualitative analysis supported these conclusions. However, it 
managed to provide a much more illuminating explanation of the MNE's investment 
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behaviour in the focus countries. Indeed, this analysis revealed that all fifteen of the 
MNEs studied used their firm-specific assets of production technology and marketing 
skills together with selected locational endowments of the three countries. The locational 
advantages used were the factor cost variables (low-cost, semi-skilled and skilled labour, 
and competitively priced natural gas) and strategic location. Further, this analysis clearly 
demonstrated that the three Caribbean countries were still offering the foreign investor 
"basic factors". They had not managed to fully progress to the development of "advanced 
factors" [Porter 1990]. 
12.2.2 The Choice of Locating FDI in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago 
The Low-Cost Factor Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the MNE and the decision to establish and 
continue operations because of low-cost factors. 
Both analyses support the arguments posed by theorists such as Vernon [1974, 
1979], Sharpston [1975], Frobel et al. [1980]. The findings from the quantitative analysis 
revealed that the MNE's initial investment decision was influenced by low-cost, 
productive labour and competitively priced natural gas. Its decision to continue 
operations in the three Caribbean countries was influenced by the cost of labour and 
natural gas. Significantly, this analysis showed that it was the cost of natural gas, not 
labour, that played a decisive role in the firm's decision to continue operations in the 
countries. It is noteworthy that the qualitative study managed to fully explain these 
relationships. 
The findings from the qualitative analysis revealed that the MNE's initial 
investment decision was influenced by labour costs. However, the decision to continue 
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operations in the three countries, notably Jamaica, was greatly influenced by labour 
productivity. Indeed, this finding contradicts that of the quantitative study. The case study 
on the four apparel MNEs in Jamaica clearly demonstrated that productivity levels played 
a crucial role in the long-term investment plans of these firms. Moreover, the qualitative 
analysis highlighted the importance of training. Barbados's relatively successful 
performance in the information service industry was largely due to the continuous 
training offered to its work force. As Chapter 9 shows, the four information service 
MNEs, supported by training grants offered by the Barbados Investment and 
Development Corporation, provided continuous training to their workers. Hence, 
Barbados's competitive advantage in low-cost, skilled labour was derived from the 
continuous upgrading of the skills of its workforce. By contrast, Jamaica's was obtained 
from a series of currency devaluations. The result was striking. The competitive 
advantage that Jamaica enjoys is unsustainable as evidenced by the foot loose nature of 
the FDI in its apparel industry. This is clearly not the case of Barbados. The analysis also 
demonstrated the importance of the country developing a work force with specialist 
skills. Barbados's successful movement to the higher-level information service activities 
is stymied by the paucity of workers with skills in areas such as programming and 
software engineering. 
In addition, the qualitative study revealed that the competitive advantage that 
Trinidad has gained from its innovative gas pricing regime is unsustainable. This gas 
pricing system is easily imitated by competing locations. However, unlike Jamaica, the 
investment made by MNEs in Trinidad was not foot loose (See Chapter 11). What is 
important to Trinidad, and indeed, the other two countries, is the sustainability and 
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growth of the investment made by these MNEs. This issue will be discussed at length in a 
later section. 
The Preferential Trading Agreement Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the MNE and its use of preferential trading 
agreements. 
The research findings from these two analyses support the arguments posed by 
Johnson [1968], Joekes [1982], Yannopoulos [1986], Griffith [1990]. The preferential 
trading agreements that these three Caribbean countries enjoyed with the US and Europe 
played an important role in the foreign firms' decision to establish and continue 
operations in the countries. The quantitative analysis revealed that the 807 programmes 
and Lome were important to the foreign investment decisions of the MNEs. However, the 
qualitative analysis elaborated that while the 807 programme was important to the 
Jamaican apparel MNEs' initial investment decision, it was not important to their 
decision to continue operations. The viability of these firms' long-term investment is 
seriously threatened by the NAFTA. Further, the qualitative analysis showed that the 
these trading agreements are of less importance to MNEs involved in highly capital- 
intensive investments in Trinidad. 
The Export Processing Zone Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the presence of an export processing zone and 
the export-seeking MNE. 
It is significant to note that the hypothesis advanced from the theory posed by 
researchers such as Frobel et al. [1980], Woodward and Rolfe [1993], and Kumar [1994] 
was supported by the two studies. The presence of EPZs or enclaves for export-oriented 
activity had a positive influence on foreign investment decisions of the MNEs operating 
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in the three Caribbean countries. Not surprisingly, the qualitative analysis provided a 
more illuminating analysis of the infrastructural elements that influenced the investment 
behaviour of the foreign firm. 
The case study analyses revealed that all three Caribbean countries possessed 
enclaves for export-oriented activity. However, it was only in Jamaica that this enclave 
was actually termed an EPZ. Moreover, the analysis showed that while the presence of 
these enclaves was important to the foreign firms' initial investment decision, the 
decision to continue operations in the three countries was greatly influenced by the 
quality of the general infrastructure. The issues of concern were the costs and reliability 
of supply of several elements in the general infrastructure. It is noteworthy that the costs 
and the reliability of the utilities service (water and electricity), the adequacy of the 
airline service, and the efficiency of the public transportation system all influenced the 
decision to continue operations in Jamaica and Trinidad. Most importantly, the qualitative 
analysis highlighted the fallacy of the governments' strategy of developing enclaves for 
export-oriented activity to attract FDI. It showed that it is vital that the governments make 
concomitant investments in improving the general infrastructure. Indeed, the 
sustainability of foreign investment is dependent on a well-developed infrastructure, not 
just isolated zones for export-oriented activity. 
In addition, the qualitative study demonstrated that an efficacious bureaucracy is 
critical to the foreign investment decision of the MNE. It showed that the bureaucracy in 
Barbados and Trinidad was efficient. However, in both Jamaica and Trinidad, there 
appeared to be a lack of co-ordination of activity among the various institutions mandated 
to stimulate industrial activity. This resulted in a duplication of functions and a needless 
waste of resources (human and financial). 
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The Investment Incentive Hypothesis 
No relationship exists between the investment incentives offered by the Caribbean 
governments and the MNE's decision to establish and continue operations in the 
Caribbean. 
The quantitative and qualitative studies did not support the postulate advanced by 
theorists such as Toyne and Shah [1978], Lim [1983] and Wheeler and Mody [1991]. The 
investment incentive system did influence the foreign investment decisions of MNEs 
operating in the three Caribbean countries. 
Interestingly, the findings from both studies revealed that the investment 
incentives favoured by the MNEs were tax holidays or low taxes, and duty exemptions on 
industry-related imports. These incentives were important to the decision to establish and 
continue operations in the three Caribbean countries. It is noteworthy that the findings 
showed that free repatriation of profits and dividends did not influence the investment 
decisions of the MNEs. These findings contradict those posed by Rolfe et al. [1993], 
Woodward and Rolfe [1993] and Coyne [1995]. The only plausible explanation for the 
conflict in these research findings is that this study was conducted at a much later period 
than the previous ones. Thus, over the intervening period, the incentive of free 
repatriation of profits and dividends has become so ubiquitous that it no longer influences 
the foreign investment decisions of MNEs locating operations in the Caribbean. 
The qualitative study also showed that there are biases in the investment incentive 
package that these governments offer to investors. The domestic investor in Barbados and 
Jamaica receives less generous incentives than the foreign investor. 
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The `Double Diamond' Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the MNE's use of its home country's 
`diamond' and the `diamond' of the Caribbean. 
The findings from both studies supported the postulate proposed by Rugman and 
D' Cruz [1993] and Rugman and Verbeke [1993]. The MNE investing in the three 
Caribbean countries sought to integrate the diamond of its home country with that of the 
Caribbean country. The quantitative analysis revealed that the US and British MNE, 
initially used privileged access to raw material, obtained from their home country's 
diamond, with elements of the Caribbean's diamond. These were low-cost labour, 
competitively priced natural gas, political stability and efficient bureaucracy. The US 
MNEs also deployed the new technology secured from their home country with the 
efficient bureaucracy of the Caribbean. In their continued operations in the focus 
countries, the US and British MNEs used the privileged access to raw materials obtained 
form their home country with selected locational advantages of the Caribbean. The 
locational advantages were the countries' proximity to the US, political stability and 
competitively priced natural gas. The US MNE also combined new technology secured 
from its home country with selected locational advantage variables. These were the factor 
cost variables (low-cost labour and competitively priced natural gas), the country's 
proximity to the US, and efficient bureaucracy. It is interesting to note that the qualitative 
study provided a much more meaningful interpretation of the firms' investment 
behaviour. 
Indeed, it was the qualitative analysis that revealed the utility of the "Double 
Diamond" framework as a tool for analysing the business environment of three Caribbean 
countries. This technique managed to capture the nuances of the investment behaviour of 
the MNEs which were not evident from the quantitative analysis. Moreover, it 
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demonstrated the extent to which these three countries were integrated into the global 
corporate strategy of the MNEs studied. In so doing, this technique highlighted the 
deficiencies in the business environment of the focus countries. 
The qualitative study revealed that the attractiveness of the business environment 
of the three Caribbean countries was varied. The business environment of Jamaica proved 
to be not very attractive to the four apparel MNEs. Many factors contributed to this. Most 
notable were the unsustainability of its competitive advantage, the inefficiency of its 
infrastructure and institutional framework for industrialisation, and the deterioration in 
social and political conditions in the country. By contrast, the business environments in 
Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago were more attractive to the MNEs. Barbados enjoyed a 
relatively sustainable competitive advantage, its infrastructure and institutions operated 
efficiently, and its government was positively influencing the development of its 
diamond. There were several weaknesses in Trinidad's business environment. Its general 
industrial infrastructure failed to operate with efficacy and the competitive advantage 
derived from its innovative gas regime was unsustainable. However, Trinidad possessed a 
fairly skilled work force. In addition, it seemed to have a cluster of firms that provided 
support services to MNEs in the natural gas sector. 
12.2.3 The Selection of Market Entry Modes in Jamaica, Barbados and 
Trinidad-Tobago 
The Intra-Firm Trade Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between intra-firm trade and the use of a wholly owned 
subsidiary. 
Conflicting results were obtained from these two studies. The quantitative 
analysis failed to support the hypothesis that the MNE involved in intra-firm trade would 
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use a wholly owned subsidiary as its mode of market entry into the three Caribbean 
countries. The qualitative study contradicted this finding. This study convincingly 
demonstrated that the MNEs involved in intra-firm trade in the three Caribbean countries 
used the wholly owned subsidiary as their market entry mode. Moreover, the analysis 
showed that these firms selected the wholly owned subsidiary because they wanted to 
exercise total control over their Caribbean operations [Anderson and Gatignon 1986; 
Gomes-Casseres 1989,1990 ]. In so doing, they were able to capitalise the global 
synergies arising from establishing operations in the Caribbean [Hill and Hwang 1992]. 
The International Experience Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the MNE with international experience and its 
use of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
Interestingly, conflicting results were obtained from the testing of this hypothesis. 
The quantitative study failed to support the theory advanced by researchers such as 
Johanson and V ahlne [1977,1990], Davidson [1980], and Li [1994]. However, the three 
case studies clearly demonstrated that the level of international experience of the MNE 
played a decisive role in its selection of market entry mode. Indeed, the MNEs which 
were fairly internationalised chose wholly owned subsidiaries. Several gas intensive 
MNEs that operated in Trinidad proved to be the exception. These firms were highly 
internationalised. However, they selected a minority joint venture as their mode of market 
entry. Apparently, the dictates of finance influenced their use of a minority joint venture 
arrangement [Stopford and Wells 1972: 118; Vernon 1983: 202; Gomes-Casseres 1990: 
12]. 
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The Cultural Distance Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between cultural distance and the use of a wholly 
owned greenfield investment and a joint venture agreement. 
There was a lack of consensus on the role that culture plays in the selection of 
market entry mode. As chapter 7 shows, the quantitative study weakly supported the 
theory posed by researchers such as Kogut and Singh [1988], Hill et al. [1990] and 
Padmanabhan and Cho [1996]. This study found that cultural distance, as measured by 
geographical proximity, influenced the firms' selection of a greenfield investment. 
However, the qualitative analysis contradicted this finding. None of the managers 
interviewed cited cultural dissimilarities and geographic proximity as influencing his 
selection of market entry mode. While the strategic location of the three Caribbean 
countries played a critical role in the foreign investment decisions of the fifteen MNEs, 
none of the managers stated that this factor influenced their choice of market entry mode. 
The evidence is too inconclusive for any definitive statements to be made on the 
influence that culture has on the MNE's selection of market entry mode in the Caribbean. 
The Use of Reduced Equity Modes in the Primary Sector Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the resource-seeking MNE and minority and 50- 
50 joint ventures. 
This hypothesis was supported by the quantitative and qualitative analyses. The 
quantitative examination revealed that the MNEs tended to conclude minority joint 
venture agreements in the primary sector of the focus countries. It was speculated that 
these modes of market entry were used by non-USA firms in Trinidad-Tobago. The 
qualitative study proved to be illuminating. This analysis showed that the majority of the 
firms that operated in the natural gas sector of Trinidad-Tobago used minority joint 
venture agreements. What was interesting, however, was that the reasons for these firms' 
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use of this mode of market entry did not accord with the extant literature [Oman 1984, 
1988; Dunning 1988; Franko 1989; Pan 1996]. It appears that it was largely financial 
considerations which influence their selection of minority joint venture agreements. 
The Role of Government Hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the government policy towards mode of market 
entry used by foreign firms in the primary sector and the resource-seeking MNE. 
This hypothesis was supported by both the quantitative and qualitative studies. 
Indeed, the analysis on Trinidad-Tobago demonstrated that the government exercised 
considerable influence over the mode of market entry that MNEs used in the natural gas 
sector. This hypothesis was also supported by the more broad-based quantitative analysis. 
12.3 General Conclusions 
The research question of this thesis is How attractive is the business environment 
of the Caribbean to the MNVE? In an attempt to find answers to this question, this study 
focused on three main concerns, viz.: 
1. The factors influencing motivations for FDI; 
2. The factors influencing the locational choices for FDI; and 
3. The factors influencing the selection of market entry mode. 
Several general conclusions can be made from this study. 
What motivates a MNE to engage in FDI in the three Caribbean countries? 
" The MNE would appear to invest in the Caribbean to exploit its firm-specific 
advantages. What is noteworthy of its investment behaviour is that the MNE does not 
375 
perceive the local firm to be its competitor. Rather, it uses its firm-specific advantages 
(production technology and human resource management) to compete with other 
foreign firms operating in the same industry. 
9 The MINE that is involved in labour-intensive activity does not appear to follow its 
competitor into these island-states. However, it is very likely that the MNE in the 
natural gas sector follows competitors into the country. It is attempting to pre-empt 
any competitive advantages that its competitor may gain from its operations in the 
Caribbean. 
" The MNE tends to combine its firm-specific assets of production technology and 
marketing skills with the low-cost labour, competitively priced natural gas and 
strategic location of the Caribbean. The Caribbean countries are yet to progress to the 
development of an abundant supply of `advanced factors'. 
What factors influence the MNE's choice of location? 
" The low-cost factors, namely labour and natural gas, are irresistible attractions to the 
MNE investing in the Caribbean. Low-cost, semi-skilled labour lures the MNE into 
the Caribbean. However, it does not keep it there. The sustainability of FDI is 
dependent on the availability of skilled labour. This has tremendous implications for 
the training of the countries' labour force. It appears that MNEs are encouraged to 
continue operations in Caribbean countries which have established successful 
programmes for the continuous training of their labour force. In addition, it appears 
that training grants have a decisive influence on the MNE's propensity to train its 
workforce. Further, an innovative pricing regime for natural resources plays a critical 
role in attracting FDI. However, the competitive advantage derived from this pricing 
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system is unsustainable. The country needs to develop other elements of its business 
environment in order to sustain FDI. 
" Except for firms in the service industry, MNEs are motivated to engage in FDI in the 
Caribbean because of the preferential trading agreements the countries enjoy with the 
US and Europe. Interestingly, these trading agreements are not critical to the foreign 
investment decision of MNEs involved in capital-intensive activities. By contrast, the 
agreements are critical to the long-term investment of MNEs whose investments are 
foot loose. 
" Export processing zones or enclaves for export-oriented activity positively influence 
the locational decisions of MNEs. However, the presence of these zones is only 
important to the foreign firm's initial investment decision. The sustainability and 
growth of FDI are dependent on the quality of the country's general infrastructure. 
" Investment incentives influence the locational decisions of MNEs. The favoured 
investment incentives seem to be low taxes or tax holidays, and duty exemptions on 
industry-related equipment. Repatriation of profits and dividends do not seem to 
influence the locational decisions of MNEs. 
" The "Double Diamond" framework is a powerful tool for assessing the attractiveness 
of the business environment of the individual Caribbean countries. This approach 
suggests that the business environment of Jamaica does not appear to be supportive of 
the apparel MNE. The unsustainability of its competitive advantage, the inefficiency 
of its institutions and infrastructure, and the deterioration of its economic and social 
conditions deter the sustainability of foreign investment in the apparel industry. 
Conversely, Barbados with its fairly sustainable competitive advantage, its efficient 
bureaucracy and good quality infrastructure seems to be an attractive environment for 
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FDI in the information service industry. Trinidad-Tobago also seems to be fairly 
attractive to the MNE involved in gas intensive activities. It offers an innovative gas 
pricing regime, its labour force is fairly skilled, and it possesses a cluster of firms that 
provide support services to MNEs in the natural gas sector. 
What factors influence the market entry mode used in the Caribbean? 
9 The MNE that is involved in intra-firm trade tends to select a wholly owned 
subsidiary to enter the Caribbean. The selection of this market entry mode is 
influenced by the MNE's desire to exercise control over its Caribbean operations. 
Moreover, it is able to gain the global synergies arising from its operations in the 
Caribbean. 
" The MNE that is highly internationalised tends to choose a wholly owned subsidiary 
in the Caribbean. In instances where the investment is highly capital intensive, the 
MNE may select a minority owned joint venture arrangement. This investment 
behaviour tends to be characteristic of the resource-seeking MNE. 
9 The MNE, in selecting a market entry mode in the Caribbean, does not appear to be 
influenced by the cultural dissimilarities between its home country and the Caribbean. 
The available evidence on this investment behaviour is still very much inconclusive. 
" The MNE generally uses minority joint venture agreements in the primary sector. 
However, it seems that financial considerations play a deciding role influencing its 
selection of market entry mode in this sector. 
" The government plays a decisive role in the MNE's selection of market entry mode in 
the primary sector. Moreover, given the present economic conditions in these 
countries, it seems that the government would exercise no control over the mode of 
market entry used by the MINE in the primary sector. 
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12.4. Limitations of the Study 
In the course of this research, a number of issues have been encountered which should be 
considered to be limitations. Firstly, this study sought to obtain responses from managers of 
MNEs that operated in the three Caribbean countries studied. Concerted attempts were made 
to ensure that the managers contacted were knowledgeable about the investment behaviour 
of the firms. Nonetheless, there is some uncertainty about those who responded to the 
mailed questionnaire. It was very difficult to ensure that the appropriate person filled out the 
questionnaire. Yet, there was not much discrepancy in the findings of the quantitative and 
the qualitative studies. 
Secondly, there is an inevitable historical bias in this analysis. In some cases, the initial 
investment decision was made a few decades ago. Indeed, the quantitative analysis included 
firms that were operating in the Caribbean since the 1970s. Evidently, there were not many 
managers who would have been able to clearly recall the factors that influenced the firm's 
initial investment decision. Attempts were made to control for this historical bias by 
contacting informants at both the subsidiary and the headquarters. However, there is some 
uncertainty about the validity of the responses made by informants from firms that 
established operations in the Caribbean during the pre-1971 period. The possibilities of this 
historical bias affecting the qualitative study were limited. In this study, the earliest 
investment was made in the 1980s. Hence, in most cases, the managers responsible for 
making the initial investment decision were easily located. Most often, these respondents 
were located at the headquarters. It is noteworthy that the managers at the subsidiary were 
often able to furnish details on the factors influencing the long-term investment plans of the 
firm. Nevertheless, attempts were made to cross-check the statements made by both groups 
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of respondents. To this end, a variety of sources of information was used. However, it was 
difficult to control for the inevitable biases in their responses. 
12.5. Contributions of the Study to the FDI Literature 
With the exception of Beamish [1988], few FDI studies have attempted to used a 
triangulation of methodologies. The benefits of using this approach in this study were 
tremendous. The quantitative study provided a broad outline of the factors influencing the 
investment behaviour and corporate strategy of MNEs operating in the focus countries. 
The qualitative analysis was able to capture the nuances and subtleties of firms' 
behaviour. Moreover, it was able to identify and explain relationships that were not 
discernible from the quantitative analysis. 
This study has added a new dimension to the literature on foreign direct 
investment. It has broken new ground by integrating three main areas of concern in the 
foreign investment literature. To this end, it attempted to determine the factors that 
influence the motivations, locational choices and mode of market entry of MNEs 
operating in three Caribbean countries. Further, it sought to ascertain the extent to which 
these factors were influenced by the timing of the investment decision, the type of FDI, 
the quantum of initial investment and the country of origin of the investor. Hence, it did 
not only examine the factors that determine the initial investment decision [Coyne 1995]. 
It also analysed the factors that affect the firm's decision to continue its operations in 
these three countries. Moreover, the analysis was not just limited to one type of 
investment [Woodward and Rolfe 1993; Kumar 1994]. It also examined all three types of 
FDI. Further, like Rolfe et al. [1993]; Coyne [1995], the study also used level of 
investment, in this case measured by the quantum of initial investment, as an explanatory 
variable. Finally, it did not merely seek to solicit responses from managers at the 
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headquarters [Reuber 1973; Guisinger 1985; Wallace 1990; Coyne 1995], as responses 
from managers located at the subsidiary were also solicited. 
Hence, this study should be able to provide reasonably definitive answers to the 
research question. The answers to this question as well as policy recommendations for the 
improvement of the Caribbean business environment will be discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
12.6 Policy Recommendations 
How attractive is the business environment of the Caribbean to the MNE? 
There is no succinct response to this question. The attractiveness of the business 
environment of the focus countries varies among the different countries and activities 
examined. This thesis clearly shows that the business environment of Jamaica was not 
supportive of the apparel MNEs. By contrast, the business environments of Barbados and 
Trinidad-Tobago were increasingly becoming attractive to the MNEs studied. However, 
what seems to be important is the ability of these countries to sustain their existing FDI, 
to make it grow, and to attract new FDI inflows. To varying degrees, their ability to do 
this appears to be limited. As was illustrated in this study, there are several deficiencies in 
their business environment for FDI. Indeed, it is imperative that the governments 
implement policies to ensure that their countries develop a business environment that is 
fully supportive of the MNE. It is also important to note that their ability to carry out 
these policies will be constrained by their existing economic, social and political 
conditions. Nonetheless, this study suggests that the governments of the focus countries 
need to address several critical issues. These are viz.: 
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" Human Resource Development 
A competitive business environment is one in which the work force is able to 
produce goods and services at a level of competence attained by its counterparts in the 
industrialised world. In addition, the labour costs should be lower than those of the 
developed world. This has tremendous implications for the focus countries. The 
Caribbean governments need to make critical interventions in the education system, 
especially at the tertiary level. They should seek to create a nexus between the 
business sector and the educational institutions. In this way, graduates will possess 
the skills and training required by industry. Moreover, it seems that capital investment 
is needed for the upgrading of existing facilities at the public educational institutions. 
Chapter 10 notes that the equipment at the technical institutes in Trinidad was 
antiquated. In addition, incentives should be given to encourage continuous training 
of the work force. The Barbados government seems to be successful in this regard. 
Further, the governments need to aggressively address the development of a critical 
mass of workers with the specialist skills required by firms in the strategic sectors. 
Indeed, the Caribbean government should seek to develop `competitive flexibility': 
Its work force should possess the skills and training which will allow it to easily 
move to higher value-added activities. Finally, Caribbean governments also need to 
take cognisance of the extremely high levels of migration among its skilled labour 
force. It may be necessary for them to introduce schemes that make it compulsory for 
graduates, who benefit from subsidised training programmes, to work in the region 
for specified periods. 
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" Infrastructure 
The governments of the countries studied should seek to improve the general 
infrastructure of the country. It seems that capital investments need to be made in the 
upgrading of the utilities service (water and electricity) in Jamaica and Trinidad, the port 
service, specifically at Montego Bay in Jamaica, the airline service in Trinidad, and the 
public transportation system in Jamaica. The introduction of foreign involvement in these 
sectors seems to have a positive influence on the quality of service offered. The 
Caribbean government should not only seek to upgrade their basic infrastructure. They 
should also attempt to offer the foreign investor in their strategic sector specialised 
facilities which are available in few locations worldwide. Barbados appears to be 
implementing this strategy. This government is attempting to introduce competitively 
priced, state-of-the-art telecommunications facilities. 
" Institutional Framework for Industrialisation 
The institutional framework for industrialisation needs to operate with efficacy. 
Hence, the institutions should be endowed with the resources (human and financial) that 
would allow them to function effectively. In addition, there should be greater co- 
ordination of activity among the various institutions established to stimulate industrial 
activity. The Barbados `country-team' approach is an innovative attempt at addressing 
this concern. It could be worthwhile for Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago to adopt this 
initiative. 
9 Creation of a Nexus between MNE and Government 
There is need for a nexus between the MNEs and the government. Institutions 
need to be established where managers of MNEs could articulate their concerns to 
relevant government bodies. The field research showed that there was a limited 
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representation of managers from MNEs on organisations such as the Chamber of 
Commerce. Hence, few fora exist where the MNE could discuss the problems that 
affect its operations in the country. Thus, policy formation for the development of the 
country's strategic sector fails to fully address the needs of the MNE. 
" Investment Incentives Package 
The focus countries offer a wide array of investment incentives. It seems that at 
present, the preferred investment incentives are low taxes or tax holidays, and duty 
exemptions on industry-related equipment. It is noteworthy that all types of FDI are 
attracted to these incentives. Hence, the Caribbean government could remove some of the 
extraneous incentives that are offered to the foreign investor. It would be inadvisable for 
them to eliminate repatriation of profits and dividends from their incentive package. As 
noted earlier, this incentive has become so ubiquitous that the MNEs investing in the 
Caribbean assumes that it is part of the package. Most importantly, the governments 
should regularly review the investment incentives package, eliminating those incentives 
which no longer required and introducing those which are desired. In addition, attempts 
should be made to remove the biases present in this system. The domestic investor should 
receive incentives comparable to those offered to his foreign counterpart. 
" The Development of the Domestic Firm 
In all industries studied, the locally owned firm was not internationally 
competitive. It is imperative that the governments in the focus countries attempt to 
stimulate the development of these firms. To this end, the governments need to address 
issues such as the creation of an entrepreneurial culture; the introduction of venture 
capital markets; the development of links between foreign and locally owned firms; and 
the investment incentives offered to locally owned companies. 
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" The Development of Clusters 
The governments need to encourage the development of activities that are related 
to and support those conducted by the MNE in their strategic sectors. It seems that it was 
only in Trinidad that attempts were made to encourage these activities. The institutions 
mandated to stimulate industrialisation in the countries appear to be concerned with 
investment promotion. Their focus is attracting FDI into selected sectors of the countries. 
Limited efforts are made to encourage the development of firms (foreign or local) that 
provide support services to MNEs. In addition, limited attempts are made to encourage 
firms to enter activities that are related to those performed by MNEs in the strategic 
sectors. It is only through the development of these firms that the focus countries will 
likely strengthen their competitive advantage. 
9 The Maintenance of Economic and Political Stability 
There is an irrevocable link between a competitive business environment and 
economic and political stability. A competitive business environment is characterised by 
economic and political stability. The governments of the focus countries, specifically that 
of Jamaica, need to ensure that they adopt policies to promote economic and political 
stability. Indeed, these conditions seriously influence the nature and sustainability of FDI 
made in the country. It seems that economic and political instability only encourages foot 
loose investment in activities that are at the lower end of the value chain. 
12.7 Future Research Directions 
A number of issues have arisen in this study which could not be addressed within 
the confines of a PhD thesis. These issues form the basis for future research. They include 
the following: 
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" One of the major findings of this research was the utility of the "Double Diamond" 
framework as a tool for analysing the business environment of countries. The 
"Double Diamond" framework that was employed in the qualitative study could be 
applied to MNE activities in other locations. Preferred choices are other developing 
countries. However, the "Double Diamond" framework could be applied to MNE 
activities in developed countries as well as in different regions of large, industrialised 
countries. 
9 The qualitative study focused on export-seeking and resource-seeking MNEs. It will 
be instructive to conduct studies that analyse the investment behaviour and corporate 
strategy of the market-seeking MNE in small, developing countries. 
9 This study could be conducted in other `forgotten locations'. Countries in regions 
such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and Southern Africa are important foci for 
research. 
" The qualitative analysis employed in this study could be used for other export- 
activities such as financial services and tourism. At present, these activities are 
increasing in pre-eminence in the Caribbean. 
9 The research findings on the role that culture has on the investment behaviour of 
MNEs are inconclusive. There needs to be more in-depth analysis of this variable. 
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Appendices 
Appendix Table 1 
Multinational Enterprises That Operate In Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad- 
Tobago 
Parent Company Address, Contact Subsidiary, Contact Activities Size of Parent 
person and contact person and contact Company 
number number (total assets or total 
sales and number 
of employees) 
1. Alcan 1188 Rue Sherbooke Alcan Jamaica bauxite, alumina and Total assets 
Aluminium Quest Company alumina products (Dec. 1994) 
Limited Montreal, Quebec Kirkvine Works Can$ 
H3A 3G2 Kirkvine 120,720.59m 
Canada Mandeville 
Total no. of 
Marketing Manager: President: employees 
M. Jocelyn Gagne Mr. Bernard (Dec. 1994) 
514 848 81 14 (tel) Cousineau 37,500 
514 848 1514 (fax) 962 3134/3480 (tel) 
2. Kaiser 5555 Hilton Avenue 1. Kaiser Jamaica mining, refining, Total assets 
Alumium & Suite 200 Baton Bauxite Company production of (Dec. 1994): 
Chemical Rouge Discovery Bay aluminium and US$ 2,693.60m 
Corporation Louisana 70808 USA St. Ann manufacture of 
fabricated sheets. No. of employees 
President-Alumina: General Manager: (Dec. 1994) 
Mr. Geoff Smith Mr. J. R. Jendron 9,744 
504 231 51 100 (tel) 973-2221,973 2251-3 
(tel) 
2. Alumina Partners of 
Jamaica (Alpart 
Jamaica Incorporated) 
Spur Tree 
Nain 
Manchester 
General Manager: 
Mr. Eugene Miller 
962 3251,4431 (tel) 
962 9333 (fax) 
3. Hydro Post box 80 Alumium Partners of production and sale N. A. 
Aluminium N1321 STABEKK Jamaica (Alpart of bauxite, alumina 
Norway Jamaica Incorporated) and alumina based 
Spur Tree chemicals. 
Mr. Jon Harold Nilsin Nain 
227 38100 (tel) Manchester 
227 37818 (fax) 
General Manager: 
Mr. Eugene Miller 
962 3251,4431 (tel) 
962 9333 (fax) 
4. Aluminium 425 6th Avenue Alcoa Minerals of production and sale Total assets 
Company of Pittsburgh, PA Jamaica of bauxite, alumina, (Dec. 1994) 
America 15219-1850 USA 13 Waterloo Road alumina based US$ 12,353.20m 
Kingston 10 chemicals and 
President-Bauxite and related Total no. of 
Alumina: Managing Director: transportation employees 
Mr. Roger Vinez Mr. Michael Goza services (Dec. 1994) 
412 553 4545 (tel) 926 3390/5,2561-4 61,700 
(tel) 
926 9637 (fax) 
5. Nabisco Brands 345 Park Avenue West Indies Yeast food production Sales (1993) 
International Suite 20 New York Company baking powder, US$ 1.8 in 
NY 10154-0001 28 Jobs Lane deserts and ready to 
Spanish Town mix Total no. of 
Vice President and St. Catherine employees 
Regional Director (1993) 
(Caribbean): Managing Director: 19,000 
Mr. Warren Smith Mr. Luis Medina 
212 572 3030 (tel) 9842677,3079/80,312 
8,3132,7917 (tel) 
6. Sherwin 101 Prospect Ave. 1. Sherwin-Williams manufacture, Total Assets 
Williams N. W. (West Indies) Limited distribution and sale (Dec. 1994) 
Cleveland OH 44115 White Marl of coatings and US$ 1,962.03m 
USA Central Village, related products 
Spanish Town Total no. of 
Vice President- St. Catherine employees 
Decorative Coating: (Dec 1994) 
Mr. Kenneth Haber Managing Director: 17,900 
and Mr. Roy W. Holness 
Vice President- 984-2787,2798 tel) 
Automotive Market: 
Richard Rodick 2. Sherwin -Williams 
216 566 2000 (tel) Company Resources 
Limited Jamaica 
7. Acco Acco World Acco Jamaica Limited paper fastners, clips, Sales 
International Corporation 449 Spanish Town metal fastners, (1993) 
Incorporated 550 Lake Cook Road Road binders US$ 270 in 
Suite 150 Deerfield Kingston 11 
IL 60015-4944 
USA Managing Director: 
Mr. John Ramson 
Vice President: 923 5051/3 (tel) 
Mr. Desmond Laplace 
708 5419500/ 
708 4059000 (tel) 
8. Goodyear Tire 1144 East Market St. Goodyear Jamaica manufacture, Total assets 
& Rubber Akron, OH 44316 Limited (60%) distribution and sale (Dec. 1994) 
Company USA 8 Oliver Road of tyres, rubber US$ 9,123.30m 
Kingston 8 products 
Vice President- Latin 
America: Managing Director: 
Mr. John Polhemus Ms. Veronica Goldson 
216 796 2121 (tel) 923 6492,7274 (tel) 
924- 8934 (fax) 
9. Pioneer 700 Capital Square, Pioneer Overseas seed corn, feed seed, Total assets 
Hi-Bred 400 Locust Street, Corporation data system and (Aug. 1994): 
International Des Moines, IA 50309 8 Sunset Close equipment US$1,253.42m 
Incorporated USA Kingston 8 
Total no. of 
Finance Director- General Manager: employees 
Research: Mr. Harold Wilson (Aug. 1994) 
Mr. Paul Matson 978 4481 (tel) 4,800 
515 248 4800 (tel) 
10. 291 Peterborough Bean, D. D. & Sons matches and match Sales (1993) 
Bean D. D & Sons Street (Jamaica) boxes US$ 20 m 
Company Jaffrey, N. H. 03452 - 10 East St. 
1238 P. O. Box 370 Total no. of 
Kingston employees 
Chief Executive (1993) 
Officer: M. anaging Director: 350 
Delcie Bean Mr. Paul Morgan 
603 532 8311 922-2448-9; 2440 (tel) 
12. Diversey Diversey Brazil Diversey Corporation manufacture of Sales 
Corporation Limited (Jamaica) Limited industrial detergents (1993) 
Estrada Dos Romeiros 8 East Bell Road US$ 477 m 
KM 325 06412-901 Kingston 11 
Barqueri Total no. of 
Sao Paulo Managing Director: employees 
Brazil Mr. Winston Kong (1993) 
923-8678; 928-2154 4,000 
Regional Director: (tel) 
Mr. Oswdo Mutta 
13. General Cigar 387 Park Avenue Cifuentes Y Cia manufacture and Total assets 
Company South Limited marketing of cigars, (Dec. 1994) 
Incorporated New York, NY 45 Elma Crescent growing and US$ 273 m 
(A division of 10016-8899 Kingston 20 processing and 
Culbro wrapping of tobacco Total no. of 
Corporation) Chairman: G. eneral Manager: employees 
Mr. Edgar Cullman Mr. Peter Brown (Dec. 1994) 
Senior 925-1080/2; 925-1086 2,695 
212 516 8700 (tel) (tel) 
14.3 M 3M Center 3M Inter America adhesives, tapes, Sales (1994) 
Interamerica Building 223 Incorporation plasters, printery US$ 45.7m 
Incorporation 3 South-03 141/2 Retirement trades and 
St. Paul Road machinery Total no. of 
MN 55144-1000 Kingston 5 employees 
USA (1993) 
Managing Director: 200 
International Mr. Loxsley Henry 
Marketing Manager: 926 3444/4054 (tel) 
Mr. George 929 5862 (fax) 
Dierberger 
612 737 6501 (tel) 
15. Ledghill 5109 NW 105 Court Jamaica Pre-Mix manufacture & N. A. 
International Miami FL 33178 Limited supplier of 
USA 31 Molynes Road aggregate ready-mix 
Kingston 10 concrete, 
Chairman: housing 
Mr. Fuller Duncan Manager: development 
Mr. Kennis Barrow 
926-3420 (tel) 
16. Liquid 135 S La Salle Street 1. Jamaica Carbonics Manufacture of Sales 
Carbonics 8th Floor Limited carbon dioxide and (1993) 
Corporation Chicago, ILL Ferry dry ice US$ 284 m 
60603-4105 Kingston 10 
Total no. of 
Managing Director: employees 
Mr. Stephen Mackay (1993) 
933 3391/2,3798, 2,500 
3768 (tel) 
2. Jamaica Oxygen & 
Acteylene 
Ferry 
Kingston 10 
Manager Director: 
Mr. Stephen Mackay 
933 3391/2, 
3768,3798 (tel) 
17. Addis Calvalley Road Addis (Jamaica) Ltd. manufacture of Total assets 
Limited: Haverhill Suffolk Temple Hall Stony personal care (Dec. 1993): 
CB9 8DT Hill products (tooth and £(000's) 29,572) 
Wisdom P. O. Box 173 hair brushes)and 
Toothbushes Manager- Kingston19 aerosol caps Total no. of 
Limited Manufacturing: employees 
Mr. Brian Mc Mullen General Manager: (Dec. 1993) 
01440 714 800 (tel) Marlene Campbell 1,185 
942-2011 (tel) 
18. UB Tingewick Road Berger Paints manufacture of Total assets 
International Buckingham (Jamaica) Limited paints, resin and ink (Dec. 1994) 
Limited MK18 ]AN 256 Spanish Town £ (000's) 4,338 
UK Road 
P. O. Box8 
Group Secretary: Kingston 11 
Mr. J. A. Melrose 
0128 0824240 (tel) Managing Director: 
0128 0815929 (fax) Mr. Warren Mcdonald 
9236226,6697 tel) 
19. Booker Tate Master's Court Sugar Company of manufacture of Total assets 
Limited Church Rd. Thame Jamaica Limited sugar, alcohol, rum, (Sept. 1994) 
Oxfordshire 22G, Old Hope Road, cane cultivation £(000's) 14,115 
OX9 3FA Kingston 5, Jamaica 
Total no. of 
Director-Caribbean Chief Officer employees 
Region: Mr. Frank Downie (Sept. 1994) 
Mr. Mike Glasford 926 5930 (tel) 211 
018 44251000 (tel) 926 6149 (fax) 
018 44251020 (fax) 
20. Bush Boake 7 Mercedes Drive Bush Boake Allen manufacture of Total assets 
Allen Holdings Montvale (Jamaica) Ltd. essential oils and (March 1994) 
Incorporated New Jersey 226 Spanish Town flavour materials £(000's) 140,063 
07645 Road and wholesale 
Kingston 13 distribution of Total no. of 
Vice President-Latin pharmaceutils employees 
America and the General Manager: (March 1994) 
Caribbean: Ms. Sonya Allen 1,724 
Mr. Christopher 923 5200,5111,5256 
Gibbons (tel) 
201 391 9870 (tel) 
21. Rothmans Denham Place Cigarette Company of tobacco manufacture Total assets 
International Village Road, Jamaica Limited (March 1995) 
Services Limited Denham 60 Knutsford Blvd. £ (000's) 113,846 
Uxbridge, Middlesex Kingston 5 
UB9 5BL Jamaica Total no. of 
employees 
Worldwide Finance Chief Executive (March 1995) 
Director: Officer: 1,830 
Mr. Jan Du Plessis Mr. John D. Hall 
0189 5834949 (tel) 984 3051 (tel) 
0189 5835228 (fax) 929- 2881 (fax) 
22. Coates Immeuble de la Coates Bros (Jamaica) manufacture of Total assets 
Lorilleaux SA Diamant Ltd. printing ink and (Jan. 1994) 
16 Rue de la Lot 9, Nanse Pen other chemicals £(000's) 124,888 
Republique Close 
92800 Pateaux P. O. Box 311 Total no. of 
France Kingston 11 employees 
(Jan. 1994) 
Mr. Stewart Gerety Regional Director: 1,281 
331 41356900 (tel) Mr. Austin Greaves 
331 41356623 (fax) General Manager: 
Ms. Marlene Virgo 
923 6028/6358 (tel) 
23. Guinness Sanctuary Center 1. Guiness Jamaica production, Total assets 
Worldwide 4800 North Federal Limited distribution and (1994) 
Limited Highway Central Village marketing of £(000's)317,400 
Suite 3068 Boca P. O. Box 620 Guinness stout and 
Raton Spanish Town kaliber and supply Total no. of 
Florida, 33431 USA St. Catherine of raw material and employees 
equipment to (1994) 
Regional Manager- Managing. Director: overseas breweries. 1,723 
Caribbean : John Otway 
Mr. John Devonport 984-2741 (tel) 
407 3916290 (tel) 
497 391 2630 (fax) 2. Denoes and Geddes 
(51 % ownership) 
214 Spanish Town 
Road 
Kingston 11 
President: 
Terry Challenor 
923- 9291 (tel) 
923-4778 (fax) 
24. Allied Prewetts Mills Estate Industries Manufacture of `Tia Total assets 
Domecq plc Worthing Road Limited Maria' coffee liquer (March 1994) 
Horsham West Sussex Montego Freeport Brewers of wines £ (000's) , 234,000 
RH12 IST Montego Bay and spirits. 
UK Manufacture and Total no. of 
Chief Executive distribution of food employees 
Marketing Director- Officer: and beverages (March 1994) 
Tia Maria Mr. Peter Bitter 71,824 
Mr. Neil Mc Millan 923 7463 (tel) 
0140 322600 (tel) 
25. Graham Miller 5620 Glenridge Drive Graham Miller & chartered loss N. A. 
Limited NE Company (Jamaica) adjusters to Lloyds 
Altanta, Georgia USA Limited Underwriters & 
303142 75 Knutsford Blvd Insurance 
Kingston 5 Companies 
Director-Latin 
America and South Director: 
America Operations Thomas Dawson 
Mr. Richard Martin 926-4873 (tel) 
404 256 0830 (tel) 
26. Fujitsu-ICL 5429 LBJ Freeway Fujistu-ICL Caribbean computers, data Total assets 
Systems Suite 900 Limited processing (Nov. 1994) 
Incorporated Dallas TX 7th Floor, Mutual Life equipment and £ (000's) 21,971 
75240 USA Building services 
2 Oxford Road Total no. of 
President-Retail: Kingston 5 employees 
Mr. R. H. E. Powell (Nov. 1994) 
716 8300 (tel) General Manager 575 
716 8586 (fax) Caribbean.: 
Ken Slyvester 
926-7567/8 (tel) 
27. Unilever Grey Friars Lipton (Jamaica) Tea packaging Total assets 
International Lewins Mead Limited (1994) 
Market Bristol 39-41 Second Street £ (000's)29,892 
Development BSI 2JJ Newport West 
Company UK Kingston 13 Total no. of 
P. O. Box 91 employees 
Sales Support (1994): 
Manager: Executive Secretary: 44 
Ms. Allison Jackson Sherron Minott 
01179 2766276 (tel) 923-4029 (tel) 
28. Reckitt & 1655 Valley Road 1. Reckitt and Colman manufacture and Total Assets 
Colman P. O. Box 943 (West Indies) Limited distribution of (Dec. 1994) 
(Overseas) Wayne, New Jersey Twickenhan Park household, toiletry, £ 
Limited 07474-0943 Spanish Town food and phar- (000's)3,194,560 
809 6842508 (tel) maceuticals 
General Manager- products and Total no. of 
International: 2. Reckitt and industrial pigment employees 
Mr. Jesse Silva Coleman (Overseas) (Dec. 1994) 
201 633 3633 (tel) Limited 18,700 
201 633 2029 (fax) 36 Beechwood 
Avenue 
Kingston 5 
809 960 52358 (tel) 
General Manager: 
C. A. Fletcher 
29. Metal P. O. Box 32 West Indies Metal bottle tops and Total assets 
Closures Group Bromford Lane Products Limited closures for drinks (Dec. 1994) 
Limited West Bromwich 7 Bell Road industry £ (000's) 73,121 
West Midlands Kingston I1 
B70 7HY 
General Manager: 
Commerical Mrs. Juliet Mc Nully 
Aluminium Manager: 923 8801/937 0295 
Mr. Nick Moore (tel) 
0121 553 2900 (tel) 
0121 5254636 (fax) 
30. Pilkington plc Prescot Road Pilkington Glass manufacture of flat Total assets 
St. Helens (Jamaica) Limited and safety glass for (March 1995) 
Meyerside Myers Wharf building and £ (000's) , 075,000 WAIO 3TT NPE transport industries 
Kingston 15 Total no. of 
Financial Director: employees 
Mr. Allan Maykels Managing Director: (March 1995) 
01744 28882 (tel) Mr. Raymond 37,100 
01744 692569 (fax) Thompson 
922 8821/4 (tel) 
31. Rentokil East Grinstead Rentokil (Jamaica) Sanitary service, Total assets 
Group plc West Sussex Limited construction, (Dec. 1994) 
RH19 2JY 13 Cargill Avenue chemicals and £ (000's) 
UK Kingston 10 renting of movables. 125,112 
Regional Manager: Managing Director: Total no. of 
Mr. Nicholas Harding Christopher Ritch employees 
0181 9946464 (tel) 926 4236 (tel) (Dec. 1994) 
0181 9948920 (fax) 7,702 
32. Sun Alliance Parkside West Indies Alliance all insurance but Total assets 
Group Horsham Insurance Company industrial (Dec. 1994) 
West Sussex P. O. Box 343 £ 000's)4,087,600 
RH 12 IXA 32 1 /2 Duke Street 
Kingston 
Manager-Americas 
Division: General Manager: 
Mr. R. K. Bellamy John Acton 
0171 588 2345 (tel) 929 8080 (tel) 
0171588 234594 (fax) 960 3179 (fax) 
33. Kier Temsford Hall Caribbean Civil engineering Total assets 
International Ltd. Station Road Construction and building (June 1994)) 
Temsford, Sandy Company Limited contractors £ (000's)16,890 
Bedfordshire SG19 Harbour Head 
2BD Kingston 17 Total no. of 
UK P. O. Box 57 employees 
(June 1994) 
M. Dir: John W. H. Manager Director: Mr. 1,233 
Lawson David Durey 
01767 640111 (tel) 928 6221 (tel) 
01767 40002 (fax) 
34. C. E. Heath 133 Hounsditch Crawford Insurance Corresponding N. A. 
(Broking EC 3A 7AH Brokers of Jamaica broker 
Services) Limited London P. O. Box 42 
17 Dominica Drive 
Mr. S. Beerh Kingston 5 
0171 234 4000 (tel) 
Chief Executive 
Officer: 
Mr. Basil Monteith 
929 2810 (tel) 
929 2819 (fax) 
35. General Pitheavlis General Accident General insurance Total assets 
Accident Fire & Perth Insurance Company (Dec. 1994) 
Life Insurance Scotland (Jamaica) Limited £(000's) 
Corporation Plc. PH2 ONH 58 Half Way Tree 10,088,300 
UK Road 
Kingston 10 
Operation Manager- 
International: General Manager: 
Mr. John Daniels Mr. Errol Zaidie 
01738 21202 (tel) 929 8450-1(tel) 
929 1074 (fax) 
36. Bank of Novia 200 Portage Avenue Bank of Novia Scotia Banking Total assets 
Scotia 3rd Floor (Jamaica) Limited (1991) 
Winnipeg, MAN Port Royal and Duke Canal 81 m 
R3C 3X2 Streets, 
Canada Kingston, Jamaica Total no. of 
employees 
Vice President: Mr. William Clarke (1994) 
Mr. Bryan Magwood 922-1000 (tel) 33,098 
204 985 3011 (tel) 924-9294 (fax) 
204 943 3971 (fax) 
37. Securior Securior Security Securior Jamaica Security services N. A. 
International Services Miami Limited 
7959 NW 21st Street 455 Spanish Town 
Miami Florida Road 
33126 USA Kingston 1l 
Mr. Simon Hornby Manager: 
305 5929368 (tel) Mr. Richard 
305 592 3145 (fax) Cunningham 
923 5979 (tel) 
937 0835 (fax) 
38. Higgs & Hill Crown House Higgs & Hill Overseas building contractors N. A. 
Limited Kingston Road Limited 
New Malden P. O. Box 900 
Surrey Montego Bay 
KT3 3 ST 
Senior Project 
Managing Director: Manager: 
Mr. Stephen Jones Mr. Barry Joyce 
0181 9428921 (tel) 979 5178 (tel) 
0181 944756 (fax) 979 5177 (fax) 
39. British Speedbird House British Airways air transportation Total Sales 
Airways plc Heathrow Airport The Towers (1994) 
Hounslow Dominica Drive £ 8359 m 
TW6 2JA UK Kingston 5 
Manager-Americas: Manager for North 
Mr. Peter Spencer Caribbean 
0181 562 3558 (tel) Mrs. Dawn Welber 
0181 562 5444 (fax) 929 9020-9 (tel) 
929 5971 (fax) 
40. Nestle Avenue Nestle Nestle-JMP Jamaica food products, Total Assets 
S. A. CH-1800 Limited beverages and (Dec. 1994) 
Verey 60 Knutsford Blvd. pharmaceuticals US$ 34,005 m 
Switzerland Kingston 5 
Total no. of 
Director-Zone 3: General Manager: employees 
Mr. Felix Braun Mr. James Rawle (Dec. 1994) 
0041 21924 3111(tel) 926 1300/8 (tel) 212,687 
0041 21924 1885 fax) 
41. Cable & Mercury House Telecommunications external Total Assets 
Wireless Limited 124 Theobalds Rjoad of Jamaica communication (March 1994) 
London 47 Half Way Tree Rd. £ 7,816.4 m 
WC 1X 84X Kingston 5 
UK Total no. of 
Chief Executive employees 
Director-Regional Officer: (March 1994) 
Business: Mr. Errald Miller 41,124 
Mr. Richard Wain 926 9700 (tel) 
Right-Lee 968 9845 (fax) 
0171 3154000 (tel) 
42. Courts plc The Grange Courts (Jamaica) retailers of Total Assets 
1 Central Road Limited consumer surables (March 1994) 
Surrey 78-81 Slipe Road on higher purchase £ (000's) 299,257 
Morden Kingston 5 terms 
SM4 5RX P. O. Box 201 Total no. of 
UK employees 
Managing Director. (March 1994) 
Chief Exectutive Mr. Richard Coe 3,871 
Officer: 926 2110/4 (tel) 
Bruce Cohen 929 0887 (fax) 
0181 6403322 (tel) 
0181 5287505 (fax) 
43. Shell Shell Centre Shell Company (West petroleum marketing Total Assets 
International London Indies) Limited (Dec. 1994) 
Limited SEI 7NA Rockfort Installation, £ 69,135 m 
Kingston 2 
Area Head OSC-Head Total no. of 
Caribbean and Central Managing Director: employees 
America: Mr. John Bullock (Dec. 1994) 
Mr. J. Da Vries 928 7301/9 (tel) 106,000 
o71 9341234 (tel) 
0171 9348060 (fax) 
44. Colgate- 300 Park Avenue Colgate-Palmolive home products Total assets 
Palmolive New York NY (Jamaica) Limited (Dec 1994) 
Company 10022 USA 216 Marcus Gavey US$ 6,142.40 m 
Drive 
Vice President- Latin Kingston 11 Total no. of 
America: employees 
Mr. Mike Tangney Managing Director: (Dec. 1994) 
212 3102000 (tel) Mr. Trevor Ottey 32,800 
923 7011/7,5694/5 
45. Johnson & 1 Johnson & Johnson Johnson & Johnson surgical, medical Total number of 
Johnson Plaza (Jamaica) Limited and baby products employees 
New Brunswick NJ LOJ Industrial Park (Dec. 1994) 
08933 USA 7 Norman Road 81,500 
Kingston CSO 
Company Group 
Chairman: General Manager: 
Mr. Georgio Petronio Errol Samuels 
908 524 0400 (tel) 938 4155 (tel) 
46. Price Southwalk Towers Price Waterhouse accounting, auditing Total assets 
Waterhouse 32 London Bridge Scotia Bank Centre and consultancy (June 1993) 
Street Cor. Duke and Port services £ (000's) 65,396 
London SE 1 9SY Royal Streets 
UK Kingston 5 
Secretary to Price Senior Partner: 
Waterhouse World: Mr. Richard Downer 
Mr. Allan Peddle 922 6230 (tel) 
0171 9393000 (tel) 
47. DHL 59 Pondsill Road DHL (Jamaica) International courier N. A. 
Worldwide St. Marten Limited services 
Express 54 Duke Street 
Mr. Paul McCarthy Kingston 
599 523 174 (tel) 
599 542 960 (fax) General Manager: 
Mrs. Felicity Reid 
922 7333 (tel) 
924 9120 (fax) 
48. Xerox P. O. Box 1600 Xerox (Jamaica) document Total assets 
Corporation Stanford, Connecticut Limited processing (Dec. 1994) 
06904 53 Knutsford US$ 38,585.00 m 
Boulevard 
Vice President and Kingston 5 Total no. of 
General Manager- employees 
Latin America and Managing Director: (Dec. 1994) 
Caribbean: Mr. Barrington 87,600 
Mr. Cyprian C. Wight Burnett 
213 968 3000(tel) 926 5630-2 (tel) 
929 5372 (fax) 
49. Canadian Head Office 9th Floor CIBC Trust and banking and Total Assets 
Imperial Bank of Commerce Court Merchant Bank financial services (1995) 
Commerce West (Jamaica) Limited Can. $ 179,244 m 
Limited Toronto, ONT 23-27 Knutsford 
M5L 1A2 Boulevard Total no. of 
Canada P. O. Box 762 employees 
Kingston 5 (1994) 
Vice President, Trade 40,807 
Finance: Managing Director: 
Mr. David Robble Mr. Albert Webb 
416 980 3933 (tel) 929 9310 (tel) 
416363 4782 (fax) 
50. Gillette Prudential Tower Gillette(Caribbean)Li cultery, toilet Total assets 
Company Building mited preparation, (Dec. 1994) 
Boston MA 21 Gordon Town chemical US$ 5,494.00 m 
012199 Road preparation, electric 
USA Kingston 6 housewares, pens Total no. of 
and mechanical employees 
Vice President-Latin Managing Director: pencils (Dec. 1994) 
America: Mr. Mark Mc Kenzie 32,800 
Mr. Norm Roberts 927 1807-8 (tel). 
617 421 700 (tel) 
51. Fyffes Group 12 York Gate Jamaica Producers banana production Total Assets 
Limited Regents Park Group Limited (1994) 
London 6a Oxford Road £ 103.3m 
NWI 4QS Kingston 5 
Group Treasury Chairman: 
Manager: 926 3503/6 (tel) 
Mr. Brian Breathnach 929 3636 (fax) 
0171 4874472 (tel) 
0171 2240618 (fax) 
52. East Ocean Room 404 East Ocean Textiles garment production N. A. 
Textiles Limited East Ocean Centre Ltd. 
98 Granville Road Lot 65-82 
Taimshatsui Kingston Export Free 
East Kowlon Zone 
Hong Kong Kingston 15 
Mr. James Leah Wah 
Saw 
923 4365,5181 (tel) 
923 5533 (fax) 
53. Jockey 2300 60th Street Jockey International Garments Sales 
International Kenosha WI Jamaica Limited (1994) 
Incorporated 53140-3822 PO Box 4 US$ 22.5m 
USA Haughton Court 
Lucea Total no. of 
President: Hanover employees 
Mr. Ed Emma (1994) 
414 658 811 (tel) Manager: 5,900 
Mr. Paul Ramsour 
956 2563 (tel) 
956 2399 (fax) 
54. Maidenform 154 Avenue East Jamaica Needlecraft Garments Sales 
Incorporated Bayonne Limited (1994) 
New Jersey NJ 54 Caracas Avenue US$ 280 m 
07002 USA PO Box 28 Kingston 
15 Total no. of 
Senior Vice President- employees 
Manufacturing: Manager: (1994) 
Mr. Lou Goldsman Mr. Harold Dougan 6,000 
923 9522,9518 (tel) 
923 9030 (fax) 
55. Fruit of the 1411 Fruit of the Noel of Jamaica Garments Sales 
Loom Loom Drive Limited (1994) 
PO Box 900015 76 Marcus Garvey US $ 826m 
Bowling Green Drive 
Kentucky 42102-9015 Gamex Freezone Total no. of 
Kingston 13 employees 
(1994) 
Manager- Manager: 3004 
Manufacturing: Mr. Bob Fillingham 
Mr. Gary Wood 923 7440 (tel) 
923 7464 (fax) 
56. Fine Line 1109 North Fairfax Fine Line Garments N. A. 
Manufacturing Street Manufacturing 
Company Suite 300 Company Limited 
Incorporated Alexandra 90-91 Zagreb Avenue 
Virginia USA Kingston Free Zone 
Kingston 15 
President: 
Mrs. Leslie General Manager: 
Schweitzer Ms. Kathleen 
703 548 0644 (fax) Anderson 
923 5249 (tel) 
923 6313 (fax) 
57. Tultex PO Box 5191 Akom Corporation Garments N. A. 
Corporation Martinsville VA. PO Box 871 
24115 Montego Bay Free 
USA Zone 
St. James 
Marketing Manager: 
Mr. Jim Snead Manager: 
703 632 8418 (tel) Mr. James Edwards 
979 8170/8427 (tel) 
979 8439 (fax) . 
58 H. H. Cutler 120 Ionia Avenue SW Jog Togs Limited Garments N. A. 
Company Grand Rapids 7 Carifta Avenue 
Michigan Nanse Pen 
49502 USA PO Box 402 
Kingston 11 
Vice Pesident: 
Mr. Jim Miller Manager: 
404 875 7765 (tel) Ms. Gwendoline Barr 
923 6152 (tel) 
923 5674 (fax) 
59. Williamson 319 Lipscomb Street Williamson-Dickie Garments N. A. 
Dickie Fort Wort Texas Jamaica Limited 
Manufacturing 76104 USA Montego Bay Free 
Company Zone 
Vice President PO Box 1377 
Administration: Montego Bay 
Mr. Jack Man St. James 
817 336 7201 (tel) 
Manager: 
Mr. Cordell Atherly 
979 8162 (tel) 
951 6237 (fax) 
60. Apparel 152 Madison Avenue Yoffi Industries Garments N. A. 
Contractors New York NY 10016 Limited 
Association USA Twickenham Park 
Incorporation PO Box 391 
President: Spanish Town 
Mr. Allen Klinger 
Manager: 
Mr. Bruce Binder 
984 3738 (tel) 
984 3739 (fax) 
61. Youngones Manri-Dong 2KA Youngones Apparel Garments N. A. 
Corporation Chung-Gu, CPO 1204 Industries Jamaica 
Seoul South Korea Limited 
76 Marcus Garvey 
President: Drive 
Mr. C. H. Bae Kingston 13 
Vice President: 
Mr. Don Hamilton 
923 4531-3 (te)) 
62. British Millbank British American cigarettes and Total Assets 
American Knowes Green Staines Tobacco Company tobacco and the (Dec. 1994) 
Tobacco TW 18 IDY uk (Barbados) Limited provision of (£ 000's) 
Limited Lodge Hill Warrens finanical services 40,230,000 
Regional Manager- St. Michael 
Latin Total no. of 
America/Caribbean: Country Manager: employees 
Mr. Chris Button Mr. Richard Hughes (Dec. 1994) 
0178 4460 400 (tel) 425 3990 (tel) 1,281 
425 3753 (fax) 
63. Sherwin 101 Prospect Avenue Sherwin Williams Manufacture, Total Assets 
Williams N. W. Cleveland, OH Tweedside Road distribution and sale (Dec. 1994) 
Corporation 44115 USA St. Michael of coatings and US$ 1,962.03m 
Barbados related products 
Vice President- Total no. of 
Decorative Coatings: General Manager; employees 
Mr. Kenneth Haber Mr. Roger Smith (Dec. 1994) 
and 436 7270 (tel) 17,900 
Vice President- 
Automative Market: 
Mr. Richard Rodick 
216 566 2000 (tel) 
64. Hall Halescott Lane BRC (West Indies) metal stockholdings, Total Assets 
Engineering Shrewsbury Shapshire Ltd. engineering and (Dec. 1994) 
(Holdings) Plc SYI 3AS Cane Garden steel reinforcements £ (000's)l 13,042 
UK St. Thomas 
Total no. of 
Chairman: Mr. R. N. General Manager.: employees 
C. Hall Mr. Peter Gooding (Dec. 1994) 
01743 445541 (tel) 425 0371(tel) 1,459 
01743 44500 (fax) 425 2941 (fax) 
65. Robert Middleton Way Mc Bride (Caribbean) manufacture of Total Assets 
McBride Limited Middleton Manchester Limited products for (June 1994) 
M24 4PP UK Lowlands household and £(000's)142,234 
Barbados personal care market 
Managing Director: Total no. of 
Mr. Edmond General Manager: employees 
0161 654 5800 (tel) Mr. John Taylor (June 1994) 
0161 6537453 (fax) 428 7217 (tel) 2,737 
428 3414 (fax) 
66. Hilton Hotels 1 Wall Street Court Barbados Hilton hotel Sales 
Corporation New York, NY Needham's Point (1993) 
10005-3302 St. Michael US$ 1.1 m 
212 973 2200 (tel) General Manager: Mr. Total no. of 
Digaetano employees 
426 0200 (tel) (1993) 
49,69 
67. American P. 0. Box 619616 Grantly Adams commerical airline Total assets 
Airlines Dallas, Fort Worth International Airport transport (Dec. 1994) 
Incorporated Airport 428 4120 (tel) US$ 19,486m 
Texas USA 
Total no, of 
Senior Vice President: employees 
Florida, Caribbean (Dec. 1994) 
and Latin America: 109,800 
Mr. Peter J. Dolara 
817 335 1234 (tel) 
68. Barclays Bank Fleet Way House Barclays Bank Plc Commerical banker Total assets 
Plc 7th Floor 25 Renedezvous (Dec. 1994) 
Farringdon Street Christ Church £(000's) 
London EC4A 4LP 91,392,000 
Senior Diector.: 
Manager: Mr. Alaistair Camp Total no. of 
Mr. Kelvin Farlane Tel 431 5300 employees 
0171 4891995 (tel) Fax 436 7957 (Dec. 1994) 
0171 2366282 (fax) 95,7000 
69. Higgs & Hill Crown House Higgs& Hill household building Total Assets 
Plc Kingston Road (Caribbean ) Limited and property (Dec. 1994) 
New Malden 6 Pine Road development £(000's) 175,429 
KT3 3ST St. Michael 
UK Total no. of 
Director: Mr. Richard employees 
Managing Director: Wareham (Dec. 1994) 
Mr. Stephen Jones 437 3502 (tel) 1,282 
0181 9428921 (tel) 436 1353 (fax) 
0181 944756 (fax) 
70. Forte Plc 166 High Holborn Sandy Lane Hotel St Hotel Total Assets 
London WC IV 6TT James (Jan. 1994) 
UK £(000's)4,437,000 
General Mabager: 
Development Richard Williams Total no. of 
Executive: 432 1311 (tel) employees 
Mrs. Lesley Ashplant 432 2954 (fax) (Jan. 1994) 
0171 3012097 (tel) 50,000 
0171 3012522 (fax) 
71. Rentokil Felecourt Rentokil Barbados Santiary service, Total Assets 
Group Plc East Grinstead Limited construction, (Dec. 1994) 
RH 19 2JY Rentokil House chemicals and £ (000') 125,112 
London Chelston Avenue renting of movables 
UK Culloden Road Total no. of 
St. Michael employees 
Regional General (Dec. 1994) 
Manager: Managing Director: 7,702 
Mr. Nicholas Harding James Haslett 
01342 8330222 (tel) 429 3546 (tel) 
01342 3262229 (fax) 429 7674 (fax) 
72. Hillsdown Hilfsdown House Bar bados Mills food processors and Total Assets 
Holdings plc 32 Hampstead High Limited distributors, (Dec. 1994) 
Street London Harbour Extension manufacture of (£ 000's) 
NW3 IQD UK Lands End furniture, househod 2,122,100 
St. Michael products and 
Corporate Affairs and building and Total no. of 
Operations Executive: General Manager: property employees 
Mr. David Gray Carlos Betgrave development. (Dec. 1994) 
0171 7940677 (tel) 427 8880 (tel) 40,473 
0171 432065 (fax) 427 8886 (fax) 
73. British Speedbird House Speedbird House Airline passenger Total assets 
Airways Plc Heathrow Airport Fairchild Street transportation (March 1995) 
Hounslow Bridgetown £ 000's)9,049,000 
TW6 2JA 
UK Total no. of 
Manager: Elvin Sealy employees 
Manager-Americas: 428 1660 (tel) (March 1995) 
Mr. Peter Spencer 426 1639 (fax) 53,060 
0181 562 3558 (tel) 
0181 562 5444 (fax) 
74. Price Southwalk Towers Price Waterhouse and accounting Total assets 
Waterhouse & 32 London Bridge Co. (June 1993) 
Company Street Collymore Rock £ (000's) 65,396 
London SEI 9SY St. Michael 
UK 
Senior Partner: 
Secretary to Price Mr. Anthony Ellis 
Waterhouse World: 436 7000 (tel) 
Mr. Allan Peddle 
0171 93930000 (tel) 
75. Economics Dorado Industrial Ecolab manufacture of soap Total assets 
Laboratory Park 6 Grantley Adams and other detergents, (Dec. 1994) 
Incorporated Lot 16-18-19 Industrial Park polishes and US$ 1,020.36 m 
Dorado Puerto Rico Christ Church sanitation goods, 
00646 services industry Total no. of 
machinery employees 
Mr. Rafael Rovira (Dec. 1994) 
809 696 1290 (tel) General Manager: Mr. 8206 
809 696 7483 (fax) Anthony Gibbs 
428 1602 (tel) 
76. BEL Tronics 2422 Dunwin Drive BEL Tronics Printed circuit N. A. 
Limited Mississauga Barbados Limited boards 
Ontario Newtown Industrial 
L51 I J9 Park 
Canada Christ Church 
President and General Managing Director: 
Manager: Mr. Andrew 
Mr. Rudolf J. C. Sagi Applewaite 
Sr. 809 428 2001 (tel) 
416 828 1002 (tel) 809 428 9064 (fax) 
416 828 2951 (fax) 
77. Betatherm 910 Boston Turnpike Caribbean Electronics Temperature sensing Sales 
Corporation Shewsbury Manufacturing devices (1993) 
Massachussets 04545 Limited US$ 7m 
United States Newtown Industrial 
Park Number of 
General Manager: ChristChurch employees 
Mr. Brian O'Keefe (1993) 
508 842 0516 (tel) Manager: Mr. Steven 130 
508 842 0748 (fax) O'Keefe 
809 420 6347 (tel) 
809 420 6347 (fax) 
78. Charles T. 605 Penkins Lane Charles T. Gamble Assembled wire- N. A. 
Gamble Industries Delanco, New Jersey Industries wound resistors 
Limited 08075 United States Building # 11 
Newtown Industrial 
President: Park 
Mr. Thomas Gamble Christ Church 
609 461 1900 (tel) 
Manager: 
Mr. Joseph 
Braithwaite 
809 428 1876 (tel) 
809428 5218 (fax) 
79. Crompton 920 Canada Road Crompton Modutec M-Series meters Total sales 
Modutec Limited Manachester Barbados Limited (Dec 1993) 
New Hampshire Newtown Industrial US$ 6,742 m 
03109 USA Park 
Christ Church Number of 
General Manager: employees 
Dana Skaddan (Dec 1993) 
603 669 5121 (tel) Managing Director: 129,814 
603 622 4262 (fax) Mr. Ken Barrow 
809 428 6369 (tel) 
809 428 6922 (fax) 
80. Galt Controls 44 Hokesmill Road M. S. I. Limited Printed circuit Sales 
Incorporated York Newtown Industrial boards (1993) 
Pennsylvania 1704 Park US$ 12m 
United States Christ Church 
Total number of 
President and General Manager: employees 
Managing Director: Ms. Gerda Burnett (1993) 
Mr. George Bradford 809 428 4611 (tel) 97 
809 428 1093 (fax) 
81. Carl Haas 7230 Schlomberg Haas Precision Hair Springs N. A. 
GMBH P. O. Box 29 Industries (Barbados) 
Germany Limited 
Newtown Industrial 
Managing Director: Park 
Mr. Carl Haas Christ Church 
07422 27-40 (tel) 
07422 27-4239 (fax) General Manager: 
Mr. L. T. Bellamy 
428 5597 (tel) 
82. The T. T. Clive House International Resistive Manufactured wire Total assets 
Group Plc 12-18 Queens Road Company (Barbados) wound resistors (Dec 1994) 
Weybridge Surrey Limited £ (000's) 291,415 
KT13 9XB Newtown Industrial 
England Park Number of 
Christ Church employees 
President: (Dec 1994) 
Mr. Trevor Blackshaw Director: Mr. John 6,903 
01932 8413 10 (tel) Young 
01932 846 724 (fax) 428 9957 (tel) 
428 9966 (fax) 
83. Rothsay Anchorhouse Tansitor (Barbados) Tantulum capacitors N. A. 
Holdings Limited 50 High Street Limited 
Bagshot Surrey Newtown Industrial 
GU 19 5AW Park 
England Christ Church 
ManagingDirector: M. Dir.: Mr. David 
Mr. Jack Sunda Monks 
01276 451 077 (tel) 809 428 8604 (tel. ) 
01276 452 686 (fax) 809 428 2823 (fax) 
84. New Jersey 20 Stern Avenue Clifford Electronics Printed circuit board Sales (1993) 
Semi- Springfield, NJ Limited assembly US$ 4.8 m 
conductor 07081-2905 Pine Industrial Park 
United States St. Michael Total no. of 
employees 
Vice President: Manager: (1993) 
Mr. Bob Hilderbrandt Mr. Charles Leacock 95 
201 376 2922 (tel) 809 436 6149 (tel) 
201 376 8960 (fax) 
85. AMR 4255 Amon Carter Caribbean Data Processing of airline Sales (1993) 
Information Boulevard Services Ltd. ticket data, payroll US$ 200 m 
Services Fort Worth, Texas Harbour Industrial and general 
70155 Park accounting, Total no. of 
USA St. Michael marketing and employees 
management (1993) 
President: reporting, insurance 4,000 
Mr. Joe Atteridge Managing Director: claims processing. 
817 9633005 (tel) Mr. Vancourt Rouse 
809 429 7260 (tel) 
809 431 0060,809 
431 0497/98 (fax) 
86. Manufacturers Manufacturers Life Manufacturers Life insurance claims N. A. 
Life Insurance Insurance Company Insurance (Barbados) processing 
Company 200 Bloor St East Limited 
Toronto ON Harbour Industrial 
M4W IE5 Park 
Canada St. Michael 
President-International Managing Director: 
Operations: Mr. Paul Gilbert 
Mrs. Diana Schwartz 809 431 1940,1942 
416 926 0100 (tel) (tel) 
416 926 5454 (fax) 809 431 1949 (fax) 
87. Donnelley RR 777 W. Wacker RR Donnelley Pre-press and other Total assets 
& Sons Company Chicago Ilinois Barbados Limited print preparation (Dec. 1994) 
60601-1696 USA Wildey Industrial Park activities for book US$ 36,502.90 
St. Michael and magazine 
Vice President-New publishing Total no. of 
Technology: Managing Director: employees 
Mr. Gary Davis Mr. Jary Johnson (Dec. 1994) 
312 326 7721 (tel) 809 436 8910 (tel) 36,500 
809 436 8903 (fax) 
88. US Title 1000 North High International Data data entry services N. A. 
Company Street Services Limited for foreignreal estate 
Long View Texas Lower Broad Street companies 
75601, USA St. Michael 
President: Manager: 
Mr. Steven Mc Daniel Mrs. Cynthia 
903 753 9666 (tel) Chandler 
809 427 1869 (tel) 
89. The Polk 1621 18th Street NDL Interntional processing of Sales (1993) 
Company Suite 300 Barbados Limited warranty claims US$ 20.1 m 
Denver, Colorado Bush Hill, Garrison 
80202 USA St. Michael Total no. of 
employees 
Vice President, (1993) 
Operations: Managing Director: 550 
Mr. C. Connelly Ms. Karen Cominiello 
303 292 5000/5281 809 427 8142/436 
(tel) 0611 (tel) 
303 298 5488 (fax) 809 427 6610 (fax) 
90. Digital 1151 North Magnolia Offshore Keyboarding typesetting, data N. A. 
Imaging & Avenue Corporation entry, using scanned 
Technologies Anaheim, California Harbour Industrial information on a 
Incorporated 92801 USA Park spilt screen, data 
St. Michael entry of technical 
Chief Executive manuscripts 
Officer: Vice President: 
Mr. Richard Coleman Ms. Marietta Boozer 
714 229 9311 (tel) 809 429 4057/8 (tel) 
714 229 9316 (fax) 809 429 3072 (fax) 
91. Cirrus Logic 3100 West Warren Cirrus Logic data entry for parent Total Assets 
corporation Avenue International company (1995) 
Fremont, CA 94538 Building 6, US $ 918m 
USA Harbour Industrial 
Park 
President: St. Michael 
Mr. Uday Bellary 
501 623 8300 (tel) Managing Director: 
415 226 2220 (fax) Mr. Rodney Wing 
809 431 0945 
92. Worldwide 120-5900 #2 Road, International Direct Direct marketing Total assets 
Group of Richmond, British Marketing services (April 1995) 
Companies Columbia Building#4, US$ 673.53 m 
V7C 4R9 Wildey Industrial Park 
Canada St. Michael Total no. of 
employees 
President: General Manager: (April 1995) 
Mr. Al Moss Mr. Fred Collier 2331 
809 437 7760 (tel) 
93. Santype Netherhampton Road, Technotype typesetting N. A. 
International Salisbury, Wilts International 
Limited SP2 8PS Incorporated 
England Unit 4B, Building 5, 
Harbour Industrial 
Chairman: Mr. Harris Estate 
Dillon Bridgetown 
0722 334261 (tel) 
0722 333171 (fax) Director: 
John Shearn 
809 431 0968 (tel) 
809 431 0995 (fax) 
94. New American 1633 Broadway N. A. L. Data Services data processing N. A. 
Library New York NY 10019 Wildey Industrial Park 
St. Michael 
Vice President: 
Mr. Alan Kaufman General Manager: 
212 366 2000 (tel) Mr. Cecil Waithe 
212 366 2666 (fax) 809 429 7250 (tel) 
809 429 5861 (fax) 
95. Philip Karben 310 Madison Avenue Offshore Keyboarding data processing N. A. 
Corporation Suite 2100 Corporation 
New York NY 10016 Harbour Industrial 
Park 
President: St. Michael 
Mr. Phil Karben 
212 6971045 (tel) General Manager: 
212 8831149 (fax) Mr. Felton Burton 
809 429 4057 (tel) 
809 427 3072 (fax) 
96. G. W. E. 417-14th Street, N. W. Scandata Processing data entry N. A. 
Consulting #300 Calgary, Alberta Incorporated 
T2N2A1 6Unit3B 
Canada Harbour Industrial 
Park 
Vice President- St. Michael 
Corporate and 
Community Affairs General Manager: 
Mr. P. L. Miss Dawn Walters 
Wolstenholme 809 436 2414 (tel) 
403 283 7157 (tel) 809426 9022 (fax) 
403 270 4398 (fax) 
97. Cable & Mercury House I. Barbados External tele-communications Total Assets 
Wireless Limited 124 Theobalds Road Telecommunications (March 1994) 
London WC1X 8RX Ltd £7,816.4 m 
UK Wildey 
St. Michael Total no. of 
Director-Regional employees 
Business: General Manager: (Dec. 1994) 
Mr. Richard Wain Mr. Vincent 41,124 
Right-Lee Yearwood 
0171 3154000 (tell) 427 5200 (tel) 
427 5808 (fax) 
2. Barbados 
Telephone Company 
Limited 
Windsor Lodge 
Government Hill 
St. Michael 
Chief Executive: 
Mr. Trevor Clarke 
429 5050 (tel) 
98. Courts plc The Grange Courts Barbados furniture retail Total Assets 
I Central Road Limited Dec. 1994) 
Surrey Morden St. George Street £ (000's) 299,257 
SM4 5RX Barbados 
UK Total no. of 
Managing Director: employees 
Chief Executive Mr. Steve Marshall (Dec. 1994) 
Officer: 431 6850 (tel) 3,871 
Bruce Cohen 429 5445 (fax) 
0181 6403322 (tel) 
0181 5287505 (fax) 
99. Shell Shell Centre Shell Antilles & petroleum marketing Total Assets 
International London Guianas Limited (Dec. 1994) 
Limited SEI 7NA Mutual Building £ 69,135 M 
Collymore Rock 
OSC- Area Head St. Michael Total no. of 
Caribbean and Central employees 
America: General Manager: (Dec. 1994) 
Mr. J. Da Vries Mr. Tim Ford 106,000 
0171 2573000 (tel) 431 4800 (tel) 
100. Securior Securior Security Securior Barbados Security services N. A. 
International Services Miami Limited 
7959 NW 21 st Street White Path Road 
Miami Florida St. Michael 
33126 USA Barbados 
Mr. Simon Hornby General Manager: 
305 5929368 (tel) Mr. Michael Lashley 
305 592 3145 (fax) 431 3423/3316 (tel) 
427 6514 (fax) 
101. United UM Group Caribbean Antilles sugar production Total assets 
Molasses Dexter House Molasses Company (Sept. 1994) 
Company 2 Royal Mint Court P. O. Box 141 £ (000's) 5,806 
London EC3N 4PE Kengsenton? Court 
United Kingdom Fontabele St. Michael 
Barbados 
Divisional Trading 
Director: Managing Director: 
Mr. Nigel Cooper Mr. Ronnie Inniss 
0171 626 8700 (tel) 429 7209 (tel) 
0171 480 6611 (fax) 
102. UB Tingewick Road Berger Paints paints Total assets 
International Buckingham Barbados Limited (Dec. 1994) 
Limited MK18 IAN Brandons, St. Michael ý £(000's) 4,338 
UK 
General Manager: 
Group Secretary: Mr. Alfred St. John 
Mr. J. A. Melrose 425 9073 (tel) 
0128 0824240 (tel) 426 9075 (fax) 
0128 0815929 (fax) 
103. Bondhus 1400 Broadway Street Bondhus (Barbados) hard and edge tools, Sales 
Corporation East Limited hand tools (1993) 
Monticello MN Newton Industrial US$ 11.7m 
55362-9347 Park 
United States Christ Church Total no. of 
employees 
President: (1993) 
Mr. John Bondhus General Manager: 131 
612 295 5500,2162 Mr. Anthony Sobers 
(tel) 809 428 7735 (tel) 
612 295 4440 (fax) 809 428 3335 (fax) 
104. Barbados PO Box 283 Island Data Systems data processing N. A. 
Data Systems Elmont Letchwood Building 
NY 11003 Garrison, St. Michael 
USA 
President: Operations Manager: 
Mr. Mark Clarke Ms. Shirley Carter 
516 3528092 (tel) 809 436 1851 (tel) 
718 4375318 (fax) 809 429 1853 (fax) 
105. Intercable 650 W. 41st Avenue ICC Security System security devices N. A. 
Communications Suite 415 Newtown Industrial 
Vancouver BC Park 
V5Z2M9 Christ Church 
Canada 
General Manager: 
President: Mr. Wolfgang Nagy 
Mr. Michael 
Armoogan 809 428 2537 (tel) 
809 428 1438 (fax) 
106. Wacoal 136 Madison Avenue Atlantic ladies' bassieres, Sales 
America New York, NY 10016 Manufacturing ladies support briefs (1993) 
Incorporated United States Limited and panties US$ 30 m 
St. Lucy Industrial 
President: Park Total no. of 
Mr. Richard Murray Fairfield St. Lucy employees 
212 532 6100 (tel) (1993) 
212 696 5606 (fax) General Manager: 300 
Mr. Glyne Hinds 
809 439 8409 (tel) 
809 439 7944 (fax) 
107. Canadian Head Office, 9th Floor CIBC Trust and banking and Total assets 
Imperial Bank of Commerce Court Merchant Bank financial services (1995) 
Commerce West (Barbados) Limited US$179,244 M 
Incorporated Ontario ONT Masson Building 
M5L 1A2 Hincks Street Total no. of 
Canada PO Box 503 employees 
Barbados (1994) 
Vice President, Trade 40,807 
Finance Manager: 
David W. Robble Mr. Maurice Grant 
416 980 3933 (tel) 426 2740 (tel) 
416 363 4782 (fax) 
108. Conoco 600 North Dairy 1. Phoenix Park Propane, Butane and Total Assets 
Incorporated Ashford (41 % owned joint Natural Gas (Dec 1994) 
Houston TX 77079 venture) Production US$36,892 m 
USA Point Lisas Industrial 
Estate Number of 
Project Director: Savonetta Point Lisas employees 
Mr. Ravy Lagarde Trinidad and Tobago (Dec 1994) 
713 293 1000 (tel) 107,000 
713 293 1440 (fax) 
Mr. William Way 
(Managing Director) 
809 636 1522 (tel) 
809 636 6810 (tel) 
109. Nucor 2100 Rexford Road 1. Nucor Iron Carbide Iron Carbide Total Assets 
Corporation Charlotte, NC 28211 Incorporated Production (June 1994) 
United States (100% owned US$2001.92m 
subsidiary) 
Vice President- Monkey Point Road Number of 
Corporate Controller: Point Lisas Industrial employees 
Mr. Terry Lisenby Estate (June 1994) 
704 366 7000 (tel) Couva 5,900 
Trinidad 
Doug Schad (General 
Manager) 
809 636 1641 (tel) 
809 636 2627 (fax) 
110. Amoco Oil U. S. Regional Offices 1. Amoco Trinidad 1. Oil and Gas Total Assets 
Company Worldwide Ltd. Exploration. (Dec 1994) 
Exploration Business (100% owned US$29,316 m 
& International ý subsidiary) 
Operations Group TATIL Building Number of 
501 Westlake Park 11A Maraval Road employees 
Boulevard, Houston Port-of-Spain (Dec 1994) 
TX 77079 Trinidad and Tobago 35,664 
USA 
David Wright 
Manager- Planning (President and General 
and Economics: Manager) 
Mr. Murray Air 809 622 7331-9 (tel) 
713 366 2000 (tel) 809 628 5058 (fax) 
2. Altantic LNG (49% 
owned joint venture 
with British Gas, 2. Natural Gas 
Cabot and the Liquefied Plant. 
National Gas 
Company of Trinidad 
and Tobago) 
111. British Gas, Rivermill House 1. Altantic LNG (31 % Liquefied Natural Total Assets 
Plc 152 Grovenor RD owned joint venture Gas Production (Dec 1994) 
London with Amoco, Cabot £28,637 m 
SWI V3JN and the National Gas 
Company of Trinidad Total number of 
and Tobago) employees 
Algico Plaza (Dec 1994) 
91-93 St. Vincent 60,800 
Executive Assistant Street 
to Stephen Brendon: Port-of-Spain 
Mr. Richard Souchard Trinidad and Tobago 
0171 821 1444 (tel) 
0171 611 2001(fax) Martin J. Houston 
(General Manager) 
809 627 8106 (tel) 
809 627 8102 (fax) 
112. Cabot 75 State Street 1. Altantic LNG Liquefied Natural Total Assets 
Corporation Boston MA (10% owned joint Gas Production (Sep 1994) 
02109 venture with Amoco, US$1,616.76m 
United States British Gas and the 
National Gas Total number of 
Company of Trinidad employees 
President: and Tobago) (Sep 1994) 
Mr. Gordon Shearer 7th Floor, Maraval 5,400 
617 526 8300 (tel) Road 
617 526 8343 (fax) Port-of-Spain 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Mr. Ken Julien 
(Chairman) 
Mr. Gerald 
Peereboom (President) 
809 627 6976 (tel) 
809 628 4429 (fax) 
113. Arcadian 6750 Polar Avenue I. Arcadian Trinidad Ammonia and urea Total assets 
Partners Suite 600 Ammonia Limited Production (Dec 1994) 
Memphis, TN (100% owned US$ 1,048.73m 
38138-7419 subsidiary-acquistion) 
United States Goodrich Bay Road Total number of 
P. O. Box 201 employees 
Point Lisas, Couva (Dec 1994) 
Chief Financial Trinidad and Tobago 1,898 
Officier: 
Mr. Al Williams Mr. J. D. Campbell 
901 758 5248 (tel) (Chairman) 
901 758 5206 (fax) Mr. Nazir Khan 
(Managing Director) 
809 636 2200-2205- 
2010 (tel) 
809 636 2052 (fax) 
2. Trinidad and 
Tobago Urea 
Company (100% 
owned subsidiary- 
acquisition) 
Plipdeco House 
Goodrich Bay Road 
Point Lisas Industrial 
Estate 
Point Lisas 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Managing Director: 
Mr. Nazaar Khan 
809 636 8732-8734- 
8882 (tel) 
809 679 2811 (fax) 
114. Farmland 3315 North Oak Farmland MissChem Ammonia Total assets 
Industries Trafficway, Limited Production (Aug. 1994) 
PO Box 7305 (Joint venture with US$1,926.63m 
Kansas City MO Mississippi Chemicals 
64116 USA Corporation) Total employees 
(Aug. 1994) 
Executive Vice 11,000 
President: 
Robert Hause 
816 459 6415 (tel) 
816 459 5933 (fax) 
115. Mississipi Owen Cooper Farmland Misschem Ammonia Total Assets 
Chemical Administrative Limited Production (June 1994) 
Company Building US$298.43m 
Highway 49 East 
Yazoo City, MS Total employees 
39194 (June 1994) 
United States 960 
Vice President- 
Finance: 
Mr. Timothy Dawson 
601 746 4131 (tel) 
601 751 2912 (fax) 
116. Ferrostaal Ferrostaal AG 1. Caribbean Methanol N. A. 
AG 45116 Essen NW Methanol Company Production 
Germany Goodrich Bay Road 
Point Lisas Industrial 
Mr. Henning Estate 
0049 201 818 01(tel) Administrative Office 
0049 201 818 2822 Level 3 Colson Mall 
(fax) 11-13 Fredrick Street 
Port of Spain 
Trinidad 
Executive Director: 
Mr. Kirston Coombs 
809 636 3 153 (tel) 
809 679 3770 (fax)/ 
117. Helm, AG Address correction: 1. Trinidad and Methanol N. A. 
Postach 103060 Tobago Methanol Production 
20021 Hamburg Company 
Germany (Joint venture with 
Ferrostaal and the 
00 4940 23750 (tel) Government of 
00 49402375185 (fax) Trinidad and Tobago) 
Goodrich Bay Road 
Point Lisas Industrial 
Estate 
Point Lisas 
Trinidad and Tobago 
General Manager 
Mr. Ashram Beharry 
809 636 2906-09 (tel) 
809 636 4501 (fax) 
118. Norsk Hydro Bygdoy alle2 1. Hydro Agri Ammonia Total assets 
Postboks 2594 Trinidad Limited Production (Dec 1994) 
Solli, N-0203 P. O. Box 952 Nkr 93,749m 
Olso 2 Port of Spain 
Norway Trinidad and Tobago Number of 
(49 % owned employees 
Mr. Amt subsidiary-acquisition. (Dec 1994) 
Almendingen (Sr. The Government of 32,416 
Vice President) Trinidad and Tobago 
472 2432100 (tel) owns the remaining 
472 2432725 (fax) 51% share. ) 
Mr. Stenton Svendsen 
(President) 
809 636 2020/30 (tel) 
809 636 2073 (fax) 
2. Tringen I& 11 
(49% owned joint 
venture. The 
Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago 
owns the remaining 
51%). 
Point Lisas Industrial 
Estate. 
Point Lisas 
General Manager: 
Mr. Khem Jokoo 
809 636 2781/2,636 
2073 (tel) 
119. Methanex 1800 Waterfront 1. Caribbean Methanol Total assets 
Corporation Centre Methanol Company Production (Dec. 1994) 
200 Burrard Street (10% owned joint Can. $ 20,307,34m 
Vancover BC V6C venture with 
3M1 Canada Ferrostaal and Clico) 
Goodrich Bay Road 
President and C. E. O.: Point Lisas Industrial 
Mr. Pierre Chaquette Estate 
604 661 2600 (tel) Trinidad and Tobago 
604 661 2686 (fax) Executive Director: 
Mr. Coombs 
809 636 3153 (tel) 
809 679 3770 (fax) 
120. Ispat Berkeley Square Caribbean Ispat carbon steel billets, N. A. 
International House Limited carbon steel wire 
7th Floor (100% owned rod coils and direct 
Berkeley Square subsidiary-acquistion) reduced iron 
London W1X 5PM Iscott Complex P. O. 
Bag 476 Point Lisas 
Chairman: Couva 
Mr. Laskim Mittal Trinidad 
0171 629 7988 (tel) 
0171 629 7993 (fax) Mr. R. S. Misra 
636 2211/5 (tel) 
679 4483, 
636 5696(fax) 
121. Premier Oil 23 Lower Belgrave St. Premier Consolidated Mining and Total assets 
plc London SWI WONR Oilfields plc production (Dec. 1994) 
UK Forest Reserve Road £(000's) 274,600 
c/o Fyzabad Post 
General Manager- Office 
International Fyzabad 
Exploration: 
Steve Lowden Manager: 
0171 730 1111 (tel) Mr. Khamkarran 
0171 730 4696 (fax) Ablack 
677-7411 (tel) 
122. Exxon 396 Alhambra Circle Exxon Trinidad Petroleum and Total Assets 
Corporation Coral Gables Limited petroleum products (Dec. 1994): 
Florida 33134 6A Queen's Park US$ 87,862.00 
West 
Vice President- Port of Spain Total no. of 
Commercial Trinidad employees 
Mr. Paul Goldberg (Dec. 1994) 
305 441 6164 General Manager: 86,000 
Mr. Harland Johnson 
627 8910 (tel) 
627 8908 (fax) 
123. Enron Oil 333 Clay Street Enron Gas and Oil petroleum and Total Assets 
and Gas Company Suite 1709 Trinidad petroleum products (Dec. 1995) 
Houston TX Mutual Centre US$ 1,861.87 
77002 USA 16 Queen's Park West 
Port of Spain Total no. of 
Vice President-Central Trinidad employees 
America and the (Dec. 1995) 
Caribbean: General Manager: 650 
Mr. Jim O'hara Mr. Edward Freeburg 
713 853 6161 (tel) 622 8774/8653 (tel) 
628 4218 (fax) 
124. Texaco Inc. 150 Alhambra Circle Texaco Trinidad Worldwide Total Assets 
Coral Cables Incorporated exploration, (Dec. 1994) 
FL 33134 USA Fifth floor Tatil marketing of crude US $ 25,505.00m 
Building oil and its products, 
Manager-Caribbean: 11 Maraval Road petrochemicals Total no. of 
Mr. Ken Wolaham P. O. Box 872 employees 
305 446 2231 (tel) Port of Spain (Dec. 1994) 
29,713 
Mr. Rene Bucaram 
622 6014 (tel) 
622 7115 (fax) 
125. Tidewater 1440 Canal Street, Tide Water Marine Marine service& Total Assets 
Incorporated Suite 20100 West Indies Limited equipment to (March 1994) 
New Orleans PO Box 4053 companies engaged US$ 902.4m 
LA 70112 Mayaro in exploration, 
Trinidad development 
Treasurer: &production of oil, Total no. of 
Mr. Keith Lousteaux Managing Director: gas & minerals employees 
504 568 1010 (tel) Mr. Murray Noble (March 1994) 
504 566 4580 (fax) 6,870 
126. British Millbank West Indian Tobacco cigarettes and other Total Assets 
America Tobacco Knowlegreen Staines Company Ltd. tobacco and the (Dec. 1994) 
Company Limited Middlesex TW 18 Eastern Main Road provision of £(000's) 
1 DY Champs Fleurs financial and 40,230,000) 
UK or insurance services 
P. O. Box 177, Total employees 
Regional Manager- Port of Spain (Dec. 1994) 
Latin Trinidad 1,281 
America/Caribbean: 
Chris Button Managing Director: 
0178 4460400 (tel) Audley Walker 
0178 4455533 (fax) 662-2271/9 (tel) 
636-5451 (fax) 
127. Coates Immeuble le Diamant Coates Brothers printing ink Total Assets 
Lorilleaux SA 16 Rue De La (Caribbean) Ltd. (Dec. 1994) 
Republique Trinity Avenue £(000's)124,888 
92800 Pateaux France Laventille 
(P. O. Box 445) Total no. of 
Mr. Stewart Gerety employees 
313 1 41356900 (tel) Regional Manager: (Dec. 1994) 
3131 41356623 fax) Austin M. Greaves 1,281 
Tel. 623-4414,623- 
7792 
Fax: 624-5035 
128. Coats Cadena Santa Fe de Bogota Coats Trinidad sewing thread, Total Assets 
Office 155 Eastern Main clothing, home (Dec. 1994) 
Carrera 33 No. 15-66 Road furnishing, £ (000's) 
Santa Fe de Bogota Laventille fashionware, 2,069,100 
Columbia 
-1 
1 handknitting and 
South America General Manager: Mr. precision Total no. of 
Anthony Low. engineering employees 
Mr. Arthur Grosset 624-5763 (tel) products. (Dec. 1994) 
623-5619 (fax) 76,208 
129. Guiness Guiness Brewery Guinness (Caribbean) Production, Total Assets 
Brewery Worldwide Limited Ltd. distribution and (Dec. 1994) 
Worldwide Ltd. Sanctuary Center 29 Queen's Park West marketing of £(000's) 317,400 
4800 North Federal Port of Spain Guinness stout and 
Highway kaliber and supply Total no. of 
Suite 3068 Boca Senior Executive: of raw materials and employees 
Raton Mr. S. Hogg equipment to (Dec. 1994) 
Florida, 33431 USA 628 0483,0477 (tel) overseas breweries. 1,723 
622 3744 (fax) 
Regional Manager- 
Caribbean: 
Mr. John Davonport 
407 391 6290 (tel) 
407 391 2630 (fax) 
130. UB Tingewick Road Berger Paints Paints Total Assets 
International Buckingham (Trinidad) Limited (Dec. 1994) 
Limited MK18 lAN 1I Concessions Road £(000's) 4,338 
UK Sea Lots 
P. O. Box 546 
Group Secretary: Port-of-Spain 
Mr. J. A. Melrose 
0128 0824240 (tel) G. eneral Manager: 
0128 0815929 (fax) Mr. Selwyn Drayton. 
623-2231 (tel) 
624-7413 (fax) 
131. Bristol- PO Box 38707 Bristol-Myers (West Pharmaceuticals Total Assets 
Myers Squibb San Juan Puerto Rico Indies) Limited preparations, dry, (Dec. 1994) 
Company 00936 P. O. Box 1062 condensed diary US$ 12,910.00m 
Port of Spain products and 
polishes and Total no, of 
General Manger- Manager: sanitiation goods employees 
Puerto Rico and L. G. Assang (Dec. 1994) 
Caribbean: 625-7242 (tel) 6,732 
Mr. Carlos Jovel 675-7245 (fax) 
132. Bristows Aerodome British Caribbean Ltd. Petroleum Service Total Assets 
Helicopters Redhill Bretton Hall Contractors (Dec. 1994) 
Limited Surrey RHI 5JZ 16 Victoria Avenue £(000's) 81,293 
UK Port-of Spain 
Total no, of 
Regional Director: Managing Director: employees 
Mr. C. W. R. Fry Mr. Henry Boyt (Dec. 1994) 
01737 822353 (tel) 622-7367 (tel) 1,415 
623-1231 (fax) 
133. Fujitsu-ICL 5429 LBJ Freeway Futitsu-ICL Caribbean Computers and Total Assets 
Systems Suite 900 (T'dad) Limited Communication (Nov. 1994) 
Incorporated Dallas TX 75240 ICL House £(000's) 21,971 
46 Park Street 
P. O. Box 195 Total no. of 
President-Retail: Port-of-Spain employees 
Mr. R. H. E. Powell (Nov. 1994) 
716 8300 (tel) Caribbean General 575 
716 8586 (fax) Manager: 
Mr. Ian Galt 
Tel. 623-2826/8 
Fax. 623-4314 
134. Unilever Unilever International Lipton (Trinidad) Packaging of Total Assets 
International Market Development Limited beverages (Dec. 1994) 
Market Company 23 Bourne Road £ (000's) 29,892 
Development Grey Friars St. James 
Company Lewins Mead 
Bristol Managing Director: 
BSI 2JJ Mr. H. P Fitzwilliarn 
UK 622-1229 (tel) 
627-5659 (fax) 
Sales Support 
Manager: 
Allison Jackson 
01179 276276 (tel) 
135. Rentokil Felecourt Rentokil (Trinidad) Sanitary service, Total Assets 
Group plc East Grinstead Ltd. construction, (Dec. 1994) 
West Sussex I1 Picton Street chemicals and £(000's ) 125,112 
RH 19 2JY Newtown renting of movables. 
UK Total no. of 
Mr. Douglas Clarke employees 
Regional General 622-1327/3275/ (Dec. 1994) 
Manager: 6472 (tel) 7,702 
Mr. Nicholas Harding 622-5332 (fax) 
01342 833022 (tel) 
01342 326229 (fax) 
136. George Trading Address: Geo Wimpey Construction Total Assets 
Wimpey plc 26 Hammersmith (Caribbean) Ltd. Services (Dec. 1994) 
Grove Southern Main Road £ (000's) 
London Couva 1,224,100 
W6 7EN 
UK Managing Director: Total no. of 
Mr. Robin Crome employees 
Mr. A. C. Watt 636-2321 (tel) (Dec. 1994) 
0181 7482000 (tel) 636-2364 (fax) 11,347 
0181 7480076 (fax) 
137. Hilton I Wall Street Court Hilton International hotel operations Sales 
International New York, NY (Trinidad) (1993) 
10005-3302 Lady Young Road US$ 1.1 m 
Belmont 
212 973 2200 (tel) P. O. Box 442 Total no. of 
employees 
Manager: (1993) 
William Aguiton 49,690 
624 3211,3111 (tel) 
624 4485 (fax) 
138. Latin American Haliburton Trinidad Oilfield service Sales 
Haliburton Energy Region Limited engineering and (1993) 
Services Halliburton Centre P. O. Box 57 constructing service US$ 6.5 m 
Suite 2300 Coconut Drive 
5151 San Felipe Cross Crossing Total no. of 
Houston Texas San Fernando employees 
77056 United States (1993) 
Managing Director: 69,200 
Vice Mr. Joseph Nunes 
President/General 657 9181/4 (tel) 
Manager: 657 9185 (fax) 
Mr. Edgar Ortiz 
713 624 3320 (fax) 
139. Marketing & 9 Galena Road Turtle Beach Hotel hotel and personal Total assets 
Reservations Hammersmith Courland Bay services (Dec. 1994) 
International London £ (000's) 66 
Limited W6 OLT Managing Dirctor: 
Mr. Michael Green 
Mr. J. S. Penman or 639-2851 (tel) 
Mr. Robin Saunders 639-1495 (fax) 
0181 741 5333 (tel) 
140. Securior Securior Security Securior Trinidad Ltd. security services Total Assets 
International Services Miami 61-63 Edward Street (Sept. 1994) 
7959 NW 21st Street Port-of-Spain £ (000's)59,374 
Miami Florida 
33126 USA General Manager: Mr. Total no. of 
Brian Ramsey employees 
Mr. Simon Hornby 624-5741 (tel) (Sept. 1994) 
305 5929368 (tel) 627-3328 (fax) 43,508 
305 592 3145 (fax) 
141. Saatchi & PO 11905 Caparra Lonsdale/ Saatchi & advertising Total Assets 
Saatchi Heights Station Saatchi Advertising (Dec. 1994) 
San Juan 00922-1905 Limited £ (000's) 228,450 
Puerto Rico 8-10 Herbert Street 
St Clair 
Regional Manager: Port-of-Spain 
Mr. Jose Antonio 
Cabrera General Manager: 
212 4633346 (tel) Kenrick Attale 
212 4632089 (fax) 622- 6480 (tel) 
628- 2309,0210 (fax) 
142. American PO Box 619616 Piarco International commerical air Total Assets 
Airlines Dallas, Fort Worth Airport transport (Dec. 1994) 
Incorporated Airport Piarco US $19,486 m 
Texas USA 
Manager: Total no, of 
Senior Vice President: Wellesley Joseph employees 
Florida, Caribbean 664 3837 (tel) (Dec. 1994) 
and Latin America: 669 0261 (fax) 109,800 
Mr. Peter J. Dolara 
817 3351234 
143. Amerijet 498 SW 34 Street 30 Mc Donald Street air cargo services Sales (1993) 
International Fort Lauderale, FL Port of Spain US$ 27.6 m 
Group 33315 
General Manager: Total no. of 
Chief Financial Mr. Anthony Farfan employees 
Officer: 627 7668 (tel) (1993) 
Mr. Joseph Garvia 624 4088 (fax) 250 
305 359 0077 (tel) 
305 359 7866 (fax) 
144. Baker Oil Baker Hughes de Prince Charles Street oil equipment and Sales (1993) 
Tools Venezuela San Fernando supplies US$ 8.9 m 
AV. 66 Concalle 146- 
178 
Apartado Postal 1078 General Manager: 
Zona Industrial Mr. Joel Maingot 
Primera Estapa 657 8746 (tel) 
Maracaibo Venezuela 652 0159 (fax) 
Mr. Phillip Bogel 
011 5861 360 291 
(tel) 
011 5861 363 631 
(fax) 
145. Crown Cork 9300 Ashton Road Crown Cork and Seal manufacture of Total Assets 
and Seal Philadelphia, PA (West Indies) Limited metals and plastic (Dec. 1994) 
Incorporated 19136 Tumpuna Road packaging US$ 4,781.30m 
Arima 
Mr. James Bolton Total no. of 
215 698 5150 (tel) General Manager: employees 
215 676 9674 (fax) Mr. Robert Flook (Dec. 1994) 
643 2420 (tel) 22,373 
146. DHL 59 Pondsill Road 90 Independence international courier N. A. 
Worldwide St. Marten Square services 
Express Port of Spain 
Manager-Caribbean: 
Mr. Paul McCarthy General Manager: 
599 523 174 (tel) Mrs. Ann Marie Jean- 
599 542 960 (fax) Charles 
625 9535/9967 (tel) 
623 3783 (fax) 
147. Federal 2005 Corporate 31-33 Abercromby international courier Total Assets 
Express Avenue Street services (May 1995) 
Memphis, TN 38132 Port of Spain US$ 6,433.37m 
Chief Executive Manager: Total no. of 
Officer: Ms. Nisa Lau employees 
Mr. Fred Smith 625 2853/623 4070 (May 1995) 
901 395 3377 (tel) (tel) 69,000 
625 0118 (fax) 
148. General 110 S Hanger Drive General Aviation aviation services Sales (1993) 
Aviation Service Jackson, MS Services Limited US$ 4.5m 
Holdings 3920 Port of Spain Cruise 
Ship Complex 
Manager: PO Box 481 
Mr. Steve Wharton Woodbrook 
601 939 9366 (tel) 
601 939 81 19 (tel) Manager: 
L. Hospedales 
625 5551 (tel) 
624 3051 (fax) 
149. United Parcel 55 Glendale Parway 74 Wightson Road international courier Total Assets 
Services of Avenue Port of Spain services (Dec. 1994) 
America Altanta, Georgia US$ 11,182.40m 
30328 Managing Director: 
404 913 6000 (tel) Mr. Wayne Cheeting Total no. of 
627 4877/4895 (tel) employees 
627 8463 (fax) (Dec. 1994) 
320,00 
150. Bacon and St. Olaf House Bacon and Woodward actuarial services N. A. 
Woodrow London Bridge City and D'Souza 
London SEI 2PE P. O. Box 396 
UK 6A Queen's Park 
West 
Head- International Port of Spain 
Department: Trinidad 
Mr. Peter Mogan 
0171 357 7171 (tel) Manager: 
0171 716 7411 (fax) Mr. Tim Kimpton 
625 3626 (tel) 
151. Robert 25 Copthall Avenue Flemming Ansa merchant banking Total Assets 
Flemming & London EC2R 7DR Merchant Bank and financial (Dec. 1994) 
Company Limited UK TATIL Building services £ 000's)3,926,863 
1 Maraval Road 
Holding Board Port of Spain Total no. of 
Director: employees 
Mr. Lawrence Banks Senior Executive: (Dec. 1994) 
0171 6385858 (tel) Mr. Adam Hodgins 1087 
0171 5887219 (fax) 
152. Price Southwalk Towers Fl 4 Scotia Centre accounting, auditing Total Assets 
Waterhouse 32 London Bridge 56-58 Richmond and consultancy (June 1993) 
Street Street services £ (000's ) 65,396 
London SEI 9SY Port of Spain 
UK 
623 1319/2325/6475 
Secretary to Price (tel) 
Waterhouse World: 
Mr. Alan Peddle 
0171 939 3000 (tel) 
153. Johnson & I Johnson & Johnson Johnson & Johnson surgical, medical Total Assets 
Johnson Plaza (Trinidad) Limited and baby products (Dec. 1994) 
New Brunswick Churchill Roosevelt US$ 15,668m 
NJ 08933 USA Highway 
Trincity Total no. of 
Company Group P. O. Box 1140 employees 
Chairman: Port of Spain (Dec. 1994) 
Mr. Georgio Petronio 81,500 
201 524 0400 (tel) General Manager: 
C. Annandsingh 
645 3772/6 (tel) 
645 3777 (fax) 
154. Canadian Head Office, 9th Floor Bank of Commerce banking and Total Assets 
Imperial Bank of Commerce Court Henry Street financial services (1991) 
Commerce West Trinidad Can $ 179,244m 
Limited Toronto, ONT 
M5L 1A2 Total no. of 
Canada employees 
(1994) 
Vice President, Trade 40,807 
Finance: 
David W. Robble 
416 980 3933 (tel) 
416 363 4782 (fax) 
155. Shell Shell Centre Shell Chemicals & oil producers Total Assets 
International London Service (East (Dec. 1994) 
Limited SEI 7NA Caribbean) Limited £ 69,135m 
UK CHIC Building 
3rd Floor Total no, of 
OSC -Area Head 63 Park Street employees 
Caribbean and Central P. O. Box 1064 (Dec. 1994) 
America: 106,000 
Mr. J. Da Vries Manger: 
0171 2573000 (tel) Mr. Andrew Hepher 
623 4338 (tel) 
625 5476 (fax) 
156. Colgate- 300 Park Avenue Colgate Palmolive home products Total Assets 
Palmolive New York NY Caribbean (Dec. 1994) 
10022 Incorporated US$ 6,142.40 in 
El Socorro Extension 
Vice President-Latin Road Total no. of 
America: 2 San Juan employees 
Mr. Mike Tangney P. O. Box 661 (March 1994) 
213 310 2000 (tel) 32,800 
General Manager: 
Mr. Earle Govia 
638 4919,674 8823 
(tel) 
674 0683 (fax) 
157. Bank of 200 Portage Avenue 1. Bank of Novia financial services Total Assets 
Nova Scotia 3rd Floor Winnipeg, Scotia Trinidad and (1991) 
MAN R3C 3X2 Tobago Limited Can. $ 81 m 
Canada The Scotia Building 
56-58 Richmond Total no. of 
Vice President: Street employees 
Mr. Bryan Magwood Port of Spain (1994) 
204 985 3011 (tel) 33,098 
204 943 3971 (fax) Senior Executive: 
Ronald Chan 
625- 3566 (tel) 
627- 5278 (fax) 
2. Bank of Novia 
Scotia Trust Company 
of Trinidad & Tobago 
Limited 
Scotia Centre 
Building 
Corner Park and 
Richmond Street 
Port of Spain 
Senior Executive: 
Kazim Ali 
625- 3566 (tel) 
627-5278 (fax) 
158. Cable & Mercury House Telecommunications external Total Assets 
Wireless Limited 124 Theobalds Road of Trinidad and communications (March 1994) 
London Tobago Limited £ 7,816.4m 
WC 1X 8RX I Edward Street 
Port of Spain Total no. of 
Director-Regional P. O. Box 3 employees 
Busines (March 1994) 
Mr. Richard Wain Chief Executive Offi 41,124 
Right-Lee cer: 
0171 3 154000 (tel) Mr. Nigel Davis 
625 4431,627 
0854,624 5619 (tel) 
159. Courts plc The Grange Huggins Home retailers of Total Assets 
I Central Road Rurnishers Limited household consumer (March 1994) 
Surrey, Morden I Chacon Street durables on higher £(000s) 299,257 
SM4 5RX Port of Spain purchase terms 
Total no. of 
Chief Executive Managing Director employees 
Officer: Mr. Richard Coe (March 1994) 
Bruce Cohen 623 6060 (tel) 3,871 
0181 6403322 (tel) 623 5929 (fax) 
0181 5287505 (fax) 
160. Unilever plc Unilever House Lever Brothers (West household and Total Assets 
Black Friars Indies) Limited personal care (Dec. 1994) 
London Eastern Main Road products £ 17,995m 
EC4P 4BQ Champs Fleurs 
P. O. Box 295 Total no. of 
Commercial Officer- employees 
Latin America and Managing Director: (Dec. 1994) 
Central Asia: Gary Voss 304,000 
Mr. Christopher 663 1787 (tel) 
Jemmett 662 1780 (fax) 
0171 8225252 (tel) 
0171 8225951 (fax) 
161. Nestle S. A. Avenue Nestle Nestle Trinidad and beverages, milk Total Assets 
CH-1800 Tobago Limited products, prepared (Dec. 1994) 
Verey Switzerland P. O. Box 172 dishes, cooking fats Swiss francs 
Port of Spain and phar- 66,647 m 
Director-Zone 3: maceuticals 
Mr. Felix Braun Senior Executive: Total no. of 
0041 219243111 (tel) R. Frei employees 
0041 219241885 (fax) 663 6832/8 (tel) (Dec. 1994) 
663 6840 (fax) 209,755 
162. Electrolux S-105 45, Stockholm Lux Trinidad Limited white goods, Total Assets ( 
Sweden 25 Warner Street household Dec. 1994) 
Port of Spain appliances, SEK 84,183m 
Manager-Acquisition commerical 
and Mergers: General Manager: appliances and Total no. of 
Mr. H. Johannson Mr. Richard Correia consumer products employees 
00468 738 6477 (tel) 628 8347-9 (tel) (Dec. 1994) 
109,500 
163. WT Leon House WT Partnership construction and N. A. 
Partnership High Street (West Indies) Limited quantity surveying 
Croydon 155/157 Tragarete 
Surrey Road 
CR9 I YY Port of Spain 
Director: Construction Director: 
Management Mr. Peter V. Morris 
Division: 628 3608 
Mr. Tim Hill 
0181 686 0431(tel) 
164. Smithkline I Franklin Plaza Smithkline Beechan pharmaceuticals Total Sales 
Beechan Philidelphia, International (1993) 
International Pennsylvannia Algico Plaza US$ 5,056m 
PO Box 6929 Level 5 
91-93 St Vincent Total no. of 
President: Street employees 
Jerry Karabelas Port of Spain (1993) 
215 751 4000 (tel) 270,000 
215 751 3400 (fax) Mr. Luke De Gannes 
809 627 7294 (tel) 
809 623 7161 (fax) 
Sources: 
1. One Source. 
2. Data Stream. 
3. Dun & Bradstreet. 1995. Key British Enterprises, (United Kingdom: Dun & Bradstreet, 1995). 
4. Dun & Bradstreet. 1994. America's Leading Public and Private Companies, (United Kingdom: Dun & 
Bradstreet, 1994). 
5. Dun & Bradstreet. 1990. Hong Kong: SHK International Service Limited, (United Kingdom: Dun & 
Bradstreet, 1990). 
6. Major UK Companies Handbook. 1995. Volume I and II, (London: Financial Times Information Ltd., 1995) 
7. European Handbook, (London: Financial Times Information Ltd., 1995). 
8. Caribbean Exporters. 1993/1994. A Directory of Caribbean Exporters, (Barbados: CARICOM Export 
Development Project, 1993). 
9. Export Directory 1993-1994, (Trinidad: Trinidad and Tobago Export Development Corporation, 1994) 
10. Jamaica Promotions Corporation. 
11. Barbados Investment and Development Corporation. 
12. Trinidad and Tobago Tourism and Industrial Development Corporation. 
Appendix Tables 2-14. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables 
Table 2. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 1. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Responses Percentage of Total Responses 
Production Technology 51 58 
Marketing Strategy 37 47 
Managerial Skills 72 88 
Distribution Networks 45 69 
Brand Name 40 64 
Access to Finance 28 42 
Access to Raw Materials 34 52 
Product Differentiation* 26 52 
New Technology 11 45 
Notes: 1.1 hese values were ranked where the highest value was one and the lowest 11. The values of tour and less were 
used in calculating the frequencies of responses. 
2. * This variable was placed on a five point likert scale. Only the values 1 and 2 were used in the calculation of the 
frequencies. They represented the responses `very important' and `important'. 
Table 3. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variable of Hypothesis 2 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of 
Response 
Percentage of 
Total Responses 
Investment made influenced by investment made by competitors. 13 17 
Notes: These variables were placed on a five point likert scale. Only the values I and 2 were used in the calculation of 
the frequencies. They represented the responses `very important' and `important' 
Table 4a. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 3- 
The Decision to Establish Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of 
Responses 
Percentage of Total 
Responses 
Low cost labour 54 55 
Labour productivity 44 56 
Labour availability 47 60 
Level of unionisation 21 27 
Guaranteed market access 21 40 
Size of the domestic market 24 31 
Proximity to US market 33 42 
Proximity to Latin American market 18 23 
Firms in similar businesses 17 21 
Presenceof firms that supply machinery and equipment 5 6 
Presence of firms that supply raw materials 17 19 
Political stability 68 86 
Government committed to open market policies 53 67 
Priceof natural gas 16 46 
Efficient bureaucracy 37 47 
Efficient port service 32 42 
Efficient airline service 44 56 
Reliable telecommunications service 47 60 
Table 4b. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 3- 
The Decision to Continue Operations 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of 
Responses 
Percentage of Total 
Responses 
Labour cost 51 61 
Labour productivity 58 69 
Labour availability 51 60 
Level of unionisation 23 27 
Guaranteed market access 34 37 
Size of domestic market 40 51 
Proximity to US market 32 42 
Proximity to Latin American market 20 24 
Presence of firms in similar businesses 17 20 
Presence of firms that supply machinery and equipment 23 27 
Presence of firms that supply raw material 15 18 
Political stability 73 86 
Government committed to open market policies 58 68 
Priced natural gas 17 44 
Efficient bureaucracy 43 51 
Efficient port service 45 54 
Efficient airline service 52 63 
Reliable telecommunications service 60 71 
Notes: l hese variables were placed on a five point likert scale. Only the values i and 2 were used in the calculation of 
the frequencies. They represented the responses `very important' and `important' 
Table 5a. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 4- 
The Decision to Establish Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Responses Percentage of Total Responses 
Labour cost 44 55 
Productivity of labour 44 56 
Labour availability 47 60 
Levels of unionisation 21 27 
Price of natural gas 16 46 
Table 5b. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 4- 
The Decision to Continue Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Response Percentage of Total Responses 
Labour cost 51 61 
Productivity of labour 58 69 
Labour availability 51 60 
Levels of unionisation 23 27 
Price of natural gas 17 44 
Table 6a. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 5- 
The Decision to Establish Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Responses Percentage of Total Responses 
807 Programme l0 33 
807-A Programme 7 24 
CARIBCAN 5 18 
Lome 10 33 
Multifibre Agreement 2 8 
General System of Preferences 6 22 
CARICOM 12 40 
Table 6b. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 5- 
The Decision to Continue Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Responses Percentage of Total Responses 
807 Programme 9 29 
807-A Programme 8 26 
CARIBCAN 5 17 
Lome 11 34 
Multifibre Agreement 2 7 
General System of Preferences 6 22 
CARICOM 10 29 
Notes: These variables were placed on a five point likert scale. Only the values 1 and 2 were used in the calculation of 
the frequencies. They represented the responses `very important' and `important. ' 
Table 7a. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 6- 
The Decision to Establish Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Response Percentage of Total Response 
Export processing zones 12 17 
Table 7b. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 6- 
The Decision to Continue Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Response Percentage of Total Response 
Export processing zones 14 19 
Notes: These variables were piacea on a rive point iiKer< scare. vnly Lnc vatucs I au. u B WCI ubcu III uIC Loiucuiauuii ui 
the frequencies. They represented the responses `very important' and `important' 
Table 8a. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 7- 
The Decision to Establish Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Response Percentage of Total 
Responses 
Import duty concessions on raw materials 40 49 
Import duty concessions on machinery and equipment 49 59 
Repatriation of profits 63 76 
Repatriation of dividends 56 69 
Waiver of income tax on dividends 35 44 
Waiver of income tax on profits 29 36 
Industrial training grants 5 6 
Market development grants 14 18 
Tax holidays 33 40 
Table 8b. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 7- 
The Decision to Continue Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Response Percentage of Total 
Responses 
Import duty concessions on raw materials 39 47 
Import duty concessions on machinery and equipment 46 55 
Repatriation of profits 69 81 
Repatriation of dividends 63 75 
Waiver of income tax on profits 30 40 
Waiver of income tax on dividends 32 42 
Industrial training grants 7 9 
Market development grants 11 5 
Tax holidays 34 45 
Notes: These variables were placed on a five point likert scale. Unly the values 1 and 2 were used in the calculation of 
the frequencies. They represented the responses `very important' and `important' 
Table 9. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 8. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Responses Per centage of Total Responses 
Tariffs 33 38 
Quotas 18 22 
Import Licences 28 34 
Import Surcharges 29 36 
Stamp Duties 25 33 
Other Trade Restrictions 5 5 
Notes: These variables were placed on a live point nKert scale. uniy the values i ana z were uses in me caicuiation or 
the frequencies. They represented the responses `very important' and `important'. 
Table IUa. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 9- 
The Decision To Establish Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of 
Response 
Percentage of Total 
Responses 
Labour cost 44 55 
Productivity of labour 44 56 
Labour availability 47 60 
Levels of unionisation 21 27 
Price of natural gas 16 46 
Size of domestic market 24 31 
Proximity to US market 33 42 
Presence of firms in similar businesses 17 21 
Presence of firms that supply machinery and equipment 5 6 
Presence of firms that supply raw materials 17 19 
Political stability 68 86 
Government committed to open market policies 53 67 
Quality infrastructure 54 68 
Efficient bureaucracy 37 47 
Table 10b. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 9- 
The Decision To Continue Operations. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of 
Response 
Percentage of Total 
Responses 
Labour cost 51 61 
Productivity of labour 58 69 
Labour availability 51 60 
Levels of unionisation 23 27 
Price of natural gas 17 44 
Size of domestic market 25 32 
Proximity to US market 33 42 
Presence of firms in similar businesses 17 20 
Presence of firms that supply machinery and equipment 23 27 
Presence of firms that supply raw materials 15 18 
Political stability 73 86 
Government committed to open market policies 58 68 
Quality infrastructure 57 68 
Efficient bureaucracy 43 51 
Notes: These variables were placed on a five point likert scale. Only the values 1 and 2 were used in the calculation of 
the frequencies. They represented the responses `very important' and `important' 
Table 11. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 10. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Percentage of 
Response Total Responses 
Mode of investment influenced by output dedicated to foreign 
affiliates. (1) 20 26 
More than 25 per cent of output used by affiliates. (2) 17 57 
Notes (1) The variable was placed on a five point likert scale. Only the values t and 2 were used in the calculation of 
the frequencies. 
(2) This response was ranked from 0% to 100%. The values that were greater than 25% were used in the 
calculation of the frequencies. 
Table 12. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 11. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Percentage of Total 
Response Responses 
Number of years firm has been operating in the Caribbean. (1) 31 39 
More than 25 per cent of sales obtained in overseas 32 60 
markets. (2) 
Notes (I) The variable was placed on a five point likert scale. Only the values I and 2 were used in the calculation of 
the frequencies. 
(2) This response was ranked from 0% to 100%. The values that were greater than 25% were used in the 
calculation of the frequencies. 
Table 13. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 12. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Response Percentage of Total Responses 
Geographic proximity 28 36 
Language similarities 33 41 
Cultural similarities 20 25 
Notes: (1)i hese variables were placed on a five point likert scale, Only the values I and 2 were used in the calculation 
of the frequencies. 
Table 14. The Frequencies of the Key Explanatory Variables of Hypothesis 14. 
Key Explanatory Variables Frequency of Percentage of Total 
Response Response 
Mode of investment influenced by policy of government. (1) 39 58 
Changes in mode of investment because of government's policy. 15 65 
(2) 
Notes: (1) These variables were placed on a tine point liKert scale. unly the values i and L were used in the caicuiation 
of the frequencies. 
(2) The response to this question was either `yes' or `no'. The frequencies of the `yes' responses were used in 
the calculation of the frequencies. 
Appendix Figure 1. The Mailed Questionanaire That Was Sent To Executives At 
The Headquarters of the MNEs. 
Section 1 
This section seeks to determine the factors that motivated your firm to invest in the Caribbean. 
1. Does your firm benefit from the provisions of guaranteed market access offered under the following 
agreements? 
CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY 
1.807 of US harmonised tariff schedule .................... 1 
2.807A of US harmonised tariff schedule .................. 2 
3. CARIBCAN ............................................................ 3 
4. Lome ....................................................................... 4 
5. Multifibre Agreement ............................................. 5 
6. General System of Preferences ............................... 6 
7. CARICOM .............................................................. 7 
8. Other 
9. None ............. 
GO TO Q4....................................... 
8 
9 
In answering questions 2 to 5, use a range of one (1) to five (5), where `1' stands for very important and 15' 
stands for not important. Please circle the relevant number. 
2. How important were the agreements identified in Q1 to your decision to establish operations in the Caribbean 
over alternative locations? . 
Very Not 
Important Important 
I. 807 programme .................................................. 
2.807A programme ................................................ 
3. CARIBCAN ....................................................... 
4. Lome .................................................................. 
5. Multifibre Agreement ......................................... 
6. General System of Preferences .......................... 
7. CARICOM ......................................................... 
8. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4. 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
3. How important are the agreements identified in Q1 to your continued operations in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1.807 programme .................................................. 
2.807A programme ................................................ 
3. CARIBCAN ....................................................... 
4. Lome .................................................................. 
5. Multifibre Agreement ......................................... 
6. General System of Preferences .......................... 
7. CARICOM ......................................................... 
8. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
4. How important were the following factors to your decision to establish operations in the Caribbean over 
alternative locations? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. A reliable electricity supply ................................................ 
2. Competitive electricity rates ............................................... 
3. A reliable water supply ....................................................... 
4. Competitive water rates ...................................................... 
5. Favourable natural gas prices ............................................. 
6. Efficient telecommunication services ................................. 
7. Competitive rental rates for industrial buildings ................ 
8. Competitive rental rates for administrative buildings......... 
9. Efficient inland public transportation system ..................... 
10. Efficient bureaucracy 
........................................................ 
11. Efficient port services ....................................................... 
12. Efficient airline services ................................................... 
13. The presence of export processing zones .......................... 
14. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
l2 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
l2 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
5. How important are the following factors to your continued operations in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. A reliable electricity supply ................................................ 
12 3 4 5 
2. Competitive electricity rates ............................................... 
12 3 4 5 
3. A reliable water supply ....................................................... 
12 3 4 5 
4. Competitive water rates ...................................................... 
12 3 4 5 
5. Favourable natural gas prices .............................................. 
12 3 4 5 
6. Efficient telecommunication services ................................ 
12 3 4 5 
7. Competitive rental rates for industrial buildings ................ 
12 3 4 5 
8. Competitive rental rates for administrative buildings......... 12 3 4 5 
9. Efficient inland public transportation system ..................... 
12 3 4 5 
10. Efficient bureaucracy ........................................................ 
12 3 4 5 
11. Efficient port services ....................................................... 
12 3 4 5 
12. Efficient airline services ................................................... 
12 3 4 5 
13. The presence of export processing zones .......................... 
12 3 4 5 
14. Other (please specify) 
12345 
6. Who are your main competitors in the Caribbean market? 
CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY 
1. foreign firms .......................................... 1 
2. local firms ............................................. 
2 
3. none ...................................................... 
3 
7. Which of the following factors enable your firm to compete effectively in the Caribbean market? 
Please rank the factors in order of importance to your company. A rank of I represents the factor you consider 
most important to your company, a rank of 2 represents the factor you consider second most important, etc. A 
rank of 10 represents the factor you consider least important to your company. 
Factor Rank Order 
1. Production techniques 
2. Managerial skills 
3. Marketing skills 
4. Distribution networks 
5. Brand name product 
6. Access to finance 
7. Access to raw materials 
8. New technologies 
9. Other (please specify) 
In answering questions 8 to 13, use a range of one (1) to five (5), where `1' stands for very important and `5' 
stands for not important. Please circle the relevant number. 
8. How important were the following investment incentives to your decision to establish operations in the 
Caribbean over alternative locations? 
Very Important Not 
Important 
1. Tax holidays .................................................................. 
2. Import duty concessions on raw materials .................... 
3. Import duty concessions on machinery and equipment. 
4. Free repatriation of profits ............................................. 
5. Free repatriation of dividends ........................................ 
6. Waiver of income tax on dividends .............................. 
7. Waiver of income tax on profits ................................... 
8. Industrial training grants ............................................... 
9. Market development grants .......................................... 
10. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
9. How important are the following investment incentives to your continued operations in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. Tax holidays .................................................................. 
2. Import duty concessions on raw materials .................... 
3. Import duty concessions on machinery and equipment. 
4. Free repatriation of profits ............................................. 
5. Free repatriation of dividends ........................................ 
6. Waiver of income tax on dividends .............................. 
7. Waiver of income tax on profits ................................... 
8. Industrial training grants ............................................... 
9. Market development grants .......................................... 
10. Other (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
10. To what extent did the following factors influence you to establish operations in the Caribbean over 
alternative locations? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. Low cost, trainable labour .......................................................... 12 3 4 5 2. Levels of labour productivity ..................................................... 12 3 4 5 3. Labour availability ...................................................................... 12 3 4 5 4. Levels of unionisation ................................................................ 12 3 4 5 5. Guaranteed market access .......................................................... 12 3 4 5 6. Size of the Caribbean market ..................................................... 12 3 4 5 7. Proximity to US market .............................................................. 12 3 4 5 
8. Proximity to Latin American market .......................................... 12 3 4 5 9. Investment made by competitors in the Caribbean market........ 12 3 4 5 
10. The presence of firms in businesses similar to yours ............... 12 3 4 5 11. The presence of firms that supply requisite raw material........ 12 3 4 5 
12. The presence of firms that supply machinery and equipment.. 12 3 4 5 
13. Political stability ....................................................................... 12 3 4 5 
14. A government committed to open market policies .................. 12 3 4 5 15. Quality of infrastructure ........................................................... 12 3 4 5 16. Price of natural gas ................................................................... 12 3 4 5 
11. How important are the following factors to your continued operations in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. Low cost, trainable labour .......................................................... 12 3 4 5 2. Levels of labour productivity ..................................................... 12 3 4 5 3. Labour availability ...................................................................... 12 3 4 5 
4. Levels of unionisation ................................................................ 12 3 4 5 5. Guaranteed market access .......................................................... 12 3 4 5 6. Potential growth of the Caribbean market ................................. 12 3 4 5 
7. Proximity to US market .............................................................. 12 3 4 5 
8. Proximity to Latin American market .......................................... 12 3 4 5 
9. The presence of firms in businesses similar to yours ............... 12 3 4 5 
10. The presence of firms that supply requisite raw material........ 12 3 4 5 
11. The presence of firms that supply machinery and equipment.. 12 3 4 5 
12. Political stability ....................................................................... 12 3 4 5 
13. A government committed to open market policies .................. 12 3 4 5 
14. Quality of infrastructure ........................................................... 
12 3 4 5 
15. Price of natural gas ................................................................... 
12 3 4 5 
12. How important were the following trade restrictions to your decision to establish operations in the Caribbean 
over alternative locations? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
I. tariffs .............................................................................. 
12 3 45 
2. quotas ............................................................................. 
12 3 45 
3. import licences .............................................................. 
12 3 45 
4. import surcharges ................................ 
5. stamp duties ................................................................... 
12 3 45 
6. other (please specify) 
12345 
Section 2 
This section attempts to determine the factors that influence the mode of investment that you have used to enter 
the Caribbean market. 
13. When did you first start operations in the Caribbean? / 
month / year 
14. What mode of foreign investment did you use to enter the Caribbean market? 
CIRCLE ONE THAT APPLIES 
1. New wholly owned subsidiary ................................................. 1 
2. Wholly owned subsidiary gained through acquisition ............. 2 3. New 50-50 joint venture agreement ......................................... 3 
4.50-50 joint venture agreement gained through acquisition..... 4 
5. Other (please specify) 
5 
15. If it is possible, could you please indicate the approximate amount of investment involved in the initial venture 
identified in Q 15? 
16. How important were the following factors in influencing the mode of investment that your firm used in the 
Caribbean market? 
Please circle the relevant number 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. Number of years company has operated in foreign markets ............... 
2. Technology used in production of good or service ............................. 
3. Marketing strategy of firm (e. g. use of a brand name) ........................ 
4. The availability of established distribution networks .......................... 
5. Output dedicated to foreign affiliate .................................................... 
6. Language similarities between your country and the Caribbean......... 
7. Geographic proximity of the Caribbean .............................................. 
8. Policy of the Caribbean government (eg lsonforeign ow rip)... 
9. Culturally similarities .......................................................................... 
10. Other (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
17. Has there been any change in the proportion of equity held in the company subsequent to your entry into the 
Caribbean? 
yes .............................................................. 
1 
no ................ 
GO TO Q19......................... 2 
18. Which of the following factors have influenced the decision to alter the proportion of equity that you 
initially invested in your firm in the Caribbean? 
Please rank the factors in order of importance to your company. A rank of I represents the factor you consider 
most important while a rank of 2 represents the factor you consider second most important, etc. A rank of 10 
represents the factor you consider least important. 
Factor Rank Order 
1. Policy of Caribbean government ................................................ 
2. Changes in the business environment of the Caribbean............ 
3. Changes in the industry .............................................................. 
4. Corporate levels changes ............................................................ 
5. Other (please specify) 
19. Do you have affiliates (i. e. wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures) in the following regions? 
CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY 
1. Latin America ........................................ 
1 
2. United States ......................................... 
2 
3. Europe ................................................... 
3 
4. Asia ........................................................ 
4 
5. Africa ..................................................... 
5 
6. Middle East ........................................... 
6 
20. To the best of your knowledge, approximately what percentage of your total sales are obtained from your 
operations in overseas markets? 
1.0% .......................................................... 
1 
2.1-25% .................................................... 
2 
3.26-50% ................................................. 
3 
4.51-75% .................................................. 
4 
5.76-100% ................................................ 
5 
Section 3 
We would like to obtain some information ©} the person who is completing this ques i neat :. , _. 
1. Name of person completing questionnaire 
2. Position in company 
3. Telephone number 
4. Facsimile number 
Thank You! We sincerely appreciate your time and co-operation. Please ensure that you have not skipped any 
questions and return the questionnaire to the following address: 
Ms. Lou Anne Barclay 
Foreign Investment in the Caribbean Project 
Marketing and Strategic Department 
Warwick Business School 
The University of Warwick 
Coventry CV4 7ALUnited Kingdom 
Appendix Figure 2. The Mailed Questionnaire That Was Sent To Executives At 
The Subsidiiary Of The MNEs. 
Section 1 
This section seeks to determine the factors that motivated your firm to invest in the Caribbean. 
j. noes your term nenetlt from the provisions of guaranteed market access offered under the following 
agreements? 
CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY 
1.807 of US harmonised tariff schedule .................... 1 2.807A of US harmonised tariff schedule .................. 2 3. CARIBCAN ............................................................ 3 
4. Lome ....................................................................... 4 
5. Multifibre Agreement 
............................................. 5 6. General System of Preferences ............................... 6 7. CARICOM .............................................................. 7 
8. Other 
8 
9. None ............. GO TO Q4....................................... 9 
In answering questions 2 to 5, use a range of one (1) to five (5), where `1' stands for very important and `5' 
stands for not important. Please circle the relevant number. 
2. How important were the agreements identified in Q1 to your decision to establish operations in the Caribbean 
over alternative locations? . 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1.807 programme .................................................. 
2.807A programme ................................................ 
3. CARIBCAN ....................................................... 
4. Lome., .............. ....................... ......................... 
5. Multifibre Agreement ......................................... 
6. General System of Preferences .......................... 
7. CA RICOM ......................................................... 
8. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4. 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
3. How important are the agreements identified in QI to your continued operations in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1.807 programme .................................................. 
2.807A programme ................................................ 
3. CARIBCAN ....................................................... 
4. Lome .................................................................. 
5. Multifibre Agreement... ...................................... 
6. General System of Preferences .......................... 
7. CARICOM ......................................................... 
8. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
4. How important were the following factors to your decision to establish operations in the Caribbean over 
alternative locations? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. A reliable electricity supply ................................................ 2. Competitive electricity rates ............................................... 3. A reliable water supply ....................................................... 4. Competitive water rates ...................................................... 5. Favourable natural gas prices .............................................. 6. Efficient telecommunication services ................................. 7. Competitive rental rates for industrial buildings ................ 8. Competitive rental rates for administrative buildings......... 
9. Efficient inland public transportation system ..................... 10. Efficient bureaucracy ........................................................ 11. Efficient port services ....................................................... 12. Efficient airline services ................................................... 13. The presence of export processing zones .......................... 14. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
I2 3 4 5 
12345 
5. How important are the following factors to your continued operations in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. A reliable electricity supply ................................................ 2. Competitive electricity rates ............................................... 3. A reliable water supply. ........ ..................... ........... 4. Competitive water rates ...................................................... 5. Favourable natural gas prices .............................................. 6. Efficient telecommunication services ................................. 
7. Competitive rental rates for industrial buildings ................ 8. Competitive rental rates for administrative buildings.......,. 
9. Efficient inland public transportation system ..................... 
10. Efficient bureaucracy ........................................................ 
11. Efficient port services ....................................................... 
12. Efficient airline services ................................................... 
13. The presence of export processing zones .......................... 
14. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
6. Who are your main competitors in the Caribbean market? 
CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY 
1. foreign firms .......................................... 
1 
2. local firms ............................................. 
2 
3. none ...................................................... 
3 
7. Were you the first firm in your industry to enter the Caribbean market? 
yes .............................................................. 
1 
no ............................................................... 
2 
8. Which of the following factors enable your firm to compete effectively in the Caribbean market? 
Please rank the factors in order of importance to your company. A rank of I represents the factor you consider 
most important to your company, a rank of 2 represents the factor you consider second most important, etc. A 
rank of 10 represents the factor you consider least important to your company. 
Factor Rank Order 
1. Production techniques 
2. Managerial skills 
3. Marketing skills 
4. Distribution networks 
5. Brand name product 
6. Access to finance 
7. Access to raw materials 
8. New technologies 
9. Other (please specify) 
In answering questions 9 to 14, use a range of one (1) to five (5), where `I' stands for very important and `5' 
stands for not important. Please circle the relevant number. 
9. How important were the following investment incentives to your decision to establish operations in the 
Caribbean over alternative locations? 
Very Important Not 
Important 
1. Tax holidays .................................................................. 
2. Import duty concessions on raw materials .................... 
3. Import duty concessions on machinery and equipment. 
4. Free repatriation of profits ............................................. 
5. Free repatriation of dividends ........................................ 
6. Waiver of income tax on dividends .............................. 
7. Waiver of income tax on profits ................................... 
8. Industrial training grants ............................................... 
9. Market development grants .......................................... 
10. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
10. How important are the following investment incentives to your continued operations in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. Tax holidays .................................................................. 
2. Import duty concessions on raw materials .................... 
3. Import duty concessions on machinery and equipment. 
4. Free repatriation of profits ............................................. 
5. Free repatriation of dividends ........................................ 
6. Waiver of income tax on dividends .............................. 
7. Waiver of income tax on profits ................................... 
................................ 8. Industrial training grants ............... 
9. Market development grants, ......................................... 
10. Other (please specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
12345 
11. To what extent did the following factors influence you to establish operations in the Caribbean over 
alternative locations? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. Low cost, trainable labour .......................................................... 12 3 4 5 2. Levels of labour productivity ..................................................... 12 3 4 5 3. Labour availability ...................................................................... 12 3 4 5 4. Levels of unionisation ................................................................ 12 3 4 5 5. Guaranteed market access .......................................................... 12 3 4 5 6. Size of the Caribbean market ..................................................... 12 3 4 5 7. Proximity to US market ................................................... ........... 12 3 4 5 8. Proximity to Latin American market .......................................... 12 3 4 5 9. Investment made by competitors in the Caribbean market........ 12 3 4 5 
10. The presence of firms in businesses similar to yours ............... 12 3 4 5 11. The presence of firms that supply requisite raw material........ 12 3 4 5 
12. The presence of firms that supply machinery and equipment., 12 3 4 5 
13. Political stability ....................................................................... 12 3 4 5 14. A government committed to open market policies., .... ...... 12 3 4 5 15. Quality of infrastructure ........................................................... 12 3 4 5 16. Price of natural gas ................................................................... 12 3 4 5 
12. How important are the following factors to your continued operations in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. Low cost, trainable labour .......................................................... 12 3 4 5 2. Levels of labour productivity ..................................................... 12 3 4 5 3. Labour availability ...................................................................... 12 3 4 5 
4. Levels of unionisation ................................................................ 12 3 4 5 5. Guaranteed market access .......................................................... 12 3 4 5 
6. Potential growth of the Caribbean market ................................. 12 3 4 5 
7. Proximity to US market .............................................................. 12 3 4 5 8. Proximity to Latin American market .......................................... 12 3 4 5 9. The presence of firms in businesses similar to yours ............... 12 3 4 5 10. The presence of firms that supply requisite raw material........ 12 3 4 5 
11. The presence of firms that supply machinery and equipment.. 12 3 4 5 
12. Political stability ....................................................................... 12 3 4 5 
13. A government committed to open market policies .................. 12 3 4 5 
14. Quality of infrastructure ........................................................... 12 3 4 5 
15. Price of natural gas ................................................................... 
12 3 4 5 
13. How important were the following trade restrictions to your decision to establish operations in the Caribbean 
over alternative locations? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
I. tariffs .............................................. 
2. quotas ............................................. 
3. import licences ................................ 
4. import surcharges ................. 
5. stamp duties .................................... 
6. other (please specify) 
................................ 
12 3 4 5 
................................ 
12 3 4 5 
.............................. 
12 3 4 5 
................................ 
12 3 4 5 
.............................. 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
13. To what extent do you use product differentiation as a marketing strategy in the Caribbean? 
Very Not 
Important Important 
The use of product differentiation as a marketing strategy 12245 
Section 2 
This section attempts to determine the factors that influence the mode of investment that you have used to enter 
the Caribbean market, 
15. When did you first start operations in the Caribbean? I 
month / year 
16. What mode of foreign investment did you use to enter the Caribbean market? 
CIRCLE ONE THAT APPLIES 
1. New wholly owned subsidiary ................................................. 1 
2. Wholly owned subsidiary gained through acquisition ............. 2 
3. New 50-50 joint venture agreement ......................................... 
3 
4.50-50 joint venture agreement gained through acquisition..... 4 
5. Other (please specify) 
5 
17. If it is possible, could you please indicate the approximate amount of investment involved in the initial venture 
identified in Q16? 
18, How important were the following factors in influencing the mode of investment that your firm used in the 
Caribbean market? 
Please circle the relevant number 
Very Not 
Important Important 
1. Number of years company has operated in foreign markets ............... 
2. Technology used in production of good or service ............................ 
3. Marketing strategy of firm (e. g. use of a brand name) ....................... 
4. The availability of established distribution networks ......................... 
5. Output dedicated to foreign affiliate ................................................... 
6. Language similarities between your country and the Caribbean........ 
7. Geographic proximity of the Caribbean ............................................. 
8. Policy of the Caribbean government (eg lsonfoiign owner iip)... 
9. Culturally similarities ......................................................................... 
10. Other (please specify) 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
12345 
19. Has there been any change in the proportion of equity held in the company subsequent to your entry 
into the 
Caribbean? 
yes ............................................................. 
1 
no ................ 
GO TO Q21.......... ,.,.,,,..,..... 
2 
20. Which of the following factors have influenced the decision to alter the proportion of equity that you 
initially invested in your firm in the Caribbean? 
Please rank the factors in order of importance to your company. A rank of I represents the factor you consider 
most important while a rank of 2 represents the factor you consider second most important . etc. A rank of 10 
represents the factor you consider least important. 
Factor 
1. Policy of Caribbean government ............................................ 
2. Changes in the business environment of the Caribbean......... 
3. Changes in the industry .......................................................... 
4. Corporate levels changes ........................................................ 
5. Other (please specify) 
Rank Order 
21. To the best of your knowledge, what percentage of your firm's output is used by other firms that are owned by 
your parent company) 
1.0% 
2.1-25% .................................................... 
2 
3.26-50% .................................................. 
3 
4.51-75% .................................................. 
4 
5.76-100% ................................................ 
5 
Section 3 
We would like to obtain some information on the person who is completing this cloe io ;_>:.: 
1. Name of person completing questionnaire 
2. Position in company 
3. Telephone number 
4. Facsimile number 
Thank You! We sincerely appreciate your time and co-operation. Please ensure that you have not skipped any 
questions and return the questionnaire to the following address: 
Ms. Lou Anne Barclay 
Foreign Investment in the Caribbean Project 
Marketing and Strategic Department 
Warwick Business School 
The University of Warwick 
Coventry CV4 7AL 
United Kingdom 
Alternatively, you may fax your response to 44 1203 524 650 
Figure 3 The Questionnaire Administered To The Executives of MNEs Used For 
The Case Studies 
1. Where did your company first learn about this country as a potential site for locating its 
operations? 
2. What are the unique advantages that this country possesses over all other competing 
locations? 
3. What are the main reasons for your locating operations in this country? 
4. How do your operations in this country assist with enhancing and maintaining the 
international competitiveness of your parent company? 
S. What specific capabilities does your company possess that allow it to operate more 
effectively than other firms in similar businesses in this country? 
Do you believe that you have any serious competitors in this country? If not, who are your 
major competitors and where are they located? 
6. Do you benefit from any of the preferential trading agreements that the country enjoys 
with the United States, the European Union and Canada? 
If so, how important are these preferential trading agreements to your company's continued 
operations in this country? 
7. Were you the first firm in your industry to operate in this country? 
If you were not, was your investment in this country influenced by the actions of your 
competitors? 
8. How important was the price of natural gas or the cost, availability and productivity of 
labour to your firm's decision to locate its operations in this country? 
Is the cost of this factor critical to your company's continued international competitiveness? 
9. Is the quality of the country's industrial infrastructure satisfactory to your company's 
needs? 
In what areas do you believe the services to be unsatisfactory? 
10. What elements of the investment incentive package offered by the governments are 
attractive to your company? 
11. Have you used the services of the organisations designed to promote investment in this 
country? 
Were you satisfied with the services provided by these organisations? 
12. Do you use the services of any other local companies in this country? 
If so, for what activities? 
Are you satisfied with the quality of service provided by these local companies? 
13. What factors influenced the proportion of equity that your company was willing to 
commit to its venture in Trinidad? 
14. What is the future of your company in this country? 
Appendix Figure 4. The Stakeholders Interviewed 
Jamaica: 
Jamaica Promotions Corporation 
" Mrs. Patricia Francis, President, Jamaica Promotions Corporation. Interview was 
conducted on 19 September 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
" Mrs. Pottinger, Senior Vice President-Strategic Planning, Jamaica Promotions 
Corporation. Interview was conducted on 19 September 1996 in Kingston, 
Jamaica. 
" Mr. Junior Lodge, Marketing Manager, Jamaica Promotions Corporation. 
Interview was conducted on 25 April 1997 in London, UK. 
Kingston Free Zone Authority 
" Ms. Andrea Philips, Manager, Client Services and Marketing, Kingston Free Zone 
Authority. Interview was conducted on 16 September 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce 
" Ms. Forbes, Senior Civil Servant, Ministry of Industry, Investment and 
Commerce. Interview was conducted on 26 September 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
Human Employment and Resource Training Trust of Jamaica 
" Mr. Robert Gregory, Executive Director, Human Employment and Resource 
Training. Interview was conducted on 17 September 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
" Ms. Delores 0' Connor, Director of the Academies, Human Employment and 
Resource Training. Interview was conducted on 18 September 1996 in Kingston, 
Jamaica. 
" Ms. Grace Mc Clelland, Director of GAMEX, Human Employment and Resource 
Training. Interview was conducted on 26 September 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
Montego Bay Free Zone Complex 
" Mr. Owen Higgins, General Manager of Montego Bay Free Zone Company. 
Interview was conducted on 24 September 1996 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. 
The Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
" Mr. James Moss-Solomon, President, 
Jamaica Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce. Interview was conducted on 2 October 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
Locally-owned apparel firm-Taylor Group of Companies 
" Ms. Campbell, Marketing Manager, Taylor Group of Companies. Interview was 
conducted on 28 September 1996. (Telephone interview). 
Barbados: 
Barbados Investment and Development Corporation 
" Ms. Peggy Griffith, Director, International Business, Barbados Investment and 
Development Corporation. Interview was conducted on 5 September 1996 in 
Bridgetown, Barbados 
" Mr. Lavine, Director, Research, Planning and Information, Barbados Investment 
and Development Corporation. Interview was conducted on 21 August 1996 in 
Bridgetown, Barbados. 
" Mr. Kenneth Campbell, First Secretary-Commercial, Barbados Investment and 
Development Corporation. Interview was conducted on 5 May 1997 in London, 
UK. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Business 
" Senator Philip Goddard, Minister in the Ministry of International Trade and 
Business, Barbados. Interview was conducted on 26 August 1996 in Bridgetown, 
Barbados. 
Computer Department, The University of the West Indies 
" Mr. Stewart Bishop, Lecturer, Computer Department, The University of the West 
Indies, Barbados. Interview was conducted on 26 August 1996 in Cavehill, 
Barbados. 
" Mr. David Trotman, Lecturer, Computer Department, The University of the West 
Indies, Barbados. Interview was conducted on 26 August 1996 in Cavehill, 
Barbados. 
" Prof. Haggar, Consultant, Computer Department, The University of the West 
Indies, Barbados. Interview was conducted on 4 September 1996 in Cavehill, 
Barbados. 
" Dr. Gladstone Best, Senior Tutor, Computing Department, Barbados Community 
College. Interview was conducted on 27 August 1996 in St. Michael, Barbados. 
Private Consultant 
Mr. Hallam Hope, Consultant, CARITEL, Barbados. Interview was conducted on 
31 August 1996 in St. Michael, Barbados. 
Barbados External Communication Limited 
" Mr. Tony Haynes, Barbados External Communication Limited. Interview was 
conducted on 4 September 1996 in St. Michael, Barbados. (telephone interview). 
Barbados Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
" Ms. Caroline Charles, Administrative Assistant, Barbados Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry. Interview was conducted on 30 August 1996 in Bridgetown, 
Barbados. 
Locally owned firms 
" Mr. Michael Armstrong, General Manager, Caribbean Data Services, Barbados. 
Interview was conducted on 15 August 1996 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
" Mr. John R. Gibbs, Director, Information Technology Services, SCL Systems 
Caribbean Limited. Interview was conducted on 29 September 1996 in 
Bridgetown, Barbados. 
Trinidad-Tobago: 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Consumer Affairs 
" Mr. Mervin Assam, Minister, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Consumer Affairs, 
Trinidad and Tobago. Interview was conducted on 31 July 1996 in Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad. 
" Mr. Neville Blake, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Consumer Affairs, Trinidad and Tobago. Interview was conducted on 5 August 
1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
" Mr. Wayne Punnett, Senior Policy Adviser in the Ministry of Industry Trade and 
Consumer Affairs, Trinidad and Tobago. Interview was conducted on 5 August 
1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
Trinidad and Tobago Tourism and Industrial Development Corporation 
" Mr. Andre-Vincent Henry, Vice President, Trinidad and Tobago Tourism and 
Industrial Development Corporation. Interview was conducted on 10 October 
1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
" Mr. Brian De Ferreire - Manager, Investor Promotions, Trinidad and Tobago 
Tourism and Industrial Development Corporation. Interview was conducted on 17 
July 1997 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago 
" Mr. Gregory Mc Guire, Manager- Strategic Planning and Marketing, National Gas 
Company of Trinidad and Tobago Interview was conducted on 8 August 1996 in 
Point Lisas, Trinidad. 
" Mr. Mark Hamilton, Project Officer, National Gas Company of Trinidad and 
Tobago. Interview was conducted on 17 October 1996 in Point Lisas, Trinidad. 
Point Lisas Industrial Port Development Corporation Limited 
" Mr. Neil Rolingson, Chief Executive Officer, Point Lisas Industrial Estate Port 
and Free Zone of Trinidad and Tobago. Interview was conducted on 17 October 
1996 in Point Lisas, Trinidad. 
National Skills Development Programme 
" Mr. Rudy Serrette, Former Officer, National Skills Development Programme of 
Trinidad and Tobago. Interview was conducted on 17 October 1996 in Point 
Lisas, Trinidad. 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
" Mr. Michael Arneaud, President of Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce. Interview was conducted on 18 October 1996 in Tunapuna, Trinidad. 
Local Partner of Joint Venture Agreement- CL Financial Limited 
" Mr. Keston Coombs, Executive Director, Caribbean Methanol Company and 
Clico Energy. Interview was conducted on 18 July 1996 in Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad. 
Appendix Figure 5. List of Managers Interviewed For The Case Studies 
Jamaica: 
1. Tutlex Corporation 
" Mr. Jim Edward, Manager of the subsidiary, Akom Corporation. Interview was 
conducted on 24 September 1996 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. 
" Mr. Jim Slead, Vice President-Marketing, Tultex Corporation. Interview was 
conducted on 28 October 1996, in Martinsville, Virginia, USA. (telephone 
interview). 
" Mr. Leon Eschenback, Vice President-Operations, Tutlex Corporation. Interview 
was conducted on 15 April 1997. (telephone interview). 
2. Maidenform Worldwide Incorporated 
" Mr. Harold Dougan, Managing Director of subsidiary, Jamaica Needlecraft 
Limited. Interview was conducted on 16 September 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
" Mr. A. Trent, Assistant Managing Director of subsidiary, Jamaica Needlecraft 
Limited. Interview was conducted on 16 September 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
3. Jockey International Incorporated 
" Mr. Paul Ramsour, Manager of subsidiary, Jockey Jamaica Limited. Interview was 
conducted on 24 September 1996 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. 
" Mr. Bob King, Public Relations Officer, Jockey International Incorporated. 
Interview was conducted on 31 October 1996 in Kenosha, Wisconsin, USA. 
(telephone interview). 
Second interview was conducted on 16 April 1997 in Kenosha, Wisconsin, USA. 
(telephone interview). 
4. Apparel Contractors Association Incorporated 
" Mr. R. Rodriguez, Managing Director of Yoffi Industries Limited. Interview was 
conducted on 14 September 1996 in Kingston, Jamaica. 
" Ms. Vivian Melindez, Personal Assistant to President, Apparel Contractors 
Incorporated. Interview was conducted on 25 September 1996 in Kingston, 
Jamaica. 
" Mr. Allen Klinger, President of Apparel Contractors Incorporated. Interview was 
conducted on 4 November 1996 in Manhattan, New York, USA. 
Barbados: 
AMR Corporation 
" Mr. Vancourt Rouse, Managing Director, Caribbean Data Services. Interview was 
conducted on 23 August 1996 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
" Mr. Tom Laughlin, Vice President, Data Management Services. Interview was 
conducted on 30 October 1996 in Fort Worth, Texas. (telephone interview). 
Digital Imaging and Technologies Incorporated 
" Mr. Felton Burton, Managing Director, Offshore Keyboarding. Interview was 
conducted on 30 August 1996 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
" Ms. Caroline Husbands, Assistant Manager, Offshore Keyboarding. Interview was 
conducted on 19 August 1996 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
Second interview was conducted on 1 June 1997 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
(telephone interview) 
" Mr. Shane Lynagh, Senior Vice President-Operations, Digital Imaging and 
Technologies Incorporated. Interview was conducted on 19 August 1996 in 
Bridgetown, Barbados. 
PRT Corporation of America 
" Mr. Srinivasan Viswanathan, President, Total Technologies Solutions Limited. 
Interview was conducted on 30 August 1996 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
" Mr. Douglas Mellinger, President, The PRT Corporation. Interview was 
conducted on 28 October 1996 in New York, USA. 
Santype International Limited 
" Mr. John Shearn, Managing Director, Technotype International Limited. Interview 
was conducted on 20 August 1996 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
Ms. Cheryl Williams, Assistant Manager, Technotype International Limited. 
Interview was conducted on 23 August 1996 in Bridgetown, Barbados. 
" Mr. Dillion Harris, Managing Director, Santype International Limited. Interview 
was conducted on 20 November 1966 in Salisbury, UK. 
Second interview was conducted on 1 June 1997 in Salisbury, UK. 
Trinidad-Tobago: 
Atlantic LNG Company of Trinidad and Tobago 
" Mr. Gordon Shearer, President, Cabot LNG. Interview was conducted on 23 
October 1996 in Boston, USA. 
" Mr. Steven Haynes, Vice President-Finance and Administration, Atlantic LNG. 
Interview was conducted on 26 July 1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
" Mr. Barry Cohen, Comptroller, Amoco Trinidad Oil Company. Interview was 
conducted on 26 July 1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
" Mr. Dave Pakaj, Comptroller, Amoco Trinidad Oil Company. Interview was 
conducted on 26 July 1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
Second interview conducted on 11 October 1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
" Mr. Aneal Maharaj, Vice President-Finance, Amoco Trinidad Oil Company. 
Interview was conducted on 11 October 1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
Arcadian Corporation 
" Mr. Prakash Boochon, Public Relations Officer, Arcardian Trinidad. Interview 
was conducted on 24 July 1996 in Point Lisas, Trinidad. 
" Mr. John Hunt, Director-Investor Relations, Arcardian Corporation. Interview was 
conducted on 18 November 1996 in Memphis, Tennessee, USA. (telephone 
interview). 
Caribbean Methanol Company Limited 
" Mr. Erwin Keutner, Project Manager, Ferrostaal AG. Interview was conducted on 
26 July 1996 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. 
" Mr. Ron Britten, Vice President-Operations, Methanex Corporation. Interview 
was conducted on 18 November 1996 in Calgary, Canada. (telephone interview). 
Ispat Group of Companies 
" Mr. R. S. Misra, Managing Director, Caribbean Ispat Limited. Interview was 
conducted on 23 July 1996 in Point Lisas, Trinidad. 
" Ms. Annanya Sen, Public Relations Officer, Ispat Group of Companies. Interview 
was conducted on 18 November 1996 in London, UK. 
